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Trade Union Power in the 1990s: a case study
Abstract
The Conservative governments of 1979-1997 were determined to reduce
what they saw as "excessive union power". A succession of Employment
and Trade Union Acts designed to undermine collective organisation and
therefore trade union power were passed. The common perception tends
to be that trade union power has been severely curtailed; however, some
researchers suggest that very little has changed on the shopfloor. The main
aim of the research was to ascertain what trade union members thought
about the power of their trade unions. The focus of the study was on the
local and workplace union organisations of the ABEU and UNISON. The
research involved a case study approach. Data was obtained through the
use of observation, interviews, questionnaires and the analysis of
documentary evidence. It is concluded that trade union power is still a
reality in the 199Os, though that power may be looked upon differently
depending whether the focus is on unions at a national level or within the
workplace. National unions may have changed but workplace
organisations appear to remain much the same as they always have; some
workplace organisations are effective and others do not appear to be as
successful at achieving their aims. The success of workplace trade
unionism is dependent upon the personalities and styles of working of the
lay representatives. The legislation appears to have had little effect on
independent workplace union organisations, though claims that the
legislation had reduced trade union power appear to have been taken at face
value, even by union members. As long as effective lay representatives
are forthcoming there is no reason why unions at workplace level should
not continue protecting their members' interests well into the 21st century.
Sharon Blank
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CHAPTER I TRADE UNION POWER IN THE 1990s
1:1 Introduction
The issue of trade union power was one of the central features of the Conservative
Party's election campaign in 1979. They argued that trade unions had too much power
and were a major force driving up wages, leading to higher prices and therefore
inflation, which in turn reduced competition and increased unemployment.
"Excessive union power" was seen as the main obstacle blocking the aim of
restructuring the economy and creating a free and unconstrained labour and product
market.
The Conservative's approach towards trade unions was part of their overall desire to
establish "the market principle" into most aspects of society. Free market theory
advocates that everything is determined "naturally"; that is, that the system, whether
health care, the labour market or the education system for example, will work most
efficiently if left to its own devices; any form of state intervention is seen as
unnecessary and counter productive. The key words were individual choice and
personal responsibility; any form of collectivism was to be changed so that each
individual company or workplace and each individual within it were to be working in
competition with each other. In essence immediate self-interest was seen as taking
precedent over any long term interests of those concerned. Trade unions were viewed
as imposing constraints on the free enterprise basis on which businesses should
operate; low productivity and poor efficiency were seen as a result of union
interference in the employer's "right to manage". Therefore, trade unions had to be
curtailed so that firms could gain higher productivity and only pay wages which
matched the market value of their products.
The newly elected Conservative government led by Mrs Thatcher was determined to
prevent a recurrence of the so-called "Winter of Discontent", a particularly strike prone
winter, which, among other things, in some areas left rubbish on the streets and the
dead unburied. The winter of 1978n9 had enabled the Conservatives to claim in their
1979 election manifesto that union reform was essential to prevent situations like that
happening again and perhaps aided their aim to create a labour market and business
culture based on free market doctrines. To avoid the mistake made by the Heath
administration in 1971 of attempting to do too much in one go a succession of
Employment and Trade Union Acts designed to reduce the perceived "power" of trade
unions were passed. Mrs Thatcher's government's two main aims were to empower
employers to resist trade union industrial power and to encourage individualistic rather
than solidaristic behaviour among workers.
In effect, much that was put into statute to help employers was already available to
them at common law, but the legislation provided them with a quicker route to
10
preventing "abuses" of union power. However, in a different vein the government
envisaged that by encouraging individualistic behaviour among employees union
power would be undermined. As well as giving individual members rights against
their union, employers were encouraged to treat their workers as individuals, rather
than deal with them as a collective: "The most important challenge for employers in
the 1990s will be to learn to deal with their employees as individuals ...."1 Rather
than all workers doing the same job within a workplace having the same contract of
employment individual contracts were encouraged, and where implemented this
change could pitch worker against worker removing any solidarity of the workgroup
and thereby reducing union power in the workplace. It appears that union members
were seen as needing protection from the very organisations that were designed to
advance and protect their interests2, but any imbalance of power between employers
and employees was ignored. This was one of the major reasons why unions
developed in the first place; one rationale of collective bargaining is to even up the
imbalance of power between workers and their employers. The 1906 Trade Disputes
Act, which gave trade unions almost blanket immunity from civil liabilities in tort, had
been passed in order to allow unions to exert their bargaining power against
employers. The overall advantage was once again being encouraged to lie with
employers.
Many of the measures adopted since 1980 had been thought about and some even put
into practice (or an attempt was made to put them into practice) before 1979: the ill
fated 1971 Industrial Relations Act is one example} However, while the step by step
approach taken in implementing the legislation may be seen as an attempt to avoid the
mistake made by Mr Heath of imposing change all at once, the number of "steps"
taken towards the legislation also suggests that it was not having the desired effect;
trade union power was not being undermined, and therefore, more legislation was
introduced. Several times the Secretary of State for Employment announced that the
necessity for union legislation had ended, but more tended to follow. A good example
concerns the statutory requirements for industrial action ballots, which were
continuously added to, but perhaps most significant is that the protection against
unballoted strike action given to employers by the 1984 Trade Union Act was extended
in 1988 to give individual union members the right to require their union to hold a
ballot before calling for industrial action. Yet this was not enough; in 1991, the Green
Paper "Industrial Relations in the 199Os" claimed that "[r]ecent strikes in the public
sector, and threats of strikes on the railways and in other public services, have drawn
attention to the continued vulnerability of the community to irresponsible calls for
industrial action" (para 3.12). It was not enough that employers and union members
could obtain injunctions against trade unions to prevent them calling for action without
the properly conducted ballot: now members of the community can also do so. This
1 "Industrial Relations in the 1990s" 1991, para 2.22.
2 See "Trade Unions and Their Members" 1987, para. 1.6.
3 However, as Hutton (1996) claimed, Mr Heath's objective was fundamentally different from that of
Mrs Thatcher's. Where Mrs Thatcher's aim was to destroy any base of union "power", Mr Heath's
aim was to codify and legalise the source of union "power" (p86).
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could be taken as an indication that employers and union members were not seen as
exercising their rights, which, therefore, had to be extended to another group of
people.
The common perception tends to be that trade union power- has been severely
curtailed. It is argued that the fall in union density, the demise of the closed shop and
a fall in the number of recorded strikes are all indicators of a weakening trade union
movement. The decline in union density, especially in areas which were seen as
traditional union strongholds, may have more to do with economic and employment
factors rather than a reduction in trade union power and it does not necessarily mean
that where unions still exist they no longer exert any influence, in fact, evidence from
the third Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS3) indicates that this is still the
case. The closed shop has been described as "perhaps the clearest symbol of trade
union strength at workplace level" (Millward et al 1992, p102). However, the end of
the closed shopS does not mean that all employees in a workplace will not be union
members; indeed, even when the closed shop was in operation it did not necessarily
mean that all union members supported their union. A drop in the number of strikes
could mean a strengthening of trade union power rather than the opposite; unions may
be achieving their goals without having to use strike tactics. However, research
reveals mixed conclusions as to the effects of the balloting procedures upon strike
activity and trade union power (for example, McConnell and Takla 1990, Brown and
Wadhwani 1990, Manning 1992). It may also be the case that many stoppages of
work are not recorded by managers as strikes and therefore are omitted from the
figures (Batstone et al 1978, Walsh 1987). Indeed, withdrawing their labour until a
health and safety problem has been rectified, for example, may not even be considered
by workers as strike action, let alone recorded as such by managers.
Some authors argue that the reduction of trade union power was one of the main
successes of Thatcherism, (for example, Savage and Robins 1990, Kavanagh 1990,
Roberts 1989), and others suggest that while the nature of industrial relations is
changing, very little has altered on the shopfloor, (for example, MacInnes 1990,
Marsh 1992a). It must be asked why is there such a difference of opinion about the
power of the same organisations? A number of factors may contribute to this paradox
including the definition of "trade union" and the definition of "power". When
discussing trade union power it is very likely that the debate centres on what the term
4 The study is primarily concerned with what is generally termed industrial power, rather than
political power; readers interested in this aspect of trade union "power" should see K.D. Ewing's 1982
book "Trade Unions. The Labour Party apd the Law". Ewing gives an excellent account of why trade
unions originally became involved in political activities, which according to Ewing were a means of
promoting the industrial interests of their members, and these political means were used only to
supplement their industrial methods. This argument is backed by Steele et al (1986). They argued
that trade unions conducted well organised campaigns emphasising the importance of defending their
industrial interests through political action, which led to members voting to retain the political fund
in those unions which already had one and the establishment of a fund for the first time in others.
5 The closed shop is not illegal but workers now have a right not to belong to a trade union and can
claim compensation if they are dismissed because of their non-membership and can also complain to
an industrial tribunal if they are refused employment on the grounds of their non-union membership.
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"trade union" is referring to. For the sake of simplicity unionism can be divided into
two separate entities: the national organisation and the shopfloor unit. In a nutshell,
there is a vast difference between these two strands of unionism. While the national
union may appear to be the flagship for the protection and advancement of workers'
interests, in many cases this may not be so; any bargaining power tends to be exerted
on the shopfloor. Power relations can take many forms, making the measurement of
"power" difficult unless the researcher spells out in precise detail exactly what he/she
means by the term. Even then unless the same measurements of power have been
used in other studies comparisons between the two will mean very little. Kirkbride
(1985) summed up the situation by arguing that on one hand the term "power" forms
part of the "taken for granted" language of industrial relations used by lay observers
and the media to explain and describe situations and yet, on the other hand, it could be
argued that despite its central position and importance to the study of industrial
relations, relatively little attention has been focused directly on the concept of power
itself "to the extent that it now represents a major theoretical lacuna within the
discipline" (p44). This thesis aims to fill at least part of that gap.
1:2 Power
The term "power" has unsurprisingly been described as "an essentially contested
concept" (Lukes 1974, p26). It is not my intention to give a lengthy review of the
various positions that have been taken regarding the meaning of power, but only to
outline some of the major arguments to give the reader an idea of the issues involved
when trying to define the concept "power",»
Many writers saw power as something that an individual had to be seen to be
exercising and which prevented some other individual from doing something that they
would have preferred to do. Those subject to power fell in with the preferences of the
powerful; therefore, in this sense, power is seen as the subordination of the
preferences of some to those of others. This view of power is often called the on~
dimensional view (Lukes 1974). This view focuses on observable behaviour in
identifying power. Power is equated with situations where it is seen to be exercised
and as a result something happens or changes. Dahl (1957), for example, argued that
..A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do." "This view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of
decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective)
interests ..." (Lukes 1974, p15).
Within this view terms such as "power", "influence", "force", and "coercion", to name
6 For a comprehensive and illuminating account of the various debates surrounding the definition.
conceptualisation and measurement of power dating back to Hobbes and Machiavelli see for example
Clegg (1989). Clegg argued that until Lukes (1974) characterised the term "power" as a concept with
a common sense essence but nevertheless subject to endless contestation, the debate about power
appeared to have a relatively coherent character with reference usually being made to a distinct causal
conception.
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but a few, are used interchangeably or as Morriss (1987) put it, they are all collapsed
into one category. To Morriss this is a wrong assumption because the different words
have different meanings. For example, Morriss (1987) argued that there are
considerable differences between "power" and "influence" and that they are definitely
not interchangeable. Power comes from the Latin "potere" meaning "to be able" and
influence from the Latin "influere" meaning "to flow in". According to Morriss the
terms "power" and "influence" do sometimes tend to overlap but at the core of each is
a very different idea. After looking at the dictionary definitions of the two terms,
Morriss concluded that all definitions of power refer to the ability to do something or
the possession of control; "'power' always refers to a capacity to do things, whilst
'influence' sometimes (and typically) does not." (1987, pI2). In fact Morriss argued
that most accounts of power are defective because they are modelled too closely on the
term "influence" rather than "power".
Morriss (1987) made a clear distinction between affecting and effecting, arguing that
"'power' is not concerned at all with affecting, though influence is. 'Power' is
concerned with effecting, which is a very different idea." (P29). He also pointed out
that in the social sciences power is most commonly associated with affecting others
and quoted Lukes (1974) as an example, "the absolutely basic common core to, or
primitive notion lying behind, all talk of power is the notion that A in some way affects
B" (p26). Therefore, Morriss saw these sorts of accounts of power as defective
because they are modelled on influence rather than what he defined as power.
Another criticism of the one-dimensional view of power is that it completely ignores
the "structural face of power". Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argued that there are two
faces of power - the first is as described above, but the second is the possibility that a
person or group may, consciously or not, prevent others from raising issues in the
decision making process. The idea of the "mobilisation of bias" is brought into the
debate about power. In this second dimension of power then, not only is observable
conflict the subject of power analysis but the behaviour of those who are excluded
from the decision making process, in the form of overt or covert grievances, is also
considered. This is called "non-decision making", which is a means by which
demands for change can be suffocated before being voiced. The one-dimensional
view ignores this process totally, arguing that if something cannot be seen, how can
we know that it exists?
The third-dimensional or radical view of power takes this argument one step further by
adding, "that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict
from arising in the first place." (Lukes 1974, p23). This is achieved by shaping
people's perceptions and values in such a way that they accept the status quo seeing it
as natural, unchangeable and/or beneficial. This view comes under fire from Clegg
(1989) who, amongst other things, argued that it is less radical than it might at first
appear to be; the conception of power as something unknowably lodged in one's
subjectivity and consciousness is remarkably similar to the classic conception of power
as zero-sum, that is power as the negation of the power of others.
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All these views are subject to criticism; in particular they all seem to focus only on
conflict, whether it is observable, hidden or just prevented from arising. Surely power
can be exercised in non-conflict situations. For example, a call by a trade union for
safer working conditions may be met by employers without a conflict situation even
arising. The union has then achieved its aim and produced an effect without a conflict
situation arising. When employers think. that workers are content they may not be
prepared to act, but in some situations it may be as beneficial to the employers to
concede the workers' demands as it is to the workers themselves. The Trade Union
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (s. 244(4» provides that an act, threat
or a demand done or made by one party against another, which, if resisted, would
have led to a trade dispute, shall be treated as done or made in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, despite the fact that no dispute does arise because the
other party submits to the act or threat or accedes to the demand The point of view
taken here seems to be one of conflict or at least potential conflict and the idea that any
demand, act or threat could lead to a conflict situation. Perhaps power can only be
exercised in situations which at least have the potential to result in conflict. The above
example about a trade union calling for safer working conditions would be a potential
conflict situation because there is always the chance that the employer might refuse to
meet its demands.
Judging power by the outcomes of situations, where power is seen to be reflected by
the ability to "win" or "influence" issues, is an "all or nothing analysis". The party
that achieves its objectives is seen as "powerful", ignoring the fact that the "losing"
party may still have a substantial amount of power (Kirkbride and Durcan 1987). This
approach succeeds in cataloguing the "winning" of issues, but fails to explain the
origins of the process by which the "win" was achieved. Similarly, this view also
fails to acknowledge that the outcome may have been reached by a compromise on
both sides and therefore, even though one party may seem to have achieved the
outcome, both parties may have contributed to it and consider it successful.
Another approach to the study of power is to assume that power is derived from the
possession and control of various resources and therefore the ability to affect another
by the use of these. Morriss (1987) argued that to imply that resources themselves are
power is to fall into the "vehicle fallacy". He argued that there is a big difference
between committing this fallacy and acknowledging that resources can be useful
evidence in reaching assessments of power. Morriss (1987) suggested that power as a
dispositional concept, (that is a concept that refers to the relatively enduring capacities
of objects), is neither a thing, (a resource or a vehicle), nor an event, (an exercise of
power); it is a capacity. He argued that although many events can be described as an
exercise of power, the term "power" should only be used if the researcher is
specifically interested in the capacity for producing events and not if interested in the
events themselves. Morriss' basic idea is that "power" is any capacity to produce
effects and "a power" is a disposition that mayor may not be activated because it can
be exercised at will.
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Kirkbride and Durcan (1987) argued that the existing literature on bargaining power in
industrial relations tended to focus only on power as resource and power as outcome
leaving two large omissions - the level of action and the question of the origin of the
resources. To rectify this deficiency Kirkbride suggested that we must consider the
deeper structural aspects of the power relationship. "Research needs to explain how
power capacity is generated and more especially how it is exercised and utilised on a
day to day basis through interpersonal social interactions." (Kirkbride 1985, p54).
In a similar vein, Pfeffer (1981) argued that power is context or relationship specific -
a person or group is not powerful or powerless except in a specific social relationship
with others. According to Pfeffer to assess the power of one party or another, one
must be able to estimate: what would have happened in the absence of the exercise of
power; the intentions of the party attempting to exercise power and; the effect of the
actions taken by that party on the probability that what was desired would in fact be
likely to occur.
It seems that the one dimensional view of power should be rejected because of its
insistence on classing only observable outcomes as exercises of power and that those
outcomes are seen as the result of a conflict situation whereby there is only one winner
and one loser. The two and three dimensional views of power must be kept in mind,
despite their reference to only conflict situations. The "mobilisation of bias" is an
important notion because how can we say that A has more power than B when B may
not even have had a chance to use hislherltheir capacity to accomplish hislherltheir
goal? Similarly the idea that people are prevented from exercising their power because
their perceptions have been shaped in such a way that they do not see any reason to do
so should be considered. Again how can we say that A has more power than B if B
does not realise that things could be different and thereby chooses not to exercise
hislherltheir power?
1:3 Trade union "power"
As many researchers, (for example Edwards 1978, Armstrong et al 1977), have
suggested, power (particularly in the industrial relations field) is not directly
quantifiable as power relations can take several forms. One form - bargaining power -
possesses many dimensions. Armstrong et al (1977) argued that the development of a
more theoretical analysis of the sources, weapons and objectives of trade union power
was required because evidence suggests that a single variable is inadequate to reflect
the many dimensions of union power.
Many analyses of trade union power are only partial in their coverage and, therefore,
could be considered inadequate. Some studies tend to use a single variable when
measuring union power; union density and strike activity are two examples: on their
own each is an unsatisfactory measure (Armstrong et a11977, Martin 1992). Union
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density is certainly not an ideal way of assessing trade union power, for "power"
cannot be measured purely by the number of members within an organisation; for
example, solidarity between members may be 100% in a small private engineering finn
and the members there may be largely successful in achieving their aims, whereas
solidarity may be almost non existent within a larger workplace and members may feel
that "the union" does "nothing for them". Therefore, union density alone cannot
indicate the extent of union power. Using the fall in the number of strikes over the last
fifteen years to indicate a reduction of union power, as government sources have done,
is equally flawed. Strike action is very often seen by researchers and union officials
as a sign of weakness rather than power. As Armstrong et al (1977) put it, "the most
powerful unions may rarely resort to strike action, since a threat to do so modifies the
employers' attitudes", (P94), and Martin (1992) argued that the National Graphical
Association's increasing involvement in strikes in the early 1980s was a sign of
declining not increasing power. Strikes are only the obvious means of exerting power
and may be less effective than non-strike sanctions which also impose certain costs
upon an employer.
Very often studies of trade union power tend to focus solely upon observable
behaviour. However, as argued above, judging power by the outcome of situations is
flawed; both parties to a dispute may gain advantages which makes the measurement
of power for one side or the other very difficult; there is not necessarily one winner
and one loser. Indeed, Edwards (1978) identified four ways in which management
and trade unions were able to determine the outcome of decision making, only one
which involved a conflict situation; with the other three both sides could claim to have
influenced the final decision. An example of a situation where both the trade unions
and the employers concerned could claim to have determined the outcome was
demonstrated by Richardson and Rubin (1993). They argued that what constitutes
victory or loss in industrial disputes is very hard to establish. The popular perception
is that the 1989/91 shorter working week campaign in the engineering industry was a
major success for the unions, but Richardson and Rubin argued that the employers
also succeeded because agreements were made to offset the costs of a shorter working
week before any reduction in hours was made. In fact, they concluded that the shorter
working week campaign actually resulted in more agreements being made to combat
organisational slack and inefficiency than previously." While this was, in effect, a
conflict situation, it still highlights how both parties in a dispute can accomplish
advantages to their own benefit, making the measurement of power for one side or the
other very difficult.
Different definitions and different measurements of power can lead to different
conclusions about the extent of that power. Edwards (1983) demonstrated how by
using two different methodologies for the analysis of "control", it was possible to
7 A study of 21 engineering companies which had reduced their working week concluded that there
are tangible benefits for employers agreeing to a reduction in hours. Greater flexibility. harmonised
terms and conditions and an opportunity to adopt new working arrangements were seen as positive
outcomes of such agreements. (IRS Employment Trends 596 November 1995.)
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come to different and often opposing conclusions about the nature of power in the
workplace. She argued that the methodology employed to a large extent determines
the "findings" of the research and that "[n]owhere is the role of method in determining
the findings of empirical investigation more clearly illustrated than in the study of
power." (P50). Edwards went on to argue that it would appear that the aspect of
power most amenable to empirical study, that is bargaining power and decision
making, merely represents the tip of the iceberg as far as the total process of power is
concerned. Therefore, the methods chosen to measure the extent of trade union power
must try and incorporate as many dimensions of that power as possible.
For the purposes of this study power is defined as the capacity or ability to
produce effects; that is, the ability to bring about or accomplish
something. Trade union power, then, is the union's capacity or ability
to achieve a desired goal. The basic purpose of a trade union is to act in defence
of its members' interests, particularly in their relationship with their employer.
Therefore, it could be argued that a trade union's power is its capacity or
ability to defend and advance its members' interests.
This is intentionally a broad definition. The ability to produce effects has meaning
which stems far beyond observable outcomes and what is usually termed "bargaining
power". Itmay include the capacity to shape decisions and therefore the final outcome
rather than dictate the terms of any agreement; many issues of concern to members
may be solved without a conflict situation arising or even to their satisfaction without
necessarily "winning" the issue. More importantly it is wide enough to include
potential power as well as exercises of power; that is, the capacity to produce a goal
may be present but not necessarily put into practice.
Also, a trade union's capacity to defend and advance its members' interests may
extend further than just in relation to employment grievances. Many trade unions also
provide benefits for their members such as legal aid for things such as accidents at
work or for work related illnesses. The provision of these benefits can still be classed
as a capacity to produce effects and in terms of power relations they can be of extreme
importance to union members, especially if they have an accident at work for example,
and therefore, must be included as a source of union power. Very often this aspect of
trade union activity is neglected in studies of union power, but it may be an important
factor to members, especially if they feel that unions at workplace level do not
adequately represent their interests (Guest and Dewe 1988). Evidence does suggest
that trade unions continue to playa vital role in dismissal procedures and that dismissal
rates tend to be lower in unionised firms (Millward et al 1992). It is even suggested
that workers in high unemployment areas are more likely to join a union not for pay
increases but because arbitrary dismissal carries a larger penalty in those areas
(Blanch flower et al 1990). Indeed, surveys have found that one of the most common
reasons for union membership is for future protection (Stevens et al 1989, Millward
1990, Hedges 1994); this could be either in the workplace or by the national
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organisation, for example legal representation for an accident at work, (nowadays this
is also provided by some unions for accidents away from the workplace and even for
members' relatives).
For the vast majority of trade union members the workplace is the main unit of union
activity, (and most likely for many, the only unit of union activity). It is argued that
the average trade union member is not interested in the workings of his/her individual
union but is more concerned with the problems that may arise at hislher place of work,
those that affect himlher personally (see for example, Goldthorpe et al 1968, Schuller
and Robertson 1983). It is also argued that senior union officials tend to lose touch
with their rank and file members (see for example, Lane 1974, Sherman 1986,
Darlington 1994a, 1994b). If we accept these arguments, it could be assumed that
shopfloor representatives are the most important people to union members, particularly
when shopfloor grievances occur. These representatives concentrate on sorting out
individual grievances and any shopfloor issue that might arise by negotiating with
management where necessary in an attempt to come to some agreement. Where
workplace representatives can work independently of their officials it is rare that a
shopfloor issue is taken outside the workplace to the national union; therefore, it could
be argued that the hub of trade union power actually lies in the workplace on the
shopfloor, which for the rank and file members at least, is the place where most of
their problems are likely to occur. Sometimes this power may involve the use of
threats which are designed to cause the maximum inconvenience to the opposing party
(of course this only applies in a conflict situation or a potential conflict situation). This
is where the issue of costs and resources enter into the discussion about power, the
more resources at a party's disposal the more likely that the costs will be greater for the
opponent.
One of the crucial factors when considering trade union power in this respect is
collective strength; indeed, it could be argued that the collective strength of workers is
a trade union's main resource and is in fact the origin of its power in relation to
employers. A combination of workers standing firm on an issue can be a very big
influence upon an employer making a decision. This kind of power can rarely be
achieved by an individual employee alone, although employees with scarce skills or in
strategic positions may be better placed to do so than the vast majority of workers.s
To achieve collective strength co-ordination amongst the workers is essential; without
it any power to produce an effect may well be lost.
Rather than relying on observable outcomes to measure the extent of union power the
study concentrates on the views of trade union members obtained through interviews,
questionnaires and observations. Edwards (1983) argued that the measures of control
based upon perceptions used in her study of trade union power provided a much more
accurate description of workplace power than her alternative diary method, because
they covered some of the unobservable processes through which outcomes are
8 Cutbacks in training over the last decade have actually ensured that skilled workers are now more
valuable to those employers who require a skilled workforce.
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determined. In this way the "hidden faces" of power produced by the "mobilisation of
bias" and "non-decision-making" are more likely to be discovered than by examining
only the outcomes of decision making. One problem with this approach is that by
using peoples perceptions any conclusions depend upon value judgments and if
Lukes' (1974) radical view of power is accepted, then it could very well be the case
that those perceptions have been shaped in such a way that they are not really the
individual's own. The question then would be whose perceptions are they? The trade
unions? The employers? Or the Conservatives? This could be a crucial point,
especially in the light of the Conservative's aims regarding trade unions and their
members during the 1980s and early 1990s. One of the main aims was to promote
individualism at the expense of collectivism. If this aim has been achieved then it
could be expected that the views of individual members would be their own;
alternatively it could be argued that nobody is totally unaffected by their environment
and therefore everybody's opinions have been shaped in some way or another.s
1:4 The Thesis
"The trade union movement no longer has any power", "the trade union movement
doesn't support the cause of the working class anymore" and of course "trade unions
no longer have the power that they used to have" are all familiar comments very often
made by members of the general public. In many cases it is a matter of personal
opinion and very often depends upon the background and experience of those making
the statement. Now and again certain individuals are happy to go against this
commonly held (and maybe socially constructed) view10 ; they argue that trade union
power is the same as it has always been. When this comment is elaborated upon, it
generally turns out that the individuals in question are union members in workplaces
where the union is considered to be quite strong, most employees belong to the same
union and the workplace union organisation has well respected figures behind it.
Morale and union support tend to go hand in hand with the success that the workers,
in the name of their union, have in the workplace, and this shows in the opinions of
those making the comments. This is no new phenomenon. Research over the decades
has shown that union organisation is different at different workplaces and that
generally unions have only a certain kind of "power", a defensive and negative power
(see for example, Boraston et al1975, Edwards 1978, Coates 1983).
The most crucial elements of a trade union are the members themselves; without the
members a trade union would have no purpose and therefore no reason to exist. It
can be argued that despite the fall in overall union density over the last fifteen years or
so the fact that many workers are remaining union members, and indeed new members
9 See for example Berger and Luclemann (1966) "The Social Construction of Reality".
10 The mass media is able to shape public opinion and as the focus of newspapers, especially the
tabloid press, usually emphasises only one side of a story readers can be misled into believing
something that is not strictly the whole truth; for example, lost production and profits tend to
dominate the news rather than the causes of a dispute. Trade unions were usually portrayed as over
mighty vehicles wielding unnecessary "power" consequently running down the country .
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are not yet a thing of the pasti r, it would be a viable project to find out exactly what
members think of the power of their trade unions. They are remaininglbecoming
members for some reason; is it purely that they have a self interest in the insurance
and services side as sources have suggested, (for example, the Employment
Committee's third report, "The Future of Trade Unions" (1994), suggested that trade
unions should provide a wider range of services to attract and retain members) or is
there something more? Most empirical studies of union power in the workplace have
focused on the shop stewards or the officials of the national union and many measured
power in terms of the bargaining outcomes and the ability of the union (or the union
representative) to get its own way. Few studies have looked at union power from the
members' point of view; some have looked at members' reasons for membership and
the British Social Attitudes Surveys touch upon members' opinions, but as Millward
(1990) said: "We still know little about the characteristics of union members or about
their reasons for belonging to unions or about any distinctive attitudes they may have"
(BSAS 7 p27).
The main aim of the research was to ascertain what a sample of local trade union
members thought of the power of their trade unions. While researchers, politicians
and the media argue about the power of trade unions, what do the members themselves
think? Different workers tend to express different opinions about their trade unions,
some argue that trade unions are still as strong as they always have been and others
argue that "they do nothing for me". Is this a result of the different expectations of
union members or maybe an indication that different unions operate differently? Or
perhaps there are other factors which determine the strength or power of a trade union?
It will be argued that the workplace is actually "the union" as far as most members are
concerned and that how well their representative performs influences their perceptions
of their union. The level of success that they have within the workplace largely
depends upon the personality and style of working of their lay representative, which
are essential in determining membership participation and interest in workplace
unionism and, therefore, the level of success that the union has when dealing with
management (Fosh and Cohen 1990, Fosh 1993). It is suggested that the lay
representative and the way that he/she works is one of the main ingredients for
successful unionism in the workplace and that overall the legislation has had little
effect upon workplace unionism. However, there are differences between
workplaces, especially between those in the public sector and those in the private
sector. These differences can be attributed to a number of factors including the type of
workplace, the nature of the employment itself, management strategy, and the
relationship of the workers to each other, but overall the lay representative is the key
player in the relationship of "the union" with management.
11 Figures indicated that overall trade union density bad almost halved since 1979 when 12.7 million
members were affiliated to the TUC: in 1995 there were only 6.9 million. This decline, however,
tends to be attributed to economic and employment factors rather than any widespread decline in
support for unions amongst workers. Indeed, 12 of the unions supplying the figures had experienced
an increased membership. Many of these represented "professional" members, indicating a growing
insecurity in these areas of employment.
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Forces outside the workplace might also play a part in altering the balance of the
relationship between the union and management within different workplaces; the state
of the British economy at any particular time can have a direct influence upon product
and labour markets and it is widely argued that favourable product and labour markets
help union power. However, the attempt to make the labour market work according to
"free market" economic theory has ensured that the workforce in Britain as a whole is
becoming progressively less protected and many workers are finding that their
employment is less secure than ever before. The decline in the manufacturing industry
has led to a new employment environment; more people are employed on a part time
basis, particularly women, there are now more than five million part time workers and
80% of these are women (Hutton 1996); more job opportunities are opening up in the
service industries; and more people are becoming self employed than ever before,
during the 1980s the number of self employed almost doubled to 11.6% of the labour
force (Hutton 1996). This employment situation has been described as the 30/30/40
society. Hutton (1996) argued that the bottom 30% of the workforce were the
marginalised; they were either unemployed or worked for poverty wages. The middle
30% were the "newly insecure"; those who were insecurely self employed, worked
involuntarily part time or were casual workers. Only about 40% of the workforce
enjoyed tenured full time employment or secure self employment and Hutton argued
that this was the category that the 31% of the workforce who were still represented by
trade unions generally fell into. All the "new" job opportunities tend to be in areas
which trade unions have not traditionally entered into and it could be argued that a new
avenue has opened for unions to exploit.
However, the uncertainty of product markets has led many employers to take on
"extra" workers when needed on temporary contracts; in this way they can be laid off
much easier if business slackens. This can cause problems for unions who have
tended in the past not to recognise temporary or part time workers as such; the AEEU,
for example, will accept temporary workers as members and try to ensure that they
receive the same benefits, wages and pension opportunities as the full time workforce.
Yet, because the union recognised them as full time workers, a local district secretary
argued that it was "a continuing battle" when management wanted to lay them off.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that temporary workers need a trade union to protect
their interests while ever they are employed, even the insistence that they are entitled to
the same benefits and wages as full time workers ensures that they are not exploited as
"cheaper" labour by employers. It could be argued that the growing army of
temporary and part time workers also provides an opportunity for trade unions to
move into "new" areas of employment. After all, all workers should be entitled to
protection of their rights and interests.
In those workplaces which are unionised the economic climate may have had an effect,
especially with the increased levels of competition between firms. The high level of
unemployment may give workers an increased sense of job insecurity (for example,
Hedges 1994) which may alter their relationship with their employer; that is, they may
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not push for a high increase in pay, for example, for fear of losing their jobs.t? Many
employees may wish to hold on to what they have got, the loss of a steady income
may mean the loss of their home or other possessions; over the last decade levels of
personal debt has hit unprecedented levels. Unionism may then take on a different
perspective for members; members may fmd that they prefer to work with their
employers to ensure the survival of their workplace (Brown 1986). Nevertheless,
this does not mean that the importance of trade unions, particularly in the workplace,
has dwindled; in many respects the economic and employment climate has reinforced
the necessity of workplace unionism (see also Cohen and Fosh 1988). As Bill Morris
clearly stated in a BBC 2 documentary, "trade unions are needed now more than ever
and if they did not exist they would be invented. "13
The following chapter outlines the differing views of trade union power taken by
authors and researchers and looks at research which assesses the impact of the
legislation upon trade union power and members' attitudes towards unionism.
Chapter 3 looks at trade unions in the public and the private sectors generally and
charts the rise of the importance of the shop steward in the workplace along with the
move towards workplace bargaining. Overall chapter 3 asks whether trade unions are
best seen as national organisations or as shopfloor units. Chapter 4 outlines the trade
union legislation, analysing why it was felt to be necessary and noting the possible
effects it may have on unions themselves. Chapter 5 discusses the issues raised from
the preceding chapters, including the issue of individualism versus collectivism. The
hypotheses that the study was testing are then outlined. The fmal chapter in part 1 of
the thesis describes the methods used in the research. Part 2 of the thesis sets out the
results of the study and discusses them in relation to the issues raised in chapter 5 and
also assesses the implications that they may have for trade unionism in general.
12 However, it appears that the current employment environment may actually have more of an effect
upon unemployed workers and especially the unskilled. Employers tend to prefer to keep their
existing workforces where possible, viewing the unemployed as lacking the relevant skills and
experience to carry out their production efficiently (without lengthy training that is). Research in
America during the 1992 recession found that firms did not layoff workers unless they were forced to
do so because of the demoralising impact on their workforce. Similarly they did not hire the
unemployed at lower rates so as not to create internal pay inequities which might also have a
demoralising effect on their newer employees (Bewlay 1993). Therefore, unemployment may affect
those in the top 40% of the workforce much less than is often thought (see also MacInnes 1987,
1990, Daniel 1987, Martin 1992).
13 "All Those In Favour", BBC 2, 29.11.93.
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CHAPTER2 TRADE UNION POWER - MYTH OR REALITY?
2: I Introduction
There are many different trade unions in Britain, yet all have the same aim: to serve
the interests of their members. The basic purpose of a trade union is defensive; it acts
in defence of its members' interests especially in relation to their employment situation.
However, trade unions have been instrumental in advancing the rights of all working
people and therefore, advancing the interests of their members is also an essential
reason for their existence. Trade unions originated as a vehicle to try and redress the
inequality of power between workers and employers; "unions do not create a
privileged position among otherwise equal parties, but seek to develop the bargaining
strength of individuals who alone are relatively weak" (Burkitt 1981, p68).
However, this view is not held by everybody and so called "trade union power" has
been an issue for governments since their very formation.
Since the Conservative onslaught on trade unionism opinions about trade union power
are mixed; some authors suggest that trade union power had been reduced drastically
while others claim that much remains the same, at least on the shopfloor. This chapter
outlines the differing views of trade union power taken by authors and researchers
before and after 1979 and looks at case studies which touched upon members'
attitudes towards trade unionism. A comparison of research before and after 1979
tends to show that trade union power, while definitely existing, was probably not as
"powerful" before 1979 as sometimes advocated; in general trade unions exercise a
negative and defensive power. Varied opinions are also revealed as to whether the
legislation which was designed to reduce trade union power has actually had any
damaging affects upon trade unions. Overall members tend to be portrayed as self
interested individuals using unions only for what they can get out of them, yet, it
appears that the shop steward is the most important aspect of unionism and is the key
to activating members and their interest in unionism and, therefore, any power that the
union may have.
2:2 A fall in union density and strike activity
Two single variables are commonly used to assess trade union "power": union density
and strike activity. The fall in both these is taken as indicating a decline in union
power, but taken on their own each is an inadequate measure (Armstrong et a11977,
Martin 1992). As Martin (1992) argued:
"Density does not invariably lead to power: it would be misleading to interpret the
contrast between the high density of union membership amongst non-manual employees
in the public sector and the low density of membership amongst similar employees in
the private sector as indicating a comparable difference in union power - difference is
primarily one of employer attitude. The significance of density depends upon
environmental conditions and institutional arrangements. including the degree of
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solidarity between different groups of workers. both inside and outside the specific
union." (plO).
The industrial relations and trade union legislation may have led to a decline in union
membership (for example, Freeman and Pelletier 1989), especially if the legislation is
seen as leading to a decline in union recognition (for example, Millward 1994). But
this does not necessarily indicate a reduction in union power. A Labour Research
survey (l992d) found that derecognition had become more widespread since 1988,
though it was noted that dereeognition had only affected a minority of unions and a
relatively small number of workplaces. The survey suggested that "[ilt would be
wrong to assume that non-unionism is the inevitable outcome of an employer's desire
to derecognise" (P7); in a number of the cases surveyed the employer's aim was
single unionism, and all but one union was derecognised. Millward (1994) argued
that single union representation was a widespread and long standing phenomenon,
though compared with multi-union workplaces, his analysis of the Workplace
Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) data suggested that where a single union was
present there were generally weaker forms of unionism. Nevertheless, some of the
unions involved in the Labour Research survey had successfully resisted the attempt at
derecognition and others had been able to maintain certain representational or
consultation rights despite being derecognised,
The TUC's bi-annual survey of trade union trends (1995a) also concluded that
derecognition had only affected a minority of unions and a small number of workers.
A fifth of the workplaces affected had successfully resisted derecognition.
Furthermore, 60% of the unions responding to the survey had secured new
recognition deals in the preceding six months. Where figures had been available they
showed that 18,275 workers had achieved union recognition compared with 1,394
who had lost it (or partially lost it). The overwhelming majority of these deals were
for full recognition, many in the education and health sectors. Unions have also
successfully organised and gained recognition for new groups of workers; according
to Gall (1993) union recognition agreements between 1988-1993 covered an estimated
60,000 employees and in some of these cases employers had actually approached
unions about recognition. However, around 80,000 employees had had their union
derecognised during the same period (Gall and McKay 1993). Nevertheless, the
authors concluded that the scope of derecognition was still relatively limited and the
TUC's (1995a) figures suggest that new recognition deals may now be covering more
employees than derecognition, It appears that dereeognition is not a significant factor
leading to declining union membership; furthermore, workers can remainJbecome
members of a derecognised union; however, employees are more likely to belong to a
union ifit is recognised (Metcalf 1991).
Nevertheless, the decline in union membership does not necessarily indicate a
reduction in trade union power. A change in employee attitudes (a principal aim of the
legislation) would explain the decline in union membership, and as solidarity among
members is a union's major source of "power", workers' attitudes would go a long
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way towards explaining any reduction in trade union power. Studies into the recent
decline in union density tend to show an uneven distribution of union membership
among different groups of workers. Green (1992) suggested that this was due to
some extent to the uneven availability of unions at workplaces and was only partly due
to employees' different choices regarding union membership. The seventh British
Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS7) found that around a tenth of non-members said that
no one had ever asked them to join and nearly a quarter of non-members cited the lack
of a union at their workplace. Therefore, it appears that employee attitudes towards
unionism may not be the reason that union density has declined since 1979, rather it is
more to do with the lack of union recruitment in particular workplaces. Indeed, a 1994
Labour Force Survey found that 3.6 million non-union employees worked in
unionised organisations, suggesting that there are many potential recruits for trade
unions (TUC 1995b). Other studies have shown that the number of workers joining
professional and non TUC affiliated unions has risen significantly since 1979,
(Burchill 1995, Farnham and Giles 1995), suggesting that workers are not averse to
becoming union members.
Waddington (1992) also rejected the decollectivisation of workers' opinions and
attitudes as the cause of the decline in union membership, arguing instead that union
membership was affected by compositional effects and the decline in the number of
large manufacturing establishments which were traditionally seen as "union
strongholds". (See also Bain and Elias 1985, Millward and Stevens 1986, Gallie
1989). The loss of members created by the decline of manufacturing employment had
not been replaced by workers in the growth areas (Metcalf and Dunn 1989).
Therefore, there are vast recruitment areas for unions to exploit.
Using strike activity as a measure of union power is, as Martin (1992) and Armstrong
et al (1977) argued, not even plausible. Both argued that the most powerful unions
rarely resort to strike action. A powerful union may resolve grievances without the
need for any overt pressure to be put upon an employer. Research into strike activity
in the 1980s highlighted a dramatic fall in the number of strikes, though this was
generally attributed more to changing economic circumstances than a reduction in
union power. It has also been suggested that the balloting procedures may have
reduced strike action (see for example, McConnell and Takla 1990) but not necessarily
in the employers' favour (Brown and Wadhwani 1990). If one were to use the falling
strike figures as an indication of a weakening of trade union power, then this would be
seen as a great reduction in the power of trade unions. However, if the most powerful
unions rarely resort to strike action then the fall in the number of strikes could be taken
to indicate a strengthening of union power rather than the reverse!
2:3 A reduction in trade union power?
There are conflicting views about whether the Conservative governments succeeded in
their aim of reducing trade union power (or the power that they were perceived as
having). Kavanagh (1990), for example, argued that the Thatcher governments had
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gone a long way towards puncturing claims about union power. Accordingly, the
weakening of their power was due to an interaction of legislation, unemployment and
technological change, but the legislation had taken hold and the balance of advantage
had changed since 1979 from union leaders to employers and managers.
Similarly, Roberts (1989) claimed that:
"The reform of industrial relations and the results that have followed must rank as one of
Mrs Thatcher's greatest achievements. Government policies made effective by the length
of her office, together with the effects of economic, social and technological changes,
have resulted in a significant reduction in union power, which has brought considerable
benefits to all sections of society." (P78).
These arguments were given backing from the ninth BSAS. Between 1985 and 1990
respondents were asked to rate the power of trade unions, business and government
on a five point scale ranging from "far too little power" to "far too much power". In
1985 the majority of respondents rated unions as overpowerful but by 1990 a
significantly higher proportion felt that they either had "the right amount" or "too little
power". Therefore, members of the public also felt that trade union power had been
reduced. Evidence from the seventh BSAS revealed that only 4% of employees
thought that their own union wielded too much power at their workplace, around half
thought it had the right amount and 37% that their union had too little power. "Clearly
the public image of trade unions is one thing: their role in the workplace is quite
another." (Millward 1990, p28.) Millward claimed that the evidence suggested that
there was a growing feeling, albeit a minority one, that strong unions were no longer
necessary. Still, those who actually used their union in the workplace could not have
all agreed with this as over a third felt that their union had "too little power" suggesting
that union members did feel that strong unions were necessary.
The general feeling appeared to be that trade union power (or their perceived power)
had been reduced. Questions can be asked as to whether the Conservative legislation
had in fact succeeded in its aim of reducing trade union power or whether statements
that the legislation had been effective had just been taken at face value.
Roberts (1987) argued that "a miracle happened in 1979". The 198Os, according to his
argument, saw a remarkable change in the climate of industrial relations with a
dramatic drop in union membership and the bargaining power of trade unions. Roberts
suggested that employees wished to be treated as individuals rather than as
collectivities and if employers offered an alternative system which satisfied employees
that their interests were being protected, trade unions would eventually cease to be
important as a major institution. But Roberts must have still envisaged trade unions as
having a certain amount of power because he stated :
"[Blut as this may be a long way off it is essential that society continues to be protected
from the misuse of union power." (p27).
Like Roberts, Metcalf (1993a) concluded that "legislative changes have undermined
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collectivism by promoting individual responsibility and voice, exit from collective
agreements, and loyalty to the company." (P39). According to Metcalf the
Conservative government had achieved virtually all it set out to do. The 1980s
witnessed the rise of individualism and the rule of the market which altered company
performance. Metcalf argued that it may well be that unionised workplaces now had
higher levels of labour productivity and investment than their non-union counterparts.
This, he argued, seemed to be due to labour compliance in the conduct of workplace
relations. However, it could be argued that this suggestion actually indicates that trade
unions are powerful; if unionised workplaces have higher levels of labour
productivity than non-unionised workplaces it could mean that the union actually
"controls" its members by ensuring that they work harder (possibly by ensuring that
they get high returns for more productivity), which managers in non-unionised
workplaces are unable to do. Case studies have concluded that trade union
organisations do act as regulators over their members (for example, Beynon 1973,
Edwards and Heery 1989b). Unions generally do not want to jeopardise a firm's
interests and may be willing to work with management as long as their members'
interests are also protected. Indeed, Machin (1995) concluded that there was no
evidence that a union presence damaged a company's long term performance or forced
uncompetitive establishments to shut down and Brown (1994) suggested that the
promotion of collective organisation and bargaining was the best way to secure
increased productivity as without a union presence companies merely managed labour
badly. (See also Williams et al 1986, Daniel 1987).
Research during the 1980s tended to conclude that collective bargaining still took place
but that there had been a change in its conduct. Brown (1986) suggested that this was
largely because of international competitiveness in the private sector and because of a
fmancial crisis in the public sector. He argued that trade unions, especially in the
private sector, were being forced to adopt new structures. They were still involved in
labour management but in more compliant ways. Brown concluded that "the structure
of trade unionism, originally developed for the strategies of employee solidarity, is
increasingly being shaped to the needs of employers." (P165). However, compliance
does not necessarily mean a weakening of trade union power. Undy et al (1981)
argued that British trade unions can adapt to anything if they have to, usually
interpreting the challenges on their own terms. Steele (1990) also argued that trade
unions had complied with and adapted in their own way to the new legal requirements
concluding that "[c]ontrary to public opinion and, more importantly government
supposition, trade unions are not unwilling to change or adapt to new circumstances."
(p70.)
Indeed, Terry (1986) argued that even though case studies may provide support for the
thesis of declining shopfloor union power, there are problems with the results as the
studies contain areas of "uncertainty and ambiguity". As particularly in times of
recession:
"It is plausible to suggest that workers and management share a common interest in the
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immediate survival of the firm ....Under these circumstances our traditional measures
may well be inadequate since we do not have tools to estimate union power when it may
be acting to assist rather than frustrate managerial intentions." (p 177).
Towers (1989) suggested that despite the various demonstrations of trade union
weaknesses, such as the collapse of the National Union of Seamen's strike in 1988:
"It may be that trade unions and their members have run the painful gauntlet of
Thatcherism remarkably well, bruised and shaken but still largely intact and considering
their options." (pI87).
Towers argued that not everything was working against trade unions; for example,
many foreign owned firms, (especially American), often chose to work co-operatively
with them. Marsh (1992a) argued that little had altered on the shopfloor. Marsh's
concluding comment is worth repeating:
"Overall, it is too easy to view governments as omnipotent and omnicompetent,
particularly when they themselves attempt to project this image. The Conservatives
have had some success in achieving their aims in the industrial relations field, but it has
been limited by the realities of industrial relations on the shopfloor." (p249).
Batstone (1988) also argued that one of the most striking features of the 1980s was the
stability of workplace industrial relations and workplace unionism rather than its
transformation. (See also Macinnes 1987, 1990.) Beck and Stones' (1992) research
indicated that new industrial relations practices actually co-existed with the older more
traditional forms, though considerable variation existed within each workgroup. It is
clear that no consensus exists about the issue of trade union power; however, when
the focus is upon decision making, research has tended to identify management as
holding the key to the final outcome.
2:4 Decision making - management or trade union prerogative?
Edwards and Heery (1989a) concluded that because of the recession the management
of Freightliner had changed their style and reformed the company's policy - the
balance of power was in management's favour and this was recognised by the unions
involved. The official union response was one of "damage limitation". Edwards and
Heery argued that collective bargaining had not been abandoned but that its structure
had just been altered.
"Changed outcomes were produced through collective bargaining partly because
management in Freightliner had become more assertive and more prepared to insist that
the unions accepted their proposals for turning the company round." (p69).
The researchers also investigated the perception of trade unionism held by the workers
themselves. The fact that union density in the company remained at the same level it
had been in the 1970s suggested that commitment to collective representation was not
diminishing, though Edwards and Heery acknowledged that check-off arrangements
could have maintained union membership despite declining worker interest. Yet on the
other hand there was evidence of workforce dissatisfaction with official trade
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unionism; the perception seemed to be that union leaders were ineffective, remote and
too close to management. (See also, for example, Beynon 1973.)
Another study by Edwards and Heery (1989b) attempted to provide a more systematic
analysis of workplace power by extending its scope to areas which were not usually
the subject of bargaining activity. They concluded that the various aspects of the
power of the NUM was largely confined to routine job-related decisions, supporting
the argument that the extent of union power in industry in general may have been
exaggerated in the past. Nevertheless:
"This is not to say, however, that union power was insignificant from management's
point of view. Most managers viewed the NUM branch as a considerable force to be
reckoned with and recognised that their job would be almost impossible without the
union's active co-operation in the running of the colliery." (p166).
But, as in Edwards' (1978) study, there were differences between collieries, with
union officials at some being far more successful than others in their attempts to get
their own way.
"These not inconsiderable differences in union power between collieries cast doubt on
how far it is possible to generalise about its extent in one industry, let alone make
statements about union power in the country as a whole ... No doubt it is this fact,
combined with the use of different indices of power, which has produced so many
contrasting accounts of the extent of union power in the workplace and the impact of
recession on workplace unionism." (Edwards and Heery 1989b, pI67).
Still, Edwards and Heery did add that their evidence shows that at workplace level
trade-unionism had been relatively untouched and the power of representatives
remained largely intact. Both studies by Edwards and Heery add weight to the
findings of other studies. In workplaces where management had asserted their right
to manage many union members tended to view their "official" union as ineffective.
However, managers still regarded trade unions as "a force to be reckoned with" and
recognised that with union co-operation the running of their business was made a lot
easier (see also, for example, Darlington 1994a, 1995). In general at shop floor level
unionism remained more or less as it always had been; however, there were vast
differences between different workplaces as to the success of trade unions to get their
own way. (See also Colling 1995.) This was not a new phenomenon. Brown et at
(1978) concluded that there was a marked contrast between local unions in
manufacturing and the public services; local unions in the public services tended to
rely more on the branch and full time union officials (FfOs) than those in
manufacturing. Boraston et al (1975) also found that there were vast differences
between workplaces and the extent to which the local union relied upon its FTO. (See
also Heery and Kelly 1990.) Brown and his colleagues found that dispersed
workforces, such as in the public services, generally had less formal union
organisations than concentrated workforces. This suggests that the degree of
dependence of the shopfloor organisation on its FTOs to a large extent determines the
level of success that stewards have in the workplace.
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However, according to Boraston et al (1975) trade unions could influence the scope
for workplace bargaining - they could modify it - but "only by agreement with the
managers with whom they negotiate and only within the limits imposed by the
structure of managerial organisation" (p 188). It has also been argued that
management strategy, (or the lack of it), is an important factor explaining the
development of the union organisation (Brown et al 1978, Terry 1982, Fairbrother
1990). Therefore, managers were seen as an important element determining the
amount of influence that unions had in the workplace.
Marchington's 1980 study concluded that although participation did exist at the
workplace he was studying, management still tended to make the final decisions, very
often by "selling" their ideas to the worker representatives. Management tended to see
this as part of the consultation process and regarded themselves as the only ones
capable of making such decisions, though Marchington did suggest that certain
decisions seemed to be more important to management and, therefore, that they might
be more willing to share control over issues which had low importance for them.
Even in 1973 Beynon argued that even though a steward may challenge management's
authority on the shopfloor he was "more often in situations where he is forced to play
the game management's way", (pI58). Marchington's study indicated that employees
possessed no great desire to run their factory, preferring instead to have a say only in
events directly affecting their own lives. (See also A.I. Marsh 1963, Beynon 1973,
Batstone et a11977, Hanson and Rathkey 1984, MacInnes 1990.)
Results from a later study led Marchington and Parker (1990) to conclude that, despite
maintaining a presence in the workplace, trade unions were becoming more marginal
to the management of employee relations. This did not appear to be part of a
conscious strategy by employers to undermine trade unions but was more likely to be
linked to the use of managerial initiatives such as employee involvement schemes.
However, each of their four case studies was different, and unionism remained central
to work in the engineering factory. Even though the role of trade unions was
becoming more marginal in terms of employee relations in the other studies, there was
no attempt by management to remove the closed shop. Marchington and Parker
admitted that a causal connection could not be imputed because the unions involved did
not occupy a central role prior to employee involvement being introduced and as it had
not been introduced to undermine union activity. Despite the potential for an
employers' offensive the authors argued that there remained doubt about management
motivation to make such a move and the likelihood of success if it was made.
Trade unions were also found to have had little influence in decision-making, at least
from a managerial perspective, by Wilson et al (1982). However, management did
admit to a constant preoccupation with union questions and affairs. Wilson and his
colleagues argued that trade unions tended to be in a defensive position - reacting to
already defined parameters:
.. What unions did do was to shape, stretch and delay the detailed implementation of
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decisions... In comparison with management, who can initiate and influence decision
topics, union power appears to remain comparatively insubstantial in the process of
strategic decision-making." (p339. Original emphasis).
Wilson et al did suggest that trade unions had the power to impede management over
personnel issues but added that this power remained on the fringe of decision-making.
These studies suggest that whilst trade unions did have a certain amount of bargaining
power in the workplace, the overall decision remained the prerogative of management
and it appears that this was the case well before 1979. However, these results should
be treated with caution, especially in the light of Edwards' (1978) conclusions;
management may claim to have made the fmal decision but in reality the union may
have shaped and altered the original issue in such a way that it could also claim to have
substantially influenced it. Edwards (1978) identified four ways in which
management and trade unions were able to determine the outcome of decision making:-
1) By the modification of objectives in anticipation of each other's responses.
2) Where the objectives of each party were congruent and therefore the desired goal
were pursued together.
3) By the use of persuasion to bring the objectives into line.
4) Where the objectives of each side were opposed and the conflict was resolved at the
expense of one side or the other.
At face value studies appear to portray employers and managers as the more powerful
when it comes to the final decision-making. However, in respect of Edwards' first
three ways of decision making, both sides may claim to have determined the outcome
making the quantification of power in one direction or another very difficult. Claims
that managers have rediscovered the "right to manage" (for example, Purcell 1991)
may be based on inaccurate measures; that is, managers may never have lost the "right
to manage" and that "right" may be shaped and influenced substantially by the union
organisation so that, in effect, unions actually structure management's right to manage.
2:5 Trade union power - no change?
Carter L. Goodrich's 1920 doctoral thesis "The Frontier of Control" examined the
extent of union power back in the early 1900s and his arguments could perhaps still be
said to have some relevance today. In answer to the question "how much power have
the workers got?" he argued that it was no use making general answers like "very
little" or "a good deal"; instead one should refer to the different types of power or
control. He identified the distinctions between a number of different types of control :-
1) Agreeable control and enforced control:
"The line between "agreeable" and "enforced" control, or better between dependent ani
independent control, must be drawn not on the ground of the origin of control or even
of the extent of control, but solely by the test of whether or not the workers' side does
actually exert an independent force." (1975 ed. p257).
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2) Negative and positive control:
"It is a commonplace that the control now exercised by the workers is mainly negative -
that they may sometimes say 'no', or say that work must not be done, or changes must
not be introduced, except under certain conditions, but they can very rarely say that this
or that must be done .... Most of the 'trade union conditions' - of hiring, apprenticeship,
demarcation, and the rest - are clearly negative. It is much shorter to enumerate the
instances of positive control ... Positive control covers then only a very small
proportion of the cases even of that independent control ... Insistence on this distinction
does not imply that regulation and negative control are not real control or that they are
not of great importance. The standard of foremanship, for example, is maintained
almost entirely by the highly negative process of insurgence. And the right to say yes
or no shades very easily into the right to say which or what ." (1975 ed. p258-9).
3) Old craft or customary control and conscious or contagious control:
,,()ld craft control is traditional and clings on but does not spread. On the other hand,
news of each 'invasion' made by the theorists and propagandists of the newer control is
carried to other trades and made the basis of agitation there. It is for this reason that the
word 'contagious' seems a significant one for describing this newer and more conscious
control.... the temper of the old crafts is monopolistic and conservative; that of the
latter, propagandist and revolutionary." (1975 ed. p264).
To Goodrich this type of control was not based on the degree of "reality" of control
exercised but on the nature and policy of the union exercising it and was of the highest
importance, The answer to the question "how much power?" depends on which kind
of control it is addressed to. From Goodrich's account it appears that the amount of
control (or power) exercised by trade unions varied between different unions, was
only applied at certain times and was usually dependent on the varying circumstances.
The trade union's role was primarily negative and defensive.
Over sixty years later Coates (1983) echoed this view, arguing that union power, in
particular their industrial power, was grossly exaggerated. Trade unions only had
power over a narrow range of issues, such as wages and conditions, which was more
a negative power and was shared with management. However, management could,
and did, make the vast majority of decisions unilaterally, (see also Burkitt 1981, who
argued that rather than shaping decisions and events unions merely reacted to them).
In addition, this limited amount of trade union power was only enjoyed at certain times
and, according to Coates, even this power was being eroded by government induced
unemployment and international competition. Coates suggested that if power was
equated with participation in decision-making then union power had significantly
increased, but argued that this power was limited as was union power measured by
effects, that is the capacity of a union to achieve its goals.
The evidence appears to suggest a rather mixed bag. When measuring the power of
trade unions it seems at first sight that management tend to have the upper hand in the
decision making process, but this conclusion could be interpreted differently if the
whole process of decision-making was examined rather than just the final outcome.
Conclusions about the nature of union power or even management power are very
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obviously related to the way that "power" was defined and measured. However, in
general it appears that trade unions, even before 1979, only had certain powers, but
so did employers (though it should be remembered that the common law was on the
side of the individual and in general the law tended to support employers rather than a
group of workers). It certainly appears that trade union power was perhaps not as
great as some would have us believe and "is far from the all-powerful force frequently
depicted" (Burkitt 1981, p67). Therefore, claims about drastic reductions in that power
may be based on a false assessment.
MacInnes (1987) argued that evidence from the first two Workplace Industrial
Relations Surveys (WIRS) suggested that the 1980s had actually seen a decline in the
rate of change compared to the 1970s. The results from WIRS3, which was carried
out in 1990 and covered more than 2,000 workplaces, revealed that there had been a
widespread decline since the mid 1980s in trade union membership, recognition,
collective bargaining coverage and the closed shop (Millward et al 1992). The authors
argued that though part of the explanation lay with the changing composition of
workplaces, declining support for trade unions among employers and employees
seemed to be a more relevant factor. But where trade union representation and
collective bargaining persisted little appeared to have altered, though there had been a
drop in the number of workplaces who had lay union representatives - seven in ten
workplaces with union recognition had a lay representative in 1990 compared with
eight in ten in 1984. Those workplaces without union representatives were much
more likely to be represented by paid union officials than in the past.
Where unions were present many features of local trade union organisation remained
the same and membership levels had generally held up through the 1980s where
unions were recognised. The report also concluded that trade unions in the 1990s
were much more heavily involved in workplace level matters than they were in 1984.
The results of the survey indicate that there are more advantages for employees in
unionised than non-unionised establishments; trade unions continued to have an
impact on pay levels, particularly those of the lower paid and dismissal rates were
much lower in unionised firms. In fact, the results suggested that trade unions
continued to play an important role in representing and assisting individual members in
dismissal and disciplinary procedures. They also exercised representational functions
in a sizeable proportion of establishments where they were not formally recognised for
pay bargaining purposes; nearly one in five managers had said non-recognized unions
played a part in resolving disputes. Also, formal grievance procedures and
committees, especially health and safety committees, were more common when a
union was present at a firm. The aim of the unions was to be consulted by
management on all issues of concern to employees, and it was found that consulting
and informing was more common in union than in non-union workplaces; there had
been no change, according to union representatives, in the level of management-union
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consultation and the releasing of information between 1984 and 1990.1 The results
also suggest that among workplaces with a strong union presence, management
support for trade unionism remained high throughout the 1980s.2
Martin (1992) supported this conclusion. He argued that firms which maintained or
enhanced their market position required continued labour co-operation, which was
secured substantially through strong working relationships with shop stewards. He
also argued that there was official union support for new technology and at plant level
shop stewards accepted that investment in new technology was an indication of
management commitment. According to Martin the limited direct role of unions in the
introduction of new technology did not indicate union weakness, particularly because
technology production was regarded as a management prerogative and it tended to
increase earnings. Indeed, despite frequently used phrases, such as "worker/union
resistance to change", unionised workplaces are more likely to introduce technical
change than those where no union is recognised (DanieI1987). According to Daniel
(1987) trade unions facilitated the introduction of advanced technology as it was seen
to represent investment, optimism, achievement and workers derived benefits from the
change, such as increased earnings and more skilled, responsible and interesting jobs.
It was also concluded that union support for technical change was so great that
managers had not had to use consultation, negotiation or participation to win worker
consent (Daniel 1987). Resistance to change was usually provoked by organisational
change, that is, the restructuring of working methods or practices without the
introduction of new machinery (Daniel 1987).
Martin (1992) also argued that the level of unemployment had less influence upon
union bargaining power than otherwise suggested, for a number of reasons, but
especially because the unemployed are different from the employed, in particular
existing employees already have the relevant work experience and skills. (See also
MacInnes 1990.) As Burkitt (1981) stated, "capital relies for its profit not upon the
employment of an individual but of the labour force as a whole" (p67).
Overall Martin concluded that the balance of bargaining power between unions and
management changed less in the 1980s than images of union density and political
exclusion suggest; bargaining power at workplace level remained dependent on the
same features as in the 1960s and 70s; however, at the centre of the trade union
movement there had been a major decline in its power base. Martin contended that the
role of the national union had become increasingly like that of the employers'
1 Millward (1994), after further analysis of the WIRS data, contended that "arrangements at workplace
level that managements had put in place to consult, communicate with and inform employees were
more widespread and highly developed in unionised workplaces than in the non-union sector." (P129).
On a wide range of matters that would be of interest to employees, managers in the non-union sector
were much less likely to disseminate that information to employees than in the unionised sector.
2 The chief conciliation officer for ACAS in 1987 said that the great majority of businesses with an
established history of collective bargaining continued to value collectively bargained agreements with
trade unions and staff associations, including those which were not legally binding. (Dennis Boyd,
1987, Foreword to Towers 1991).
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association - a source of expert advice and information and the provider of services:
"The effect of changes in the 1980s was to reduce the power of the trade unions as
organisations, but not to reduce the power of labour equivalently." (p 177).
This suggests that when talking about trade union power it makes a vast difference if
talking about trade unions as national organisations or as local units - the shopfloor or
workplace organisations. Even then, as Edwards (1978) and Edwards and Heery
(1989) pointed out, there are variations between different local units even within the
same industry. Nevertheless, it appears that trade union power actually remains more
or less as it always has been, some union organisations (even of the same union) may
be seen as more powerful than others, but that, it seems, has always been the case.
Evidence, such as that from the WIRS surveys, appears to indicate that trade unions
are still invaluable to their members (and possibly to employers) and that trade unions
are still achieving substantial goals for their members.
2:6 The legislation and trade union power 3
Research during the 1980s and 1990s to a large extent focused upon whether the
legislation had had any effect upon trade union power. It appears that the legislation
has not always produced its intended effects and that unions have adapted it to their
own advantage (Fosh et all993). Elgar and Simpson (1992) concluded that while the
law had, in general, become a more important factor across the spectrum of industrial
relations, to understand its impact it must be located in the context in which it operates,
which varies considerably between different employment sectors. They also argued
that while strike ballots had had a universal impact the other labour legislation had not
made such a general impression.
The balloting procedures received a lot of attention. McConnell and Takla (1990)
found that an increase in strike activity had occurred between 1980 and 1984 followed
by a significant decrease after 1984; "[t]his suggests that the requirement for unions to
hold secret ballots before they go out on strike has had the most effect in reducing the
frequency of strikes." (p 17). Strike activity may have fallen, but, as Brown and
Wadhwani (1990) argued, "[a] decline in overt disruption does not necessarily imply
reduced union power" (p13). They suggested that balloting does not necessarily result
in a large number of majority votes against action; on the contrary, it tends to highlight
the strike threat and the strength of support behind it leading to a settlement without
any action taking place. Ballots provide more information to both parties about their
relative bargaining strength and, therefore, are more likely to increase the efficiency of
bargaining.
Elgar and Simpson (1993a) concluded that the use of ballots had emerged as a feature
of union strategy in negotiations. Indeed, they argued that the law on strike ballots
stands out as the most important of the changes made by the 1980s legislation. They
3 The legislation and its possible effects on trade union power is looked at in more detail in chapter 4.
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also found that while the majority of ballots produced votes in favour of industrial
action, action was rarely taken (see also TUC 1995a). However, they did find that
some union negotiators could find themselves exposed during negotiations if a ballot
was not supported by members, and the majority of negotiators questioned saw the
law as an important factor favouring employers in the bargaining process. The TUC
bi-annual survey of trade union trends (1995a) found that unions were more likely to
ask members whether they wanted to take full strike action and action short of a strike,
rather than opting for only one or the other, enabling them to pursue the winning vote
rather than risk opting for the action which might not be the preferred member choice.
Members from 9 of the 31 unions who had responded to the TUC's survey (1995a)
had taken industrial action in the preceding six months and the majority of these cases
were endorsed by the national union. However, the report did admit that "[t]his high
level of official action may, of course, be because unions at head office level (where
most of the responses were compiled) did not have information on short, local and
possibly unofficial action."4 Most strike action involved selective strikes, often of
one day's duration, the majority lasting for less than a day. It was also found that if
unions took selective action they were more likely to win some of their demands.
Overall 57% of the unions who had been involved in some form of industrial action
said that they had won all or some of their demands. The single greatest cause of
industrial action was pay followed by redundancies and changes to working practices.
(See also Labour Research 1992c.)
It appears, then, that rather than producing a change in trade union power, ballots may
have actually strengthened the hand of trade unions when bargaining and may have
contributed to a reduction in industrial action but not necessarily trade union power;
officially trade unions are still able to protect and advance their members' interests.
The fact that it takes a certain amount of time to organise industrial action ballotss may
mean that when workers have to confront an urgent problem, such as the dismissal of
a workmate, they may be more likely to take immediate and, therefore, unofficial
action to rectify the problem; waiting even a week for an official ballot to be conducted
may be too long in these types of circumstances. As national unions rarely get to
know of this type of action, which is usually short lived and successful, the actual
figures for successful industrial action may be much larger. It could also be argued
that the balloting procedures may have led to more unofficial (and possibly
unrecorded) action taking place,e
Nevertheless, Manning (1992) contested the assertion that ballots may strengthen a
4 Indeed, many employers may not even define short stoppages of work as strikes let alone record
them (Batstone et al 1978. Walsh 1987.)
5 Only 29% of unions responding to the TUC survey could do so within two weeks and 5% took five
weeks or more (1995a).
6 The Department of Employment's statistics for unofficial action (which would not include
umecorded action), collection of which ceased in 1981, showed that well over 90% of industrial action
was unofficial between 1960 - 1979 (Metcalf 1993b).
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union' s hand when bargaining. He argued that because employers would want to use
their first wage offer as an information gathering exercise, it would probably be a low
offer rising according to how large the majority in favour of strike action was. "In this
case, balloting may simply become a ritual; employers routinely make an offer they do
not expect workers to accept and workers routinely vote against it ... Ballots would
then have no effects on outcomes and would simply be a waste of time." (pI4).
Manning continued by arguing that ballots may affect trade union bargaining power in
other ways, especially if members vote in line with their self interests. For example,
union influence over employment decisions could be reduced; self interested workers
whose jobs are safe are unlikely to vote for strike action over an issue, whereas
workers' interests are usually more affiliated in wage disputes.
Despite this argument it does appear that "[t]he readiness of workers to vote for strike
action denies one of the giant assumptions behind the Tories' existing union
legislation, which has sought to give individuals an unintimidated voice in union
affairs through secret ballots" (Metcalf and Dunn 1989, p22). By the use of secret
ballots (for union elections and other important decisions, such as whether a union
should have a political fund, as well as for industrial action) it was envisaged that
union government would be reformed and that unions would become more democratic
and accountable to their members. The overall objective was to reduce trade union
power by undermining collective organisation by "giving the unions back to their
members"; that is, by increasing the involvement of union members as individuals
rather than as members of a collective group. It was expected that individual members
would vote by postal ballot in their own interests without any intimidation from other
members. Indeed, it has been concluded that low turnouts for union elections shows
that the legislation has had the opposite effect to that intended - to increase the
democratic participation of members in union affairs (Labour Research 1990a).
According to research, awareness of the law does play an increased part in industrial
disputes and negotiations. Evans (1987) argued that his evidence pointed to the
increasing importance of the role of the law in shaping how industrial disputes were
conducted; however, he did admit that it only applied at the margins. Elgar and
Simpson (1992,1993b) found that managers had an increased awareness of the law
especially in relation to the balloting procedures and the legal vulnerability of
individual workers when taking industrial action. However, according to the
researchers they seemed to prefer resolving disputes, where possible, with the union
FTOs, failing this the managers would then use the industry's dispute procedure.'
Nevertheless, Elgar and Simpson concluded that if industrial action did become a more
central management concern then the law would undoubtedly play a significant part in
the strategies of employers and unions. Indeed, a survey of 62 private sector
companies by Dibb Lupton Broomhead solicitors found that around one in six
7 Itmay well be the case that managers actually prefer dealing with their stewards rather than Fl'Os.
As Goodman and Whittingham (1969) commented, stewards are available and better informed of the
history, facts and implications of a shopfloor dispute than FTOs. (See also Clegg, Killick and Adams
1961, McCarthy and Parker 1968.)
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employers anticipated industrial unrest in the following twelve months. The majority
of the employers would have considered taking legal action against a union if they
were faced with an unlawful dispute; however, 90% preferred where possible to
resolve a dispute through negotiation. A high proportion of the employers (98%)
thought that it was useful to have the option of legal action available to them where
industrial disputes were concerned.s
Nevertheless, according to the TUC bi-annual survey (1995a) legal action against trade
unions remained very unusuals; only three employers had commenced legal action
against a union and two unions reported that they had been threatened with legal
action. However, the survey found that there appeared to be a greater willingness on
the part of union members in some unions to sue their union; these cases largely
concerned the union's disciplinary powers. In the cases that had been completed no
union was fined or had damages awarded against it, but the costs faced by the unions
were high and the survey estimated that all TUC affiliates could have faced legal bills
of more than a £1 million in the previous year. This suggests that though employers
may threaten unions with the law (it may be the case that employers actually threaten
their workplace union rather than the national organisation; therefore, the number of
threats against trade unions may be much higher than the ruc figures) it is rarely
resorted to.t 0 Yet, the legislation does appear to have mobilised some union members
to complain about their trade unions, even if these cases are only a minority, the fact
that some members have challenged their unions might have been seen as a step in the
right direction by the Conservatives.
Studies may appear to confirm that knowledge of the law is quite common for those
concerned; however, whether that knowledge is correct or not remains another thing.
One of Elgar and Simpson's (1993a) conclusions was that:
"The fact that some employers apparently made threats for which there was no legal
basis is indicative of the importance which the parties' perceptions of their legal rights
and obligations may have, even where these are some way removed from the reality of
the law." (Pll).
Welch (1993) conducted a survey of lay union representatives in order to identify their
perceptions of the current law and their attitudes towards compliance with it. He
found that misunderstandings of the law were common. With respect to employers'
rights of dismissal and the organisation of industrial action short of a strike, many lay
8 "Industrial Relations Review and Report" 549 December 1993. Elgar and Simpson (l994c) found
that public sector transport employers had made greater use of the law in disputes than any other
employers surveyed. Yet there were mixed opinions of the results of the resort to the law. On London
buses, for example, challenges to the validity of strike ballots had led to fresh ballots and larger
majorities for industrial action.
9 A Labour Research survey, while confirming this view, also found that employers had a renewed
interest in using the law, particularly to challenge unions on industrial action ballots (Labour
Research 1994b).
10 However, it could be the case, as Martin (1992) suggested, that "the potential threat of
interlocutory injunctions - and eventual sequestration of union assets - has significantly inhibited
union action" (p165); therefore, there would be less need for employers to use the law.
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representatives were found to underestimate the consequences of the law with respect
to themselves, their members and their unions. Additionally, the nature of legal
liability was exaggerated with respect to the balloting procedures and picketing; the lay
representatives believed that a breach of the criminal law was involved. Welch argued
that the findings indicated that trade unionists are more likely to favour compliance
with the law and he concluded:
"This suggests that in the here and now legal controls are working to restrain the forms
of industrial action that trade unionists take, and that the law has an inhibiting impact at
workplace as well as national level. Misunderstandings as to the nature of legal liability
can clearly reinforce this inhibition." (pp240-241.)
However, he also argued that the findings suggested that many of the respondents
generally favoured defiance irrespective of whether they thought the relevant action
was contrary to the law. Presumably this would depend upon how well the "activists"
could persuade their members that defying the law and possibly their own trade union
was in their best interests. If, as Welch argued, most trade unionists are more likely to
favour compliance with the law then this may be a mammoth task. The main point is,
though, that misunderstandings about the legal positions of employers and trade
unions could lead to situations which may not have happened if the law was clear in
the minds of all those concerned.
Overall it does appear that, despite well publicised disputes where employers have
demonstrated their increased readiness to use the law, most notably in the printing
industry, II the legislation has not affected trade union power to the extent that the
Conservatives wished. The demise of the closed shop and the virtual elimination of all
kinds of secondary action (Millward et al 1992) along with the loss of union
immunities without first holding pre-strike ballots may appear to have weakened trade
union resolve, yet, even though the law may have made trade unions at national level
act with greater caution, the number of balloting successes suggest that members
continue to support their unions. The balloting procedures may have even
strengthened a trade union's bargaining position. The law may have provided
employers with a further means of control over trade unions (Evans 1987); yet, many
employers appear reluctant to use that means. Those who have been most likely to
derecognise unions and/or use the legislation against them tend to be concentrated in
those industries and workplaces which have been marked by a history of poor
industrial relations, for example, the printing and shipping industries. This, according
to Marsh (1992b), indicates that it is the history and current state of relations between
an employer and his/her workforce within a given company which has the most effect
on the institutions and outcomes of industrial relations in that company. "In the private
sector at least, the Government can influence the legal framework and the ideological
context within which industrial relations occur, this influence is important but it is
indirect." (Marsh 1992b, p49.)
11 Elgar and Simpson (l994a) found that in contrast with the newspaper industry considerable change
had been achieved in general printing without major confrontation with the unions. While the law had
been a prominent feature of the management of the process of change, it was seen as a background
factor of real, if limited, significance. . •
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2:7 Union members
The crucial thing keeping trade union organisations together (whether locally or
nationally) is the membership. Yet, one of the most striking features from a study by
Guest and Dewe (1988) was the poor evaluation of their union's role among members.
In their 1991 article, Guest and Dewe also concluded that trade unions were not
perceived at local or national level as doing a satisfactory job, even by their own
members. Only half of the union members studied accepted that unions at plant level
were even moderately successful at representing their interests. But, as Fosh (1993)
concluded, members are likely to evaluate their unions differently depending on the
circumstances at the time of the study, and Guest and Dewe (1991) did conclude that
the best predictors of allegiance were perceptions of trade union performance.
A specially commissioned survey of trade union membership and the closed shop
conducted during February and March 1989 asked employees a number of questions
in relation to trade unions. Stevens et al (1989) found that the most common reason
for union membership was "to protect me if problems come up in the future" followed
by "to get higher pay and better conditions". When asked about the power of British
trade unions two-fifths of employees thought they had "about the right amount of
power" and about the same number thought they had "too much" or "too little".
Interestingly, similar proportions of union and non-union members thought they had
the right amount, but twice as many non-members than members believed trade unions
had "too much power". 45% of employees felt that the power of the unions at their
own workplace was "about right", 37% that they had "too little power", and 2%
thought they had "too much power". These results are very similar to those cited
earlier from the seventh BSAS. Similarly the two most common reasons for
belonging to a trade union found by the seventh BSAS was for future protection and
higher pay and better working conditions. However, whereas Stevens et al reported
that only a very small minority (6%) of their respondents thought that becoming a
union member "shows solidarity with the people I work with", Millward (1990) found
that the majority of respondents thought that "to help other people 1work with" (76%)
and "I believe in them in principle" (67%) were important reasons for union
membership.
The differences between these two sets of results and those of Guest and Dewe could
be related to many factors. For example, the way that the questions were asked, or
phrased (employees could interpret the term "power" differently to questions asked
about the representation of their own interests), the timing of the study (posh 1993),
or there may have been vast differences between the different workplaces, the
employees and indeed the union organisations there. Nonetheless, it can clearly be
seen that the majority of members chose self interested reasons for union membership.
However, there was a vast difference in the percentage of respondents giving
"solidaristic" reasons in Stevens et al and Millward's surveys. This again could be
due to how the questions were worded ("showing solidarity" may be interpreted
differently to "helping those 1work with" for example) or to the different workplaces
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and circumstances involved. Indeed, Millward suggested that instrumental or self
interested reasons were most often cited by the younger union members (those at an
age when family formation can produce economic problems) and those lower down
the occupational hierarchy and, therefore, generally lower paid, whereas solidaristic
reasons were more relevant to the older age groups, particularly those in skilled
manual jobs. However, the differences are most probably due to the fact that Stevens
et al asked respondents to choose which was the most important reason for them
personally from a list of possible reasons, whereas the BSAS survey asked
respondents to rate how important each of eight possible reasons for membership was
to them. Therefore, in the BSAS survey members could indicate that a variety of
reasons were considered important factors for union membership rather than just one.
Nevertheless, members' attitudes do appear to be changing. The BSAS series found
that while in 1989 improving pay and protecting jobs were regarded by employees as
equally important goals for unions to work towards, by 1993 nearly four times as
many employees regarded job security as more important than improving pay (Hedges
1994).12 In 1986 only 30% of union members thought belonging to a strong union
was important for job security.is Hedges suggested that job security may have
become a more dominant concern because inflation was seen as being under control
whereas unemployment was not. He also added that beliefs that trade unions were less
effective than they used to be may have been a contributory factor. However, this
factor appears to be the least likely of the two, as the survey also found that the
proportion of employees with unions at their workplace who thought that they were
doing their job "well" remained consistently close to 60%.
A number of American studies have pointed to how unions can influence their
members' perceptions of them. Kuruvilla et al (1993) from their comparative study of
Sweden and Canada argued that their results suggested cross-cultural generalisability.
They found that those members with the most contact with their union were more
committed and concluded that:
"Simply put, unions can, through purposefully designed actions, influence their
members to evaluate them positively." (P512).
Fiorito et al (1988), using data from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, found
that union participation was positively related to perceptions of union performance in
"bread and butter" issues and member-union relationships, and in tum union
participation was found to enhance satisfaction with the union. The researchers also
argued that the more a worker participates in union business the more he/she begins to
12 However, it could be a case of who is asked these questions; respondents in well paid jobs may
consider pay a lesser priority. Stevens et al (1989) found that "to increase earnings" was below "to
improve working conditions" and "to protect existing jobs" when their respondents were asked what
they thought the main objectives of the trade unions at their workplace should be. In addition it has
been argued that unions' ability to determine wage levels is much greater in non-competitive
industries (Mischel 1986, see also Gregg and Machin 1991), therefore, employees in competitive
industries may have different priorities from their counterparts in non-competitive industries.
13 "Working in Britain", MORI survey for IBM/SheW Sunday Times. January 1986.
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appreciate the constraints on union influence as well as the significance of union
achievements. Though they did suggest that beliefs about unions in general
conditioned workers' perceptions of their own union and those with negative ideas
tended to rate their own union performance much lower on all issues.
It appears that union members are largely self interested; the most common reasons
for membership tend to relate to the member as an individual and to problems within
the workplace, such as working conditions which affect them personally. In 1968
Goldthorpe et al suggested that workers were more concerned with shopfloor issues,
particularly those which were "economic" in nature and "local" in their origins and
scope, than with the national union itself or even with the activities of their own
branch. The shop steward was the most important union representative in their eyes.
Goldthorpe et al argued that unionism had little significance other than in relation to
"bread and butter" issues and could, therefore, be described as "instrumental
collectivism"; that is, it is only seen as a means to an end with the emphasis on self-
interest. (See also Nichols and Armstrong 1976.) This it appears may still be the
case. However, research also suggests that unions can influence their members'
perceptions of them and that participation in union affairs tended to enhance those
perceptions. Therefore, if the most important person to members is their workplace
representative, it follows that he/she must be the key to involving members in the
union. This argument has been emphasised by Fosh (1993).
Fosh (1993) argued that "union involvement comprises participation in and attitudes
towards the local union" (p578). The concept of participation is many faceted and
covers both formal participation (attending meetings and voting etc.) and informal
participation (reading the union journal and interacting with the shop stewards).
According to Fosh, different workplaces have varying patterns of "surges and
troughs" in participation. The significance of union meetings also varies; a crucial
workplace meeting to determine a pay claim or other dispute will have a much larger
attendance rate than the routine branch meeting.
Fosh identified two dimensions of commitment to workplace unionism:
1) Commitment to solidarity and its opposite, where the member has an
individualistic attachment to the union.
2) Commitment to union goals, the member has an ideological orientation to
unionism. The opposite is an instrumental conception of unionism, a means to the
ends of the individual or the workgroup "usually in terms of insurance or economic
betterment" (P579).
Whereas members are generally seen as having one or the other of these forms of
"union orientation", Fosh argued that members continually move between the two
opposites in each dimension depending on the varying circumstances. Equally, most
rank and file members' conception of unionism can contain elements of both
instrumentality and ideology; members cannot be divided statically into either
solidaristic or individualistic types:
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"Members' individualist rationales towards the union as a source of valued benefits
interlink with a more collective attitude: the members see the union as a necessary
protection against a more powerful employer." (1993, p580).
Similarly, instrumentally oriented members can be as active as those who are
ideologically driven.
The most important part of Fosh's argument was that the fluctuations in members'
patterns of participation and variations in their commitment to their workplace union
over time are connected to "the impact of events or developments that disturb the local
union context. The levels of participation and of solidaristic commitment to the
workplace union rise when issues of concern to the membership are being decided or
widely discussed." (pp580-581). (See also Batstone et aI1977.) However, according
to Fosh, the impact of events on the membership are mediated by several factors, such
as industrial relations atmosphere, past experiences of workplace unionism and the
structure of the local union. However, overall local leadership style is of particular
importance; a leader who stresses the importance of involving all the members in
decision making can encourage members to take an interest in union affairs:
"A collectivist outlook is one where issues are seen by local leaders as relating to a
shared situation of employment rather than where they are taken up as individual
grievances." (pI993, pS8l).
If a "leader" treats a grievance solely as an individual one, not involving other
members, then the member and hislher fellow members participate to a significantly
lesser degree in the grievance process and do not develop a conception of the union
"that encompasses group action".
The essence of Fosh's argument was that members fluctuate between different
attitudes towards their union and the key to encouraging greater participation is the
style of working of the union representatives. However, Fosh' s argument also brings
out another point, that individualism and collectivism can be intimately connected, the
two working together to protect each other. Members may be self interested and see
unionism as a means to an end, but sometimes only by acting collectively are those
ends met. Nevertheless, it has been argued "that steward leadership is likely to be
more common where the nature of the work situation fosters collective strategies
among members" (Batstone et al 1977, p131). This might seem a reasonable
assumption, but Fosh argued that even though the workplace situations and attitudes
of management may be very different for different lay representatives, the adoption of
the right style of working could increase member participation and, therefore, the
effectiveness of the union within any workplace. Therefore, it could be argued that the
steward is actually the key to successful unionism within the workplace; it is the
steward who interests hislher members in the union and encourages them to participate
in union affairs, and member participation actually enhances satisfaction with their
union.
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2:8 The shop steward - a role or an individual personality?
It appears that the shopfloor organisation has always been "the union" as far as the
majority of rank: and file members are concerned and in many cases the shop steward
might actually be seen as "the union" (see for example, A.I. Marsh 1963, McCarthy
and Parker 1968, Goodman and Whittingham 1969). As Marchington (1980) said,
"many of the fmdings have served to substantiate the thesis that for most members, the
shop steward is the union." (p66). However, is the position of shop steward just a
role that an individual takes on or is there much more involved?
Batstone et al (1977) suggested that patterns of power and influence could be created
so that a new incumbent to the position of steward could find himlherself already
endowed with the "power" that their predecessor had built up. This suggests that once
established the role of shop steward itself may actually be "powerful" and "influential"
rather than the person taking the position. In reality it appears that this is far from the
truth. Batstone et al (1977) found this and argued that "much power" may be based on
past achievements of "a personal kind" so that a newcomer does not automatically
inherit these sources of "influence" and "power". Goodman and Whittingham (1969)
also acknowledged that the extent of a steward's discretion to lead depended on his
experience, past record and personality; they also argued that very often management
began to respect a shop steward as an individual, (see also Marsh and Coker 1963).
The success of shop stewards in advancing and protecting their members' interests
does vary between and within different workplaces, different industries, different
unions and between all these at various points in time. The explanation appears to lie
with the personalities of those involved, especially those of the lay representatives, in
particular the main lay representative.
Whilst Edwards (1978) was in fact trying to show that power relations can take several
forms, her findings tend to indicate that management-union relations and the power
that each may possess may be a result of the personalities at the place of work. She
found that management-union relationships were very different in two collieries; in
one the bargaining strategy of each side was one of conciliation rather than conflict,
whilst virtually the opposite was the case at the other. The importance of the
individuals concerned is also brought out in studies of union membership. Fosh and
Cohen (1990) found little support for the idea that institutional or demographic factors
were related to different patterns of participative democracy. They concluded that the
local leader's style was essential in determining membership participation and interest
in workplace unionism. Commitment to collectivism induced local leaders to try and
involve their members in local decision making and a high level of participation was
found to be effective in winning advances and concessions from management.
Fosh (1993) continued this argument (see above) and distinguished between the
different types of participation and the different dimensions of union commitment,
between which members continually shift. This is an extremely important point which
must be remembered, especially when using attitude surveys, because if Fosh was
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correct, most members will express different feelings in varying circumstances
depending upon the impact of recent events. However, overall the steward's style of
working was essential to induce member participation and therefore the effectiveness
of the union within the workplace. Even in 1968 McCarthy and Parker recognised that
some stewards had more influence than others and suggested that this could be to do
with the differences in leadership style and therefore effectiveness; they distinguished
between the charismatic leader who gained a wide degree of discretion and influence
and those who chose not to lead at all and were little more than a channel for objectives
and strategies of others. (See also Batstone et al 1977).
Other case studies add weight to these arguments. Beynon (1973) argued that despite
stewards' complaints about their members' lack of interest in the union, "given the
correct leadership [the members] could behave properly. A prerequisite for ... correct
leadership was continuous contact with the members" (P221) and that the willingness
of members to follow their leaders "can be a result of the activities of the leaders"
(p222). Beynon's study contained many examples which indicated that it was the
personalities and styles of working of the stewards that were the key to successful
unionism within the workplace. Another point suggested by Beynon was that as well
as the steward's personality hislher social framework of his/her life and contacts
should also be considered (see also Batstone et al 1977); contacts may be essential
when needing advice and support, but it could be argued that a person's life and the
contacts that he/she has built up are also a product of that person's personality and
individuality. However, contacts with other stewards may be especially important so
that the norms of leadership are built up and continually reaffirmed (Batstone et al
1977).
Schuller and Robertson (1983) also concluded that groups of well organised shop
stewards who were visibly effective tended to promote better relations. Though they
found that the shop steward was seen more as an individual - problem solver than as a
leader of a collective approach to problems; the bulk of steward contact with members
actually concerned individual grievances probably leading to the view by the shop
stewards that their members were only self-interested. (See also Goodman and
Whittingham 1969, Batstone et a11977, Terry 1982). Indeed, Schuller and Robertson
argued that if contact with members was confmed to individual grievance processing it
would reinforce the tendency of members to ignore the role of the union as a collective
organisation. Perhaps if these stewards had involved the whole work group in the
problem solving process, thereby turning individual problems into group ones, they
and the union may have been regarded differently by their members.
However, even self interested members may act collectively to achieve their aims,
hence the term "instrumental collectivism" (Goldthorpe et al 1968). Providing the
steward has the right personality and style of working to induce member participation,
there should be no reason why unions should not be able to achieve at least some of
their goals on the shopfloor. Nevertheless, it is imperative that lay representatives
have the backing of their members, otherwise any potential "power" may be lost; "the
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crux of the power of any shop steward is his ability to carry his [/her] members with
him [/her] in a course of action" (Goodman and Whittingham 1969, pI4). Members
play a vital role in the styles of behaviour which stewards might adopt (Batstone et: al
1977); however, if the representative has the right style of working he/she ought to be
able to "lead" his/her members effectively (posh 1993). Nichols and Armstrong
(1976) suggested that the workers at Chemco had "not demonstrated any awareness of
the fact that they will not get the representation they want until they themselves are
willing to provide the backing" (PlIO); perhaps if the stewards there had developed a
different style of working they may have had more success in getting their members'
participation in those affairs that involved them.
From his evidence Terry (1982) suggested that with a dispersed workforce, as is very
often the case in the public services, a "key steward" was crucial to the success of
workplace unionism. The steward must have mobility, that is accessibility to members
and to the decision-making levels of management. Contact with membership was
essential to ensure that everyone knew that the trade union organisation existed and
was available to them, otherwise the trade union simply became a label which went
along with the job. The key steward formed the basis of the trade union structure.
Terry also argued that an emphasis on individual grievances put less of a strain on a
fragmented workforce than collective issues might. However, it could be argued that
this might also reduce the effectiveness of the organisation in the workplace as a
whole.
Two seemingly contradictory state of affairs can be seen. Research suggests that trade
union members are largely self-interested and treat their shop steward as an individual
problem solver; and yet membership participation in union affairs was found to have a
positive influence on perceptions of union effectiveness. Linked to this is the assertion
that the style and personalities of local leaders are important in determining
membership interest and participation in union activities. If members are largely self
interested it might be assumed that unless something affected them personally they
would not be interested and union participation would be slight, possibly leading to a
poor evaluation of the effectiveness of the union itself. However, it could be argued
that because most trade union members have the same self interests, generally higher
wages and improved working conditions, participation in union meetings and activities
which are arranged to specifically address problems of this nature may be much higher
than participation in a meeting designed to discuss an issue unrelated to the shopfloor.
This suggestion is given added weight by the findings from a study which found that
willingness to attend union meetings was strongly related to both goal motives and role
related characteristics (Flood 1993).
Perhaps the two fmdings are not as contradictory as it may at first seem. Providing
that the problems are local and relate (even indirectly) to all members maybe they
would find it beneficial, in their own self interests, to participate in the union activities
that relate to those problems. This may, to a large extent, rely upon the effectiveness
of the local shop stewards' "styles" in "involving" their members in the problem
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solving aspects of any grievance (posh 1993). This in tum may affect members'
perceptions of the effectiveness or the "power" of their union. In fact Hancke's
(1993) comparative study demonstrated that local structures were a much stronger
predictor than national structural elements of union strength. Hancke argued that
national arrangements were only beneficial to the national union movement and then
only in addition to strong local unions. Unions with strong local structures lost very
few members or actually gained some whilst those unions without a strong local
organisation saw their union density drop. It may be the case that where workers can
see that a union is attempting to protect its members' interests they may be more
inclined to join. For example, the 1994 BBC dispute prompted more than 600
membership applications to the NUJ, mostly in the two weeks before the first day of
action.t+
These factors indicate that union organisation can be built up providing workplace
organisations deliver the goods as far as the employees are concerned. Authors who
suggest that trade union organisation is declining by basing their assumptions on a
national system of industrial relations rather than a workplace based system, may be
misleading their readers (see for example, Beaumont 1987).
Friedman (1982) was interested in the Teamsters Union in America. He concluded
that workers can take over a local union and use it to defend themselves at their
workplace. Democratic workers' movements are those in which power is held at the
bottom by the rank and file; the active involvement of the rank and file in negotiations
produced much more favourable settlements of grievances. Successful unionism
depends upon the direct action of union members. Officers, argued Friedman, can at
the most lead the workers but the workers must do the fighting, "reliance on legalism
destroys workers' capability to take direct action, and even weakens workers' ability
to use legalism effectively" (1982, p245). Therefore, it could be argued that the
legislation will, from Friedman's point of view, seriously weaken the power of
national trade unions to defend and advance their members' interests, but not
necessarily members' power in their own workplaces.
However, whether members in particular workplaces will be prepared to become
actively involved in those issues which concern the union may depend upon their
steward's ability to interest them in unionism and therefore encourage them to
participate. Fosh and Cohen (1990) argued that it did not matter whether the lay
representative was ideologically or instrumentally driven providing he/she had the right
style of working to encourage hislher members to participate in the affairs that
involved the union. Yet it has been concluded that the different responses of NUM
members in two almost identical collieries during the 1984/5 miners' strike were due to
the ideological differences of the union leadership at those workplaces. Rigg (1987)
argued that those leaders who had completed courses in politics, economics and
industrial law appeared to be more theoretically and practically equipped to influence
and raise the consciousness of their membership.
14 "Your Union At Work" National Union of Journalists Report (1995).
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Darlington (1994a) also argued that "the best defence of workers' interests is strong
workplace union organisation which, despite the need for compromise, is both willing
and able to engage in militant struggle against management" (P290). Darlington
appeared to be advocating that unionism must be more than just workplace based. He
argued that political organisation and consciousness was of paramount importance in
the revitalisation of workplace unionism; shop stewards', and therefore their
members, "factory consciousness" should be broadened into a more "class conscious"
perspective. However, as other studies have shown, workers, even two or three
decades ago, were less inclined to develop a "class consciousness", which implies a
wider movement, than they were a "factory consciousness" which involved them
personally. Therefore, while Darlington, amongst others, may see the way of
overthrowing capitalism through a combined movement of worker struggles, workers
themselves appear interested only in the fates of their own workplaces (Brown 1986,
Terry 1986) and are not interested in changing society. Even in 1968 Flanders
commented that workers did not join unions because they thought alike and shared the
same political outlook, they joined for the sake of gaining immediate improvements in
their lot, (see also Moran 1974). If workers do not share the same political outlook,
and surveys have shown that some union members had voted Conservative (for
example, Rentoul 1989, Millward 1990), they cannot be expected to fight for a "new
society". Nevertheless, Darlington's case studies did reveal that the different
personalities and styles of working of the stewards could affect the "power" of the
union in the workplace and the morale of members.
2:9 Trade union power - myth or reality?
Overall no firm conclusions can be reached regarding trade union power. Research
has even revealed mixed conclusions as to whether the legislation designed to reduce
that power had had any damaging effects upon trade unions. Indeed, in some
instances it seems that the very legislation designed to reduce union power may
actually have had positive effects for trade unions, for example, the balloting
procedures. However, the review of the literature does reveal a few important and
interconnected points:
There are two different strands of unionism - the national organisation
and the shepfloor unit and it appears that it does make a difference which of these
a person is referring to when he/she comments about trade union power. As a rule,
those who argue that trade union power has been curtailed tend to be referring to
national union organisations, whereas those who suggest that nothing much has
changed are usually referring to shopfloor or workplace organisations. As the next
chapter elaborates, trade union "power" may once have appeared to have belonged to
national organisations and the trade union movement as a whole, yet, in many respects
this may have been an illusion which has now almost disappeared, perhaps due to the
union legislation, which seems to restrain national unions much more than their
workplace units, (see chapter 4). As MacInnes (1990) said:
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"Trade unions have changed less than we expected under Thatcherism, because the core of
their activity - collective bargaining at workplace and company level, has to some extent
been insulated from mass unemployment and anti-union legislation." (p229).
The balance of advantage may well have been transferred from the national union
leaders to employers (Kavanagh 1990) but this view neglects the fact that within the
workplace the "union leader" may still retain a "powerful" position and this may also
be recognised by management.
The two different branches of unionism represent different dimensions of trade
union "power"; that is the ability of the union to achieve a desired goal and produce
effects. The shopfloor or workplace unit tends to be the centre of union activity for
most members and it is here where any "bargaining power" is used over workplace
grievances, very often without the "interference" of the national union. The national
union wields the "power" to administer services (especially legal services) and benefits
to members when they are needed. Most studies of trade union power concentrate
only on their "bargaining power" and tend to neglect the fact that union benefits, such
as representation at industrial tribunals, can still be classed as a capacity to produce
effects and can, therefore, be seen as an exercise of power. In fact it has been argued
that for the smaller less militant unions, their social role was probably more important
than their economic role (Milligan 1976). The benefits, insurance and support
provided for members helped "with the maze of officialdom they have to confront"
(Milligan 1976, pI79).
Evidence from the 1990 WIRS suggested that trade unions continued to play an
important role in representing and assisting individual members in dismissal and
disciplinary procedures; indeed, dismissal rates were found to be much lower in
unionised firms (Millward et al 1992). This could reflect upon the "power" of the
workplace organisation, which may negotiate with management for the member's
reinstatement, but it might also reflect unions' success rate at industrial tribunals;
employers may be reluctant to dismiss union members unless they feel that they have
an undisputed case.l5 In fact, it has been argued that risk-averse workers will
willingly join a trade union and pay subscriptions even if there is no wage gain from
15 According to a Labour Research article 40,000 individuals submitted industrial tribunal
applications alleging that they bad been unfairly dismissed in 1993; the largest ever recorded figure.
(Labour Research 1994d.) This figure appears to be rising rapidly; between March 1993 and March
1994 nearly 70,000 claims were submitted (Labour Research 1995). Perhaps more alarmingly,
according to the Employment Department's analysis there was a sharp fall in legal representation for
employees and an increase for employers. As certain employment sectors were over represented among
the tribunal applicants, in particular distribution, hotels and catering, it might be reasonable to
suggest that these types of workers would benefit from union membership. The 1995a TUC survey
found that unions actually had a much higher success rate in negotiating settlements than all other
parties and, with one exception, unfair dismissal and redundancy were the most common grounds for
submitting applications; eighty per cent of the claims were over part time workers' access to equal
pension provision. The fact that unions have been using tribunals to challenge discrimination against
part time workers is a good indication that unions are protecting their interests as well as full time
workers, and if non-union part time workers see that their union counterparts are gaining from their
membership it might encourage more to join.
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doing so if unions offer "insurance" against victimisation and arbitrary dismissal
(Blanchflower et al 1990).
Perhaps not such a pressing reality because no one likes to think that accidents will
happen to them, but another union benefit is usually the provision of legal
representation for accidents at work, which can be a very costly experience for a
worker paying his/her own legal fees. Many workers may not realise the importance
or even existence of this benefit until the unfortunate moment itself happens. A 1994
Labour Research survey found that though unions' priority was preventing work
accidents and ill health by campaigning for better health and safety standards, unions
were very successful at ensuring that their members were properly compensated for
work related injuries and illnesses (Labour Research 1994a). This suggests that
unions are "powerful" in the sense that they are able to achieve a desired goal for their
members, compensation against employers for work related accidents or illnesses.
However, it appears that while benefits provided by the national union are important to
members.re especially in terms of compensation, they are more interested in their
union's "power" to help them on matters relating to their everyday working situations;
in particular money, working conditions and job security. The shopfloor union
organisation appears to be the most important as far as rank and fIle members are
concerned. This it seems has always been the case. The steward is the union
representative who members look upon as "the union"; he/she is the person who deals
with their problems, even those problems, such as an accident at work claim, which
the national union eventually resolves tend to be dealt with initially by the steward for
the member. Therefore, the steward is the union as far as the maijority of
members are concerned and it is most likely that the steward's
performance influences members' perceptions of their unlon.r? National
organisations and their shopfloor units appear to be different entities, each with their
own views and ways of working. As Fairbrother (1990) argued "a nationally-based
and focused set of policies need not necessarily correspond with the specific detail and
circumstances of workplace organisation and action." (p172).
Different workplace union organisations, even of the same union, have
varying degrees of success within the workplace. This may, to a large
extent, reflect the different personalities at those workplaces, in
particular that of the lay representatives and especially the main lay
representative. When measuring the power of trade unions in terms of decision
making, at first sight it may appear that management have the upper hand; however,
this could be interpreted differently if the whole process of decision making is taken
16 The seventh BSAS found that 71% of union members questioned thought that '10 get members'
benefits" was an important reason to belong to a trade union (Millward 1990).
17 Colling (1995) argued that the vast differences that existed between the different workforces he
investigated, especially as to the strength and maturity of the local organisation, "exposed and
intensified divisions between the membership and had serious consequences for the perception of the
union locally" (pI42).
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into account rather than just the final outcome. Even studies which had concluded that
decision making was a management prerogative also concluded that management
remained preoccupied with union affairs (for example, Wilson et al 1982, Edwards
and Heery 1989). Nevertheless, it certainly appears that trade union power,
while definitely existing, was probably not as "powerful" as sometimes
stated. This coupled with the fact that the amount of "power" possessed by unions
varies from workplace to workplace makes it extremely difficult to generalise
about the extent of trade union power let alone any decline in that
power. In general trade unions exercise a negative and defensive power and the key
to that "power", at least in the workplace, appears to lie with the lay
representatives.
From the evidence presented above, it can be argued that trade union power has
never been a myth; however, in reality trade unions exercise different types of
"power", depending on whether the focus is on the national organisations or the
shopfloor units. The national organisations still retain the "power" to help their
members through the use of union services and benefits. Perhaps Martin (1992) was
correct when he argued that national unions were becoming like Employers'
Associations, they do appear to resemble insurance agencies, a fall back in times of
need. The "power" of a trade union to defend and advance its members' immediate
interests in the workplace appears to be a distinct reality in some workplaces, while in
others that "power" is less predominant. However, this does not indicate a reduction
in trade union power; even before 1979 some shopfloor organisations were much
more successful than others at getting their own way. Explanations for this include the
type of union involved; for example, those representing public sector employees and
those representing the private sector, reliance on FTOs and the nature of the bargaining
arrangements. Yet it appears that the main reason for any difference in trade union
power between workplaces is actually the lay representative himJherself.
The essential ingredient for trade union power is the solidarity of the
workers, "where they are united they invariably achieve their ends" (Batstone et al
1977, p98), and the key to membership involvement is the steward. The
shopfloor is the place where members are most likely to unite over issues that affect
them personally, unless they require some form of union benefit members tend to be
less interested in the activities of their national union. Therefore, from a members'
point of view it could be argued that trade union power actually lies within the
workplace rather than with their national union. National unions may have
changed but on the shopfloor much appears to remain the same as it
always has.
The next chapter looks at the rise of the shop steward along with the move towards
workplace bargaining, which, it could be argued, placed the onus on the steward
rather than the national organisation. Overall the chapter asks whether trade unions are
best seen as national organisations or as shopfloor units.
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CHAPTER3 TRADE UNIONS: NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
OR SHOPFLOOR UNITS?
3: 1 Introduction
When the term "trade union" is referred to its meaning is rarely questioned, but does
the term always refer to the same organisation? Evidence seems to point to the fact that
there is more than one strand of unionism. Therefore, it is possible that one person's
meaning of a trade union is different from another's. Unionism for the sake of
simplicity can be divided into two entities - the national organisation 1 and the
workplace or shopfloor organisation) Whilst they are connected each has its own
identity and very often the term "trade union" is used when referring to either.
Many commentators have argued (for example, Kavanagh 1990, Roberts 1987, 1989)
that the 1980s witnessed a decline in "trade union power" and others have suggested
that while the nature of industrial relations may have changed trade unions tend to
remain intact and at workplace level nothing much has altered, (for example MacInnes
1987, Batstone 1988,Towers 1989, Marsh 1992a). However, when discussing the
issue of "trade union power" it seems very likely that the debate centres on what the
term "trade union" is referring to; those who suggest that trade union power has been
curtailed are usually focusing on the national side of trade unions. In the light of
previous research findings, it is highly likely that to members "trade union" refers to
their shopfloor unit and not the national union. It has even been suggested that for
many employers "the unions" are simply their own workforces (MacInnes 1987).
Members are more concerned with shopfloor issues and those problems that affect
them personally rather than with the activities of their national union or even their own
branch (for example, Sherman 1986, Goldthorpe et alI968). There is a distinct lack
of interest among the membership when it comes down to branch meetings; perhaps
this has always been the case. Allen (1954) noted low branch attendance; he argued
that this may indicate nothing more than the fact that SUbscriptions are collected "on the
job" or that an effective shop steward system was in operation. Is this an indication
that to members the union is based in the workplace and not outside it? At least in the
1 The national union, in this context, is taken to include every union organisation other than the
branch which is outside the shopfloor unit, for example the district and regional offices. In other
words everything which is headed directly by an official who is paid by the union itself constitutes the
national union. Whereas branch officials are paid by the national union for their branch activities they
tend to be elected from amongst senior shopfloor representatives. Different unions do have different
branches and there may be differing degrees of reliance on them but it does seems that, in many
instances, the branch today is nothing more than a go-between for the national and shopfloor
organisations.
2 Shopfloor and workplace will be used interchangeably. However, there can be a difference between
the shopfloor organisation and the workplace organisation. In a workplace different workshops may
have their own union organisations which are separate from each other; therefore, the workplace
organisation could be described as being made up of the different shopfloor units, each with its own
ways of working and own levels of influence.
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private sector, the shop steward at the workplace performs most of the functions
necessary to resolve members' grievances and even if the full time officer (PTO) has to
be called in, members probably would not see the situation as being handled by the
national union. It has even been found that matters relating to unions as a whole were
rarely discussed between stewards and members and that most members did not see
their representative as a link with the national union (Schuller and Robertson 1983).
As will be seen in part 2 of the thesis the national union is considered to be "out of
touch" with the realities of the shopfloor. Benefits are provided by the national
organisation but where these benefits are connected to workplace grievances, such as
an accident or an industrial disease, in general members still see their workplace
representative as the "union"; he/she is the person who gives them the advice and as a
rule helps them to make their claim and deals with any problems relating to it.3
Nevertheless, according to the AEEU many members were failing to take advantage of
the services on offer, even those services which are directly connected to work such as
legal representation for an accident claim. Some members were using private solicitors
at tremendous cost to themselves and usually lacking the specialist knowledge that the
union solicitors can provide; very often cases were only resolved satisfactorily after a
union solicitor had been brought in.4 This is possibly another indication that to
workers the shopfloor is "the union": those particular members may have joined the
union for the shopfloor benefits; that is protection against the employer on the
shopfloor itself. The workplace is the location where problems occur and is usually
the place where those same problems are solved without any reference to the outside
organisation. Nothing much has changed in the nature of workplace unionism, for
even before the acclaimed watershed year of 1979, some workplaces had strong
organisations and others had weaker ones. The gap between the workplace
organisation and the national organisation is not a new phenomenon.
3:2 Shopfloor units - the first step to union organisation
How did it transpire that the prominence of shopfloor units should take precedence
over the national organisation, at least from the members' point of view? To answer
this question it is necessary to look briefly at the formation of unions in the nineteenth
century. It can then clearly be seen that unions were originally based upon the
workplace and the fact that shopfloor units actually become "the union" can be looked
upon, not as a new phenomenon but, as a product of their very formation.
The early unions, which were essentially craft or "trade" unions, were loose
federations of trade societies, temporarily united to fight issues that extended to whole
trades. The fragmentation of trades into many small workshops each catering for a
local market, plus the fact that transport, and therefore communication, was not fully
developed at that time, kept anything resembling a "union" confmed to the workplace.
3 Goodman and Whittingham (1969) claimed that many members regarded their FTOs as legal claims
experts rather than as their representatives.
4 Union Review, May 1994 & Union Review, August 1994.
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From the 1850s, with the aid of a railway system making communication beyond the
immediate community much easier, local societies tended to join together to form
national unions with a growing centralisation of power at that level. The main
attractions of these unions were their friendly society functions; bargaining tended to
remain at local level. National bargaining became widespread only in the inter war
years. Typically the formation of a union would take place at workplace level and
wherever sections of workers established themselves as "a union" they tended to be
vigorously opposed to central direction. Labour unrest at grass roots level was not
political in motivation but mainly economic. In many cases, the rank and file, who
were faced with immediate and specific problems, were resentful of their national
leadership who, in tum, were suspicious of the activities of their members. National
leaders tended to frown upon any activity which might consume the assets of the union
and prejudice sick and superannuation benefits.
The second wave of unionism in the late 1800s and early 1900s involved semi- and
unskilled workers. Again, these "new unions" were little more than federations of
small unions based on a localised occupation and many elected their own, albeit
unofficial, workplace leaders. The workers, it seems, even then saw "their union" as
the workplace unit; the workplace was, and still is, the place where workers could
identify with each other, which has been described as a "factory consciousness" as
opposed to a class consciousness.e It has been argued, probably correctly, that trade
unionism did not develop a "class consciousness" that went beyond the workplace
antagonism of labour and capital (Lane 1974). Organisations of working men may
have been looked upon as revolutionaries by governments, employers and even their
national organisations,« but in general this could not have been further from the truth.
No doubt people existed who wished to change the social order, but the average
working person was more concerned with the immediate problems related to work. It
could be argued then, that trade unionism was solidly rooted in the workplace from the
time of its very conception.
Collective bargaining in Britain has passed through three broad phases of development
(Marsh and Coker 1963). Before the first world war, wages and conditions were
primarily settled at local level. The war was followed by depression, Whitleyism and a
new pattern of general unionism which gave impetus to the development of national
negotiations and national agreements on wages and conditions. During and since the
second world war the tendency has been for national agreements to remain but as a
general framework for the growth of workplace bargaining. While national
agreements may be advantageous in some respects, (for example, they introduced an
element of predictability into the course of labour costs easing competition between
5 Beynon (1973) suggested that while a shopfloor organisation may not be political as such. politics
is essentially about power and who does what to whom; therefore, a shopfloor organisation can have
quite a developed political understanding but the boundary of this politics is the factory floor and is
"implicitly tied up with the day-to-day battle with the boss." (p87).
6 During the early twentieth century, some employers fearing revolution from their employees were
willing to accept trade unions as national organisations. seeing them as barriers to social revolution
(Lane 1974).
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firms in the same industry) where they cover working conditions they seldom cover
the regulation of many matters of importance to the shopfloor, leaving considerable
scope for the practice of workplace bargaining.
The main body of domestic negotiations operate in an informal fashion, is confined to
the privacy of the factory walls and is seldom recorded in formal agreements of any
kind." A. I.Marsh (1963) compared it to a family circle; it only becomes of public
interest when any arrangements break down. He contended that workplace bargaining
evolved to fill the gaps in an inadequate system of national agreements. However, it
could be argued that workplace bargaining was most probably a central feature of the
unionisation of workers. In fact, Marsh himself suggested that "[t]he growth of
workplace bargaining is .... most easily explained as arising from clashes of interest
between management and work groups." (P22). This is surely one of the reasons
workers initially formed into unions and, therefore, could be taken to mean that
workplace bargaining has always been the norm. Negotiations usually involve a key
figure, at workplace level that key figure today is most commonly known as the shop
steward.
3:3 The rise of the shop steward
Shop stewards first rose to prominence (that is visibility outside the workplace) in the
war years but they had been active for many years before that, the engineering industry
being the original home of the "shop steward". The district committees of the ASE
were first authorised by their union rules to appoint shop stewards in 1896, primarily
to keep the membership in check, but the growth of a conspicuous, rival leadership
based on the workplace occurred during world war one. Engineering stewards had no
nationally recognised rights in workshop negotiations until the end of the war; their
recognition was a result of their own work during the war and their unoffIcial
leadership of the rank and file (Marsh and Coker 1963).
The "Shop Stewards and Works Committee Agreements" of 1917 and 1919, (which
are substantially repeated in the 1922 Procedure Agreement), gave stewards the
representational rights of their members after the foreman stage within the limits of
their workshops, but insisted that they should conform to the same working conditions
as their fellow workers. These agreements were an important milestone for the
engineering stewards, giving them the basis for a formal position and status in the
workplace and ensuring they were free to deal with domestic matters without
interference from outside officials, who were only allowed to be present when
7 However, some workplaces may record any agreements made between the shopfloor and
management: the shop steward organisation of a local firm insisted that every concession they gained
was written down or added to existing agreements. These agreements were not legally binding, and
had nothing to do with the employers' association or the national union as such, but the management
and the workers abided by them. The convenor argued that when everything is written down there is
always proof that certain things had been agreed upon; if either side to the agreement wanted to
change any part of it it had to be renegotiated. McCarthy (1966) noted that sometimes informal
arrangements were codified in procedures between the union and management.
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domestic discussions between the shop steward(s) and management had been
exhausted.
It cannot be disputed that workplace bargaining became more prominent after the
second world war; however, it is highly likely that workplace bargaining has always
been present, though its scope was obscured by its informality (Goodman and
Whittingham 1969). It could also be argued that many workplace union organisations
have always been independent of their national bodies: their workplace leaders were
(and still are) not publicly visible; the less an organisation becomes visible the more
effective it probably is, because problems are solved within the confines of the
workplace.
The definition and role of the shop steward may vary between unions and industries.
Originally the role was seen by the national unions as an information carrier between
union and management hierarchies, and the steward was regarded as a recruiter of
members and a guardian of national agreements. In practice this supposed situation is
not the case and probably never was - the shop steward (from whichever union) may
have many tasks but hislher prime and most important one is to represent the interests
of hislher members in the workplace. This is where the role of workplace bargainer
enters the scene. The most important duties according to shop stewards were issues of
pay, hours, policing agreements with management, hygiene, joint consultation, branch
and steward meetings, members' welfare problems, production queries and complaints
about management (Goodman and Whittingham 1969). However, a separate study
comprised of observation and analysis of the work diaries of shop stewards found that
pay and hours were seldom important (Goodman and Whittingham 1969). This could
be related to two factors: either the steward did not bargain over payor he/she only
did so when the pay negotiations came around, usually once a year; the rest of the
year was taken up with the more pressing realities of the workplace.
It is important to recognise that workplace bargaining can be a cloudy area. Lack of de
jure recognition of a shop steward does not mean that de facto recognition is not
present within the workplace.s In many establishments management find it easier to
deal with one person representing many than with each worker individually;
encouragement of shop stewards by managements is an important but often
overlooked element in workplace bargaining (Goodman and Whittingham 1969). It
had even been suggested that one of the most important reasons for the "great power
and standing" of stewards in British industries was because managements' liked them
to have it and helped to give it to them (Clegg et all961).
Most stewards are prepared to bargain about anything that may affect the interests of
their members (A.I. Marsh 1963). Indeed, McCarthy (1966) argued that the steward
used "every opportunity available to him to try and satisfy members' demands. If
necessary he is ready to circumvent established procedures and union rules in pursuit
8 For the purposes of this paper the term "shop steward" refers to the workplace union representative
whether be/she has credentials or not.
58
of this objective." (p4). This is probably still true today, and despite legislation
designed to bolster the employers' position in respect of unofficial action, it may not
affect the stewards' position within the workplace as many employers prefer to deal
with their own workforce representatives rather than FfOs (Clegg et al 1961,
McCarthy and Parker 1968, Goodman and Whittingham 1969). It is an advantage to
keep problems within the workplaces: the shop steward knows the intimate details of
the ease and more importantly knows the implications of the dispute and has better
contacts with the workers. All this may be unfamiliar to outside sources. It could
also be argued that without a workplace representative many issues may take a lot
longer to process (if indeed they are brought to anyone's attention) leaving a
dissatisfied workforce for longer, which may lead to even bigger problems. In
addition, managements do not like to admit that they cannot manage their own affairs
and if the outside union is called in, it usually means that employers' representatives
will be called in too; many managers may feel that it is a confession of defeat to allow
issues to proceed outside the workplace (A.I. Marsh 1963).
Negotiation with shop stewards may also improve domestic relations within the
workplace. A long established steward can be essential to the workplace organisation,
especially with his/her knowledge of plant practices and precedents; he/she can also be
a stabilising influence upon the other stewards. Shop stewards may also maintain a
certain degree of internal discipline among the workforce. Beynon (1973) suggested
that controlling the membership was a part of the shop steward's job and could mean
that the steward, rather than management, disciplined individual workers for not
working properly. Stewards may also prevent workers from taking various courses of
action (see for example, Batstone 1984). This may still be the ease in some
workplaces. The convenor of a local firm insisted when interviewed that "the union
controls the shopfloor to the advantage of management"; if a member stepped out of
line management would say "he's your responsibility, you deal with it". Similarly, a
retired AEU shop steward commented that "the steward was as good as a gaffer"
during his working time and ensured that members did a "fair day's work for a fair
day's pay". Indeed, Marchington and Parker (1990) found that in one of their case
studies there was no attempt by management to remove the closed shop because they
saw no point in destabilising an arrangement which offered a degree of order in the
workplace. (See also Edwards and Heery 1989b.)
An established steward ean also be useful to management, particularly because
management will most likely have got to know the individual and his/her reactions
and, therefore, where they are liable to stand on an issue before they even confront the
workforce with it. In fact, it could be argued that stewards who are good at their jobs
would not allow management to confront the workforce with issues that they know
will be found unacceptable to their members. It has been suggested that the degree to
9 A.I. Marsh (1963) called it the "cult of privacy", meaning "without outside interference". Private
settlements resolve immediate problems without any fuss, create no precedents elsewhere am both
parties have to live with the consequences - outsiders may create difficulties for which they accept no
responsibility .
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which management initiates discussion and negotiation (rather than the union
representative) depends on two factors: their views as to the strength of the workers'
organisation and their personal relationships with the shop stewards involved
(McCarthy 1966).
It is probably still true that the shop steward is "more of a lubricant than an irritant" in
the workplace (McCarthy and Parker 1968, p56). This part of the steward's role
would be difficult to conduct by sources outside the workplace. It can be very
important that the steward is seen as "one of the lads"; if he/she is viewed as being
outside the group the likelihood is that he/she will not be accepted and a rival
leadership may emerge. The shop steward's relationship with hislher members is the
most crucial aspect of hislher job and the key to hislher success.
3:4 Shopfloor dependence on the national union
It appears that national and workplace union organisations are definitely two different
strands of unionism. Brown et al (1978) concluded that steward organisations were
mainly "home grown" arising despite, rather than because of, the formal constitution
of the outside union. This could be interpreted to mean that the "shopfloor union" is a
separate unit to the national union, which fits entirely with the thesis that the national
and workplace organisations of the same union are two entities each with their own
identity and goals. A shopfloor organisation may be "largely self-contained and self-
regulating, in the sense that its main motivations, pressures and controlling impulses
originate within the plant itself" (McCarthy and Parker 1968, p67) and is concerned
largely with the realities of the workplace. The national union is an external
organisation, and as Nichols and Armstrong (1976) put it, "quite simply, the officials
are not part of these workers' world." (pp30- 31). Indeed, studies have found that
when shop stewards become FIOs they may unintentionally become distanced from
their members just by the nature of their job; they tend to take a different view on
certain issues to a shopfloor perspective (see for example, Beynon 1973). National
organisations may cover so many different workplaces that it is impossible to expect
officials to be familiar with every issue of concern to members, especially those that
are unique to particular workplaces; many national unions find it difficult to give
substance to workplace concerns (Fairbrother 1990). Therefore, it could be argued
that for unionism to become effective within a workplace it is essential that the
shopfloor unit can work independently of its parent body.
However, there are vast differences between workplaces as to how reliant shopfloor
organisations are on their FIOs. Boraston et al (1975) described a continuum with
complete shop steward independence at one extreme and virtually complete
dependence on their FIOs at the other, along which different workplaces fell at
different points in time. Numerous studies have stressed the importance of particular
factors which may shed light on this phenomenon.
It has been suggested that variations in the way work is organised, for example,
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different technologies and job descriptions, leads to different behavioural
characteristics of workers which influences the industrial relations of different plants
(Sayles 1958). It has also been suggested that the size of a workplace may influence
the nature of its shop steward organisation (for example, Brown et al 1978, Boraston
et al 1978). Large firms may give shop stewards an advantage over those in smaller
firms; there are more members (and potential members) and where there are more
members there tends to be more shop stewards, who may then build up a network of
relationships and build on each other's experiences. While these explanations may go
some way towards explaining the difference between different types of workers, for
example, clerical workers who may work on an individual basis and factory workers
who work together as a team, they would not account for the differences between
similar groups of workers or between workplaces of the same size or even the fact that
small workplaces may have a strong union organisation.
The attitudes of management, FrOs and even the union itself may influence the
amount of independence that shop stewards exercise. Boraston et al (1975) concluded
that the outside union can either actively encourage or discourage workplace
independence, especially by the availability of the FrO; lack of a FrO may push a
workplace organisation towards independence whereas the ready availability of a FrO
may hold it back. (See also Derber 1955). However, once a workforce has become
self reliant there is little the national organisation can do but accept it (Boraston et al
1975). Managers may also be involved in this process. Brown et al (1978) found that
management resistance or acceptance could have an affect on union organisation; in
their opinion management played the dominant part in determining the strength of the
workplace organisation. In co-operation with employers, and within the limits set by
them, the national union could restrict the decision making which was left to the
workplace organisation (Boraston et al 1975).
Therefore, institutional factors, such as the degree of centralisation in a workplace or
industry, the form of its collective agreements and the nature of its wage structure,
may influence steward behaviour. It has been suggested that if a national union is
initially invited by management to organise the workplace it hinders the development
of member-steward communication; recognition of the national union ensures that the
workers do not experience the shared struggle often necessary to gain union
recognition. The argument is carried further by suggesting that with national
agreements employees' working lives are structured by externally given facts, rules
and procedures, so that they lack an effective power base of their own (Nichols and
Armstrong 1976). However, even where all major agreements must be settled at
national level, taking the main bargaining areas out of the stewards' hands, there is
plenty of scope for a strong workplace organisation to develop; many grievances can
occur during the working day which the shop steward could negotiate with
management about, especially those which need immediate attention.
The fact that most managements prefer to deal with their shop stewards rather than
outside sources (Clegg et al 1961, McCarthy and Parker 1968, Goodman and
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Whittingham 1969) may encourage shopfloor union development. Indeed, it was
suggested that employers assisted the development of workplace bargaining by
resisting detailed outside regulation and the free entry of Fl'Os into the workplace
(A.!. Marsh 1963). However, while this may explain the differences between
different workplaces it does not shed any light on why differences may exist between
two shopfloor organisations within the same workplace.
It must be argued that despite changes in the compositions of unions and the labour
market over the last five decades it is very likely that there are other factors which
determine the independence and, therefore, the "power" of shop floor organisations.
The union, as far as the rank and file are concerned, is situated in the workplace and
evidence tends to point to the fact that this has always been the case. The steward,
even if not always known as such, has probably existed wherever men and women
have worked together. Different unions may advocate certain ways of working for
their shop stewards; however, in the end it is down to the individual himlherself. The
variations between and within workplaces (and between different points in time) of the
independence of shopfloor organisations and their success within the workplace may
have an important connection with the personalities and working styles of the
representatives in those establishments. Therefore, it could be argued that the
personality and style of working of the lay representative are essential ingredients for
successful unionism in the workplace. This would go a long way to explain the
differences between and within workplaces as to the perceived power of the union
organisation.
3:5 Are national unions becoming too big?
Many shop stewards feel that their national union organisation is out of touch with
shopfloor issues. These shop stewards are usually members of the larger unions
which have established workplace organisations in many industries and over a wide
geographical area. It is understandable that workers' representatives feel that they
themselves have more knowledge about their own workplace and the problems that
they encounter there. However, in smaller unions the situation may be very different.
..As a small union we're much closer to our members. I regularly attend shop floor
meetings and any union member can pick up the phone and arrange to see the general
secretary within 24 hours" said the general secretary of the National Union of Lock
and Metal Workers (NULM). (Labour Researcb 1992a p15). This would be an
impossibility in the larger unions.
Many small unions are craft unions and have a highly localised base, usually dealing
with one industry and one employers' federation; therefore the national union is in
close contact with its members and their problems. In a sense this can be compared to
the workplace organisation of a larger union. The general secretary of the Rossendale
Union of Boot, Shoe and Slipper Operatives summed this up neatly:
"Our structure is firmly based on the shopfloor and in the local community. We know
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all our members and employers and understand what's going on in the factories and the
communities." (LabourResearch, 1992a, p l S.)
Therefore, in contrast to the larger union organisations, it could be argued that in small
unions the national organisation itself is considered to be "the union". The larger
unions are so big and cover many workers in different industries that it is essential for
the workers to develop a strong shopfloor organisation to maintain themselves
adequately within the workplace. Those with close contact with the workplace have a
better understanding of the immediate problems there. It would be impossible for the
national leaders of a large union to understand the problems encountered in each
individual workplace.
As a union expands it tends to become alienated from the problems of its individual
workforces, becoming more a source of information for lay representatives and a
benefit and service agency for members. This is not to say that small unions do not
provide benefits for their members, but, with the exception of perhaps the NULM,
many do not directly offer the same specialist services as those provided by the larger
unions (Labour Research 1992a). Nevertheless, as their members still appeared
satisfied with "their union" whether benefits were on offer or not, it can be presumed
that the local base of a small union and the special contact that members may have with
their national organisation is what they enjoyed. This may be another indication that to
members of the larger unions the shopfloor is "the union" rather than the national
organisation; it is local, close knit, has knowledge of local problems and the lay
representative is more readily available than a national officer. In a sense, a small
union could be seen as the equivalent to a shopfloor organisation of a larger union, at
least from the workers' point of view.
In multi-union firms a convenor or senior steward from one union may represent
stewards from the other unions on site. In fact, case studies have revealed that on
some multi-union sites a self-governing organisation made up of representatives from
many unions existed within the workplace. This shows that even where many unions
were involved the workplace/shopfloor was still considered to be "the union" by those
involved. Beynon (1973) argued that the multi-union situation at Fords in Dagenham
led to a "powerful and efficient organisation" owing no allegiance to any of the
individual unions represented, much to the dissatisfaction of the national unions
involved; they resented the independence of the shop stewards' committee and its
strength within the workplace - which was called "a private union within a union" by
the two inquiries set up to look at industrial relations at the Dagenham car plant where
constant friction had caused many stoppages of work (1957, 1963).10 The shop
stewards were relatively immune from the disciplinary powers of their Fl'Os but it also
10 Report of a Court of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of a Dispute at Briggs Motor
Bodies Limited, Dagenham. (1957) London: HMSO. Cmnd. 131, pSI.
Report of a Court of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of a Dispute at the Ford Motor
Company Limited. Dagenham. (1963) London: HMSO. Cmnd. 1999, p26.
See also Turner et al (1967) who concluded that the shop stewards' organisation had become a real
union with almost a similar degree of elaboration and complexity as the larger union.
63
meant that they existed without the protection of the official union organisation. This
suggests that "union" organisation can take place solely within a workplace without a
national organisation to watch over them. Admittedly members would then be without
the added protection of benefits, but if the workplace organisation is strong enough
there is no reason why it should not continue, providing the workers give their
support. So, in theory, there is no reason why workplace organisations could not
survive without national backing.
John Edmonds of the GMB has argued that the labour movement must return to its
roots if fifteen years of falling membership is to be halted and if unions are to cope
with the decline of the large workplace.t ! The roots of the union movement are
firmly embedded with the members and the workplace; therefore, national unions
would be well placed to recognise this. If we cannot have small unions, (the
amalgamations of many larger unions is creating even bigger organisations), then it
must be recognised that it is an advantage for workers to be represented by strong
shopfloor organisations when dealing with an employer. National unions have
traditionally been seen as the predominant organisations within the public services,
largely because of the nature of the bargaining arrangements; however, the move
towards more workplace and local bargaining may be advantageous for the
development of more independent workplace organisations within the public sector.
3:6 Workplace bargaining in the public services rz
In most public services and nationalised industries the scope for workplace bargaining
was fairly narrow, limited by tight industry agreements. Such agreements did not
destroy workplace independence, but limited the scope for its application and
transferred authority to the higher levels of the union organisation. Studies have found
that in the public services there tended to be a greater reliance upon the FrO than in the
private sector and generally this was associated with either a scattered workforce (for
example, Terry 1982) or national level bargaining (Brown et aI1978). In fact Brown
et al (1978) argued that the existence of a well developed shop stewards' organisation,
such as in the private sector, was associated with a reduced wish to see more of the
FrO. Terry (1982) argued that although dominant senior stewards were less
frequently found in local government than elsewhere; where they did exist they exerted
an important influence. The FrO was still an important figure but his data suggested
that he/she may not have played the major role in local negotiations. Therefore, where
stewards did negotiate themselves the importance of the FrO was reduced.
The marked contrast between public and private sector workplace unions' reliance on
their national organisation may change. National agreements, especially in the public
services, have been blamed for the differences in the levels of independence of
n TheDaily Telegraph, 14th June 1994.
i2 The case studies reported in part 2 of the thesis attempt to highlight any differences between a
public sector union and a private sector union; therefore, this section is important particularly because
of the rapid changes which were taking place in public sector employment.
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individual workforces on their Fl'Os, However, during the 1980s and 90s a move
towards more plant based and local bargaining was actively encouraged by the
government; national level collective bargaining was considered as interfering with the
operation of the free market, whereas local bargaining was seen as offering a flexible
response to the conditions of the local labour market (Fatchett 1989). This could have
a positive effect on trade union workplace organisation; negotiations at workplace level
may encourage lay representatives to become more involved in those issues that
directly affect them and their members. Providing the results are to the members'
satisfaction, an effective workplace organisation could be built up.
From a national union's perspective workplace bargaining may be rejected; for
example, public sector unions do not favour local bargaining (let alone workplace
bargaining) within the NHS, arguing that workers doing the same jobs but at different
workplaces may get different pay rates and conditions attached to their jobs depending
on the trust and the availability of funds. While it could be argued that this might
depend to a large extent upon those negotiating it is not a new argument. During the
advent of shop stewards and their increased role in bargaining activities it was
commonly argued that workplace bargaining would weaken rather than strengthen the
union position because the employer might evade recognition of uniform conditions
established by collective bargaining for all workers in a trade or district. "Members in
the workplace receive intimate service, but soon to the cost of overall solidarity" (A.I.
Marsh 1963, p26). This argument largely rests on the assumption that a trade union is
looked upon by its members as a national organisation; however, if the union is
looked upon as being based in the workplace the argument may be ignored. If the
workplace union is able to bargain satisfactorily for its members the national union
(and even similar workplaces) may not be considered. It could be argued that national
unions dislike local bargaining because many issues are taken out of their immediate
jurisdiction. The Donovan Commission (1968) recognised that with the move towards
workplace bargaining the control over the bargaining process by national unions and
employers' associations diminished (P18).
Research studies have shown that workplace organisations can effectively "run a
plant" without significant contact with their national union (for example, Batstone et al
1977). Indeed, Martin (1992) argued that the "workplace organisation may be more
important than national union organisation" (p169) because the development of
company oriented industrial relations policies undermined the power of national unions
but not the power of workplace organisations. In hospitals, for example, with the
move to NHS trusts13 and local accountability, the workers in those establishments
may find that they have more bargaining power than if they were part of a nation-wide
industry. One important contrast in the structure of management in the public services
and private industries commented on by Boraston et al (1975) was that most private
13 Trusts are employers in their own right who control their own budget and have the freedom to
determine the terms and conditions of employment of their own staff. One of the central objectives of
the creation of trusts at unit level was to break up the existing system of national bargaining (Elgar
and Simpson 1994b).
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industries consisted of independent firms with their own administrative and accounting
procedures usually working in competition with each other, whereas the public
services were run by a national or a regional board. This is not strictly true anymore.
Most hospitals, for example, are now run by their own board of administrators and are
generally made to compete against each other.
Fatchett (1989) argued that there was good reason to suggest that, in the context of
skill shortages, workplace bargaining might actually benefit many employees in the
health and education sectors and lead to an overall increase in pay; the competitive
nature of workplace bargaining could force a hospital trust or educational
establishment to pay above the current national rate for particular skilled jobs, which in
turn would force similar establishments to match those rates of pay in order to
retain/recruit their own staff.t+ If as evidence suggests (for example, Ferner 1989) the
government interfered in many public sector pay talks causing the level that
management were prepared to offer to drop substantially, then it could be argued that
local pay bargaining, without government interference, might increase public sector
workers' wages. Bryson et al (1995) concluded that while managements' perspective
was dominated by affordability there was an opportunity for unions to press for pay
awards in excess of nationally determined outcomes.
Bryson et al (1995) concluded that the public service unions, especially UNISON,
"are well placed to have a powerful influence on industrial relations in trusts." (p 131).
They found that management had failed to persuade staff to abandon their protected
conditions in large numbers in all but a few trusts, indicating that staff value their
union protection. Moreover, they found that where management worked with the
unions, trust conditions were more likely to be accepted. This suggests that "union
power", that is the ability to produce effects, was working within hospital trusts;
when the unions were involved, agreements on trust terms were made much easier and
in some cases the unions had been successful in modifying management proposals.
Bryson et aI's (1995) evidence indicates that trusts either believed that unions were a
threat to their human resource strategies or worked very closely with them to win staff
commitment towards trust objectives. Elgar and Simpson (1994b) concluded that
"[m]anagers were ... generally influenced by a concern to maintain patient services at
all times and also, it appeared, a belief that a cooperative approach with unions,
professional associations and a workforce which, maybe for pragmatic reasons,
shared something of the same concern, would be likely to be most productive." (pI4).
Bryson et al (1995) concluded:
"The key to ensuring an influential role in trusts appears to be sufficient membership
numbers or high density in powerful occupational groups .... The unions must continue
to attract members and cannot rely only on staff distrust of management.... Union
policies need to be seen to be effective in an environment where industrial action is not
always even a last resort (although if forms of action excluding strike action are
14 This argument probably carries a lot of weight especially when it has been claimed that personnel
managers in trusts had been advised not to offer better terms than the national ones for staff that are
easily recruited and retained (Corby 1991).
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successful, this may lead to change in policy by some organisations). The key to
effective policies is to develop their own wider agenda rather than just respond to
management initiatives.
Under the new NHS internal market the supposed key to success for trusts is to
maximise their competitive advantage. It is crucial for unions to show that their
presence is essential for a trust to provide an effective service." (p132).
If unionised firms in the private sector are more productive than non-unionised
companies (Metcalf 1993a) this statement may contain the key not only to public sector
union success but also to the success of individual trusts.
However, it could be argued that within the NHS the national union organisations tend
to retain control over bargaining rather than allowing workplace organisations to
negotiate their own terms and conditions. It has been argued that while many unions
in the public services have taken initial steps to establish workplace structures, "these
moves have often resulted in the sponsorship of forms of organisation that bear the
stamp of leadership manipulation and control, rather than autonomy and membership
initiative. In these circumstances, the steps towards the development of workplace
steward structures has often resulted in stewards who are dependent upon remote
branch leaderships and who act within a very narrow remit." (Fairbrother 1990,
pI72).
It could be argued that workplace bargaining would be more beneficial to a trust (and
its members) than national or even local level bargaining. National bargaining,
because it covers many workplaces, may lead to national disputes which are much
harder to resolve locally. Indeed, it was found that during the 198Os,where a national
dispute led to industrial action within the NHS, part of the response at local level was
to seek agreements which limited its impact on local services and avoidance of
measures which might lead to an escalation of the dispute (Elgar and Simpson 1994b).
If workplace bargaining within the NHS becomes widely accepted it may be to the
advantage of both managers and workplace unions, in much the same way as private
sector companies strive to keep their industrial relations, where possible, within the
confines of their own workplaces. Certainly, Elgar and Simpson (1994b) found that it
was clear "that disputes and actual or threatened industrial action in the 1980s were
equally if not more likely to arise over local issues" (P13). Therefore, if bargaining
should be allowed to remain within the confmes of the workplace, it is possible that a
quicker solution may be found and as the concern to maintain services was shared by
the NHS unions as well as management (Elgar and Simpson 1994b) an amicable
agreement is more likely to be made between the parties concerned rather than outside
sources not directly involved. Where industrial action did take place during the
1980s,15 "management response would not normally involve any legal dimension,
both because of the short lived nature of most action and a concern not to risk making
relations at local level worse" (Elgar and Simpson 1994b, plO). The law relating to
15 During the 1980s industrial action in the NHS tended to take various forms, usually short of an
all out strike, including demonstrations and marches, working to grade, threat of strike action and
national days of action (Elgar and Simpson 1994b).
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industrial action was rarely used by NHS managers; however, they tended to use the
law against individual workers, such as deducting pay from individuals for taking
action short of a strike (Elgar and Simpson 1994b). Therefore, the trade union
legislation appears to have had little effect upon trade unions within NHS trusts.
If the key to successful unionism in the workplace is the steward, it is essential that
shop stewards within the NHS become more involved as leaders of their workgroups
rather than as individual problem solvers (Terry 1982) and develop a style of working
that encourages the participation of their members and diminishes their dependence on
their FfOs. Colling (1995) argued that although the compulsory competitive tendering
(CCT) legislation had the specific aim of breaking the grip that unions had on local
services by putting pressure on national agreements, contracting may provide the
stimulus needed to encourage the forms of workplace unionism that have been
missing. The same could be said of workplace bargaining within NHS trusts. Colling
contended that national union responses to CCI' remained focused at national level,
whereas local bargaining over contract submissions was the primary determinant of the
terms and conditions; national agreements became purely a benchmark. Colling
concluded:
"The crucial test for trade unions will be their ability to reconfigure the current
distribution of authority, skills and resources within their organisations and to actively
build and invest in workplace organisation in particular." (P142).
Within the public sector, trade unions need to recognise that the key to their success is
to encourage active and independent workplace organisations to develop and maintain
themselves. As Colling (1995) put it "[i]t is difficult to maintain clear organising
principles at national level when the circumstances faced by members are so variable"
(pI42).16
If the government viewed the public sector as "the breeding ground for over-mighty
trade unions, out of touch with their members and unconstrained by the threat of their
companies' bankruptcy" (Ferner 1989, pl), it could be argued that a move towards
workplace bargaining might change this, at least from a national perspective.
However, there is also the possibility that workplace bargaining may lead to many
more local (albeit confined within the workplace) disputes as national unions have
16 Colling (1995) found that there were differences between groups of women workers, especially
part time women, and groups of men. Women were much more likely than men to suggest that
unions had been powerless to protect their interests and to admit to baving considered cancelling their
membership. This suggests that as well as building up independent workplace organisations it is
essential that unions encourage women as well as men to participate collectively in those affairs that
involve them; participation enhances union success and therefore satisfaction. However, it appears
that unions may not actively encourage certain groups of workers to form independent union
organisations; Fairbrother (1990) found that the rationale behind keeping stewards dependent upon
remote branch leadership was that unions considered that certain workers were not "ready for
autonomous forms of union organisation, either because of their class or gender position or the
specific circumstances of their employment as public service workers." (PI 72-3). Therefore, some
unions may intentionally keep some members dependent upon their Fl'Os and yet this may bave the
unintentional effect of isolating those members rather than encouraging them to build up their own
shopfloor unit.
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traditionally intervened to stamp out local disputes which were outside the scope of
their bargaining machinery (Ferner 1989); national bargaining may involve national
unions restraining members' "power" within the workplace. Unions at national level
may become less prominent within the NHS if local bargaining is adopted, but if
adequate workplace representation could be built up, the public sector unions may
become more powerful within their own workplaces. Workplace bargaining would be
more beneficial to members. They could at least see if their interests were being
protected, whereas when bargaining is conducted at national level members may feel
that their needs are not being addressed.
This raises the question of how far national union leaders actually represent the
interests of their members. Agreements which are acceptable to management and
union officials may not be to the shopfloor; national agreements may be forced upon
workforces without their consent whereas domestic agreements are not. In some
instances a national union may ooncede to a deal with management which does not take
away its rights, but members may find that the new deal takes away some of their
concessions; in other words the national union is not affected by the agreement - the
realities of the shopfloor are not necessarily taken into account by the national union
when bargaining with employers (see for example, Beynon 1973, pp299-305). A
comment from a NUJ member is quite apt here: "Trade unions at national level will
very often sell you out".17 The interests of the national union may not correspond
with those of its members.
3:7 A conflict 0/ interests?
Declining membership is liable to have a greater effect upon national union
organisations than strong workplace organisations, especially in terms of fmance;
fewer members means less subscription money. Fewer workplaces in the traditional
strongholds of union recruitment will decrease the number of members overall, but in
those workplaces where a union presence still exists nothing much has changed on the
shopfloor (Millward et al 1992). Where the workplace union is seen to be effective
membership tends to be constantly upheld (Hancke 1993). Union amalgamations may
be designed to combat the fall in membership, but are amalgamations considered
necessary for the benefit of the members or the national union itself? It seems very
likely that it is for the benefit of the national organisation, especially in terms of
finance; for example, it is cheaper to run one union from one headquarters than two
unions from two headquarters. (See Undy et al 1996 for a discussion on union
mergers and the reasons behind them.)
Undy et al (1981) saw the role of the union leadership as critical for union growth, but
it oould be argued that the role of the shopfloor representative is more important. The
shopfloor is where unionism begins and for the vast majority of members that is where
their interests are largely protected. In fact, it has been suggested that the national
union is turning into an anachronism, especially with the move towards local
17 The People's Parliament, Channel 4, 3rd September 1994.
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bargaining, and that rather than amalgamating the trend ought to be demerger, so that
the basic unit of trade union organisation would be the workplace. IS However,
whether unions merge or demerge, it seems to be the case that the basic unit of union
organisation already is the workplace, whether that organisation is seen to be strong or
weak reflects upon a number of factors but especially the personalities of all those
involved.
Martin (1992) suggested that the role of national unions had changed: they had
become sources of expert advice and providers of services. National unions are
beginning to offer members services that are directed at them as individuals, including
services that are unrelated to work activities. Perhaps the promotion of individualism
has had some effect since union leaders are trying to attract members by individual
incentives rather than collective ones.ts They may also be trying to encourage
members to think of "the union" in terms other than the workplace. However, on the
shopfloor it appears that members still prefer to act collectively to realise their self
interests, hence the union. While benefits do playa large part in the lives of those on
the shopfloor, especially where accidents and industrial disease are concerned, the
initial attraction of unionism for members appears to be the satisfactory resolution of
workplace problems with the emphasis on protection and "strength" against the
employer. The fact that some members do not take advantage of the services available
to them is also a strong indicator that the protection and advancement of their interests
at work is still the main union objective for many members; opinion polls have also
confirmed this view. It is, therefore, quite feasible to argue that at national level
unions have in many ways grown apart from their members.
Indeed, members may not even support the political issues raised by their national
organisations. Moran (1974) found that the Union of Post Office Workers' policy on
political issues did not reflect its members' views. Almost all the members had joined
the union for "calculative" rather than political reasons because they saw material
advantages in doing so. More importantly the UPW leaders did not feel that they were
out of touch with their members!
With the succession of 1980190s legislation a further difference between the national
organisations and their shopfloor units has emerged; one is restrained by the
legislation and the other is on occasion prone to act on impulse. National unions are
very careful that they act within the legislative boundaries when a confrontational
18 The Economist, 3rd July 1993.
19 Many unions have developed their provision of "member services", "a broad term covering any
union facility which is of benefit to members individually" (IRS Employment Trends 1990). Unions
provide services which are directly funded themselves, such as legal assistance for non-work related
matters, and attractive packages which cost them nothing at all, such as discounted financial services.
Fixed rate provident benefits for sickness, retirement and unemployment are no longer a priority for
most unions and many are running down or discontinuing these benefits. 90% of unions believed that
the provision of discount arrangements and access to specialist advice will play an important part in
the future recruitment of new members. (IRS Employment Trends 1990). During the six months
preceding the TUC's 1995 bi-annual survey more than half the respondent unions had introduced new
services aimed at individual members.
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situation with an employer is imminent; they realise the problems they might face if
they do not. A frequent comment from local shop stewards is that the national
organisation is scared of sequestration, which could be seen as an indication that "head
office" is looking after its own interests rather than the immediate ones of its members.
If a grievance is passed to the national union from a workplace organisation, unless
that organisation is a weaker one, it is usually one which cannot be settled in the
workplace; that is, a deadlock has been reached between management and workplace
union; as a rule these disputes are rare and usually involve pay settlements.
3:8 Union power at shopfloor level
It appears that trade unions originated on the shopfloor and for the majority of
members that is where they remain. The national organisations may be of great benefit
to members in times of need or even for discount financial packages but the main
function of unionism, that is advancing and protecting members' interests, seems to be
performed most adequately in the workplace itself. Different shopfloor organisations
have had varying degrees of success within the workplace since trade unions first
appeared; therefore, it can be argued that trade union power, at least at workplace
level, remains more or less the same as it always has.
However, it has been contended that:
"[I]f we simply stop at the workplace and conclude that there has been minimal loss of
trade union power and there is no crisis. then we are redefining what trade unionism has
meant in the past." (McIlroy 1988. p224.)
A number of comments can be made about this statement. One has the distinct
suspicion that the Conservatives were trying to remould the image of trade unionism,
especially by their attempt to promote individualism amongst union members; that is
the idea that each individual should pursue hislher own self interests in such a way that
they would in effect be in competition with each other, rather than working collectively
to pursue their goals. If this should happen, unions as a whole would become nothing
more than service and benefit agencies, providing a form of insurance against
accidents, unfair dismissals and even legal advice on matters unrelated to work. This
would be a redefmition of what trade unionism has meant in the past, but it would also
encompass a change in the attitudes of those trade unionists on the shopfloor. Yet
most evidence seems to point to the fact that at shopfloor level many union members
still realise their goals and self interests by acting collectively. The national
organisation may be seen as a form of insurance but that does not mean that for rank
and me members the definition of trade unionism has changed. Indeed, many studies
into trade union activities in the 1960s and 1970s also concluded that for members "the
union" was the shopfloor and their reasons for membership are no different now from
what they were then.
The crucial point to remember is that when trade unions were first formed the social
situation was very different from now. The national organisation was seen as more
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important then. Trade unions at national level were the front runners campaigning for
rights for the working man and a demand for greater equality in society as a whole;
many trade union activities did benefit the whole of the community. However, the
social situation has changed dramatically, and these changes (for example, changes in
leisure time with the shorter working week, changes in living conditions and a change
in the material welfare of the working class in general) have affected the position of
trade unions and their members. People's ideas have changed and their "working
lives" no longer dominate their existence. This is not to say that everyone is well off
or treated on an equal footing to everyone else - there are many issues that are still
campaigned about today. The point is that the original objectives of trade unionism -
the protection and advancement of members' interests - are still the same but they tend
to take place more within individual workplaces rather than prominently on the national
front. Past practices and forms of organisation no longer suffice as effective ways of
representing and articulating workers' interests (Fairbrother 1990).
Campaigning by national trade unions, representing both the public and private
sectors, still takes place. National unions still campaign on behalf of all workers and
indeed all members of society, for example on issues such as VAT on fuel, health and
safety and better training and educational facilities. Ten unions challenged the legality
of government plans for the new criminal injuries compensation scheme; they failed to
win their action, but it illustrates the point that national union organisations do attempt
to challenge what they see as a matter of injustice for all in society. However, while
being a matter of concern for everyone, the importance of the issues raised may not be
realised by individuals until they are put into the position where they have to confront
them personally. For most rank and file members the only problems that concern them
are those which have a direct bearing upon their current situation.
Within this scenario it is hard to agree with McIlroy's (1988) statement about
redefining what trade unionism has meant in the past. To the average worker and trade
union member unionism means the same now as it did then, the protection of their
interests at work. Of course there are the added advantages of services and benefits,
but these tend to take second place in terms of reasons for membership. The
workplace is for most members, in the private sector at least, "the union" and even in
the public sector, where problems of dispersed workforces may mean a greater
reliance on the national organisation, the working environment is generally the main
focus of union activity. When McIlroy talks about a redefinition of what unionism has
meant in the past, he is probably right from the perspective of national unions but not
from a shopfloor perspective.
Trade unionism as a whole may have been seen in the past as a movement which
attempted to embrace all workers. However, it is the case now, and has certainly been
the case for at least the last thirty years (perhaps from the start of the union movement)
that individual members are more concerned with issues that affect them personally
rather than remote issues that are affecting someone else. Allen (1954) argued that
most trade union members regarded non-economic objectives as extras and that few
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workers had illusions about the ability of unions to build a "new society". In fact,
according to Allen, they were rarely interested in this aspect of unionism; wage
increases, hours reduction and improved working conditions were the main interests
of members, and presumably this would be at their own workplace. As Goldthorpe et
al (1968) said, unionism is only seen as a means to an end with the emphasis on self
interest. When pay negotiations are taking place employees are concerned with what
they can gain for themselves, albeit as a collective; they do not think of others
elsewhere who may not have had a wage increase or those without a job.
The impression given is that for most members they are not part of a wider union
movement; "the union" is the shopfloor and most problems are dealt with there. Here
we can see the distinction between the "sword of justice" aspect of unionism and the
"vested interest" aspect. The first refers to the unions' role as campaigners against
inequality and injustice and is mostly a matter of national lobbying and "their striving
to change society", the latter as "wielder of economic muscle", which involves local or
workplace bargaining (Flanders 1961). MacInnes (1990) argued that the "sword of
justice" aspect of unionism has always been the weaker of the two and has been hit
hardest by "Thatcherism"; it is at national level that trade union influence has been
weakened because they have been denied any influence over government policy
making. However, he also suggested that because trade unions had never been too
centrally involved in the political decision making process that this effect has not been
as dramatic as it might have been.
John Monks, the TUC's general secretary, told USDAW' s 1994 annual conference:
"I make no excuse for talking about solidarity. Some argue that the future of trade
unions is about individuals, about providing the sort of services at work that the AA
provides for motorists, but there is more to unionism than that." (The Daily Telegraph
2nd May 1994, p2).
This statement is largely backed up by research studies. For members there is
definitely more to unionism. Whether they experience it though depends upon the
workplace and the union organisation within it. The service side of unionism tends to
belong to the national organisations and it is very likely that this is how most members
think of their national unions; that is, if they think of their national organisation at all.
3:9 National and shopfloor unions - two different entities
It must be concluded that the national union is a different thing from the shopfloor
organisation. In general when members speak of their "union" they are usually
referring to their workplace organisation, even if that organisation is reliant on the
national union; to the majority of members their representative is "the union".
The two strands of unionism can be summarised as such: one is restrained by the
legislation and as far as members are concerned is probably nothing more than an
insurance agency, providing legal services and benefits in times of need; the other
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may act on impulse for maximum impact without much regard for "the law" and does
attempt to address the problems that members encounter at work. Far from working
for the national union a shop steward's main task is to act as a go between for the
workers and management, and his/her loyalty is to his/her members. It can be argued
that the shopfloor unit is more concerned with the pressing realities of the workplace
than the legal boundaries within which they should work. Nevertheless, how
"powerful" the shopfloor unit is perceived as being appears to be dependent upon the
place of work and the personalities there, in particular that of the lay representatives
(see for example, Fosh and Cohen 1990, Fosh 1993).
When people talk about trade union power it makes a great deal of difference which of
these organisations they are referring to. Since 1979 the role of the national union has
diminished (although it could be argued that the larger a union becomes the less
important the national organisation is to the members anyway) especially in the
political sphere, but even here there are doubts as to whether unions were really
influential before 1979. Admittedly, if the unions' opposition to the 1971 Industrial
Relations Act is compared to that of the 198Os' legislation it could be argued that their
influence has diminished. But that political influence, whether diminished or not,
does not necessarily affect the shopfloor. Indeed, it may be the case that members do
not even identify with their national union's political objectives.
Unlike small unions, if the national organisation of a larger union was the main unit
coordinating all union activity, there would most likely be vast problems, especially in
relation to individual workplaces. Without the smaller shopfloor units members'
employment interests would most likely be at a severe disadvantage. If it was not for
the shop steward many grievances would not become known and members' loyalty
might be lost (A.I. Marsh 1963). It can be argued that the "power" of a trade union
lies at the bottom of the union hierarchy with the members. The members are the
essential components making up the shopfloor units and without them "the union"
would not exist. It is on the shopfloor that any "bargaining power" is exercised, even
if the external union is called in it is still the members who hold the key as to what
action they should take. "Power, as opposed to formal authority, rests with the rank
and file who may entrust it to external officers or seek to exercise it themselves"
(Goodman and Whittingham 1969, pIS). In some respects it could be asked if the
national organisation itself has ever been the "powerful" part of a trade union if that
very "power" actually works upwards from the shopfloor. It is possible that a
workplace organisation could survive without the national organisation, albeit without
the added protection of benefits such as legal aid. However, even though national
organisations exist independently of any particular workplace, it could be argued that
they could not survive without the shopfloor units.
There are two very different organisations within the same institution; one caters more
for the member on an individual basis in the form of benefits and services and the
other looks after individuals on a collective basis. It is possible that those workplace
organisations (particularly in the public sector) which are reliant on their FrO tend to
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deal more with grievances on an individual basis because of their stronger connection
with their national union. Developing a collective approach to those problems may
strengthen their workplace organisation. As Fairbrother (1990) contended: "Only
through active and semi-autonomous workplace organisation will workers be able to
meet the diverse and uneven developments that are taking place throughout the
economy .... Effective workplace organisation and activity signifies the recognition of
the collective rather than the individual moment in social relations." (p 174).
Not all members may be satisfied with the performance of their shopfloor union, or for
that matter their national union, but it does not alter the fact that it is highly likely that
to most members the shopfloor unit is what they consider to be "the union". As it is
no new phenomenon that from a members' point of view the term "trade union" refers
to the shopfloor, it could be argued that there has been no significant loss of trade
union power, as different workplaces appear to have exercised different amounts of
"power" since the formation of unions themselves.
Employment and trade union legislation since 1979 had been designed to reduce trade
union power. The next chapter looks at the law relating to trade unions and attempts to
assess how it has affected the power of unions to defend and advance their members'
interests. It appears that while the legislation has encouraged national union
organisations to act with greater procedural caution, indications are that the law has
had little impact upon the majority of workplace organisations.
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CHAPTER4 THE LAW AND TRADE UNION POWER
4:1 Introduction
From 1979 onwards the Conservative government was committed to reducing trade
union power. Trade unions were seen as the main obstacle blocking the
government's aim of restructuring the economy and creating a free and unconstrained
labour and product market. A move away from government involvement in the
enforcement of sanctions against trade unions was developed: by the empowering of
employers to resist trade union demands and the encouragement of individualistic
attitudes amongst trade union members. Legislative changes since 1979 include
limitations of trade union immunities, the introduction of compulsory postal ballots for
union elections and before industrial action is taken and giving individual union
members rights against their trade union.
This chapter looks at aspects of the law which relate to trade unions and individual
members and attempts to assess how it has affected the power of unions to defend and
advance their members' interests. I The issue of democracy within trade unions is
looked at first followed by the law relating to industrial action. Overall, while the
legislation has caused national trade unions to act with more procedural caution, it is
concluded that union power, that is at shopfloor level, remains much the same as it
always has and has been largely untouched by the law.2
4:2 Union democracy
The issue of trade union democracy involves the relationship between the national
unions, their officials and their members, the crucial question being one of the
representativeness of trade unions in advancing their members' interests. As chapter 3
argued the interests of a national union organisation may not always be those of its
members. Conservative thinkers believed that union officials were unrepresentative of
their members. There was a tendency to view employees as being coerced into
membership and collective action and, therefore, it was claimed that members needed
protection from their own unions. This was to be achieved by strengthening the
individual's rights against his/her union, thereby diminishing goal divergence between
leaders and members by allowing members to influence policy and prevent
unrepresentative leaders from controlling them against their will.
1 Appendix 1 sets out in more detail aspects of the legislation that are not outlined in the text.
2 It is essential to note that the legislation tends to refer to trade unions as national organisations;
therefore, when the term "trade union" is used in this chapter it is referring to the national organisation
unless otherwise stated.
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4:3 Ballots 3
The Trade Union Act 1984 made it mandatory for trade unions to hold elections by
secret ballot for all voting positions on the executive of the union and to hold ballots to
determine whether a political fund should be established or continued. More
importantly the Act required that any industrial action must be supported by a majority
vote in a secret ballot if the trade union(s) involved wished to retain their immunity
from tort liability for industrial action. The 1984 Act was amended and consolidated
by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A) and
this Act was amended by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993
(TURERA). Before 1984 the only rules regulating balloting procedures were those
found in each trade union's rule book.
The Donovan Commission (1968) had rejected the idea of compulsory strike ballots,
arguing that they would not alleviate unofficial action "which makes up the
overwhelming majority of the total number of strikes" (p114), and that there was little
justification for the view that workers were more likely to vote against strike action.
The Commission also suggested that once a ballot had been taken room for manoeuvre
within the negotiating process was limited and strikes could last longer. Practical
problems might also arise such as how to phrase the question on which the vote was to
be taken. These arguments were largely vindicated.
Nevertheless, the view taken was that a secret strike ballot would reflect members'
views, whereas without a ballot the leadership may call a strike which members did
not wish to support but felt they must because of fear of reprisals if they did not.
Therefore, an essential component of the measures was aimed at encouraging
individual members to restrain their union from using its "power" excessively. The
fact that the ballot paper must stress that industrial action is a breach of contract is
clearly an attempt to dissuade union members from voting in favour of action. As far
as strike ballots are concerned it appears the overall aim was to reduce the number of
strikes or, failing that, to at least make the process of calling members out on strike
much longer, possibly with the intention that the longer the process the more time for
tempers to cool and a settlement to be reached.
The use of secret ballots was seen as leading to the long term transformation of trade
unions by increasing union democracy and making the leadership more responsive to
their members' opinions. The 1981 Green Paper "Trade Union Immunities" declared:
" The internal authority of trade unions over their members will always be inadequate if
their leaders are felt to be out of touch with those they represent and without proper
democratic procedures there will inevitably be suspicions that trade unions sometimes
pursue policies which the majority of their members do not support." (1981. para 20.)
Members should make the important decisions; "if trade unions are to serve and fairly
represent the interests of their members they should ensure that any important
3 See appendix lA for further details of the balloting legislation.
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decisions are supported by a majority of the members voting in a secret ballot. "4 For
example, according to the Conservatives many union members were unaware that they
were paying a political levy; they should be free to choose whether their union had a
political fund and whether to pay the levy towards it.5
The introduction of mandatory balloting provisions was an attack on the perceived
"excessive power" of trade unions. It could be argued that the two most important
reasons for the balloting reforms were that they would lead to a more moderate rather
than militant leadership and less industrial conflict by a restraining of union power
from within their own ranks. Events during the 1984/5 miners' strike had convinced
the Conservative government that dissident members were willing to constrain the
exercise of union power, enabling the legislation to be enacted with confidence.
Mandatory postal ballots can also be seen as an attempt to individualise union ballots;
that is, to try and ensure that individual members vote in their own SUbjective interests
without any regard for the collective interests of the workgroup. This was in line with
the aim of promoting individualism at the expense of collectivism.
4:4 The effects of mandatory balloting on trade unions
Balloting, particularly before industrial action, may have become a permanent feature
of industrial relations in Britain (Elias 1990). Martin et al (1991) found that unions
which used ballots routinely saw both advantages and disadvantages with their use.
The three main advantages were: the scope of consultation was broadened; a legitimate
means for resolving conflicting opinions within the union was provided; and balloting
could provide valuable support for negotiators facing management, by indicating the
strength of membership opinion. The major disadvantages were practical: the length
and inconvenience of the required procedures and the reduction in the role of leaders to
"postmen". Low turnouts for elections and narrow majorities were also seen as
negative effects of balloting (Elgar and Simpson 1993a). However, balloting was
popular among members (Elgar and Simpson 1993a, Rentoul 1989).
Union elections: "Union leaders are now more accountable to their members than
ever before" declared the Conservative govemrnent.e Yet the expectations that the
introduction of postal ballots for union leadership elections would lead to the
emergence of a more "moderate" leadership and, therefore, changes in union policy
have proved to be largely unfounded.
Trade unions have substantially reformed their rules and practices to comply with the
legislation but their leadership and policies have largely remained unaffected. In some
unions changes have resulted; for example, the NUl's general secretary was defeated
by a moderate candidate and NATFHE members elected a candidate from the left rather
4 "Democracy in Trade Unions" 1983, para 56.
5 Contracting out procedures were already available for those who objected to paying a political levy •
but the Conservatives were concerned that many unionists were unaware of its existence.
6 "Industrial Relations in the 1990s" 1991, p6.
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than the sitting general secretary. But these are the exceptions and in general the sitting
office holders are rarely defeated (Smith et al 1993). It could be argued that members
(or at least those members who vote) were satisfied with their leadership in the
majority of unions. However, not all union elections are subject to the same degree of
competition; some may be uncontested and, therefore, a vote is not necessary. (See
for example, Labour Research 1990a.)
The legislation, then, has not led to a more moderate leadership and even where a
union's leadership is seen as more "moderate" than its members, those within the
union can always defeat the executive if their views are somewhat different; for
example, at their 1994 national conference the NUT executive was defeated on a
number of motions by its own membership. In this case, contrary to Conservative
expectations, it seems that the membership were actually more militant than the general
secretary who had been elected.
However, it appears that the legislation may have reduced membership participation in
union elections rather than strengthened it (for example, Labour Research 1990a).
Whether union leaders are now more accountable to their members than ever before
must be a matter of opinion - if fewer members are voting for their "leaders" than
previously, (under workplacelbranch ballots), it is arguable as to whether the
leadership is as representative as it was before postal balloting was made compulsory.
Indeed, it is probably the case that those who voted in these elections were not the
"silent majority" that the government hoped to mobilise; perhaps those members are
not really interested in the internal processes of their unions after all.
In the case of union elections it appears that, at least for the present, the reforms have
not led to the change in trade unions that was envisaged. A similar situation can be
seen in relation to ballots held for the retention of a political fund
Political funds: To date all trade unions with established political funds have had
majority votes returned in favour of their retention. In addition, a number of unions
had voted to establish a political fund for the first time (for example, the Inland
Revenue Staff Federation and the National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers).
The participation level in the majority of these ballots was quite high and two of the
highest turnouts were in the two unions which balloted on the establishment of a
political fund for the first time. There was also a clear relationship between the size of
the turnout and the method of balloting used; workplace ballots achieved much higher
levels of participation than the postal ballot (Steele d al 1986). Steele d al (1986)
argued that the explanation for these results lay in the strategy adopted by the unions.
"They conducted professional and well organised campaigns which emphasized the
importance of defending their industrial interests through the political fund" (p459.)
Industrial action: The law on strike ballots tends to be seen as the most important
of the changes in the law,7 the use of ballots emerging as a feature of union strategy in
7 Indeed, the present government intends to retain it.
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negotiations (Elgar and Simpson 1993a). Employers also felt that the legal obligation
to hold ballots before industrial action was a good thing for trade unions, mainly
because of the more "democratic" or "truthful" representation of members' views
giving "a stronger mandate to union representatives" (Elgar and Simpson 1993b, p13).
However, despite an increased awareness of the law, managers, particularly in the
NHS, appeared reluctant to challenge their workforces usually because of the short
lived nature of any action and to prevent making industrial relations at plant level any
worse (see for example, Elgar and Simpson 1994b).
The assumption that balloting before industrial action would lead to less industrial
conflict is supported by the strike figures (see for example, McConnell and Takla
1990). But, as Brown and Wadhwani (1990) argued, this does not necessarily mean a
reduction in trade union power; majority votes in favour of strike action tend to
highlight the support behind the strike threat and may lead to a settlement without
action taking place (Brown and Wadhwani 1990, see also Elgar and Simpson 1993a,
TUC 1995a). However, Manning (1992) argued that ballots may affect the level of
trade union bargaining power in more direct ways: if workers vote in line with their
self-interests employers may be able to make offers that benefit a majority of workers
at the expense of a minority. He also suggested that the delay in organising industrial
action may give opportunities for both sides to strengthen their bargaining positions.
But as ballots reduce the scope for rapid strike action the presumption must be that the
delay is to the advantage of the employer and that the balance of power may have
shifted away from union leaders towards shopfloor activists as ballots act as a
constraint more on official than unofficial strike action.
Manning may have a valid argument. However, he neglects the possibility that most
workers have the same self interests and tend to work collectively to gain them;
workers whose jobs are safe, for example, may still wish to fight for the jobs of those
who are threatened, because the next time it could be their own job which might be
lost. His assumption that the delay in organising industrial action is to the advantage
of the employer has been recognised by others. Brown and Wadhwani (1990), for
example, acknowledged that the delay necessary for a strike ballot introduced a
"cooling off" period whereby if the grievance is of a type that fades with time the
"passions" of members may wane or employers may be provided with time to buy
them off. However, it could be argued that the "cooling off" period may also put
added pressure upon employers; the "legalism" of the procedure may result in the rank
and file becoming even more committed to the cause, the eventual strike becoming
more disciplined and whole-hearted, making the dispute much harder to settle (Brown
and Wadhwani 1990). It is true that ballots act as a constraint on official rather than
unofficial action; however, balloting cannot be said to have shifted the balance of
power away from national union leaders to the shopfloor activists when it appears that
the seat of "power" has always been with the shopfloor (see previous chapter), and if
90% of recorded industrial action was unofficial between 1960-1979 (Metcalf 1993b),
ballots may act as a restraint only upon a minority of potential disputes.
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Industrial action ballots could be said to have had an impact upon strike action;
therefore, they could be considered successful. But they have also had a significant
impact upon the conduct of collective bargaining and appear to have been incorporated
into the strategies used by unions when negotiating, very often to their advantage.
The decision of whether to take any action or not is supposed to be an individual
decision recorded secretly without any pressure or coercion from other people, the
presumption being that the individual will vote for himlherself rather than on behalf of
the collective. However, many research studies show that "far from undermining
collective consciousness, ballots have been adapted in ways which largely reinforce it"
(Martin et a11991, pI98).
4:5 Balloting - an aid to union power?
If the reason for introducing compulsory secret ballots was to make union leaders
aware of their members' opinions and, therefore, more representative of their
membership the balloting procedures could be said to have succeeded. However, if
union members were presumed to be less "militant" than their leaders and, therefore,
that they would generally vote against their unionss leading to a reduction in the so
called "abuse" of "union power", this idea it appears was largely misconceived; far
from undermining trade union power it could be argued that ballots, especially
industrial action ballots, may strengthen that power.
"There is little evidence that ballots have bad the anticipated effects on trade unions;
trade unions have not become decollectivised. Instead, ballots have been absorbed into
the repertoire of union bargaining tactics, and have helped to legitimize union
decisions." (Martin et al 1991, p203).
It can be concluded that in general ballots have been an advantage to all parties in the
negotiating arena, enabling the strength of membership feeling to come to the fore.9
Overall, while not always enhancing union power, industrial action ballots cannot be
said to have undermined that power.
On the face of it, it may look as though both the Conservatives and unions can claim
victories in respect of the balloting legislation. Not only has compulsory balloting
enabled trade unions to show that their leaders and their policies were already what
their members wanted and, therefore, in many ways has legitimated them even more,
but the balloting procedures have given trade unions a valuable tool to use in the
negotiating process as well as opening up a new route of communication with their
members, one that is seen to be legitimate by all those involved. Evidence suggests
that balloting has actually become more widely used than the law requires: for
example, unions may use ballots to determine their members' opinions on employers'
8 Many industrial action ballots are instigated at the request of members in a particular workplace
rather than by the national union itself; therefore, the national union is doing the bidding of its
members rather than the other way around.
9 National union leaders do not always advocate militant action; very often the national union stance
may be against industrial action; when a ballot is called members may then vote for strike action
against the advice of their national leaders.
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offers or proposed settlements (see for example, Elgar and Simpson 1992).
Postal ballots do, however, tend to have a lower turnout than workplace ballots;
accordingly, it could be argued that even though all members are entitled to vote they
are not doing so and, therefore, the idea of representativeness could be questioned.
Indeed, the result may not even reflect the majority of members' views. However, the
Conservatives justified the use of postal ballots by arguing that high levels of
participation are not the most important factor ensuring a democratic decision is
reached; more important is the fact that postal ballots are least susceptible to union
manipulation. Nevertheless, it could be argued that while the postal ballot enables the
voter to choose hislher preferred option without any interference, members may be
casting their votes without being fully aware of all the issues involved and, indeed,
may be influenced by outside manipulation; the member may even take hislher voting
paper to work and ask advice which defeats the object of the "secret ballot". Of
course, the idea was that those members who disagreed with "the activists" at work
could vote secretly without exposing themselves in public. But if the turnout is lower
with a postal ballot, then it seems that these voters either are not interested in voting
anyway, or else they are voting with the "majority".
The abolition of funding for trade union ballots will most likely place a large financial
burden upon all trade unions, and even though the legislation insists that postal ballots
should be at no direct cost to members themselves, they may find that eventually the
cost of balloting may affect them indirectly if unions increase their subscriptions so as
to meet any extra costs. National unions do conduct their daily business with more
procedural caution, but it would be wrong to conclude that the balloting procedures
have reduced trade union power in any way; it could be said that in certain cases
balloting has even highlighted trade union power.
4:6 The closed shop
The term "closed shop" is usually applied to an agreement or arrangement which
requires employees to join a certain union as a condition of employment.' 0 It had
long been recognised that trade unions could exert a tremendous power over individual
workers' job opportunities through the operation of the closed shop. The legislation
relating to the closed shop was more concerned with the rights of the individual rather
than abolishing the practice altogether.
Arguments for and against the closed shop had been voiced for years. In a nutshell,
the rationale against the closed shop was largely based upon the individual's rights:
for example, the right not to belong to an association, the right to work on terms freely
agreed between the individual and employer and the right to choose whether to take
industrial action or not. But, it was said that, overall, the operation of the closed shop
10 For an enlightening discussion on the closed shop and a look at the differing explanations for its
survival and the competing theories for why managers either "loved or hated" it, see Dunn and Wright
(1993).
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placed too much economic power in the hands of trade unions (for example, the
Donovan Commission 1968).
Despite the views against the closed shop the Donovan Commission recommended that
its prohibition should be rejected, arguing that it would be better to recognise that with
proper safeguards a closed shop could serve a useful purpose; acceptance of the "rule
of majority" was a normal democratic principle and 100% membership was a
stabilising factor in industrial relations, an aid to efficient consultation machinery and
in encouraging effective productivity bargaining. It was also argued that the closed
shop helped to secure the observance of agreements since it added to the power of the
union to discipline those who ignored them. Therefore, a closed shop situation was
seen as an advantage to management as well as the unions concerned and it could be
argued that research on unionism and company performance, for example, does tend
to support the view that a union presence is beneficial to all concerned (see for
example, Beynon 1973, Williams et a11986, Brown 1994).
Dunn (1981) suggested that the spread of the closed shop in the 1970s was actually
permitted and encouraged by management. The legislation to a certain extent
concentrates upon penalising employers who either refuse to employ a non-unionist or
who dismiss an employee for being a non-unionist. IfDunn's analysis was correct the
closed shop actually represented no threat to industry and was dependent upon
management to survive. This support can no longer be relied upon. However, if
managers believe that a union presence enhances the efficiency of their workplace they
may still encourage employees to become union members.
The 1971 Industrial Relations Act gave employees a right not to belong to a trade
union, but the Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts of 1974 and 1976 reversed this
position. The 1974 Act allowed dismissal for non-membership of a union in a closed
shop unless the employee genuinely objected to membership on religious or any other
reasonable grounds. The 1976 Act narrowed this to religious objections only. The
1988 Employment Act effectively "abolished" the post-entry closed shop altogether,
by making it unfair to dismiss or take action short of dismissal against a worker
because he/she was not a union member.t t (Also see appendix ID.) In these
situations the normal qualifying period of employment before bringing a claim does
not apply. The demise of the pre-entry closed shop came with the 1990 Employment
Act, which provided a right to complain to an industrial tribunal for anyone refused
employment on the grounds of non-union membership or for refusing to become a
union member after the employment has begun. All the above stipulations other than
those which have been repealed are now contained in TULR(C)A 1992. In addition a
union now loses its immunity against action in tort if industrial action is taken in
support of any closed shop.
The 1988 White Paper "Employment for the I990s" , which was directed at creating
employment by removing barriers to jobs, cited research findings from the London
11 This also applies if a union member is dismissed because of bis/her membership.
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School of Economics12 to show that trade unions had used their power in ways which
adversely affected labour costs, productivity and jobs, particularly where a closed
shop was in operation. Contrary to opinions by unions and employers that the closed
shop helped to create stability in the workplace, it was argued that there was very little
evidence that it actually reduced conflict.
However, amidst concerns for the flexibility and efficient working of the labour
market, the main aim of the legislation relating to the closed shop was, it appears, to
encourage the individual worker to resist union membership, thereby, promoting
individualism rather than collectivism. The attack on the closed shop was yet another
card played in the attempt to reduce the perceived power of trade unions by
undermining their organisation by reducing union density in the workplaces that had
previously insisted on 100% membership. The Conservative government claimed that
their legislation had helped curb the abuse of trade union power (1988, para. 2.22).
4:7 Has the demise in law of the closed shop reduced trade union
power?
The most obvious effect of the legislation is that no individual can be forced to become
a trade union member as a condition of hislher employment. However, individuals
may have rights against unfair dismissal, but that does not mean that they will not
suffer ostracism at the hands of their union workmates. In fact, Stevens et al (1989)
found that there was a range of sanctions that employees could expect from fellow
workmates if they gave up their union membership.
Even though the closed shop may no longer exist in theory, 100% membership at
workplaces where the workforce all wish to be union members cannot be prevented.
Millward et al (1992) argued that those establishments which had maintained 100%
membership in 1990 were very likely to have done so without any active endorsement
or encouragement from employers. This suggests that a decline in closed shop
arrangements does not mean that employee support for unionism has declined.
"Rather than tacitly supporting [the closed shop] to stop it disappearing, managers
tacitly support it where it refuses to disappear: where it represents the will of the
membership and is part of the furniture." (Dunn and Wright 1993, p23).
However:
"[T]he fact that there were so many fewer cases of lOOper cent membership must be
substantially due to the withdrawal of support for union membership by employers and
the increased legal obstacles to maintaining closed shop arrangements." (Millward et al
1992, pl00.)
It could be said that the legislation has led to a decline in union density in some
12 Blanchflower. D., Millward, N. and Oswald, A. J. (1988), "Unionisation and Employment
Behaviour," Centre for Labour Economics: LSE.
Metcalf, D. (1988), "Trade Unions and Economic Performance: The British Evidence," Centre for
Labour Economics: LSE.
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workplaces, which may not have occurred if employers did not have to face legal
implications if they maintained that all employees must be union members. However,
employers may still see advantages with a predominantly unionised workforce, and
while not enforcing membership upon new employees may advise them that a union is
present on site. (See for example, Marchington and Parker 1990 - while a closed shop
did not exist at the workplaces they studied, most managers did advise that a union
was present and in some cases referred the new employee to the union
representatives.)
It could be argued that an attack on the closed shop was the surest way of reducing
solidarity within the workplace and, therefore, the power of the union(s) involved. In
fact some authors have argued that "real union power rests on the closed shop and the
strike threat" (Metcalf 1988). Therefore, it is easy to see why some commentators
suggest that trade union power is now diminishing. But, if in a closed shop situation
some members were not committed to unionism, it could be argued that any supposed
solidarity of the workforce was already being undermined from within. In fact,
Milligan (1976) argued that even when the closed shop was in full operation the
system was not supported by all union members. The only remedy against individuals
who did not comply with union wishes was disciplinary action, and, as we shall see,
this situation has changed.
On the other hand, evidence from the seventh BSAS suggested that continued
employment in a closed shop may actually strengthen trade union allegiance; the
average trade unionist in a closed shop situation reported far greater participation in
union affairs than unionists in open shops (Millward 1990). If greater membership
participation in union affairs enhances the success of the workplace union to achieve
its aims, (for example, Fosh and Cohen 1990, Fosh 1993), it might be expected that
where a closed shop situation existed the union was more successful at achieving its
goals than in open shop workplaces. This might explain why 100% membership does
remain at some workplaces; however, at the other extreme, if members in a closed
shop situation were more active in their union's activities than those in an open shop,
union participation may decrease now that the closed shop can no longer be legally
enforced. Whether workers will stick together appears to be dependent upon the place
of work and the union organisation there.
Claims that trade unions, especially in closed shop situations, had used their power in
ways which affected productivity can also be countered by research which reached
quite different conclusions (see for example, MacInnes 1990, pp214-21S). Therefore,
it would be hard to claim that productivity in unionised firms has improved since the
legislation was brought into force. As far as limiting union power is concerned,
employees still tend to have far more advantages if they work in a unionised
workplace, whether there is 100% membership or not (see for example, WIRS 3
1992). It could be argued that the demise of the closed shop has not necessarily
reduced the power of trade unions to help their members.
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It is often suggested that another indicator of management support for trade unionism
is the existence of "check-off' arrangements, although this is not necessarily true: the
1990 WIRS, for example, found that the practice extended to workplaces with union
members but no formal union recognition. The check-off system was one of the last
trade union practices to come under fire from the Conservative legislation.
4:8 The "check-off"
"Check-off' is the name given to the practice whereby employers deduct trade union
subscriptions direct from the wages of members and pay them to the relevant union.
The Donovan Commission (1968) argued that check-off was a useful arrangement
and recommended that trade unions not collecting subscriptions by this method might
consider doing so.
Until 1992 there were no statutory requirements regarding the use of check-off
provisions other than a section in the Employment Act 1988 which gave employees a
statutory right to have the check-off facility stopped if they had terminated their union
membership. Union members now have the right "not to suffer deduction of
unauthorised or excessive union subscriptions" wherever a check-off arrangement
between an employer and a trade union exists (section 15 TURERA 1993). Where
such an agreement does exist the employer must ensure that the employee has
"authorised" the deduction by signing and dating a document. An authorisation once
made remains operative for three years unless the worker withdraws it in writing.
However, the fact that the employee has authorised the deductions does not mean that
the employer is obliged to maintain or continue a check-off agreement (section 68(9)
TULR(C)A). The amount deducted by the employer must not exceed the "permitted
amount", which is the amount of the union subscriptions set under the check-off
arrangement. When union subscriptions are increased the employer must give at least
one month's notice of the new amount to those affected before any increase can be
deducted. The notice must be in writing, state the amount to be deducted and in
addition state that the worker may at any time withdraw from the arrangements by
giving a written notice to the employer. These provisions also apply to any additional
deductions such as a levy to the union's political fund.O
Why did the Conservatives want to alter a system that many companies had operated
for decades, that employers appeared content with, and most of all was convenient for
unions and their members? The 1991 Green Paper "Industrial Relations in the 1990's"
stated that the majority of trade union members had their union subscriptions collected
by means of the check-off system and that difficulties could and did arise for
individual employees who wished to remain union members but not to pay their
subscriptions via this method. The Green Paper focused upon cases where union
13 An employee may complain to an industrial tribunal if bis/her employer makes a deduction in
breach of section 68 TULR(C)A. The complaint must be made within three months from the date of
the last deduction, unless it was not reasonably practicable to do so. If the complaint is upheld the
tribunal will make a declaration to that effect and order the employer to refund the unauthorised
deduction(s).
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members had objected to paying particular "levies" such as a contribution to a strike
fund, and that where that levy was collected through check-off as part of the union's
subscriptions the member had no redress other than leaving the union.
On the face of it, it appears that the concern was for the individual member and hislher
right to choose how to pay hislher subscriptions and whether they wished to contribute
to any additional levy. But underlying this concern was probably a deeper motive, one
connected with the reduction of trade union power. By insisting that all union
members must sign the check-off authorisation every three years the hope may have
been that many members would refuse to sign and give up their membership. In
addition the onus is placed on employers rather than trade unions to ensure that the
correct procedures are followed. The cheek-off system may in effect become a time-
consuming and expensive system to operate for employers who may decide to pullout
of any existing cheek-off arrangements. Indeed, the AEEU had reeeived letters to this
effect.t+ The 1991 Green Paper said that employers should examine and re-evaluate
their existing practices, presumably one of those was the check-off system.
Most unions had over 70% of their members paying subscriptions through cheek -off
facilities; research in 1989, showed that 80% of union members paid their
subscriptions by check -off arrangements and argued that the use of this arrangement in
the last ten years had contributed greatly to the rise in the percentage of due
subscriptions collected (Willman et aI1993). The Conservatives recognised that "the
cheek-off gives the union a seeure income at minimum administrative cost" (1991,
para .. 6.21). The check-off laws could be seen as an attack on the financial base of
trade unions; a purposely designed hindrance to their revenue collection. The main
aim, it appears, was in line with the original aim of reducing trade union power
indirectly by using employers and individual members. The law, while not directly
challenging trade unions, may encourage employers to opt out of the check-off system
and encourage individual members to drop out of their union, reducing union
membership and, therefore, their finances.
4:9 The effect of the check-off legislation on trade unions
Clearly the main effect on trade unions would be the damage suffered if members did
not renew their check-off arrangements or use alternative methods of payment. Many
unions were already struggling to maintain their levels of subscriptions income
(Waddington 1993). However, during the six months leading up to the final date after
which written authorisations had to be made (29th August 1994) trade unions were
mobilising their officials to ensure that all their check -off paying members signed
authorisations. Most unions also engaged in communications via newsletters, union
journals and their workplace representatives to make sure that members were aware of
all the benefits they would lose if they opted out of membership.
Behind these campaigns was the knowledge that some existing members may fail to
14 "AEEU Journal", November 1993, p3.
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sign their renewal notices. Union officials were also aware that the obligation is on
employers rather than trade unions to ensure that cheek-off authorisations are up to
date. To remedy this and ensure that employers retained check-off facilities some trade
unions, for example the ABEU, took the initiative and worked with employers;
drafting the renewal notices and mobilising their representatives to ensure that they
were signed and returned to the employers in plenty of time. They also advised their
officials to reassure employers that their only liability was if a union contribution was
deducted without a valid written authorisation.
Generally employers were helpful in the unions' drive to get their members to re-sign
for check-off and in some cases they appeared as keen as trade unions to facilitate
check-off agreements (Labour Research, September 1994c, pI2). However, any extra
cost incurred by employers might induce them to begin charging trade unions
administrative costs or where these already exist to charge more for the service.
Apparently some NHS trusts were beginning to charge for the administration of cheek-
off as a means of income generation, even two trusts which had derecognised COHSE
had allowed check-off arrangements to continue.15 According to Waddington (1993)
the reason that a large number of unions ran into deficit during 1991 was the result of
"burgeoning administrative expenditure" (P220), this could be added to if employers
decided to charge more for the existence of check -off facilities.16
At least for the present trade unions appear to have ridden the storm rather well and
have come out of it even better than they themselves imagined; as union representatives
collected existing members' signatures, an opportunity for new recruitment opened up.
The ABEU, for example, recruited over 150 new members at British Airways.t?
However, members must re-sign their authorisations every three years; therefore,
trade unions must ensure that they deliver the goods as far as their members are
concerned to encourage them to remain members.
Throughout the legislation relating to democracy in trade unions the emphasis was on
the individual rather than the collective unit. The individual union member has also
been given a substantial range of rights against his/her trade union.
15 IRS Employment Trends 545, October 1993.
16 Alternatively, trade unions were aware that any difficulties created by the legislation could be
minimised by persuading members to pay their subscriptions by direct debit. However, local
workplace representatives had reservations about this method of payment; it is very easy to cancel the
payments and not let the representative know making it harder for shopfloor representatives to keep
track of their members. Similarly, the CPSA was also worried that because direct debit provides
members with day to day control over whether to pay their subscriptions it could endanger its future
income. However some unions find the move to direct debit a lot easier than others; for example,
5,000 BIFU members transferred to direct debit at the Royal Bank of Scotland between March and June
1993 as part of the annual pay agreement. BIFU saw its direct debit campaign as "three-pronged" - all
new members were automatically put on direct debit, bulk transfers of members were encouraged and
an ongoing campaign of leaflets and journal articles was being used to encourage the switch from
check-off to direct debit. (IRS Employment Trends 545, October 1993.)
17 AEEU Union Review no.5 August 1994.
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4: 10 Individual rights vis-a-vis trade unions
A trade union is a voluntary, unincorporated institution governed by its constitution
which is found in its rule book. The union rule book is characterised in English law as
a contract of association among the members of the union. The foundation of a
member's rights vis-a-vis his/her trade union is the contract between him/herself and
his/her fellow members whereby he/she agrees to join the union and abide by the
rules. Trade unions generally had, until recently, a great deal of freedom when
drafting their rules; the only constraint was that the courts could intervene to interpret
the rule book and control its terms. If a union does not act in accordance with its
constitution it is open to any member to challenge the validity of that action in the
courts on the ground that it is a breach of contract,18 The limits of a member's right
to enforce the constitution depends upon the judges' views about how to accommodate
two conflicting principles: the contractual right of the member to have the constitution
obeyed and the principle of majority rule (Elias and Ewing 1987). In some instances
statutory requirements will prevent certain rules from being enforced in the courts.
The present statutory requirements prevent rules such as those allowing for
disciplinary action against non-striking members from being enforced.
The common law rights of trade union members have long formed an extensive body
of law; however, judges were rarely capable of extending union members' rights
beyond those that were contained in the rule book. To confer rights upon trade union
members that were not provided for in the rules could be achieved only by legislative
intervention, which is precisely what the Conservative government did between 1980-
1993.19 Members now have a substantial number of rights against their trade unions
including the right not to be excluded or expelled from any trade union and the right
not to be unjustifiably disciplined. (See appendix IB for an outline of some of the
rights of individual members.) The statutory rights of an individual in respect of
his/her trade union membership or non-membership are contained in TULR(C)A
(1992) amended by TURERA (1993). The legislative framework, however, does not
affect the common law rules unless they are in conflict with one another, in which case
the statutory provisions must be followed.
The post of the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members was
established to help protect certain statutory rights of members and was extended to
18 The courts will enforce the contract of membership where they find that a rule has not been strictly
followed and will refrain from doing so only where there can be no doubt that the union concerned is
acting within its powers. Where the rule is unambiguous and specific the question of whether there
was a breach of contract will generally be based on a question of fact. However, if the rules are
ambiguously worded or open to more than one interpretation then the courts will tend to adopt the
interpretation that favours the individual member. For an early, short and readable account of some of
the judicial interventions into the internal matters of trade unions, see for example, Grunfeld 1963.
19 Though the 1971 Industrial Relations Act had imposed a detailed system of regulation upon trade
unions' internal affairs and established a "bill of rights" for union members (Elias and Ewing 1987).
The Act was repealed in 1974. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 and its amendment in
1976 marked a return to statutory non-intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions. However,
the Act did require trade unions to keep proper accounting records; that is professionally audited ones.
89
cover the protection of contractual rights. The process of application to a court can be
expensive and daunting for an individual and before the Commissioner was
established, according to the Conservative government, union members needed to be
"exceptionally determined and sometimes courageous" to take the route to enforcing
their full rights.20 Because the courts were not being used it was considered necessary
to set up a post that was accessible and inexpensive to union members so that they
could ensure that trade unions observe their statutory duties and do not break the
contract of membership.
The statutory rights given to trade union members against their trade unions were
another attempt to undermine the perceived power of trade unions by the policy of
promoting individualism. Rather than directly intervening into trade union internal
affairs or by empowering employers further, the aim was to constrain union power
from within their own institutions. This rationale was influenced by the events of the
1984185 miners' dispute; civil litigation played a crucial part in weakening the NUM
during the strike and, for the most part, that litigation was generated by dissident union
members seeking to enforce the union rule book. Union members had shown that
they were willing to take action against their own union.
It was argued that: "The right of the individual to choose to go to work despite a call
to take industrial action is an essential freedom. "21 A union may lead its members into
action for which it has legal immunity, but members do not; that is, they could risk
losing their jobs. To ensure that individuals may exercise their freedom to choose, it
was claimed that clear and practical protection against being disciplined for refusing to
take industrial action was necessary, otherwise the member may be deterred from
making the "right" decision; that is, by a threat of being disciplined. As the courts
already provided safeguards against "unjustified" discipline, (that is discipline that is
not administered according to the rule book), it could be argued that rather than
safeguarding the individual, the principal aim of the right not to be unjustifiably
disciplined appears to have been directed at undermining the effectiveness of lawful
and democratically called strike action.
In relation to trade union funds the reasons for the statutory rights seem quite
legitimate at face value:
"The members, on whose contributions the unions' funds largely depend, have a
legitimate interest generally in the use to which these funds are put and, in particular, in
avoiding unnecessary expenditure arising from unlawful activities." ("Trade Unions and
Their Members" 1987, para. 3.1.)
This all appears straight-forward. It is also just that members are entitled to
information about their union's financial affairs. However, the majority of members
may consider it an unnecessary expenditure to allow "dissident" members or those
expelled under the union rules to claim damages and compensation from their unions.
20 "Trade Unions and Their Members" 1987, para. 6.9.
21 "Trade Unions and Their Members" 1987, para. 2.10.
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There is no right allowing union members to question this sort of expenditure. It
would appear that rather than making unions more accountable for their finances,
deeper ulterior motives existed. It could also be argued that where the concern
appeared to be about trade unions "avoiding unnecessary expenditure arising from
unlawful activities", the legislation has created an environment whereby to stay within
the legal boundaries trade unions have to spend money, for example, on postal
balloting before industrial action.
Despite the Conservative government's claims that their objectives were to protect the
democratic rights of trade union members, (itself a contentious issue when the new
rights have in effect created a right to disregard a majority result in a democratically
held ballot to take industrial action), it appears that the main motive was to undermine
the solidarity of workers, and therefore, trade union power, by attempting to mobilise
a minority of members to take action against their unions. As McKendrick (1988)
suggested, the new rights are only directed at a very particular type of individual:
"It is the individual who does not wish to go on strike and who wishes to restrain his
union from embarking upon 'unlawful' activity. No new rights are given to the union
member who wishes to engage in industrial action despite the fact that no immunity is
provided for such action." (p141).
For those members who may support the principles of trade unionism and believe in
"solidarity" with their fellow workers, no new rights have been given other than the
right of others to undermine democratically agreed decisions and, therefore, the
collective organisation.
4:11 Potential effects of individual members' statutory rights on trade
unions
Union members now have certain rights regardless of whether they are contained in
the rule book or not; for example, the right to elect their leaders, the right to call for a
ballot before industrial action and the right to restrain their union from using "their"
funds in ways considered inappropriate to the benefit of members. The most
significant of the new rights must be the right not to be unjustifiably disciplined.
Unions can act in complete conformity with their rule book and still have action taken
against them. This right significantly undermines the contract of membership, where
if a particular decision falls within the rules of the union then each member is bound by
their contract with the other members to follow that decision. Individual members
have a right to ensure that the "relevant" rules (obviously a member could not complain
that hislher union was not complying with a rule on disciplinary action against a non-
striker) are followed but at the same time they are given statutory freedom to ignore
certain rules themselves. For example, they can ensure that a call for industrial action
is not made without a majority decision in a secret ballot, but regardless of the union
rules they do not have to follow that decision themselves. This right could be seen as
undermining the whole democratic process of balloting and, indeed, the structure of
unionism itself. One of the fundamental elements of unionism is that the authority of a
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union is based on the principle of majority rule, which is reinforced by the fact that
members are generally responsible for the creation of their union's rules and policies;
therefore, the rules ought to be legitimately enforced.
According to Gennard et al (1989) the rules which set out a union's disciplinary
authority are very important to ensure that the principle of majority rule prevails:
"Union disciplinary powers ensure that in the last resort members and leaders comply
with the rules and policies and provide the means of maintaining the unity and
coherence of the organisation." (P7). Trade unions must be able to enforce
membership compliance if their industrial and social objectives are to be achieved.
Democratically made decisions must be enforced, otherwise the union may run the risk
that those who support the majority decision may resign in protest. "Individuals
cannot join a union without realising that they may at some point have to submit
themselves to the discipline of the organisation and abide by majority decisions with
which they may not agree if the union is to achieve its objectives." (Gennard et al
1989, p7.) Union disciplinary powers are central to collective bargaining and
industrial action and are also necessary to ensure compliance with collective
agreements made with employers. The need to maintain unity is essential and it is,
therefore, necessary that those who seek to undermine solidarity be disciplined.
Allowing a right not to be unjustifiably disciplined was no doubt an attempt to
undermine the needed unity and solidarity when industrial action is anticipated, albeit
one disguised under the head of "freedom and choice". Far from ensuring democracy
within trade unions the meaning of the word is turned upside down. To undermine the
principle of majority rule where decisions comply with constitutional and legal
requirements threatens effective and cohesive trade union action. The balloting process
itself could be undermined; individual members may feel that they need not vote in a
ballot because no matter what the result they do not have to comply with it. In tum
this could result in a majority vote which won't be complied with because if everyone
entitled to vote had done so the result might have been different. Alternatively
members who wish to take industrial action may see no reason why they should abide
by a majority decision against the action, which is, in effect, reversing the situation
and could cause problems for the trade union(s) involved. (See section on industrial
action below.)
It might be thought that if a union member was dissatisfied with his/her union's
policies and decisions, the reasonable thing to do would be to resign from the union.
However, as Auerbach (1990) has argued, one of the key aims of the legislation was
to encourage dissident and unsatisfied union members to opt for the strategy of "voice"
rather than "exit", thereby challenging union power from within. This is an indication
that the Conservatives may have been trying to tum trade unions into service and
benefit organisations; those members who are dissatisfied with some of their union's
policies may wish to remain in the union to keep their entitlement to benefits but need
not support their union on other matters.
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Aggrieved union members now have an easier and inexpensive route to solving their
grievances than the courts alone provided. The year 1991-1992 was a typical one for
the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members; it was characterised by a
large number of inquiries, a relatively low number of applicants and an even smaller
number of assisted applicants (Morris 1993). The fact that the Commissioner receives
many inquiries coupled with the assertion that after approaching the Commissioner
many problems are sorted out internally (Morris 1993) indicates that the intervention of
the Commissioner may induce unions to sort out problems faster than their normal
procedure would take.
The right not to be excluded from any trade union means that the "Bridlington
Agreement", which governs inter-union disputes arising from competition for
members, can no longer be used effectively. However, it is generally thought that the
law will have little effect in this area because of the reduction in inter-union
competition for members following union amalgamations; many amalgamations have
been by unions with a history of competition for members. Simpson (1993a) looked at
the possible effects that the change in the law could have on existing arrangements
between unions and employers, and in particular at single union deals (SUDs). He
argued that two separate issues were involved: whether existing SUDs would be
undermined if significant numbers of workers joined another union; and, whether
employers would be dissuaded from entering into SUDs by the impossibility of the
agreement being protected by "Bridlington".22 From an employer's perspective the
Bridlington principles operated to deter TUC affiliated unions from seeking to disrupt
existing bargaining arrangements.
The legislation was clearly intended to enhance the power of individuals within trade
unions at the expense of the unions' collective objectives. The rights of the individual
are given a much greater priority than the collective interests of the union. One
individual is able to challenge and prevent certain types of action, which in tum could
destroy a system that the majority want and benefit from. The promotion of
individualistic attitudes within trade unions could lead to the end of trade unions as we
know them. Even so, whilst only one dissident member can undermine certain union
activities, it will require many members to rebel against their unions before any real
change to the main objectives of unionism will be made. The fact that trade unions are
prevented from disciplining non-striking members does not mean that fellow members
will not show their hostility to those who did not support their action. This can be
expressed in many ways which does not constitute a breach of the law, but could make
life miserable for those on the receiving end.
Fear of the law by trade unions may be understandable, particularly when they risk
22 However, the results reported in part 2 of the thesis show that, at least in the local area covered by
the study, employers were still willing to enter into single union deals, (also see Millward 1994), and
that many local union members believed that they should then become a member of the recognised
union. Therefore, employers had not been dissuaded from entering into SUDs and some employees
were actually leaving their old union and joining the recognised one so that union might become
pitched against union.
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losing substantial amounts of money and maybe even control of their assets. In
addition English common law has always been individualistic in its nature and,
therefore, tends to work against collective groups such as trade unions. This
predicament has now been made even clearer with the new emphasis on individual
members' rights against their trade unions. However, when considering the possible
effects on trade unions of the rights of their members against them, the main point is
not so much whether members may be disgruntled with their union, but whether they
are prepared to take advantage of the rights given to them.
4:12 Industrial action
Industrial action is a means of exerting pressure on an employer and can take many
forms, such as a work to rule or an overtime ban; however, the most commonly
thought of is the withdrawal of labour or the strike, probably because strike action is
generally the only form of action which may be widely publicised and may affect the
public. It is usually the case that workers who resort to strike action do not do so
lightly, and very often because they have not been powerful enough to achieve their
goals by other means (Armstrong et a11977, Martin 1992). Nevertheless, a strike can
be a powerful weapon, particularly if workers from more than one industry stop work
at once, though it is rare for a strike to affect more than one industry at the same time
with the possible exception of the public sector.23 The Conservative government
argued that trade union power in this respect was being misused - by causing the
maximum amount of inconvenience to the public to achieve a desired goal - and strikes
were seen as the cause of the poor economic performance of the British economy. The
response was to "impose one of the most restrictive regimes of strike law in Europe"
(Davis and Freedland 1993, p658).
It was argued that "the existence of unconditional and practically unlimited legal
immunities for trade unions and their officials from 1906 to 1980 lies at the heart of the
British trade union problem and, some would say, at the heart of the economic
problem too" (Hanson 1991, p20). Therefore, the removal of some of the previously
enjoyed immunities by trade unions was inevitable. At first sight the objectives for the
loss of immunities were to ensure greater democracy, by requiring unions to hold
secret ballots before industrial action so as to avoid decisions that the majority of the
rank and file might not support, and to prevent unnecessary hardship caused by
industrial action to third parties not connected with the dispute. However, the
underlying motive of the measures was the curtailing of trade union power.
Overall the main aim of the legislation was to reduce trade union power by limiting the
scope of lawful industrial action and by making national unions liable for their actions
and for those of their members. The encouragement of individualism was evident; the
Conservatives hoped that individual members would prevent trade unions using their
"power" by not being intimidated into taking action that they did not personally
support. The notice that a national union must send to its striking members if it
23 For example, the Winter of 1978/9.
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repudiates their unofficial action is also an indication of how the Conservative
government was trying to appeal to the self interests of individual members;
reminding them of the fact that if they are dismissed they have no right to complain of
unfair dismissal (see appendix IC).
One of the first priorities was to gain control over mass picketing and secondary
action. The use of secondary action gave rise to the specific concern that employees
who had not been participating in strike action were being induced by pickets to
support the dispute. By controlling picketing24 and other forms of secondary action
an effective part of the strategy of strike action would be undermined.
4: 13 The Right to strike
Under English law there is no positive right to strike25; unions have only enjoyed
negative rights by being granted immunities from civil liabilities in tort.26 The Trade
Disputes Act 1906 had given trade unions "the social right to strike" by removing the
common law liabilities that had rendered the taking of industrial action unlawful (Davis
and Freedland 1993).
At common law a strike is seen as a breach of the contract of employment, even if the
action is against the unlawful conduct of an employer, who, himlherself, may be in
breach of contract. Employers may obtain an injunction in tort against the union or its
officials to stop inducing others to breach their employment contract. However, the
immunity for acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, bestowed
upon trade unions in 1906, had protected unions unless they were acting outside the
limits set by their rule books. The scope of this immunity has been restricted since
1980. For example, all legal immunity for official disputes is conditional upon a
majority vote in a secret ballot; national unions are legally liable for all unofficial
action unless they repudiate it; all trade disputes must be confmed to the employees'
place of work and secondary action, except peaceful picketing at or near the picket's
place of work, loses a trade union its immunity. (See appendix 1C.)
During the two world wars extensive statutory restrictions were placed upon industrial
action and striking was made an offence. However, legislation seems to have little
affect on preventing employees from withdrawing their labour; for example, referring
to the non enforcement of the 1915 Munitions of War Act against 200,000 South
Wales miners, Allen (1960) argued that it was "the first indication of the fact that if a
24 A legal right to picket has never existed, but peaceful picketing, that is an assembly of workers
with the intention of persuading others to support their action, was generally recognised and permitted.
25 The absence of a legal right to strike in Britain is in stark contrast to many other European
countries, where the freedom to strike enjoys a greater legal recognition and is regarded in some
countries as a basic human right protected by the constitution.
26 However, members of the armed forces and policemen have no right to strike and other workers
may find that they are guilty of a criminal offence if they take strike action; for example, under the
Post Office Act 1953 post office workers are guilty of a criminal offence if they "wilfully detain or
delay" the mail.
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large enough number of workers in a vital industry ignored anti-strike legislation there
was nothing the government could do about it except behave as if no legislation
existed" (p138).
The 1971 Industrial Relations Act dismantled the 1906 Trade Disputes Act27 and made
national unions legally responsible for the activities of local officials (the intention was
to curb unofficial strikes) and required a "cooling off" period before strike action
began. The Act was a reaction to what the Conservative government called "the strike
problem" and was based on a new approach to industrial relations which aimed to curb
strikes by restricting trade union immunities and by the use of legal penalties. Despite
the Act workers continued to strike and many succeeded in gaining higher wages. The
1974 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act restored the legal immunities of trade
unions.
The employer is entitled to dismiss striking employees without prior notice.28
However, in practice most strikes do not end in dismissal. Before 1982, if an
employer dismissed all those engaged in strike action he/she would have had complete
immunity against a complaint of unfair dismissal; only if he/she selectively dismissed
(or selectively re-engaged) any of the strikers could a complaint be made. The 1982
Employment Act introduced a measure allowing employers to dismiss striking
employees without also dismissing those who had at any time prior to the date of
dismissal participated in the action. This provision relieves the employer of the
responsibility to notify employees that unless they return to work by a specified date
they will be dismissed. The employer may also dismiss those striking at a particular
"establishment" and not at other "establishments" owned by himlher, though the term
"establishment" is not defined. It appears that employers can retain their immunity by
the selective dismissal of strikers, that is, by dismissing only those on a particular site.
This might be done to allow production to continue by replacing the strikers with new
workers or to make an example of one group of strikers to encourage a return to work
at other sites (Ewing 1991). The selective dismissal of unofficial strikers is also
allowed and they are denied the right to complain of unfair dismissal even if other
employees participating in the action are not dismissed. In addition trade unions have
no immunity to take official action in support of those selectively dismissed for taking
part in unofficial action. Employers are also allowed to selectively re-engage official
strikers after a period of three months has passed since their dismissal. In fact, as
Ewing put it, the employer could "offer lawfully to re-engage them on terms which are
a material variation of the original contract and in fact the very subject of the dispute
between the parties" (1991, pS9). Therefore, employers are invested with a
considerable power over their employees. In addition, strikers are also subject to
27 The 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act had previously withdrawn the 1906 Act's
immunities and had made it a criminal offence to organise strikes unless they were aimed at furthering
trade disputes in the industry where the strikers were employed providing they were not intended to put
pressure on the government or pose hardship in the community. This Act was repealed in 1946
following Labour's election in 1945 and the policy of the 1906 Act was fully restored.
28 Though rarely done, employers may seek damages for any loss suffered as a result of a strike from
their individual workers,
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penalties imposed by the state; they are disqualified from unemployment and welfare
benefits.
4:14 Curbs on industrial action and trade union power
It has been suggested that the reduction in trade union immunities has curbed the abuse
of trade union power (for example, Hanson 1991). Coates and Topham (1988)
argued that:
"The reason is obvious: a few spectacular cases which produce devastating results for
unions, strikers, their communities and individual workers are enough of a deterrent
(reinforced by unemployment) to induce further docility amongst most other employees,
so that the necessity for repetition of injunctions and suits does not arise." (p324).
Coates and Topham (1988) contended that the decline in the rate of strikes provided all
the evidence necessary. Indeed, in 1991 the government claimed that their legislation
had been the major reason for the great improvement in industrial relations and the
dramatic reduction in the number of strikes.29 However, the strike rate also fell in
other Western countries and therefore cannot be solely attributed to the legislation.
Moreover, the reduction in the number of strikes does not necessarily mean a
weakening of union power, in fact, it may mean the opposite; that trade union power
has been enhanced by the balloting procedures and therefore the need to take strike
action has been reduced. (See for example, Brown and Wadhwani 1990, Elgar and
Simpson 1993a, TUC 1995a.)
Reforms affecting strike activities can have an enormous impact on the national unions
concerned particularly financially, especially if the rules on picketing and secondary
action are breached. However, it appears that members are still prepared to withdraw
their labour when they feel it is necessary; the number of strike ballots which have
produced votes in favour of action indicates this (see, for example, TUC 1995a).
Nevertheless, unofficial strikesJo tend to be more common than official ones, albeit
they tend to be short lived and successful. Where the dispute needs an immediate
response to initiate an impact, "the result may be unballoted and unofficial action,
which could cause separate legal difficulties for the union, but might lead to speedy
resolution of the dispute. In many cases this represents no change to established
practice" (Elgar and Simpson 1992, p47). In this respect the reforms have not
affected trade union power at all; however, when the action is unofficial the union
taking the action is the workplace organisation; that is, it has not been endorsed by
the national union.
The main change has been to make national unions liable for any unlawful action of
their members (unless they repudiate that action). By the removal of almost all trade
29 "Industrial Relations in the 1990s".
30 It may also be the case that other kinds of unofficial action, such as overtime bans, are quite
common. However, if they remain informal and unrecorded this kind of action may never reach the
public eye.
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unions' immunities and particularly because of the restrictive definition of "trade
dispute" (see appendix IC), a trade union can be severely at risk financially if it does
not act within the law. Indeed, some unions have been weakened financially (for
example, the NUM and the NGA); however, "[t[hese initial shocks to trade unions are
unlikely to be repeated .... It is clear that the risk of sequestration has been a major
deterrent to unions in the conduct of disputes" (Brown and Wadhwani 1990, plO).
Political disputes have no immunity at all. However, it could be argued that it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish between a political and an economic dispute,
especially if the government intervene in wage bargaining in the public sector. It has
even been suggested that in principle every strike could be characterised as a political
one:
"All industrial action is 'political' in the sense that it involves struggle, conflict and
power relations. But there are different levels or types of workplace action and
politics .... Even strikes over wages, production levels or job distribution can have a
wider political impact. It depends both upon their objectives and the way they are
perceived and reacted to." (Hain 1986, p20).
An employer only has to argue that a union is pursuing a political rather than an
industrial dispute to try to obtain an injunction against the union. The crucial test in
court will be whether the dispute fits the "relates wholly or mainly" tesPl; this may put
a wide range of industrial action by workers in essential services at risk (Simpson
1993b).
The Social Security (No 2) Act 198032 reflected the Conservatives' election pledge of
ensuring that "unions bear their fair share of the cost of supporting those of their
members who are on strike". It was considered that unions had no incentive to pay
strike pay to strikers with dependents because of the deductions made by social
security officers. Ewing (1991) may have hit the nail on the head when he stated that
the benefit restrictions operated to deny the minimum level of subsistence to people in
dispute and that they were designed to reduce the number and length of disputes by a
policy of starvation. This may have been the principle behind the Act; however, the
take-up of benefits by strikers' families is very low and is, therefore, unlikely to have
a great effect on strike activity, with perhaps the exception of long drawn out disputes,
such as the 1984/5 miners' dispute. As workers most probably do not expect a
dispute to last too long, it is highly unlikely that the Act will be a major deterrent to
workers considering strike action; however, it could be seen as a strike breaking
device in long lasting disputes.
31 In Mercury Communications Ltd. v Scott-Garner [1984] ICR 74, a dispute arising out of the
ending of the British Telecom telephone monopoly was held not a trade dispute because it failed the
"relates wholly or mainly" test. The court held that the Post Office Engineering Union was waging a
campaign against the political decision to privatise the industry as there was little evidence to support
its claim that the dispute was due to fears over job losses.
32 The Social Security (No 2) Act 1980 ensured a total discounting of strike pay against any benefit
that might be payable to a striker's family; an index linked sum, originally £12 per week, should be
deducted from any benefit payable, whether strike pay is paid or not. Urgent needs payments for
strikers and their families were virtually eliminated.
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It could be argued that union members have always been at the mercy of the common
law if the employer wished to take action against them. However, the employer is in a
more powerful position than before 1979; for example, he/she can selectively dismiss
workers in unofficial disputes without fear of any redress. The picketing laws have
also made it easier for employers to remove any immunities still enjoyed by the union
in dispute, by allowing them to transfer work done at the workplace in dispute to
another establishment, even a newly developed one. The new workplace is not the
strikers' place of work and, therefore, the national union has no immunity from action
in tort if strikers picket the new workplace. Ifproduction continues the employer loses
nothing and, therefore, the effectiveness of the action is undermined33 Nevertheless,
as the majority of strikes tend to remain within the confmes of individual workplaces,
the law on secondary action will not have much effect on the bulk of disputes.
Membership support tends to be much stronger where the dispute affects them
personally.
Attempts to act within the law by national unions could also render ineffective any
action or proposed action. In 1989, for example, the dock workers' employers tried to
obtain an injunction to prevent the TGWU from inducing its members to take strike
action. A national strike ballot had been held after the refusal of the dockers'
employers to negotiate a new agreement to replace the National Dock Labour Scheme
(NDLS). The High Court rejected the employers' claim that the action was against the
government's decision to abolish the NDLS and was not covered by the immunity
from actions in tort and ruled that the union was pursuing a legitimate trade dispute and
was therefore protected. However, despite a majority vote supporting strike action the
TGWU waited for the Court of Appeal decision before calling a national stoppage.
The Court of Appeal granted the port employers an injunction. By the time the House
of Lords overturned this decision, the union was required to hold a second ballot (see
appendix 1C). A strike was eventually called but ended in defeat as the NDLS had
already been abolished. In order to stay within the law the TGWU achieved nothing,
purely because of the time taken to ensure that they were conducting the dispute
lawfully. As Marsh (1992b) contended, the TGWU would have been able to use a
greater variety of tactics to persuade the port employers to accept a new national deal if
the 1980s legislation had not been passed; as it was they were forced to delay any
action to such an extent that their bargaining power was severely weakened.t+
Therefore, it could be claimed that the legislation has curbed trade union power;
however, this again relates to national trade unions rather than workplace
organisations. If immediate, and therefore unofficial, action appears to benefit
members more than official action which, because of the time it takes to organise, may
33 The dispute between News International and the print unions (NGA and SOGAT 82) in 1986
illustrates this; in a nutshell, News International dismissed all the strikers and moved its newspaper
production to Wapping; picketing Wapping was unlawful secondary action and the sacked employees
could not claim unfair dismissal or redundancy payments.
34 This might aIso be one of the effects of balloting before action is taken if the ballot takes a long
time to arrange; members' passions may "cool off' or the employer may use the time to "buy them
off" (Brown and Wadhwani 1990,p12).
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be too late to be effective, members may not be concerned about whether they will put
their national union at risk or not.
Employers have been further equipped to resist union demands where industrial action
is concerned and union members have been given an easier route to challenge the
actions of their unions. However, the creation of the Commissioner for Protection
Against Unlawful Industrial Action suggests that the promotion of individualism
among union members and the empowering of employers to resist union demands
were not preventing unlawful industrial action and, therefore, further channels were
seen as necessary, though it appears that this tactic was aimed at industrial action
which affected essential services. Employers and dissident union members have both
used the law against trade unions; however, this appears to be rare rather than the
norm, the large majority of companies prefer not to take legal action (for example,
Elgar and Simpson 1993a, 1993b, I994b). Injunctions tend to be the major legal
weapon used by employers, though there has been an increase in the use of the law of
contract (Marsh I992b). Injunctions were used mostly in the printing, public services
and shipping sectors, particularly where the product was highly perishable and most of
them were taken out to prevent secondary action (Evans 1987). The Commissioner
received no applications for assistance between April 1994 and March 1995; she
claimed that the availability of assistance to enforce the "citizen' s right" has a deterrent
effect on those contemplating organising unlawful industrial action.35
National unions have to be very careful how they proceed with industrial action. Any
attempt to extend it beyond the workplace, sometimes an essential part of strike action,
is unlawful and could lead to financial penalties for the unions involved. In this
respect it could be argued that the legislation has reduced the power of national trade
unions; however, as the majority of industrial action occurs within the confines of a
particular workplace, (very often unofficial), it could be argued that trade union power
has been affected very little by the legislation depending upon the workplace
organisation: the power of a workplace union lies with its lay representatives and its
members within the workplace. Respect for the law by members is essential for the
legislation to have any real affect upon unofficial disputes and it is possible that
workplace organisations act with their own interests in mind before considering the
law.
At first sight the "right to strike" may appear to have been severely restricted and
where employers are determined to overcome any action it can be done, as illustrated
by the Wapping dispute in 1986 (and the Grunwick dispute in the 1970s). In fact, it
could be argued that these disputes suggest that there is no right to strike at all; to
strike in effect loses the worker his/her job. However, the impact of the legislation on
industrial action is largely dependent upon the extent to which employers are willing to
use the courts, and as the majority appear to settle disputes through negotiation (for
example, McConnell and Takla 1990, Elgar and Simpson 1993b, 1994b) without
resort to any outside sources, it could be argued that the impact of the legislation has
35 "Annual Report of the Commissioner for Protection Against Unlawful Industrial Action 1994/95."
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been slight, at least on workplace union organisations. No amount of legislation can
actually prevent workers from withdrawing their labour; however, the worker is at a
disadvantage as far as the law is concerned. Nevertheless, whether an employer
wishes to dismiss his/her workforce must depend upon many factors including how
soon he/she needs the work to be done and how easy it is to replace his/her existing
workforce.
It appears that, at least for workplace union organisations, trade union power remains
more or less the same as it always has; it is contained within the workplace and where
that organisation can act independently of outside sources, the national organisation
appears unable to exert the necessary control to stop any unlawful action from taking
place.
4: 15 Democratic unions - a reduction in union power?
Trade unions appear to have adapted to the statutory requirements rather well; in
particular the balloting procedures are generally considered an essential trade union
strategy during collective bargaining. Nevertheless, national unions do tend to act
with more procedural caution, especially in relation to industrial action; in particular
strikes which affect public services, such as in the transport sector or the postal
services, tend to be executed by a series of well planned one day stoppages rather than
drawn out continuous strike action.
There is no doubt that trade unions can be seen to be democratically run. However,
the acceptance of the principle of majority rule is generally considered a normal
democratic principle; if this does not have to be followed for certain decisions,
(notably those concerning industrial action), then the whole democratic process is
undermined. If postal ballots result in lower turnouts than workplace ballots it could
be argued that the result is not representative of all members. This is particularly true
if those members who do not wish to take industrial action do not vote because they
know that they need not follow an instruction to do so. If unions were still allowed to
discipline those members who do not heed a majority vote, participation in the
balloting procedures might be higher, possibly leading to a majority decision against
industrial action. Nevertheless, no matter how many members vote in a ballot,
whether for the election of an official or for industrial action, the result does legitimise
union decisions. On the face of it, unions can be seen as representative of their
members; leaders have been chosen by them and decisions ratified by them.
However, if only a minority of members vote, the question of representativeness could
be challenged.
There is always the possibility that those members who do not vote in election ballots
are not really interested in who their leaders are as long as their needs are met. If it is
true that the average union member is not particularly interested in the internal
workings of his/her union, but is more concerned with any potential problems at
his/her own workplace, those that affect him/her personally, the average member will
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be more concerned about who his/her local representative(s) is/are and whether they
can protect his/her interests in the workplace. Union benefits are probably seen as part
of this local process and as long as the member gets what he/she is entitled to, the
personalities and aspirations of their national leaders make no difference.
But were trade unions undemocratic before 1979? The slogan "giving the unions back
to their members" implied that members were not in control of their unions before the
legislation was passed. Certainly, dissatisfied members could enforce their contract
of membership and ensure that their trade union abided by its own rules. Indeed,
Hemingway (1978) argued that if members felt their interests were being ignored they
were very likely to challenge their leaders, though not necessarily through the courts
but through legitimate union channels, such as the annual conference. The overall aim
behind the legislation was an attack on the "perceived power" of trade unions.
Individualism was promoted to such an extent that if enough members rose to the bait
the collective aspect of trade unions would be weakened. In some respects, as far as
national union organisations are concerned, this might even be the case: they are
beginning to provide services for their members as individuals; the collective aspect of
trade unionism appears to belong to the shopfloor organisations.
It is even questionable as to whether the Conservatives really had the interests of
individual members in mind when drafting the reforms. A trade union's very purpose
is to protect and advance the interests of its members, most of whom would find it
very difficult to negotiate alone with their employers for the best possible deal; trade
unions enhance the "power" of individual members. It could be argued that trade
unions actually have individual members' interests in mind when conducting their
business. However, those interests are served by acting with a collective voice. The
principle of majority rule must be observed in these situations otherwise the collective
voice will be undermined. Therefore, if trade unions already looked after individual
members' interests, albeit largely through a collective stance, the promotion of
individualism to such an extent that the collective organisation could be undermined
appears to be against the long term interests of individual members.
The Conservatives, rather than being concerned about the individual, were more
determined to reduce trade union power by attempting to undermine the effectiveness
of democratically made decisions by using the individual as the weapon. A major
government concern was the responsibility of union officials to their members, yet
surely members also have a responsibility to their union; that is, their fellow members
by their contract of association. The legislation in effect makes the issue of
responsibility one sided: officials must abide by the rules but in some circumstances
members can ignore them if they please.
The role of the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members is in stark
contrast to the level of help given to employees in enforcing their rights against their
employers, especially when the fact that legal aid is not available for legal
representation before industrial tribunals is taken into account. The number of
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applications to an industrial tribunal for unfair dismissal cases is far greater than those
to the Commissioner and the consequences are more serious for those concerned than
complaints of unlawful behaviour by trade unions. Legal representation is not
necessary at a tribunal but it is in the applicant's best interests to have a lawyer present
as they are twice as likely to win. Further, there is no substantial evidence of
particular abuses of trade union "power" against individual members, who are
probably more concerned about their rights vis-a-vis their employer than the activities
of their union.
The "right to work" and not be unfairly dismissed take on a different meaning from the
"right to work" and not be unjustifiably disciplined by a trade union. The "right to
work" appears to be enforceable only against trade unions, and the right tends to
ignore the inequality that exists between many employers and their workers. Since the
start of the MORI series in 1975 there has been no significant change in the proportion
of union members agreeing that "trade unions are necessary to protect workers'
interests" and people are more likely to agree that "employees need strong trade unions
to protect their interests" than to disagree (Rentoul 1989). Indeed, Rentoul found that
many employees saw the workplace in terms of conflict and whilst some might have
been initially reluctant to join a union they were eventually converted when they
needed help and found that it was there for them. The point is that whilst the
Conservatives may have wished to ignore the possible inequality that might exist
between workers and employers, workers still believe that conflict situations are an
inevitable part of the working process and that trade unions are necessary to protect
their interests.
Support for some of the trade union reforms does not mean that people accept the
"whole package of individualism" (Rentoul 1989). Rentoul found that among his
interviewees there was widespread support for secret ballots, but as long as there was
a democratic majority for a strike in a secret ballot, the right of the majority to at least
discourage the minority from strike breaking was accepted. In a sense trade unions
must comply with democratic standards which are slightly different from those
normally considered just. The promotion of individualism is inherent throughout all
the legislation; the aim was that individuals would see themselves as being in
competition with each other ending the solidarity aspect of workers. Democracy in
this respect represents individual interests rather than collective interests. However, as
the data collected by Rentoul shows, the self interests of individual workers are
fulfilled by trade unions, and because those self interests are common to the majority
of workers they become "collective interests"; hence Rentoul's assertion that trade
unions become "vehicles for collective selfishness" (p96). When voting individuals
may vote for themselves with no consideration for the entire group, as was hoped, but
if each voter has the same self interests then the vote will most probably be a vote for
the "collective self interests" of the group. The Conservative's conception of
individualism as the direct opposite to collectivism may have been wrong; evidence
tends to portray individualism and collectivism as working together to promote and
help one another. If this is the case it is easy to see why it is argued that the reforms
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have not decollectivised trade unions.
If the long term transformation of trade unions through the reforms was envisaged,
especially by changing the image of trade unionism into service organisations,
members may have other perceptions of trade unions and the role that they should be
playing, especially within the workplace. If the legislation makes it hard for trade
unions to carry out that role, members may find it necessary to rebel against their
national unions, though this might not be in the direction wanted by the Conservatives.
As the legislation is aimed at trade unions as national organisations, it neglects the fact
that independent workplace organisations exist, and where these are seen as effective
they appear to be largely untouched by the legislative reforms; democracy still applies
to workplace organisations, but the legislation largely overlooks the fact that national
unions may not become involved in workplace disputes. Suggestions that the
legislation reduces the power of workgroup union organisations to initiate industrial
action (for example, Martin et al 1995) appear to be unfounded. Of course, official
action would have to be endorsed by the national union, but as most industrial action
tends to be unballoted and over sectional or workgroup issues (for example, Elgar and
Simpson 1993b), the power of shopfloor organisations appears to be more or less the
same as it always has been.
It is possible that the Conservatives misinterpreted the main source of union power;
the basic unit of union organisation (and power) is the workplace rather than the
national organisation and national leaders. The members themselves hold the key to
whether trade unionism can survive the legislative attack upon it. Members are needed
to uphold the financial standing of national trade unions, to uphold their very purposes
and most of all to maintain whether a union even exists at all. Nevertheless, it seems
to be the case that the workplace organisation is actually the key to whether workers
will join a union (see for example, Hancke 1993). Therefore, providing members are
satisfied with their shopfloor union, national union organisations should survive.
The next chapter summarises the conclusions reached in chapters 2 to 4 and identifies
the main points which appear to explain why there are conflicting opinions about trade
union power. The chapter also illustrates how the nature of the empirical research
documented in part 2 of the thesis was influenced by these conclusions. The
hypotheses that the study was addressing are also outlined.
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CHAPTER5 TRADE UNION POWER - A CASE OF
INTERPRETATION
This chapter summarises the conclusions from the previous chapters and identifies the
main points which appear to explain why there are conflicting opinions about trade
union power. Questions are raised which Part 2 of the thesis attempts to answer. The
fmal part of the chapter shows how the nature of the empirical research, the results of
which are documented in part 2 of the thesis, was influenced by these conclusions. A
number of hypotheses which the study addressed are set out. Chapter 6 outlines the
methods used to test these hypotheses.
5: 1 Introduction
Trade union power was one of the central features of the Conservative Party. selection
campaign in 1979, and they introduced a succession of Employment and Trade Union
Acts designed to reduce what they described as excessive union power. Overall no
firm conclusions can be reached regarding trade union power; some authors argue that
the reduction of trade union power was one of the main successes of Thatcherism and
others suggest that very little has altered on the shopfloor. It is certainly clear that
trade union power, whilst definitely existing, was probably not as "powerful" before
1979 as sometimes advocated. In general trade unions exercise a negative and
defensive power. Research has also produced a mixed bag of conclusions as to
whether the legislation designed to reduce that power has had any damaging effects
upon trade unions. Indeed, in some instances it seems that the very legislation
designed to reduce union power may actually have had positive effects for trade
unions, for example the balloting procedures. Why is there such a difference of
opinion about the power of the same organisations? The answer was largely revealed
by the previous chapters which highlighted a few important and interconnected points.
Each one is briefly summarised below.
5:2 The definition of power
The term "power" is hotly debated in the industrial relations arena (see chapter 1).
Power relations can take many forms, making the measurement of "power" difficult
unless the researcher spells out in precise detail exactly what he/she means by the term.
Even then unless the same measurements of power have been used in other studies,
comparisons between the two will mean very little. Many analyses of trade union
power are inadequate because they are only partial in their coverage; for example,
using only observable behaviour to study "power" very often equates "power" with
the party that appears to have "won" an issue, yet both parties to a dispute may have
gained advantages from the outcome, which makes the measurement of power for one
side or the other very difficult. Using indices such as strike activity or union density
to measure union power is not even feasible because they neglect the many dimensions
of trade union power. As Edwards (1983) argued, the aspect of power most amenable
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to empirical study - bargaining power and decision making - merely represents the tip
of the iceberg as far as the total process of power is concerned.
Different definitions and different measurements of power can lead to different
conclusions about the extent of that power. Edwards (1983) argued that the
methodology employed to a large extent determines the "findings" of the research;
therefore, the methods chosen to measure the extent of trade union power must try and
incorporate as many dimensions of that power as possible.
For the purposes of this study power is defined as the capacity or ability to
produce effects; that is, the ability to bring about or accomplish
something. Trade union power, then, is the union's capacity or ability
to achieve a desired goal. As the basic purpose of a trade union is to act in
defence of its members' interests, particularly in their relationship with their employer,
it could be argued that a trade union's power is its capacity or ability to
defend and advance its members' lnterests.' This is a broad definition. The
ability to produce effects has meaning which stems far beyond observable outcomes
and what is usually termed "bargaining power". It may include the capacity to shape
decisions and, therefore, the final outcome; many issues of concern to members may
be solved without a conflict situation arising or even to their satisfaction without
necessarily "winning" the issue. More importantly it is wide enough to include
potential power as well as exercises of power; that is, the capacity to produce a goal
may be present but not necessarily put into practice.
A trade union's capacity to defend and advance its members' interests extends further
than the workplace; the provision of services and benefits can be classed as a capacity
to produce effects and can, therefore, be seen as an exercise of power. Very often this
aspect of trade union activity is neglected in studies of union power, but it may be an
important factor to members, especially if they feel that unions at workplace level do
not adequately represent their interests (Guest and Dewe 1988). The seventh BSAS
found that 71% of union members questioned thought that "to get members' benefits"
was an important reason to belong to a trade union (Millward 1990). Evidence does
suggest that trade unions continue to play a vital role in dismissal procedures and that
dismissal rates tend to be lower in unionised firms than those which are not unionised
(Millward et al 1992). Indeed, surveys have found that one of the most common
reasons for union membership is for future protection (Stevens et al 1989, Millward
1990, Hedges 1994); this could be either in the workplace or by the national
organisation, for example, legal representation for an accident at work.2
1 Members' interests can be defined as anything that relates to their weJJbeing or welfare, particularly
in relation to their employment. Anything that benefits either an individual member or a group of
members could be described as advancing members' interests.
2 Nearly 70% of compensation paid to workplace injury victims is won with trade union backing
and individuals making claims without union support are increasingly unsuccessful. This is largely
because of restrictions in eligibility for legal aid and claimants' inability to afford legal representation.
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However, whether members are aware of the services that are on offer to them is
another question. According to AEEU journals some members do not take advantage
of the services that are on offer and take up their own legal representation at
considerable cost to themselves. Some members may consider the shopfloor to be the
union and do not consider the added extras on offer; alternatively, members may be ill
informed by their lay representatives and therefore do not know how to go about
receiving any benefits or services that may be due them. This leads to the next point.
5:3 There are two different strands of unionism -
the workplace/shopfloor unit and the national organisation
When discussing trade union power it is very likely that the debate centres on what the
term "trade union" is referring to. For the sake of simplicity unionism can be divided
into two entities: the national organisations and the shopfloor units (see chapter 3). In
a nutshell, there is a vast difference between these two strands of unionism. While the
national union may appear to be the flagship for the protection and advancement of
workers' interests, in many cases this may not be so; any bargaining power tends to
be exerted on the shopfloor, and even if an external officer is called in to deal with a
dispute, it is still the members who decide what action should be taken and whether to
accept any negotiated deals.
Studies conducted before and after 1979 point to the fact that there is indeed a
difference between these two entities and that the shopfloor unit is actually "the union"
as far as most members are concerned. Members appear to be concerned with
shopfloor issues and problems: those that affect them personally, rather than with the
activities of their national union. In other words, members are not necessarily
concerned with the politics of their national union but with the politics of the
workplace. Any problems are taken to the shop steward and the vast majority of
grievances are dealt with in the workplace without any outside help.
It is here where the two different aspects of unionism identified by Flanders (1961)
comes under the spot light. Do members think of their unions as campaigners against
inequality and injustice on a national scale or do they just look upon their union as a
"wielder of economic muscle" in the workplace? In other words do members see "the
union" as the shopfloor or a wider movement? In the light of previous research it
seems highly likely that "the union" means the shopfloor, particularly when it is
argued that employees are more interested in the fates of their own firms than the
struggles of fellow workers elsewhere (Brown 1986). It cannot be denied that the
national organisation may be essential for workers when issues must be taken out of
the workplace; for example, in Scotland UNISON gained female workers equal pay
with their male counterparts and backdated payments3. However, it could also be
argued that in many cases if a strong workplace union existed there should be no need
to pursue outside help because these matters would be solved in the workplace.
3 Bargaining Report 00.147 February 1995.
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The legislation and the economic climate since 1979 may have had more of an effect on
national unions. The leaders of these organisations realise how important it is for the
union as a whole to abide by the "law", especially where industrial action is
concerned, yet in the workplace, at least where a union organisation exists that can
work independently of its FfOs, observance of the "law" may take a back seat
especially when a grievance requires an immediate solution. The economic climate
has also hit national trade unions harder than shopfloor units; declining membership is
liable to have a greater effect upon the national organisation than an effective
workplace organisation, especially in terms of finance; where the workplace union is
seen to be effective membership tends to be constantly upheld (for example, Hancke
1993).
When people talk about trade union power it makes a great deal of difference which of
these organisations they are referring to. The two strands of unionism reflect the
different dimensions of trade union "power"; that is, the ability of the union to achieve
a desired goal and produce effects. The workplace unit is the centre of union activity
for most members and the place where "bargaining power" is usually exerted over
workplace grievances without the "interference" of the national union. The national
union wields the "power" to administer services and benefits to members when they
are needed; for example, the provision of legal representation for accidents at work,
which can be a very costly experience for a worker paying hislher own legal fees.
Many workers may not realise the importance or even existence of this benefit until the
unfortunate moment itself happens.
It is argued that since 1979 the role of the national union has diminished (see for
example, Martin 1992), perhaps with the exception of small unions which could be
equated with a shopfloor unit of a larger union. The original objectives of trade
unionism have not changed but they tend to take place within the confines of individual
workplaces rather than prominently on the national side. As Fairbrother (1990)
argued, past practices and forms of organisation no longer automatically suffice as
effective ways of representing and articulating workers' interests. The role of the
national union has become more like that of the employers' associations: a source of
expert advice, information and a provider of services (Martin 1992); they have even
been described by union officials as "a cheap form of insurance". Is this how
members view their national organisations?
5:4 Different opinions and ways of bargaining
Research studies have found that different opinions about the purposes of unionism
and different ways of bargaining exist between different unions and in different
workplace organisations of the same union. An explanation for these differences,
especially where the same union is involved, may lie with the personalities of those
concerned, especially the representatives. Indeed, it has been argued that it is the local
leader's style which determines membership interest and participation in workplace
unionism and, therefore, the level of success of the union when bargaining with
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management (Fosh and Cohen 1990, Fosh 1993). It has been concluded that even
when the workplace situation is not the most favourable for the development of
unionism, a careful choice of leadership style can still produce successful results (Fosh
1993).
If different opinions and styles of bargaining do exist between and within workplaces
it is very hard to generalise about the extent of trade union power let alone its decline.
If lay representatives of the same union operate with differing degrees of success,
especially within the same workplace, then, this indicates that the potential power of a
trade union lies within the workplace itself. It is widely accepted that the lay
representative, or shop steward, is the key "union" figure within the workplace and as
most bargaining power, at least in the private sector, tends to be exercised there and
grievances are usually resolved without national assistance, it might be presumed that
the shop steward is the most important person as far as members are concerned.
Indeed, many studies have highlighted the fact that to most members the shop steward
is "the union" (for example, Goldthorpe et al 1968, Marchington 1980). It is most
likely that to members the extent of their union's power is measured by the level of
success that they have in the workplace. Ifwe accept that the lay representative's style
and personality are essential in determining membership participation and interest in
workplace unionism and, therefore, the level of success that the shopfloor unit has
when dealing with management, it can be argued that how well the representative
performs- will influence members' perceptions of the "power" of their union; that is,
its capacity or ability to defend and advance their interests (see above). Therefore, it
could be argued that the personality and style of working of the lay representative are
essential ingredients for successful unionism in the workplace. If this argument is
accepted it might be expected that union members in different workshops may evaluate
the same union organisation differently because of the working style of their lay
representative; the representative in one workshop may behave differently from that of
the representative in the adjoining workshop.t
The essence of Posh's (1993) argument was that members fluctuate between different
attitudes towards their union and the key to encouraging greater participation is the
style of the union representatives. This may be particularly significant in the light of
studies which suggest that participation in union activities is related to positive
perceptions of union performance (for example, Fiorito et al 1988). In addition it is
suggested that it makes no difference whether a steward has an ideological or
instrumental commitment to unionism, he/she can still perform his/her role adequately
in the workplace providing he/she has the right working style (posh and Cohen 1990).
In other words, stewards do not have to attend union meetings outside the workplace
or be committed to a country wide union movement to be able to build up commitment
among their members on the shopfloor. It may also be the case that membership
4 Indeed. Darlington (1994) found that shop stewards were judged by their ability to satisfactorily
resolve issues.
5 Colling (1995) found that the vast differences that existed between different workforces "had serious
consequences for the perception of the union locally" (P142).
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participation encourages the steward to work more effectively; it has been suggested
that leadership is only achieved through continual negotiation within the domestic
organisation (Batstone et al 1977).
Previous research has highlighted the fact that some unions in the public sector tend to
operate slightly differently from those in the private sector. This is an important point
which influenced the research design of the study (see next chapter). In particular
many public sector workplace organisations tend to rely on their FrO more than those
in private sector firms. This may be due to the national union and management
creating an atmosphere whereby independence for the shopfloor unit is difficult to
maintain (Boraston et al 1975, Fairbrother 1990) or to the imposition of national level
bargaining taking decisions away from the workplace (Brown et al 1978). However,
it could also largely rest with the shop steward himlherself and his/her style of
working. Members do tend to be interested in their shopfloor representatives rather
than their national leaders, (after all these are the only union contact that many
members will probably have), particularly where bargaining takes place locally, but
even where all major agreements must be settled at national level, taking the main
bargaining areas away from shop stewards, there is still plenty of scope for a strong
workplace organisation to develop. Many grievances can occur during the working
day which a shop steward could negotiate with management about, especially those
which need immediate attention. Even if the main shop steward is not regularly
available, that is, he/she travels around many different sites for example, there is no
reason why an "unofficial" leader should not emerge from within the workgroup itself.
As Fosh argued, "a careful choice of local leadership style can yield results even when
members' experiences and situations are not the most favourable for the development
of unionism." (1993, p589.) Even Terry (1982), who argued that with a dispersed
workforce the senior steward was best suited to the role of individual grievance
processor rather than a leader of a collective approach to problem solving, suggested
that if steward organisation at lower levels became more developed the need for a
"key" steward who travelled around the workforce might disappear. Making public
sector bargaining local rather than national could result in some public sector
workplace unions becoming more independent of their FTOs than they are at present.
It could be argued that differences in the way that shop stewards operate will lead to
differing perceptions of union power in different workplaces. This may be particularly
highlighted when a public sector union is compared with a private sector union, mainly
because of the dispersed nature of some of the workforces within the public sector
which could lead to their stewards adopting different approaches to those with a close
knit workforce.
5:5 The legislation and trade union power
Since 1980 a succession of Employment and Trade Union Acts have been introduced
each designed to reduce the "perceived" power of trade unions. The main aims were
to empower employers to resist trade union demands and the promotion of
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individualism. However, whether the legislation has had the desired effect is a
contentious issue; for example, some studies show that the legislation relating to
balloting procedures may have enhanced trade union power (Brown and Wadhwani
1990), whereas others suggest that balloting is just a waste of time and does not affect
the outcome of collective bargaining at all (Manning 1992).
Indeed, it could be argued that even the Conservatives were aware that their aims were
not being fulfilled, each piece of legislation was specifically designed to reduce trade
union power and several times the Secretary of State for Employment announced that
the need for further union legislation had passed. However, the fact that until 1993
each piece of legislation was followed up by another suggests that they were not
succeeding with their aim; that is, reducing trade union power.6 Research highlights
the fact that employers are aware of the legislation but the majority where possible
prefer to keep disputes confined to the workplace and settle disagreements with union
representatives.
In terms of "power" national unions may have been affected far more by the legislation
than shopfloor units, the workers themselves. The risk of sequestration of union
funds will most probably have an impact upon how union executives' conduct their
business, particularly in relation to industrial action, whereas at shop floor level union
members may find the need to take instant action in support of a particular grievance
which needs immediate attention. If action of this sort is taken it is probably without
any thought about the national union or any likely consequences and even without
official union backing members still tend to see themselves as acting in the name of
their union (or even as the union - the shopfloor unit). Very often shopfloor
grievances that produce an instant reaction from workers will be alleviated very
quickly, (usually the action was created by some small problem, albeit an important
one to those concerned, such as a door that will not close in winter), indicating to
those involved the effectiveness of their action. In this kind of situation the two
different strands of unionism can be clearly seen, one restrained by legislation the
other acting on impulse creating the possibility of a potential conflict situation between
the national union and the workplace unit. However, studies that have shown that
"fear of the law" may restrain industrial action should be kept in mind. Nevertheless,
the point is that there may be a discrepancy between how members perceive the
"power" of their national union and that of their local unit. It may well be, as previous
studies have indicated, that the ordinary trade union member is not at all interested in
hislher national union and therefore just thinks of the "power" of hislher union in
terms of the workplace unit.
However, differences, and in some cases very large differences, do exist between
shopfloor units. It is a possibility that how the legislation has affected shopfloor units
6 Unless, of course, other factors influenced the Conservative governments' motives for introducing
further legislation; for example, "union bashing", because of its previous success, may have been
seen as a good vote winner before each election deflecting criticism away from other government
policies that may not have been considered as successful.
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may be a throwback from the national organisations; that is, those shopfloor units
which are more reliant on the national organisation may have an increased awareness
of the necessity to abide by "the law", at least from the national union's perspective. It
is worth noting that in those areas where the legislation has not impinged on trade
union power, for example, health and safety issues and some dismissals, unions, it
appears, whether national or local, still have a substantial amount of power to bring
about desired outcomes."
5:6 Individualism versus Collectivism
We have already seen that the most common reasons for union membership were for
protection from future problems and to get higher pay and better working conditions,
which could be described as individualistic attitudes. However, it could be argued
(and indeed is argued by some union members) that there is more to being a union
member than receiving benefits and gaining higher pay rises. 6% of the employees in
Stevens et al's (1989) study thought that the most important reason for becoming a
union member "shows solidarity with the people I work with". This could be
described as a collectivist attitude. Many more members used the "individualist"
reasons as the most important for becoming a union member than the "collectivist"
reasons. However when members were asked to say how important many different
reasons were for belonging to a trade union, collectivist reasons were seen as fairly
important, but again individualistic reasons were given the highest backing (Millward
1990). This issue brings us to another important point illustrated by the previous
chapters.
Many of the case studies cited above suggest that the shop steward is seen by
individual members as an individual grievance processor first and foremost,
illustrating the argument that members are generally interested only in pursuing their
own self interests. Could this be a result of the Conservative's policies which aimed
to promote individualism at the expense of collectivism as Metcalf (1993a), for
example, suggested? This question is a tricky one. Goldthorpe et al concluded in
1968 that unionism was only seen as a means to an end, with the emphasis on self
interest; they described unionism as "instrumental collectivism". It may be realistic to
assume that individualistic attitudes actually prevailed before 1979.
The individualistic model, envisaged particularly by the Thatcher governments, depicts
the pursuit and maximisation of self-interest as the overriding goal of all individuals; it
therefore follows that each individual is in competition with each other. The usual
7 For example. employers must disclose certain information relating to their undertakings when
requested to representatives of recognised trade unions for the use of collective bargaining purposes.
Recognised trade unions must also be consulted about any proposal to make redundant any employee
covered by the recognition agreement. Regarding health and safety, UK law currently restricts the
presence of statutory safety representatives and committees to workplaces where there is a recognised
trade union; therefore, employees working in a non-union establishment may find that they have no
health and safety representative. However, employers are allowed to discriminate against union
members over pay and working conditions; they do not have to offer union members the same terms
as non union members.
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argument (it seems the one believed by the Conservatives) is that individualism is the
antithesis to collectivism. Therefore, when individualism triumphs, collectivism will
fall by the wayside. However, from the evidence available it could be argued that
individualism and collectivism are actually two sides of the same coin. Far from being
polar opposites the two models may fit very closely together; that is, by working
collectively each individual's self interests may be fulfilled.
Trade unions are generally seen as the most immediate embodiment of collectivist
principles, but it is also the case that trade unionism first appeared as a defence of
individualism (phelps Brown 1983). The goal of trade unions is the protection and
advancement of their members' interests. Even if all members are self-interested first
and foremost in general their self interests will merge together and become collective
interests. That is, most individuals are interested in getting the best possible deal for
themselves and in most instances at work this is done most efficiently collectively; an
employer employing many workers would find it very difficult negotiating with each
individually. In addition by negotiating collectively trade unions may to a great extent
enhance the negotiating power of individual members; unless an employee possesses
scarce skills or is strategically placed in the workforce he/she alone would probably
find it very hard to get the best possible deal. In fact Kingdom (1992) argued that:
"When people are working together in harmony they are not sacrificing their
individuality, they are expressing it. The individual can only achieve fulfilment in terms
of a community." (p99).
Therefore, collectivism may be seen as a prerequisite for individual freedom and self
development. Moreover, support for individualist values can co-exist with deeply held
collectivist principles. Ordinary people will use and support individual and collective
services without necessarily seeing any ideological conflict between them (Rentoul
1989).
The argument that by promoting individualism collectivism will wither away,
particularly with regards to trade unionism, appears particularly flawed when the past
is examined more closely. Individualism is not a new phenomenon. According to
Kingdom (1992) new English individualist thought reached its zenith by the mid
nineteenth century. The essential object was the freedom of the individual to act
without constraint, although no moral basis for determining the ends they might
pursue was offered other than they should be chosen on the grounds of personal self
interest.s So there was already "a legacy of individualism deeply etched into the
culture" (Kingdom 1992, p27). Kingdom argued that the culture of individualism was
at its most virulent in industry, "the spiritual home of capitalism". British trade unions
and employers' associations were formed when market liberalism was at its most
triumphant and all the participants were concerned only in promoting what they saw as
S For a fuller account of the theories of individualism by thinkers such as Locke, Hobbes and Adam
Smith, see for example, Kingdom (1992) who traced the roots of individualism and argued that Mrs.
Thatcher's pronouncement "there is no such thing as society" is one of the sentiments of "a prince of
individualism" - Jeremy Bentham. Marquand (1988) also traced the historical origins of (what he saw
as) the deeply entrenched individualistic attitudes of British culture.
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their self interests. Trade unions were expected to fight for the interests of their
members (which could be described as the self interests of their individual members
which when amalgamated becomes the self interest of the trade union). Olson (1982)
argued that Britain's relatively long, smooth constitutional development resulted in the
formation of an unusually large number of small, specialised groups, each with their
own self interest which was unlikely to be congruent with the national interest.
Marquand (1988) also contended that possessive individualism helped to shape the
whole of British culture in the late nineteenth century. According to his argument the
British "crisis" is one of "maladaptation". Trade unions, private companies,
government departments and the general public have all failed to adapt their inherited
practices, institutions, expectations and assumptions to the changes that have taken
place. Possessive individualism still prevails and sectional interests tend to take
precedence over the common interest, and the problems of Britain's relative social and
economic decline over the past century were caused by too little collectivism rather
than too much.
MacInnes (1987) argued in a similar fashion:
"[T]he key to understanding the problem of the economy and industrial relations in
Britain today lies in the contradiction between individual or sectional interests and the
collective or national interest and that the problems of the 1970' s perhaps stemmed from
too little rather than too much collectivism in the British industrial order and its
workplace industrial relations." (pp xiii-xiv).
MacInnes continued by arguing that in a sense the British working class has always
been prone to middle class and individualist ways of thinking and acting and "far from
conflicting with the tradition of adversarial industrial relations - a tradition which ....is
still very much intact - it is a basic part of that tradition." (pxv). Many of the features
of the new industrial relations are actually rather old and "[a]t an ideological level,
then, Thatcherism blended well with many long-established features of the British
social order." (P162). To MacInnes this identity between Thatcherism and earlier
British traditions helps to explain why the attempted change of the industrial social
order had been so unsuccessful. Britain has always had a culture of enterprise,
therefore it cannot be claimed that Thatcherism had generated one, and if Britain's
economic and industrial problems began long before 1945 it is not clear why a return
to the policies of the 1920s or 1870s should solve them now.
Kingdom (1992) argued that the sense of community (or collectivism) is in fact an end
in itself, "an indispensable component of the good life which we all seek" (p86). The
spirit of community is natural to the human condition and remains part of our primeval
inheritance. In fact, Phelps Brown (1983) suggested that the fact that trade unions
developed independently indicates that they sprang from drives that are basic to human
nature. This brings us back to the idea of the self interested individual. Ifwe all seek
the good life and a part of that is to belong to a collective group, then, it must follow
that it is in the individual's self interest to do so. Joining a trade union could be looked
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upon as doing so in order to advance ones own self interests through collective means,
which as already argued is hard to do alone. Olson (1965) argued that workers may
feel they do not need to join a trade union because they can still enjoy the benefits
gained, such as pay rises and improved working conditions, without being a union
member. But this neglects the fact that many unions provide benefits which are not
available to non-union members. Blanchflower et al (1990) captured the essence of
this when they argued that in the present employment situation workers see the benefit
of union membership not just for wage gain but to protect them from arbitrary
dismissal. This can also be described as joining the union for a self interested reason -
the need to stay in employment.
Whereas earlier research had found that young people were generally dismissive of
trade unions saying that they meant nothing to them, research by Gould Mattison in
July and August 1988 detected a shift in favour of the principle of trade unionism.
Young people had begun to regard trade union membership as self-evidently a good
thing and necessary for the protection of their interests at work. (Cited by Rentoul
1989). Rentoul also found that workers who had previously dismissed union
membership gladly joined after they had realised that help was there for them when
they needed it, which also suggests that unions (at least in the workplace) are prepared
to help non-union members, probably in anticipation of their future membership.
This illustrates what could be described as the merger of individualism and
collectivism. People are beginning to recognise that it is difficult to realise their goals
alone and that individual ends can be achieved by collective means. (Indeed, this may
always have been the case.) However, it could be that individuals do not actually
think of the collective aspect of trade unionism as such, but see it purely in terms of
their own self interest - that is, the protection of their own interests. In fact, Rentoul
supports this view:
"What is often overlooked about people's attitudes towards trade unions is their self-
interested nature. For politically aware observers, trade unions may represent the
practical application of collective principle, and the solidarity of unionised workers can
be interpreted as idealistic and ideological when in fact, for the people we interviewed,
trade unions were useful for what you could get out of them." (1989, p92).
Therefore, it could be argued that many trade unionists do have individualist values,
but this can hardly be attributed to the legislation since it appears that these attitudes
have existed since the formation of trade unions in the nineteenth century. However,
that does not mean to say that the legislation has not made individuals more aware of
their own self interests. Indeed, it could even be argued that in today's economic
climate people are much more aware of looking after their self interests, especially
when many people have mortgage and loan repayments to keep up and will very
possibly fear the loss of their homes and businesses if these cannot be met.
It appears that individualism has been part of British culture for a very long time and
yet:at the same time support for trade unions continued and in workplaces where they
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presently exist that support still seems to be continuing. It is therefore difficult to
ascertain whether the aims of promoting individualism at the expense of collectivism
have been fulfilled. Collectivism seems to embrace individualism and the two work
together.
Nevertheless, permeating all the employment and trade union legislation of the 1980s
and 1990s was the distinct promotion of individualism. Concerns about individual
freedom of choice and individual members' rights were frequently voiced. However,
it is argued that:
"The central image of conflict between the individual and the collective underpins the
legal endorsement of individual rights; thus obscuring the conflict and inequality
between individual workers and employers. Clearly, there is an important place for
individual rights against majority rule; but the importance given to such individual
rights within this legislative matrix is based on a denial of any possibility that the
collective could enhance individual fulfilment or that industrial action could be in the
interest of individual members." (Fredman 1992,p37).
The denial that the collective can enhance individual fulfilment is not borne out by the
evidence. In particular it could be argued that if shop stewards are regarded by their
members as individual problem solvers, then the trade union's role concerns more than
just collective action, a fact that is becoming more evident with the provision of
individual services. Also, as already argued, a trade union acts in the interests of its
members - that is, the self interests of its individual members. The view that portrays
trade unions and their collectivist pursuit of goals as impeding individualism is totally
turned upside down.
Where national unions are concerned maybe the promotion of individualism has had
some effect: unions are beginning to offer members services which are directed at
them as individuals and are generally unconnected to work; perhaps this is another
indication that the national organisations have been affected more by the legislation
than the shopfloor units.
This is possibly the most important aspect of the legislation in relation to the research;
individualism was seen as a means of undermining unionism. The Conservative
government encouraged negotiation between individual employees and employers
rather than negotiations which covered the workforce collectively (see for example,
"Industrial Relations in the 1990s", p9). An example of this is where companies offer
incentives and salary rises in return for individual contracts and the loss of collective
bargaining; there would be no union negotiated rates of pay, only individual rates, a
rate set by each individual's bargaining position. It is argued, maybe correctly, that
few workers as individuals will be in a position to negotiate an improvement to their
terms and conditions of employment and that the real meaning of individual contracts
is "that they exploit every inequality between workers" ("Press For Union Rights",
p6). But accordingly, it is the individual's right to choose and whether they choose to
represent themselves or remain within the collective bargaining arena may reflect the
perceived strength of their workplace union organisation. If members sign a personal
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contract and give up their collective bargaining rights they can still be union members,
particularly for the benefit side and as a safety net for such things as dismissals and
accidents at work rather than for one of the main principles of unionism - collective
strength and "voice" against the employer.? However, where members perceive their
union to be unsuccessful in terms of representing them on the shopfloor they may feel
that they are no different in this situation anyway. This leads back to the point that
national unions may only be seen by members as insurance agencies whereas the
shopfloor is seen as "the union". As Millward (1990) suggested, the relative strength
of the workplace union organisation clearly has some bearing on members' reasons for
belonging to their union. If the shopfloor unit is seen as powerful maybe members
will be deterred from signing personal contracts.
Did the Conservatives under-estimate the self interests of individuals in the workplace?
Evidence tends to point to the fact that for the majority of union members trade
unionism is a means of furthering their own self interests, albeit self interests which
tend to apply to all union members. Whether members view their union as a vehicle
for pursuing their interests collectively may largely rest with the shop steward, indeed,
they may well be content to use their union as an individual problem solving agency
but even if this is so it was also happening long before 1979. It has even been
suggested that in some workplaces shop stewards themselves take an individualistic
approach to union representation and this is created because the senior representatives
have become bureaucratised and are seen as "experienced" and "expert" on factory-
wide issues leaving the stewards responsible for day to day grievances on their own
sections (Fairbrother 1990). However, while Fairbrother lays the blame for this
largely at the door of the senior leadership who he described as failing to act in a
supportive way of the stewards, he also described how the stewards seldom spoke to
each other or developed common approaches to problems, operating as individuals
referring to the senior stewards only when they felt unable to process an issue.
Therefore, it could be argued that the stewards were partly to blame because they were
not coordinating together as a collective. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean
that they did not instil in their members a sense of union commitment; it may all hinge
on how they dealt with each problem.
It seems very probable that trade unionism means different things to different people.
The evidence tends to point to the fact that for the majority of union members trade
unionism is only a means of furthering their own self interests, albeit self interests
which tend to apply to all members. However, a minority of members are committed
to the principles of collectivism which involve more than just self interested priorities.
Whether members regard trade unionism in purely self interested terms or in more
solidaristic terms may affect their perceptions of the "power" of their own trade union
and of trade unions in general. An interesting point from the seventh BSAS was that
Millward (1990) suggested that the solidarity aspect of trade unionism increased with
age and yet, he also argued that favourable perceptions of trade unions were found to
9 Nevertheless, giving up collective bargaining rights does not necessarily mean that union members
can/will not act collectively against their employer if they feel that they have a legitimate grievance.
117
decline with age. Perhaps those who associate trade unionism first and foremost with
solidarity feel that the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s have diminished
trade union power because of the emphasis on individual attitudes rather than collective
principles. Alternatively, they may feel that trade union power is as it has always
been, the strength of collective feeling on the shopfloor remaining almost unchanged,
(whether seen as powerful or not), they may not perceive the national union
organisation in a favourable light.
Members who view individualistic attitudes as the most important reasons for union
membership may also perceive the power of their union differently. Those who have
received help or benefits may evaluate their union's effectiveness (national or local)
much differently from those who have needed no help and therefore may feel that they
have paid their subscriptions for nothing. However, the point to remember is that
there is a distinctive difference between whether a person uses the national or local
union as the basis of union power.
5:7 The economic and employment climate
During the 1980s and 1990s there was a change in the pattern of employment in
Britain which may have led to a change in the nature of union members. There has
been a decline of employment in the traditional union strongholds of the manufacturing
industries and a growth of employment in the service sectors where unions have
traditionally found it difficult to organise (Roberts 1989). Part time workers,
particularly female, temporary workers and self employed people, as well as small
scale enterprises which employ only a few workers have all increased. Human
resource management (HRM) has also become a popular model of management which
"puts stress on the importance of the individual, on planning the most effective
utilization of every individual employed in relation to their personal development and
to the achievement of the targets of the enterprise" (Roberts 1989, p73).
A 1994 Labour Research Department survey of HRM found that most workplaces had
seen some cut in employment and that those offering secure employment were
outweighed by those which were introducing new methods of selecting people for
redundancy. Those forms of employment that are often less secure, such as temporary
and part time work, were sharply on the increase at the expense of full time
employment. Employers were also found to be securing big changes in the way their
employees worked, particularly through increasing individual responsibility, team
working and work effort and creating a wider and more flexible range of skills. There
was also a widespread expectation by managers that employees should show more
commitment to the company and that employees' attitudes were increasingly being
taken into account.! 0
If the legislative controls are looked at alongside the wider economic changes which
have led to the change in the pattern of employment in Britain, it might be argued that
10 "Bargaining Report" no.147 February 1995, pp7 - 13.
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not only is it more difficult for unions to fight for their members, but that members
may have become more reluctant to make demands of their employers. The economic
climate may have had an effect upon unionised (as well as non-unionised) workplaces,
especially with the increased level of competition between manufacturers, and the high
level of unemployment may give employees an increased sense of job insecurity (see
for example, Hedges 1994) which may alter their relationship with their employer;
that is, they may not push for a high increase in pay, for example, for fear of losing
their jobs. Nevertheless, the current employment environment may actually have more
of an effect upon the unemployed, particularly the unskilled; employers tend to prefer
to keep their existing workforces where possible, viewing the unemployed as lacking
the relevant skills and experience to carry out their production efficiently (without
extensive training that is). (See for example, Bewlay 1993, MacInnes 1987, 1990,
Martin 1992.)
The workplace may now be viewed differently from how it was two decades ago and
unionism may take on a different perspective for members; members may find that to
ensure the survival of their workplace and, therefore, their jobs, they prefer to work
with their employers rather than against them (Brown 1986, Terry 1986). The role of
trade unions within workplaces may have altered; however, this does not mean that
their importance or power has declined. In many respects the present employment
climate has reinforced the necessity of workplace unionism (see also Cohen and Fosh
1988). There are many issues other than job security that unions fight for their
members over. WIRS3 highlighted the fact that there are far more advantages for
workers in unionised workplaces than in non-unionised ones. However, union
recognition might lead to a feeling of increased job security in some workplaces. The
1994 Labour Research Department survey concluded that unions were responding
where they could to specific changes in employment and working practices, in some
cases shaping the agenda, but in others being forced to accept the imposed changes.
(Bargaining Report no.147 February 1995.) Nevertheless, accepting changes does
not necessarily mean a weakening of union power, as the report acknowledged: at one
workplace the GMB had said that it "agreed to the new way of working because it
secures jobs and gives the union more power" (pi I). The report concluded that the
responses showed that at the workplaces covered by the survey, "most of which have
experience of techniques like HRM, management cannot expect to have it all its own
way when it comes to changes in working practices" (p13).
If researchers such as Metcalf (1993a) were correct when they argued that unionised
workforces have a higher productivity rate than non-unionised workforces, it could
perhaps be suggested that union membership may lead to higher productivity and,
therefore, a feeling of increased job security. Workers who feel insecure in their jobs
may be more liable to join a union than those who feel that their employment is safe
(for example, Blanchflower et al 1990). As Allen (1960) pointed out, every
employee, irrespective of income and status, is a potential trade unionist and as the
instability of his/her position as an employee is exposed he/she is likely to wish to
become a member.
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If Green (1991) was correct that union density tends to be higher in larger rather than
smaller workplaces, in the manufacturing rather than the service industries, for males
than females, for full time employees than part time ones and for older rather than
younger workers, then the changes in the pattern of employment may indicate a fall in
union density. While union density is not an adequate measure of union power on its
own, these changes could lead to a loss of union power within workplaces if only a
minority of employees are members. However, Green argued that the above
differences were partly explained by the availability of unions at particular workplaces.
Therefore, it might be in the employees' and the unions' best interests to begin to look
at the opportunities that are opening up for recruitment.
Where trade unions are present at workplaces it seems that they are now operating in
different environments than they were previously, however, it does appear that they
have learnt to adjust to the changes in the employment climate, particularly at the level
of the workplace. It is here where workers encounter the stability or instability of the
particular employment situation of their own companies. If they prefer to work with
management to ensure the safety of their own jobs, they will be aided greatly if they
are members of a workplace union organisation which is guided by representatives
who are able to work for their members as well as convincing management that their
demands will benefit the company as a whole.
5:8 The focus of the study
All the above points influenced the nature of the research. The overall focus of the
study was on the workplace organisations of two different unions rather than the
national organisations. The above points suggest that it is here where most union
power, or at least potential power, lies; that is with the members. The legislation was
specifically designed to reduce trade union power, yet while some of it may have been
beneficial to unions, generally it may appear at first sight to have substantially reduced
trade union power; however, this reduction may only be from the national
organisation's viewpoint and not from that of the members.
The research, then, was based on the premise that "the union" for the vast majority of
members was the shopfloor rather than the national organisation. It was presumed that
there would be many union organisations each with differing degrees of success and
levels of power within the main parent organisation, so that the power of a trade union
cannot be solely attributed to the national union organisation itself; one workplace
organisation might be looked upon as extremely powerful and another as not powerful
at all. If lay representatives of the same union operate with differing degrees of
success, especially within the same workplace, then, this indicates that the potential
power of a trade union lies within the workplace itself.
Research studies conducted before 1979 tend to indicate that while differences in the
perceived power of trade unions did exist between workplaces, in general trade unions
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exercised only a defensive and negative power. As a rule management were portrayed
as being the more powerful when it came down to the final decision making; that is
not to say that unions may not have shaped those decisions to their own advantage, but
that the final prerogative was usually left to management. In addition any leverage a
union may have had was only enjoyed at certain times and usually only over a narrow
range of issues. However, it was found by McCarthy (1966) that many informal
arrangements between managers and unions were not admitted by managers when
questioned about them, especially those concerning management prerogative. If this
was correct, studies which insist that the final prerogative remained with management
may be misleading.
If the union is perceived as powerful in the workplace it does not necessarily mean that
management "do not manage". If the personalities of the lay representatives do
determine the strength of the shopfloor organisation it does not mean that a powerful
organisation works against management in an arbitrary way. Indeed, a strong
personality may work to management's advantage; satisfied workers tend to work
better and produce more, whereas a weak personality and a weak workplace
organisation may lead to low morale among workersu and a low productivity rate, to
management's disadvantage.
The employment climate in Xtown, the locality of the workplaces covered by the
study, was no exception to the general picture as highlighted above. The Chamber of
Commerce and Industry' s annual salaries and benefits survey for the local area in 1995
found that 68% of the respondent companies employed part time workers. The survey
also provided a useful snapshot of the average wages for a range of occupations in the
area. It was found that there was a significant variation between the minimum and
maximum hourly rate within specific occupations and noted that the minimum rates of
pay for certain jobs were "clearly a cause for concern". A report by Xtown's Citizens
Advice Bureau (CAB) (February 1996) highlighted that for many people in Xtown
"paid work is blighted by low pay and exploitation, often causing considerable
financial difficulties". Nearly two thirds of the cases dealt with by the CAB's debt
counsellors involved employed people. Perhaps highlighting the need for unionism
among some local employees was the statement by the CAB that "often for employees
working in [Xtown], the level of their wage entitlement is based on an individual
negotiation with their employer. "
The CAB report also noted that part time employment in Xtown had increased as a
proportion of total employment. While part time employment for both men and women
had increased, the number of women in part time employment had increased from 18%
to 27% of total employment and the proportion of women in employment overall had
increased from 39% to 48%. The 1994 Labour Research Department survey also
noted that workplaces with a mainly female workforce were more likely to have seen
an increase in part time and temporary workers, especially in the service sector.
11 Some of Darlington's (l994a) evidence, for example, showed how at one of the workplaces he
studied union power and employee morale were connected.
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Therefore, the employment climate may have an effect upon union membership. If
more women than previously are making up the workforce, then, women are potential
union recruits. However, if women are more likely than men to evaluate their union's
performance negatively (Colling 1995), then, unions must respond to the needs of
these potential members so as to attract and retain them. The need for effective
workplace unionism appears to be extremely important, especially to address the
disadvantages that many of these workers will face. It is, therefore, essential that
unionism within these workplaces is responsive to potential members and especially to
women workers.
If trade union power was not as great before 1979 as often suggested, then claims
about drastic reductions in that power may be based on a false assessment. It could
very well be the case that in workplaces where union membership has held up and
where the organisation has always been seen as powerful the union is still seen as
such. In other workplaces the union may never have been looked upon as powerful
and therefore, there is no loss; the union can only gain in strength.
The points identified in this chapter led to the formation of a number of hypotheses that
the research, the results of which are documented in part 2 of the thesis, tested.
5:9 The hypotheses
1 The shopfloor is "the union".
2 It is most likely that to members the extent of their union's
power is measured by the level of success that they have in the
workplace in achieving their aims.
3 How well the lay representative performs will influence
members' perceptions of the "power" of their union.
4 It is the local leader's style which is essential in determining
membership participation and interest in workplace unionism and,
therefore, the level of success that the shopfloor unit has when dealing
with management.
5 The personality and style of working of the lay representative are
essential ingredients for successful unionism in the workplace.
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6 Individualism versus collectivism. The idea that through the
agency of the individual member making individual decisions in his/her
own interests, trade union power will be reduced is based on a flawed
interpretation of individualism.
7 The legislation is likely to have had little influence on members'
opinions about the power of their trade union.
8 The change in the economic and employment environment may
have altered the attitudes of union members and the role of trade
unions.
The next chapter outlines the research strategy used to test these hypotheses. A variety
of research methods were used; each one is described along with the reasons for its
use and its associated advantages and disadvantages. Two case studies made up the
bulk of the research, each one relating to a different trade union.
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CHAPTER6 THE RESEARCH
6: I Introduction
The main aim of the research was to ascertain what trade union members thought of
the power of their trade unions. As it appeared that for the majority of union members
"the union" was actually based in the workplace rather than nationally the major focus
of the study was on the workplace organisations rather than the national unions
themselves.
The research documented in part 2 of the thesis involved a case study approach, which
consisted of mixed methodology producing qualitative and quantitative data. Data was
obtained through observation, interviews, questionnaires and the analysis of
documentary evidence. Using a variety of methods is a useful approach because the
advantages of one method can often be used to combat the disadvantages of another.
It is also valuable to compare the results obtained by different methods to see if similar
conclusions are reached; conclusions supported by more than one method are stronger
than those supported by just one or where different methods produce differing
conclusions.
The bulk of the research material was obtained during 1993-95. A substantial amount
of information about the two unions involved was obtained by observing a number of
union meetings and through informal interviews with key local members of those
unions. The questionnaires that were given out to members of the AEEU and
UNISON provided an insight into members' opinions about their union membership.
The research was also supplemented by analysis of journals and other secondary
material published by the unions concerned and unions not directly involved in the
study. Material from the two workplaces involved, such as notebooks kept by the
AEEU convenor and minutes from the trust staff council meetings, also provided a
useful insight into how the unions performed in the workplaces and gave added weight
to the conclusions reached via the other research methods.
6:2 Case stud ies
A case study approach allows a detailed concentration on a specific individual or group
situation and makes it possible to identify, explore and understand the various
interactive social processes which may be taking place. The "case study is concerned
principally with the interaction of factors and events" (Bell 1987, p6). It may also
facilitate a historical exploration of changes and continuities within the situation being
studied. The researcher aims to identify the common and unique features of the group
or organisation being studied and to show how they may influence the way that it
functions. A successful study will provide the reader with a three-dimensional picture
and should illustrate relationships, micro-political issues and patterns of influence in a
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particular context (Bell 1987, p7).
The case study is a very diverse and flexible approach and the researcher is able to
combine qualitative and quantitative research methods. No method is excluded from
this approach and the use of multiple methods is common, however, observation and
interviews are the most frequently used. Observations, usually with the researcher
recording events as they happen, produce qualitative data, and often resemble
participant observation in the degree of intimacy and rapport that is established
between the researcher and those observed. Rose (1991) noted the following
characteristics of the approach: the case study design may comprise single or multiple
cases and these may consist of snapshot or longitudinal studies. Where the design
consists of multiple cases, the choice of cases may be based on a logic of comparison,
diversity or replication. The basic design can be adapted to meet various theoretical
and practical requirements. (p200).
An advantage of the case study approach is that it provides an opportunity to identify
and suggest possible relationships and it provides evidence to support further study.
The quality of the information collected lies with the researcher and his/her ability to
record what is happening in an objective and accurate manner. The major weaknesses
of this approach concern the issues of representativeness and generalisability.
However, as Rose (1991) argued "to advocates of the approach these methodological
points can be answered and, moreover, turned into a positive virtue." (pI92). Rose
suggested that with a quantitative method representativeness has come to mean
typicality in the sense of a statistically reliable sample from a population, however, he
also noted that survey samples are frequently taken from strategically selected localised
populations rather then national populations, so that problems of generalisability exist
even there. "[T]ypicality in the statistical sense is not a major concern for case study
research. This is not to suggest, however, that representativeness ceases to be an
issue. On the contrary, where more than one case is used the issues of selection
criteria and qualitative representativeness can be of considerable importance." (Rose
1991, pI92).
6:3 Research design
The research involved two main case studies, the AEEU locally and UNISON locally,
and two sub-studies, each involving a study of a particular workplace organisation
within each union (in UNISON's case two similar workplaces were involved). Each
of the case studies comprised of the following research methods: observation,
interviews and questionnaires. Each of these is discussed below.
The two unions, UNISON and the ABEU, were selected because of the contrast
between the main workplaces in which they operate; the ABEU largely in the private
sector and UNISON in the public sector. One workplace covered by the AEEU and
two workplaces with UNISON members were chosen as case studies. The workplace
covered by the AEEU was chosen largely because the main union representative there
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was also a branch treasurer and, therefore, I was able to meet him at least every month
while observing the meetings of that particular branch (see below). He had also
expressed his willingness to allow me access to his firm's shop stewards' meetings
and other information that he had concerning his workplace and the union. Two
workplaces covered by UNISON were selected because at the original hospital, which
was chosen because UNISON members there had already been observed at work over
a two year period prior to the research taking place, I could not contact the shop
steward. Therefore, a second hospital was also selected where the steward was
willing to be interviewed and supply me with any relevant documents relating to the
local hospital trust and UNISON.
Individual workplace organisations are (in theory if not in practice) linked to each other
through the local organisation of their unions. Previous research has shown how
union organisations within individual workplaces had varying levels of dependence
upon their local full time representatives (see for example, Boraston et al 1975).
Therefore, by studying the local organisations of UNISON and the AEEU it was
considered that an insight into how each union operated at a local level could be gained
and this might be linked to how the individual workplaces under their jurisdiction
maintained their union organisations. It would also give an insight into any
differences between the AEEU and UNISON at a local level. UNISON's local
organisation consisted of one local branch (for the health section) for the area. The
AEEU's local organisation was slightly more complex, with four branches, district
shop stewards' meetings and a district committee.
Attendance at union meetings allowed me to meet representatives and members from a
number of different local workplaces. To ensure that the main focus of the study
remained on the issues involved rather than the actual workplaces under investigation it
was decided that all persons, workplaces and the area involved in the study should
remain anonymous. The area studied is called Xtown for the purposes of the research
and the different workplaces are referred to in the text by a letter or a number, for
example, firm A, firm B, hospital 1, hospital 2 and so on. Overall, twelve workplaces
which had AEEU members are referred to in part 2 of the thesis and three main
hospitals which were represented by UNISON. The AEEU workplace chosen as a
case study is referred to as firm A and hospitals 1 and 2 made up the UNISON study.
No systematic procedure was used to select the unions, workplaces or union members
who were informally interviewed or asked to complete questionnaires. The interviews
with members and stewards (other than the stewards connected to the chosen
workplaces) were conducted spontaneously, that is, when a person was attending a
meeting for example, they were engaged in conversation (if they were willing), in fact
many individuals approached me and were only too happy to be informally
interviewed. The questionnaires were distributed to two workplaces, one from each
sector; firm A and hospital 1 (see below). It could be argued that the workplaces
chosen and the members who completed the questionnaires were not representative of
the entire population of workplaces and union members within the area studied.
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A table briefly setting out the structure of the AEEU in Xtown. the
methods used to study it and the main reasons why this was done
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However, the use of different research methods, in particular the observation of
meetings attended by stewards and members from many different workplaces, tended
to confirm the conclusions reached from the case studies.
It should also be noted that the union members who completed questionnaires and who
were interviewed were predominantly men in the private sector and women in the
public sector. Any differences in the attitudes between men and women towards
unionism might then be revealed; however, there was also the danger that this may
have blurred any distinction between the two different unions.
6:4 Observation
Observation can be a valuable research tool. The researcher has the opportunity to
directly observe parts of the social world that he/she is studying, gaining useful
insights which may not have come to light by the use of interviews and questionnaires
alone. Questionnaires and structured interviews contain a predetermined set of
questions which the researcher has already decided are important whereas observation
may reveal different issues; issues that those being observed consider important.
Observation is often criticised because it lacks reliability. This is because observation
relies on the interpretative skills of the researcher; one researcher may interpret the
same situation differently to another. Nevertheless, it could be argued that observation
is no less reliable than any other method as the reliability of each depends upon how it
is carried out. It is also argued that it is not possible to generalise from the results of
observation alone. However, researchers who rely on observation techniques argue
that they do not wish to generalise from their findings but hope to gain an
understanding from them and develop further questions. In addition it is argued that
observation is rich in validity.
My observation work was largely confined to union meetings. However, this was
invaluable to the research because it gave an overall "feel" for the situation and
provided many interesting examples of local circumstances. Inparticular, the focus on
AEEU branch meetings developed my general knowledge providing information on
previously unknown areas and substantial information about local firms. The
meetings also brought me into contact with shop stewards and members from a variety
of local workplaces. My initial observations, particularly of AEEU meetings, strongly
informed the nature of some the questions asked in the questionnaire and clarified the
focus of the research.
I was allowed to observe four AEEU district shop stewards' meetings which were
held twice a year and were attended by shop stewards from around the region.
Therefore, I was able to gain a valuable insight into the different opinions and
problems of union organisations in different workplaces across the local area. I also
attended regularly, for approximately eighteen months, a particular local branch
meeting which met once a month. This was of tremendous benefit to my research and
in many respects provided the background to the study. I also attended two of firm
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A's shop stewards' committee meetings held once a year. Extremely useful
information was gained from these meetings and from informal interviews with some
of the shop stewards afterwards.
All the AEEU meetings I attended took place at the local Labour Club, the shop
stewards' meetings being held in the largest room and taking a more formal outlook,
whereas the branch meetings were held in one of the smaller rooms, and tended to
have an informal air about them. The meetings relating to the AEEU' s local
organisation were held in the evening, the stewards' meetings on a Wednesday and the
branch on a Monday. Firm A's stewards' meetings were held on a Saturday
afternoon.
In comparison with the AEEU UNISON representatives were very difficult to contact
and sometimes quite evasive. I was eventually invited to attend a UNISON monthly
branch meeting, which was held at the local Labour club on a Tuesday evening. The
meeting resembled an amalgamation of the AEEU's branch and shop stewards'
meetings and was a formal affair. Even though the meeting was open to members it
appeared that it was mainly attended by shop stewards from workplaces covering the
local area. Despite only attending one meeting it gave me a tremendous amount of
information about UNISON locally and the types of problems that the stewards were
encountering.
Where possible I made written notes on the spot; however, in situations where this
was not viable, such as an informal interview with a member, the information was
recorded as soon as possible afterwards. All my notes were written up and the details
elaborated upon as soon as possible after the event.
6:5 The role of the researcher
The role of the researcher is extremely important when using observation as a research
method. With overt observation there is always the possibility that if the researcher
makes hislher identity known those being observed may intentionally or
unintentionally change their behaviour. To overcome this possibility and remain as
objective as I could I tried to blend into the background and watch and listen; it is
essential that the researcher does not become too involved and lose hislher detachment
as an observer. This was possible at some union meetings, for example, UNISON's
branch meeting and the AEEU's district shop stewards' meetings; however, because
of the informal nature of the AEEU branch meetings, members only attending to see to
their business rather than staying for the whole meeting, the situation was slightly
different. Members tended to accept me without question, and as they became used to
me being there they began to stay longer, sitting and talking to me. I tried not to let my
actions and knowledge influence those that I was speaking with and refrained from
passing judgment on any sensitive issues when they were being discussed even
though at times my opinion was asked. It is appropriate to add that some of those
attending the AEEU branch may not have been fully aware of what I was doing there,
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and on a couple of occasions I was mistaken for a member of the branch committee.
Nevertheless, the fact that they tended to see me regularly probably made them feel
more at ease as they made a point of remaining at the branch longer than they would
normally have done. I never made any pretence of what I was doing there and do not
feel that I deceived anyone, always willing to explain my position if necessary.
However, I feel that the information gained was sometimes better when the person
was unaware of what I was doing because as soon as people tended to know they had
specific opinions on unions in general rather than on their own personal reactions to
the situation at their workplace.
I also became acquainted with three AEEU convenors from different workplaces and
the main UNISON shop steward from hospital 2. Between them they provided me
with a lot of useful information on their particular union organisations and their
relationships with management and their members. I also found that of the few people
who attended the AEEU branch regularly, mainly to pay their subscriptions, many
were only too happy to sit and talk to me about their experiences and feelings. Again
these men were from differing workplaces usually those which did not have a strong
union presence and their comments and opinions were helpful in enabling me to
understand their reasons for membership. The few retired members who called in at
the branch on a number of occasions were perhaps the most willing to talk about "the
union" in their working days, and this information makes a useful contrast to the
views of current working members.
6:6 Interviews
The majority of the interviews conducted were unstructured interviews whereby the
respondent was allowed to talk freely, sometimes even setting the topic of
conversation. In this way the respondent was given greater flexibility to say what
he/she wanted, indicating what he/she thought was important. If it was felt necessary
the respondent may have been asked a few specific questions or have been guided onto
a certain topic of conversation, but generally the most fruitful information was
gathered by allowing respondents to direct the conversations themselves. In this way,
that is, by allowing respondents to talk freely and asking questions only to clarify
something said, I feel that any interaction problems associated with unstructured
interviews were avoided. Semi-structured interviews, where a number of questions
were specifically addressed but where the respondent was allowed to answer freely,
were conducted with the main lay representatives of each workplace studied.
The AEEU convenor from finn A and the UNISON steward from hospital 2 were the
main lay representatives and both were willing to talk with me on numerous occasions.
Both provided me with invaluable information about their unions generally, locally and
about their own work and both allowed me access to various documents relating to
their unions and workplaces. The AEEU convenor abo provided me with a set of
notebooks/diaries which he had kept from 1986 to 1991 (see below). The semi-
structured interviews and many informal interviews with firm A's convenor took place
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at the local Labour club. Hospital 2' s steward welcomed me into her home on two
occasions to interview her and I could contact her by telephone whenever I needed to.
Informal interviews were also held with a former NALGOl steward, with a UNISON
steward from the community health group, AEEU stewards who attended the district
shop stewards' meetings and with three of the AEEU stewards from firm A. The lead
UNISON convenor for the local area (who was also the branch secretary) declined to
be interviewed because of her heavy workload but completed a questionnaire. In
addition, the domestic services manager, the employer of the UNISON members
asked to fill in the questionnaires, granted me an interview about her own and her
workers' relationships with UNISON. With the exception of the domestic services
manager and the former NALGO steward, whose interviews took place at the
workplace and at home respectively. all these interviews took place at the local Labour
club after union meetings.
Conversations with union members also provided a great deal of useful information,
particularly about their perceptions of their union and unions in general. With the
exception of the representatives from the workplaces chosen as case studies, the
members and stewards who were interviewed/spoken to were not chosen
systematically, but because of their availability at a particular time and, in many cases,
their willingness to speak to me. In some cases members engaged me in conversation.
The majority of the AEEU members were spoken to at the local Labour club during the
branch meetings and, with a few exceptions, UNISON members were informally
interviewed either during their work breaks or while they were leaving work; at
hospital 1 many UNISON members were willing to talk to me about their union, but
none of them wanted to be formally interviewed mainly because of the time factor.
Therefore, by sitting with these members during their break times and accompanying
them when they left work, I found it useful to enter into informal conversations with
them so as to elicit as much information as I could. They were happy to do this as it
was not taking up any of their "spare" time.
6:7 The Questionnaire
It was decided that the best way of getting as many members' views as possible was
by a self administered questicnnaire.s Self administered questionnaires are an ideal
way of reaching as many people as possible within a certain time limit; interviewing
the same amount of people would take up an enormous amount of time. It was also
considered that respondents might be more likely to comment on contentious issues if
they remained anonymous than they might in an interview situation. However, it was
recognised that questionnaires of this type do have disadvantages such as the fact that
1 NALGO (The National Association of Government Officers) was a union in its own right until it
amalgamated with NUPE and COHSE to form UNISON.
2 Quantitative data from questionnaires with closed questions is also easier to analyse than data
obtained through, for example, interviews where the respondents have been allowed to talk freely. The
data was analysed using SPSS.
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the return rate may be rather low, whereas with interviews each interviewee is
questioned and his/her answers monitored. It was decided that to get the maximum
return rate possible the majority of questions on the questionnaire should be closed
questions so that the respondent would find it easier to answer the questions by ticking
boxes rather than writing out his/her answers. Again it was recognised that this has its
disadvantages such as the fact that some respondents may not find the reply they wish
to give, or the fact that with closed questions respondents answers are not elaborated
upon. However, it was considered the best way to ensure that as many questionnaires
as possible were completed and respondents were given the opportunity to comment
on any of their answers at the end of the questionnaire. It was found that those who
wished to comment on their answers tended to do so beside the questions anyway.
Another disadvantage of self administered questionnaires is the fact that respondents
cannot clarify the meanings of questions that they do not understand. Therefore, it
was essential to try and phrase the questions in a way that would mean the same to
everybody. However, there is always the risk that different people may interpret the
meaning of the same question differently and this must be kept in mind when
analysing the results. Many of the questions relate to the respondents' perceptions and
expectations rather than to straightforward facts. Therefore, there is a danger that
those attitudes may vary over time and may have little or no correlation with the
respondent's actual behaviour. Previous studies have already found that members
may shift between different dimensions of union commitment, which is connected to
the impact of events and developments; the levels of participation and solidaristic
attachment to the union tend to rise when issues of concern to members are being
decided and widely discussed (posh 1993) and that feelings of solidarity are most
common when conflict situations are arising (Batstone et al 1977). The observation
work and informal interviews with members were therefore vital to compare with the
questionnaire answers because what people say on a questionnaire may not reflect
what they say in a social situation. They also clarified any incidents that may have had
a bearing on the answers given. However, it must be noted that observation relies on
the observer's understanding and interpretation of events and is not a foolproof
method itself, but the three methods combined should give a fuller picture than using
only one.
The question formation was particularly sensitive and had to be formed in such a way
so as to get at what members thought of the "power" of their unions without actually
using the word itself; the word "power" might mean different things to different
people. The questions were phrased so as to try and get the same estimate of union
power from all the respondents. It has been argued that employees do not consciously
compare their power (to withhold labour, work poorly etc.) with the manager's
power, but rather the authority to manage is so legitimised and taken for granted that
issues of power and sanctions seldom become consciously considered (Pfeffer 1981).
The questions were phrased in certain ways to try and address the different dimensions
of trade union power, again because members might not think of trade union power in
the same way as set out in the previous chapters. Some questions which may have
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been relevant to a person's attitude towards their union were not included because they
were considered personal and made the questionnaire too long; for example, the
respondent's marital status and whether they had any dependants might affect their
attitudes because they had a family to support, whereas single people may accept lower
pay rates more readily or even be more prepared to go on strike because they only have
themselves to account for. Other questions were omitted so as not to make the
questionnaire too long as it was decided that they were not directly related to the issue
of trade union power; for example, whether members vote in their union elections for
president or general secretary. However, because the questionnaire is largely directed
at the workplace, it makes it hard to tell exactly what members think of their national
unions (if at all); while issues such as how many members vote in their national
union's elections are not connected to union power as such, they may show
membership attitudes towards their national union in terms of whether they care who
their "leaders" are or about the policies they advocate.
The questionnaire was designed to ascertain members' opinions about a number of
issues:
- Trade union membership in general; their reasons for joining and any differences
that being in a trade union made to them;
- Their opinions about their workplace organisation; how they used their union at
work, the union's relationship with management and whether they thought their union
was effective in their workplace;
- The fmal section was related to the legislation to find out if members thought the
legislation had had any affect on trade unions generally but particularly on their
workplace organisation. One question related directly to trade union law and was
designed to see if members were aware of the legislation, which was designed to "give
the unions back to their members" and give them individual freedom and the right to
choose. If members are not aware of the legislation it cannot necessarily be claimed a
success.
Some of the questions were repeated in slightly different formats to test members'
opinions; that is, they may answer positively to one question, for example, the most
important reason for union membership may be for job protection but then they may
answer negatively to "being in a trade union makes a difference in the case of job
protection". Some questions were specific ones which asked directly what the
respondents thought, such as whether they thought that their union was effective at
their workplace. Other questions were general ones which were indirectly trying to
establish whether the member's union could be described as effective and, therefore,
as "powerful"; for example, if members thought that being in a union made a
difference in a number of particular circumstances, it is an indication that their union
was producing effects even if they had replied (to the specific question) that their union
was not effective overall at their workplace.
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One question was related to a description of the workplace representatives to see if
members rated their union differently according to how they described their
representatives. It is accepted that this is a crude measure but may indicate a
relationship between the styles of the lay representatives and their perceived
performance in the workplace. Questions were also included asking whether members
had been represented by a union representative and whether they were satisfied with
that representation and whether they had received any form of union benefit, as it was
considered that members who had received some form of representation or benefit may
rate their union differently to those who had not. It has been suggested that awareness
that the union has done something for you engenders a healthy attitude toward the
union and the workplace organisation (Higgs 1969). However, it should also be
noted that there may be a difference in the number of members from different
workplaces represented at tribunals due to the strength of the workplace organisation;
a strong workplace union may not allow a member to be dismissed, whereas a member
of another may be dismissed for a similar reason and subsequently be represented at a
tribunal.
A slightly modified version of the questionnaire was designed for shop stewards,
which related more to their relationship with management and their members. See
appendix 2 for a copy of the questionnaire distributed to members and appendix 3 for
the shop steward's questionnaire.
A pilot study was carried out at firm C with the cooperation of the convenor there. To
test the suitability of the questionnaire twenty were given to AEEU members in one
particular workshop by their convenor. Extra questions were added to these asking
the respondents particular questions about the questionnaire itself. Ten were returned
and on the basis of these answers the questionnaire was modified slightly for the main
study.
At firm A the AEEU convenor distributed and collected in the questionnaires himself.
Therefore, respondents were not selected systematically, though the convenor assured
me that he was not selective in who he gave them to; he distributed them to all
members working in five of the eight workshops over a two week period, so as to
involve members who worked alternative shifts. In fact, according to the convenor,
some AEEU members had actually approached him and asked if they could take one.
The convenor from firm A and the shop steward from hospital 2 had both said that it
would be better if they gave out the questionnaires so that their members did not think
that they were from management. Because of reservations that members may have
been reluctant to answer questions negatively in case their representative looked at the
completed questionnaires they were distributed with envelopes so that respondents
could seal them after completion. However, any reservations about how respondents
may have answered were unfounded.
All UNISON members within the domestic services department at hospital I were
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approached and asked to complete a questionnaire. However, many UNISON
members were willing to talk to me about their union but they were reluctant to
complete the questionnaires, many even refused to take one. Despite numerous visits
to hospital 1 to encourage members to return their questionnaires the return rate was
very low, under a third were completed (9 out of 30) which makes comparisons with
AEEU members difficult (a 67% return rate, 119 questionnaires were returned out of
178). However, the information can still be used. The fact that UNISON members
were willing to talk about their union yielded information that can be used in
comparison with AEEU members' opinions. In addition, those members who
refused to take questionnaires tended to talk negatively about their union, which may
mean something in itself) At hospital 2 the steward had said that her members would
be happy to complete the questionnaires. However, after inquiring further it appeared
that because many of the staff at hospital 2 had just completed a number of other
questionnaires they were rather reluctant to take another and, therefore, the distributing
of questionnaires to UNISON members was abandoned.
The questionnaire designed for stewards was completed by ten of the twelve AEEU
shop stewards at firm A (an 83% return rate) and the convenor also completed one. In
addition UNISON's lead convenor for the local area completed a slightly different
questionnaire (see appendix 4). A different questionnaire was designed for
UNISON's convenor because her position was different to that of the AEEU stewards;
she did not work in one individual workplace but was responsible for a number of
workplaces under her jurisdiction.
6:8 The use of documentary data
A number of various documents were analysed and were a valuable resource
complementing and backing up the evidence obtained from the other research methods.
In particular the convenor from ftrm A allowed me unlimited access to a set of
notebooks/diaries which he had kept from 1986 to 1991. These recorded all aspects of
his work on a day to day basis; which included problems encountered, meetings with
management, threatened dismissals, instances of threatened and actual industrial action
and the outcomes of most problems. They also recorded how many stewards had
attended different training courses in 1987 and 1988. These notebooks provided
invaluable evidence, particularly of the period preceding the actual study and they
showed the many types of problems that members take to their union representatives.
In addition they clarifted much of what the convenor himself had told me, which on its
own may have been considered exaggerated. The UNISON steward provided me with
several copies of the minutes from the NHS trust staff consultative council meetings.
These were a valuable source of information on the impact that UNISON had upon the
trust generally and in particular about members' concerns over how the trust was
operated.
3 The members who refused to take questionnaires appeared to have a different attitude to those who
took them.
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Other documents analysed included:
Union correspondence sent to shop stewards from both UNISON and the AEEU.
Union journals (members and shop stewards).
AEEU weekend school packs.
Works committee papers.
Collective bargaining agreements.
Union rule books.
Union publications, leaflets and information pamphlets (many provided by the national
unions).
6:9 Reliability and generalisation
As the bulk of the evidence collected was largely based on members' perceptions and
opinions the reliability of these measures can be questioned. However, as the aim of
the study was to ascertain what members thought of the power of their unions, it must
be accepted that some of the conclusions may be based upon the respondents' views of
the world which may change according to the different situations that they may find
themselves in. Nevertheless, the questionnaire was designed to try and uncover any
conflicting opinions that particular individuals may have held and the observation work
and documentary analysis in many ways confirms some of the interview and
questionnaire data so that some conclusions can be made with confidence. It is also
recognised that the results may only be relevant to those workplaces studied so that
generalisations about unions in general should be made with caution. However,
because of the nature of some of the conclusions, backed up by the additional evidence
from stewards at workplaces other than the main ones studied, an overall picture of
why unions may be successful at some workplaces but not others can be built up and
is worthy of further study.
Part 2 of the thesis documents the results of the empirical research. Chapters 7 to 10
concentrate upon the ABED and chapter 11 focuses on UNISON. The final chapter
analyses the evidence presented in part 2 of the thesis and relates the findings to the
conclusions and hypotheses that were discussed in chapter 5. The conclusions from
the research findings are set out and the implications that they may have about trade
union power in general are discussed.
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Chapter 7 THE AEEU - FOOD FOR THOUGHT
7: 1 Introduction
Part 2 of the thesis documents the results of the empirical research. The information
contained in this chapter concerns the ABEU generally and within the local area. The
chapter is largely descriptive and the evidence is based mainly upon the perceptions
and opinions of local workplace representatives and members, as well as the
observations and interpretations of the researcher. However, the information provides
a useful insight into the AEEU in Xtown and its surrounding areas and it illustrates
how it is highly likely that union power is influenced by the personalities and styles of
working of those concerned.! The data was obtained through the observation of four
AEEU district shop stewards' meetings which were attended by stewards from a
number of local engineering ftrms2, and the observation of the monthly meetings of a
particular ABEU branch over an eighteen month period. Informal interviews with
some of the stewards who attended the shop stewards' meetings and all the branch
officers and conversations with members who attended the branch also contributed
significantly to the findings. The empirical work was supplemented by the analysis of
a variety of documentary materials pertaining to the ABEU. The final part of the
chapter summarises the evidence and relates it to the hypotheses set out at the end of
chapter 5.
The following two chapters give details of a case study of the AEEU organisation
within a particular local firm - firm A; chapter 8 concentrates on the views of the shop
stewards and chapter 9 on the opinions of members. Chapter 10 combines all the
findings relating to the AEEU within Xtown and its surrounding area and sets out the
overall conclusions and implications about the "power" of the AEEU. Chapter 11
concentrates on UNISON. All the data gathered about UNISON is presented in one
chapter; because of the low response rate of UNISON members to the questionnaire it
was not considered viable to present these results as a separate study. However, the
quality of the information obtained by other research methods, that is, the observation
of a branch meeting and interviews with stewards and members is such that
conclusions can still be reached regarding UNISON and useful comparisons with the
ABEU can be made. Chapter 12 analyses the evidence presented in part 2 of the thesis
and relates the findings to the conclusions and hypotheses that were discussed in
1 The personality and the style of working of an individual are separate concepts. However, it will be
argued that an individual's personality may have implications for the style of working that they adopt.
The style of working adopted by union representatives appears to be the most important part of their
role as this determines how members react to them and "the union". It does not necessarily follow
that representatives have to have similar personalities to adopt a similar style of working. However,
it is highly likely that particular personalities will be able to adapt to a leadership role much easier
than others; for example. it is clear that a commitment to collectivism enables a steward to adopt a
style of working that is more likely to encourage union participation among the membership than a
steward who treats members and their problems individually.
2 Each firm is identified only by a letter.
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chapter 5. The final section presents the conclusions from the research findings and
the implications that they may have about trade union power in general.
7:2 The AEEU
The AEEU was created in May 1992 by the amalgamation of the AEU and the EETPU
and is the fourth largest union in the TUC with around 775,000 members in every
kind of industry. The trend towards amalgamations was noted by Gavin Laird in
1993: "there will soon be fewer and stronger unions and the AEEU will be one of
them."3 However, from a member's point of view this might not be the case: bigger
unions are not necessarily what members want, and are not necessarily stronger. The
bigger a union becomes the more the national organisation appears to lose touch with
the realities of the individual workplaces under its jurisdiction (see chapter 3).
However, the union "has always been proud of the fact that it is a membership rather
than an activist based union", and its "democratic structure ensures that all important
decisions are taken by members as a whole and not by small groups of committed
activists. "4 According to the national organisation, the branch is the basic unit of the
union and is the place where any member can freely raise for discussion any matter
affecting the union's business. Resolutions to change policy begin at the branch. But,
as will be seen, members' interest in the branch is virtually non-existent; therefore, it
could be argued that the national organisation of the AEEU was out of touch with its
members.
An AEEU recruitment pack stated:
"Look what you get when you join us!
There's so much you can get when you join the AEEU. Not just a union
that can win wages, shorter hours am greater job security, but one which
offers a whole range of services that could save you and your family a lot of
money."
The pack went on to tell the reader each benefit of union membership and the final
sheet stated that the AEEU is a union where members matter most. However,
whether members feel that their interests are being taken into account may differ from
the opinions of the national organisation. Beynon (1973) found that lay
representatives and their members tended to have a different view of things from their
national officers. The national union was trying to attract new members and retain old
ones by introducing more and more packages designed to benefit the member and
hislher family as individuals; for example, financial services including car and house
insurances, life assurance and a newly introduced wills service. Legal services had
been extended and were also offered to members' families at no cost to the member.
The AEEU was not alone in introducing benefits designed to attract members as
individuals rather than aiming to get members to view themselves as a collective, most
3 Divisional Organisers' Weekend School Pack 1995 - "Future Structure of The New Amalgamated
Union." p4.
4 Ibid p3.
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other unions now provide similar benefits: however, it could be argued that they are
following the path that the Conservative government wanted them to, by becoming
insurance agencies rather than vehicles for collective voice and collective action. But is
this what members want? Indeed, even one of the AEEU's solicitors admitted at a
local shop stewards' meeting that not many members knew about some of the services
on offer.
The union was, at the time of the research, altering its structure to reflect "the best
aspects" of both the ABU and EETPU structures. Indeed, at the end of the research
period, a ballot of members approved proposed changes to the rule book, as a result of
this the district secretary has become a regional secretary covering a much larger
geographical area and local branches are to be merged. The implications of these and
other changes imposed by the "new" rule book are discussed in chapter 12. The
Divisional Organisers' Weekend School Pack - "ABEU Affiliation To The TUC" said
"The ABEU's strength in representing its members has already been enhanced by the
merger between the engineering and electrical unions" (p2A), but the same optimism
was not forthcoming from members in Xtown. Many local shop stewards resented the
amalgamation of the EETPU with their own union. They argued that the electricians
had wanted to join them for many years and "no one wanted them". The electricians'
union was looked upon as embodying a totally different attitude from that of the
engineers, or at least locally.a The feeling was (and especially by the chairman of the
district shop stewards' committee who was a delegate at the first conference of the
"joint union") that the electricians wanted to take over the whole union with no regard
for the concerns of the engineers. A particular concern focused upon the changing of
the rule book to suit the electricians. It was argued that when the construction side of
the union joined the engineers the rule book was not changed, so why should it be
changed now']6 The most important point was that the report of the ABEU Policy
Conference given by the local delegates to the shop stewards' meeting was in marked
contrast to that reported in the union's journals. The national organisation were proud
of the results of the conference and argued that "the Union has taken huge strides
forward and all sections are closer together. 'W7 However, as already noted, local
delegates felt that many of the resolutions accepted were concessions to the electricians
and most resolutions from the engineers were not accepted; this added to the general
5 The EETPU was generally a "right wing" union and left wingers "in the EETPU have a tough time
of it" (Basset 1986, p77) especially as the union was dictated by an intense anti-communist approach
("a right-wing mirror-image of its old Communist days." Basset 1986, p77). According to Basset
(1986) the union attracted controversy like a magnet. During the 1980s the EETPU attracted a lot of
criticism from other unions by working with employers so as to entice the entire workforce of a
factory into membership rather than beginning by recruiting a few members at a time. The EETPU's
leaders actually described their members as "individualistic, skilled, flexible, argumentative, mobile,
entrepreneurial,dqfelmt." (Basset 1986, p71.)
6 However, contrary to local activists' opinions the rule book has been changed and not entirely in
favour of members.
7 "Union Review" No. 13, August 1995, pI.
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feeling of distaste for the electricians and the national organisation itselff
7:3 "Head Office"
The national union, or "head office" as it was commonly referred to by branch
officials, was seen as distinct from the local unit. In fact, the local unit could also be
divided up into separate shopfloor units, each an entity with its own ways of
operating. Therefore, it could be argued that rather than two strands of unionism there
were actually three: the shopfloor unit, the local unit and the national organisation.s
The branch officials gave the impression that head office was not considered as part of
the union as such, perhaps because it was so remote. Shop stewards do appear to see
themselves (perhaps unconsciously and as a result of members' reactions towards
them) as "the union", at least as far as their own workplace is concerned. The national
union does not exist as such, but amounts only to "head office".
Head office dealt with all correspondence such as membership applications and
accident forms. These forms were sent to head office after being signed and stamped
by the branch secretary. Very often head office became the object of complaint. It
was not uncommon for members to have to submit a second claim because the first
one had disappeared. Even the branch membership register was very often not up to
date, creating a problem for those concerned. However, after the merger of the AEU
and the EETPU, head office had changed its system to a computerised one and many
of the problems were blamed on this. It could be argued that the problems may have
been created at branch level; however, when a member submits two claims together
through the branch, and one claim is acknowledged and the other has to be
resubmitted, it indicates that the fault lies not with the branch but with the
administration at head office) 0 Indeed a paid collector rang head office himself after
receiving an arrears letter; he discovered that they had two computers, on one he was
in arrears and on the other he was fully paid up!
A number of members had received arrears notices when they paid their subscriptions
through the check -off system. This created a lot of anxiety for some members, who
8 Interestingly, an ex -shop steward from the old plumbers' union described the amalgamation of the
plumbers with the electricians as "when the plumbers were taken over by the electricians - it was
disastrous!" He described in great detail how the "very right wing" electricians took over all the
lodges; plumbers who had run lodges for ten to fifteen years suddenly found themselves voted out by
electricians who "appeared from nowhere in their throngs" for these meetings. The essence of his
argument was that the electricians "took over!" Perhaps this was what local AEEU representatives
feared and after reading unionjournals it appears that the AEEU's Executive Council were willing to
go along with this.
9 However, due to the rule book changes which were implemented after the research was conducted,
the local unit of the AEEU may disappear. District shop stewards' meetings were to be discontinued
and branches amalgamated. Unless shop stewards are prepared to attend the newly constructed branch
meetings (not put into place at the time of writing) the local side of the AEEU could vanish
altogether.
10 Or possibly with the union's solicitors. After a change of solicitors problems with claims forms
were beginning to subside.
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constantly asked their union representatives for advice. According to the district
secretary, employers were to blame for the arrears notices because many of them sent
union subscriptions paid via check-off facilities to the union in a lump sum without
explaining if someone had been exempt from paying through sickness or retirement,
for example, and therefore those members were considered to be in arrears. The
branch officials were of the firm opinion that head office was unaware of the problems
it was causing and that "a lot of people down at the bottom are running around trying
to set things straight and sort out the problems created by things such as arrears
notices". In some instances members tended "to take it out on their shop stewards"
which may be another indication that members see their steward as "the union",
blaming himlher for problems which are created higher up the union hierarchy.
"There's something wrong somewhere," commented one convenor about head office;
"we've got enough on at work, never mind having to sort these things out."
The national union was trying to entice members to pay their subscriptions by direct
debit. This might ensure that the union itself receives regular payments from its
members and any problem with employers sending in payments would be eliminated,
but some workplace representatives were not happy with the idea. They argued that it
was moving away from "control" of members at local level; when all their members
are on check-off they have access to a full list of members (providing the employer is
cooperative) but, at least at local level, an individual could cancel hislher direct debit
and still claim to be a member. This coupled with the fact that the register of members'
names and addresses was rarely up to date could cause enormous problems for the
union if a ballot was to be held. I I
Another problem was created because many union members did not inform their
branch of any change in their circumstances, which did not help when having to
determine who should be paying subscriptions and who was exempt. This in turn
may have had an adverse affect upon any benefits that a member may wish to claim.I2
This was not a problem faced by the AEEU alone; most other unions had the same
difficulties with their members. The NUJ report for 1995 stated:
"One of the most intractable problems faced by our membership department is keeping
track of members who move. At anyone time we have the wrong address for about
1,000 members, mainly because they have moved without telling us."13
Members may not realise that they should notify head office via their branch if they are
off work ill, made redundant or retire so that they may remain members but are
excused contributions until they begin work again; even unemployed members are
entitled to some of the benefits on offer. If head office is not informed of these
11 This actually happened at firm G, which only had four employees; the two union members at the
firm were not sent their voting papers when the union held a vote of all its members.
12 It appears that it was only when a member submitted a claim form that any discrepancies with the
union register were discovered.
13 "Your Union at Work. National Union of Journalists Report 1995." February 1995. London
NUJ.
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changes the member will eventually be expelled for arrears, which then creates
problems for those concerned if the member wishes to be reinstated. The convenors
from firms A14 and C always informed the branch of any change in their members'
circumstances that they knew of, for example, redundancies, retirements or deaths.is
The branch secretary described this as "the sign of a good union man"; it also shows
the dedication that these two union representatives felt towards their members.
However, in this situation members may not be aware that they are still union
members.re This could cause problems if the member gets new employment. He/she
may apply to become a member again, confusing the issue at head office or
alternatively he/she could apply to become a member of another union while still on the
books of the AEEU. This is another indication that most members associate the union
with the workplace; when they leave their employment they do not think of the union.
Indeed, one of the main fmdings of a research project investigating the unemployed
and trade union membership was that unions are not perceived as having anything to
do with the unemployed. They are organisations for people in work (Lewis 1989).
Head office was considered to be out of touch with the realities of the shop floor. The
"power" of the union was seen as working upwards from the shopfloor towards those
on the Executive Council. The shopfloor was considered to be "the backbone of the
union"; the shop stewards do all the work and recruit new members, "head office
don't". A point which came over strongly at finn A's joint shop stewards' committee
meeting was that most "union work" is done at the workplace itself, where the
members are together. When necessary the MS convenor at firm A spent time at work
outside of his normal working hours to ensure that all members were consulted on a
particular issue. Similarly the convenor at firm C would spend a lot of his free time
ensuring that his members were getting the best out of their union as possible.
Indeed, members may not always agree with what their national leaders say publicly.
A particular example of this goes back to the 1989190 campaign for a shorter working
week. Local members were under the impression that they were fighting for a 35 hour
working week; however, Bill Jordan, the ABU president at the time, had spoken on
television about the fight for a 37 hour week, which many members at a local firm
were annoyed about and voiced their opinion to their convenor. At a London
conference about the 35 hour week Mr. Jordan again spoke about a 37 hour week.
The convenor from the local firm, who was attending the conference with a number of
14 The convenor from firm A referred to in this chapter was the convenor of the machine shops.
Firm A had two AEEU workplace organisations, one in the foundry and one covering the machine
shops. In the text these will be referred to as the MS convenor, for the machine shops, and the CS
convenor for the foundry or casting shop.
15 In most of these circumstances these two convenors actually considered it their "duty" to get to
know these things and inform the relevant branch secretary. In some respects it could be considered
that they were actually taking the onus away from the member doing it himlherself. This was also
put forward as another argument against the introduction of direct debit; the convenors may lose track
of those members who have a change in their circumstances.
16 This had actually happened. Two members at firm A had two different union numbers (and were
members of two branches) because they had rejoined the AEEU after being employed at firm A
without realising that they were still members after leaving their previous employment.
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local workplace representatives, questioned him about this. According to those
present their "great leader" suddenly looked as though he had developed "St. Vitus's
dance", uncomfortably squirming on the stage. When he finally answered the question
he skirted around it in such a way that the representatives never received a satisfactory
answer.t? The impression given by local lay representatives was that they did not
have much respect for their previous leader and the presidential election was a
welcome thing; the comments made over his new post in Brussels were very
derogatory, relating to the fact that "he had feathered his own nest while the grass
roots were still fighting on". The common feeling that "head office" did not realise
just what does happen on the shopfloor during the course of a normal working week
was again prominent; shopfloor representatives actually see what is "going on" on a
day to day basis, whereas head office does not. In contrast the AEEU's new
president impressed local representatives during the election campaign. According to
them, he was "straight John Bull" and spoke his mind, his background was on the
shopfloor and that was where his main concerns lay. Yet at the same time he was seen
as honest by declaring that he could not say exactly what he would do if he won the
election because what he would like to do and what he might be able to do may be two
different things.
The difference between FrOs and lay representatives was plain to see. There was a
vast difference in the mannerisms and the attitude of the district secretary when
compared to those directly representing the shopfloor. The FrO was constantly
defending head office and did not like to hear anything said against it. If we were to
talk in terms of militancy then the district secretary for the area under observation was
certainly less militant than those he was responsible for. This finding was different
from the conclusions of Heery and Kelly (1990) who found that Fl'Os were not
markedly less militant than stewards in their selection of objectives and methods.
However, Heery and Kelly did suggest that where workplace organisations were well
developed, stewards were less dependent upon their FrO and were more capable of
reaching their own decisions. This appears to have been the case here.
The evidence does appear to confirm that the national union and the
shopfloor units are separate entities. The local workplace
representatives recognised their national union as such, but were more
concerned with the everyday problems that they encountered at work
and with which the national union was considered to be out of touch.
The politics of the workplace rather than the national union were their
main concerns. If this is how shop stewards see their role it could be
argued that it is no wonder that members are likely to view the
shopfloor as "the union".
17 The introduction of a 37 hour week was the first phase of the campaign for a shorter working
week. Phase 2 was to be the pursuit of a 35 hour norm across the engineering industry. The
misunderstandings of the AEEU members in Xtown suggests that members were not fully informed
about the campaign. Even Bill Jordan did not explain to their representatives at the conference the
intentions of the campaign.
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7:4 The Branch
While union members may be aware of the existence of the branch, they appear to
consider that their convenor or shop steward deals with all their problems (as the
example with arrears letters above shows). Many problems, which should have been
taken to a branch meeting to be dealt with, were taken instead to the member's work
representative, whether at work or at the representative's home.is Very often these
grievances related to a minor thing such as whether a deafness claim had gone
through, something which the member himlherself could have found out by contacting
the union's solicitors. Whether this reflects the fact that union members see their
representative as "the union" or whether they are just too lazy to take it to the branch or
make the necessary phone call themselves is a point worth considering. In most cases
it appears that the member actually thinks hislher workplace representative is the
person who should deal with his/her problems. It may also indicate that to union
members the workplace is the most important, or even the only, place of union
activity; their steward is "the union". Indeed, Marchington (1980) concluded that for
most members the shop steward is the union.i? The fact that workers' representatives
are constantly sought after for advice indicates that he/she may be used as an individual
grievance processor. This is not a new occurrence; other studies have highlighted this
fact (for example, Schuller and Robertson 1983).
A common problem at all AEEU branch meetings was members' lack of interest. It
was frequently voiced that at one time the branch was the hub of union activity;
judging by the attendance rates now the hub of union activity must be either on the
shopfloor or has disappeared altogether. The average attendance at a branch meeting
was about five members and they usually attended to pay their subscriptions.zc A
member may have attended if he/she had a particular problem and had been referred to
the meeting. As a rule those who visited the branch, whether to pay their dues, hand
in a claim form or to ask for advice,21 were from workplaces where AEEU
organisation was either not particularly strong, that is only a few employees were
members, or from very small workplaces where fewer than twenty people were
employed. These members used their branch as a source of information, unlike
members at large well-organised firms where the shop steward was used by members
to deal with problems. It was not only members who failed to attend the branch, shop
18 A representative might be disturbed at any time of the day or night by a member who has a
grievance of some sort, especially if he/she has a telephone.
19 See also A.I. Marsh (1963), McCarthy and Parker (1968), Goodman and Whittingham (1969).
20 The branch observed had around 900 members from the local area.
21 The advice asked for by members varied. Enquiries included those about money while off work
looking after a sick spouse, death grants, whether convalescent homes still existed, about union
membership for the wife of a member. and advice on how to deal with management when they impose
rules which encroach on a person's civil rights.
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stewards rarely did.22 Even the paid subscriptions collector from firm J never
attended. He relied instead on the branch secretary to follow him up and collect the
money despite being asked several times to bring it to the branch.23
Check-off facilities were blamed for the drop in branch life; many members no longer
have to attend to keep their subscriptions up to date. However, does it also indicate
that members see their union as being on the shopfloor, dealing with grievances that
affect them personally and as a group, or that members are not interested in the union
except for when they need help as an individual, such as an accident claim? In 1954 it
was contended that low branch attendance probably indicated nothing more than the
fact that subscriptions were collected at work or that an effective steward system was
in operation (Allen 1954). This suggests that when the union is effective in the
workplace members need not think of the "external" union organisation because any
problems they may face are taken care of within the workplace. In 1968, Goldthorpe
et al concluded that the shop steward was the most important union representative to
individual members. Members were more concerned with shopfloor issues than with
the national union or the activities of their own branch (see also Sherman 1986);
unionism had little significance other than in relation to "bread and butter" issues; it
was seen as a means to an end, with the emphasis on self-interest. These conclusions
still carry a lot of weight today.
A retired member was amazed that branch attendance was so low. When he was
branch secretary, the branch used to be a constant source of information and all
problems were taken there, special meetings were even arranged to explain things such
as the tax system and health and safety. It appears that after this particular person had
to give up his post as branch secretary problems began to develop.24 His successor
was not informing members of their entitlements and they were beginning to take their
grievances to the previous secretary at his home; he was astounded to find that many
things that he had considered a necessary service to members were no longer being
carried out. The present secretary was even less organised than this; he was rather
lackadaisical and very rarely wrote anything down. Now and again when a member
followed up a query he had not done anything about it. A significant point is that
neither of the two people to take the office after the retirement of the previous secretary
particularly wanted the job; both were cajoled by the district secretary into taking it on.
This may indicate that the personalities of those involved can influence the proceedings
22 Attendance at district committee meetings was also dropping; the district secretary had to
telephone the majority of members the evening of the meeting to ensure that they would attend. The
branch secretary described these meetings as "boring nowadays". However, it may also reflect the
different personalities and their levels of commitment; the branch president, for example, enjoyed
these meetings because «you can follow up the problems and outcomes of local firms."
23 This reflected back on his members, who had been notified that they were in arrears (through no
fault of their own). This particular instance was sorted out satisfactorily but future problems may
affect any claims that those members want to make.
24 As he was retiring from work the member was "forced" to give up the position of branch secretary
even though he had asked if he could continue. He had enjoyed the job and it seems that he was
particularly dedicated; it may well have been the case that he would have continued doing a "good job"
especially due to the fact that he no longer had any work commitments.
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and the participation of others in those proceedings; the retired secretary must have
made the branch an interesting place to visit so that members participated in branch
life, which in turn may have added to a sense of the union outside the workplace. This
would probably not have been associated with the national organisation but with the
local organisation. This appears to no longer exist, at least for the majority of rank and
file members.
The branch had also changed since the district office had moved away from Xtown to
new premises about twelve miles away. Originally this particular branch was held at
the district office, where, according to the treasurer, union information, leaflets on
workers' rights etc. and all the relevant union forms were readily available. These
were rarely seen at a branch meeting (or at least at this particular branch) possibly due
to the inefficiency of the branch secretary. The district secretary was surprised when
questioned by the branch treasurer over the lack of information that was given to
convenors, members and branch officials: apparently the branch secretary received this
kind of information from head office and should have taken it to each branch for others
to see. However, the district secretary must have been aware that this particular
branch secretary did not always pull his weight. One night he was especially annoyed
with him and he more or less accused him of creating the problems that the branch was
having, implying that it was only this particular branch that had so many problems for
him to sort out.25 The branch treasurer was especially annoyed when he learned the
result of the first round for the AEEU presidential election from a national newspaper
rather than through the union itself. The district secretary had given him a date when
the results would be available for members; the newspaper had printed the results
before this date. Even then he never heard anything else about this result until new
ballot papers arrived by post for the second round of the ballot, which local members
had not been informed about. There was no information explaining the first result and
why there was to be a second ballot included with these ballot papers; if the treasurer
had not read the information in the newspaper he would not have been able to explain
to those members who queried the second ballot. It again appeared that the branch
secretary should have received the results and informed other people at the branch.
25 While it may appear that the branch secretary could be to blame for the problems encountered by
the branch, similar problems did occur at other branches. This was highlighted at a district shop
stewards' meeting. Other branch secretaries had received abusive phone calls from members who had
received arrears letters. Apparently, at a district committee meeting all the local branch secretaries had
made an issue of the "shambles" that head office was becoming, and had complained about the
correspondence that they were receiving (or not receiving). A retired member who had notified the
branch and been recorded as such in the branch register had been expelled and even a couple of
members who paid their subscriptions by direct debit had received arrears notices. All this indicates
that the fault was not always at branch level. Therefore, the district secretary was being a little harsh
that particular night. Also the fact that the treasurer bad begun to post all the claims and proposition
forms himself so that he knew that they had been sent to head office did not eliminate the
discrepancies. A batch of hearing claims were posted together; everyone concerned heard about their
claim within the procedural four weeks (the time limit that the AEEU say that claimants can expect to
receive an acknowledgement from them) except one man; the branch secretary could not be blamed for
this; therefore, head office must have been at fault somewbere. Numerous other examples where the
branch secretary could not be held responsible could be cited.
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Another difference highlighted by the retired branch secretary was the method of
address: when called "Mr." by the branch secretary he immediately replied "Brother".
Perhaps this is an indication that the togetherness of branch life is disintegrating in
more ways than one. Certainly, comments such as "the union is not like it used to be -
branches used to be real stormy!" coupled with the opinion of the branch president that
the role of the union has altered so much that union representatives must also alter their
ways to keep in line with it, suggest that in the opinions of some representatives the
role of the union has changed enormously over the last decade or so.
The fact that many branches were being amalgamated (creating initial difficulties for all
those concerned), coupled with a belief that head office were cutting costs, led branch
officials to assume that "they" were moving towards "trying to run everything
themselves from London, which they won't be able to do. They'll find that they have
no members". "They haven't got a clue about the grass roots of the union." This
could become even worse when the branch structures change again to meet the
requirements of the new rule book. However, from the members' point of view this
may make no difference; as long as a steward is present in their workplace who is
capable of dealing with their problems and queries they may not even notice if the
branch structures alter. At the time of the research ABEU members in Xtown
belonged to one of four different branches, which were not necessarily connected to
the workplace; therefore, when a member took a problem to hislher steward instead of
the branch it sometimes created problems for that representative, especially when
members did not know which branch they were in. In fact many members did not
even know their own union number, let alone which branch they were in. Members
on check-off should have had plastic union cards containing all their relevant details;
however, many complained that they had never received one. The convenors from
firms A, Band C found it convenient to enrol new members at their own branch; then
they at least knew which branch their new members were in.
The amount of extra work which lay representatives found themselves doing at the
request of the district secretary, in their eyes, was not right because the district
secretary had the facilities to do these tasks more easily and quickly than they could,
plus "it is his job, not ours". Many examples of this occurred during my attendance at
the branch. Members often brought queries to the meeting after being referred by the
district secretary; the feeling at the branch tended to be that he was just "passing the
buck". Indeed, the retired branch secretary had contacted the district secretary
inquiring about convalescent homes and was sent to the branch; after enquiries it was
established that the convalescent home no longer existed and according to the branch
officials the district secretary should have known this or at least could have found it
out more quickly than they did. Investigations into one problem revealed that there
were actually two members with the same name, one whose union number was known
and the other, the one submitting the claim, whose number was not. This caused a lot
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of confusion.26 The branch officials were particularly annoyed by the fact that the
district secretary did not appear to be doing anything to rectify the situation. The
problem was eventually solved when the member's convenor spent the entire day with
the district secretary; they spent at least half of the day on the phone to London trying
to trace the member's union credentials and claim form, which, according to the
branch officials, should have been done by the district secretary long before this.
When the district office was situated locally, the local representatives found it a lot
easier to sort out problems like this one; they could just walk into the office and query
a problem or pick up any information they needed. With the office situated much
further away appointments had to be made to ensure that the district secretary would be
there. In addition when the office was situated locally a full time secretary was
employed who "knew her job" and could give advice herself; the secretaries are now
employed on a temporary basis and rarely know how to deal with representatives'
queries. Further problems for lay representatives may be created now that the former
district secretary has become a regional secretary and his office is situated even further
away. However, the convenors were agreed that he did respond fairly rapidly to their
requests to visit their workplaces if an urgent problem needed his attention.
Nevertheless, if he now has more workplaces under his jurisdiction this situation
could change.
Goodman and Whittingham (1969) concluded that the function of the branch was
largely administrative due to the erosion of its original functions. Local branch
officials believed that branches were now useless and that head office should allow
individual convenors to deal with claims and proposition forms from their place of
work. However, it could be argued that this would to a large extent depend upon the
individual representatives and whether they are prepared to put themselves out even
more than they may do now. Those that are dedicated probably would find this easier
because it would save them a journey each month to the branch and they would know
exactly whether forms had been sent off and when. Nevertheless, there are some
representatives who do not seem to have a lot of time for their members, especially
outside the workplace, and are not as dedicated to their role as others: these individuals
may resent having to do more work, especially paper work.
Evidence from the branch suggests that for the majority of members the
shopfloor is the union and their lay representative is the person who
deals with all their problems and queries. The evidence also indicates
that the personality and style of working of the branch secretary are
essential in determining membership participation and interest in branch
life. Therefore, if this is so, it is highly likely that the personality and
style of working of the lay representative are essential ingredients for
successful unionism within the workplace.
26 Similar confusion was created over a member wrongly expelled for arrears. It eventually turned out
that he had been mistaken for another man with the same name who had already left the union. It
took about four years to get the member reinstated.
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7:5 Shop Stewards' Meetings
Shop stewards' meetings were held every six months and should have been attended
by at least one representative from all local firms covered by the AEEU. The meetings
were very formal, unlike the branch, and were held according to an agenda, which
included the district secretary's announcements, any correspondence, report from the
district committee, branch reports and reports from the stewards present about the
current situations in their workplaces. There was an opportunity for each
representative to air hislher grievances or any problems that they were having with
their members or management, and time was allowed for general discussion of these.
Each meeting had a guest speaker who gave a short talk on a topic of interest to union
members.27
Attendance at the meeting was generally rather poor. At the first I attended ten local
firms were represented; however, attendance at the following meetings was poor in
comparison. This was despite the fact that all representatives attending were paid their
travel expenses and convenors received £4.00 and stewards £3.00. The district
secretary expressed his concern over the lack of attendance and blamed the weather on
two separate occasions; however, it may also indicate a lack of enthusiasm on the part
of the stewards themselves. Perhaps for them, as well as the members, the union is
associated with the workplace and once outside the workplace they "forget" about the
union, leaving only those who are fully dedicated to worry about any problems outside
of worktime. As a rule the same six firms were represented at each meeting.
Elections for committee officials and those for officials of the district committee,
(which were held at the shop stewards' meetings), were held by a show of hands;
however, there was usually only one person nominated for each post and usually that
person, if not standing for re-election, had had to be cajoled into standing for
nomination.28 The feeling among local representatives appeared to be that "I would
like to do it but I've got enough on my plate at work!" This indicates that most union
work, at least for shopfloor representatives, is in the workplace and that their time
(worktime and sometimes leisure time) is taken up with their own workplace
problems. Therefore, they were reluctant to take on further positions which would
involve problems from other workplaces as well as their own. If this was the case for
stewards, it follows that to the members who those stewards were representing the
union is, indeed, in the workplace.
27 The speakers on the occasions that Iattended the meetings were: a solicitor from the union's law
firm talking about the new benefits introduced by the union; the coordinator from the unemployed
workers' centre explaining the possible effects of the changes to unemployment benefit and how it
could affect working people as well as the unemployed; a former district secretary speaking about the
AEEU generally; and a speaker on TUC training courses for shop stewards.
28 In some cases representatives from individual branches were put forward by the district secretary
without the knowledge of the branch officials, who were not always pleased to know that they had
been left out of the process and in some cases they did not even know the person who had been
nominated.
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These meetings were the main way that local shop stewards gained information about
their union in general, but perhaps the most important thing was that stewards from
different workplaces could meet and help each other with their problems. At one
meeting a steward from firm L was concerned because management at his workplace
were considering introducing performance/profit related pay (PRP). After receiving
little information from the committee's officials about PRP, two stewards from another
firm where PRP had been operating for a number of years were able to give the
worried steward a substantial amount of information about the different ways of
running PRP and the pitfalls to avoid. The steward heeded their warnings and acted
on their advice and showed his appreciation by leaving them a thank you message at
the following meeting. This also suggests that "the union" is in the workplace;
experience and knowledge being gained there and being shared with representatives
from other workplaces, rather than the national union stepping forward with solutions
to stewards' problems and queries. Union officials may be able to answer questions
in theory, but when it comes down to putting things into practice, those who have first
hand experience are the best qualified to do so.
First hand experience "on the job" might also be a reason for the poor attendance at
trade union training courses. In Xtown a wide variety of TUC training courses were
on offer to union representatives and, according to the district secretary, they were
very highly rated when compared to courses elsewhere. It was feared that if the
present trend continued whereby courses were running with short numbers they would
be phased out, which had happened in other areas. Ideally new representatives should
complete all four stages of the courses. The district secretary argued that it was
essential that all stewards should attend as there is a fundamental advantage in
knowing the skills of being a shop steward. "It is really worth going, what you learn
is a lot more than what you can learn from just going to union meetings", explained the
convenor from firm B. However, poor attendance may indicate that stewards prefer to
"learn on the job" as such; where else but the workplace is practical experience
gained? Shop stewards are entitled to release from work to attend the courses; so, it
could be argued that they do not have to give up their spare time to do so. Perhaps the
most important areas that stewards cannot always "learn on the job" are issues relating
to the law, the legislation concerning trade unions themselves and health and safety.
As the district secretary stressed to those present at a meeting, "it is advantageous to
keep re-attending to upgrade yourself and see how much things have changed".
However, most local stewards appeared to be too busy with problems at work to ask
themselves whether they needed to update themselves on the law; they asked for
advice on these matters if and when the need arose.
It appears that where the union organisation within a workplace was relatively
independent29 shop stewards ignored "the law" as such and worked in their own
29 That is, the workplace organisation was able to act on its own and resolve the majority of its
problems without recourse to the national union or its officers.
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established ways. It was only if the "external" union became aware of a situationw
that "the law" might become an issue. If shop stewards do not consider the legislation
when they are negotiating with management, then, members are probably even less
likely to do so.
The main issues affecting local firms tended to be redundancies,31 although according
to the district secretary these had "slowed down a bit recently", changes to working
practices, and competition - a problem which affects the whole company and not just
the workforce. The biggest problem for the union organisation within a workplace
appears to be when a firm is taken over by another company. Firm M was being
divided and a third of the firm was being sold to a German company, which had split
the union organisation in that workplace. The union at firm M was having a lot of
problems with management and the district secretary had had to visit the company
many times to deal with changes to contracts and changes in working practices, among
other things. The management at firm Mwere uncooperative when it came down to the
union. They were not even prepared to provide the union's solicitors with the results
of their most recent noise surveys to assist with members' deafness claims.
Many companies were altering the working practices within their workplaces. In
particular human resource management (HRM), introducing PRP and changing from
piece work to cell working were options considered by local companies. In the
majority of firms these changes were implemented after discussions with the union and
in general the workplace union organisations coped rather well with the introduction of
PRP, with stewards managing to negotiate a higher percentage of the profits that
management had proposed to give them. The feeling of the shop stewards' committee
was that the Conservative government had been encouraging the use of PRP because it
had hoped that it would take away unions' negotiating rights; in fact, in many of the
local firms where it had been introduced the unions involved had kept their negotiating
rights and in most cases had found that the introduction of PRP actually benefited their
members.
It was only in companies like firm M where problems remained unresolved. Whether
this was because of a stubborn management or a poor union organisation is a question
to be asked. However, it is recognised by the TUC that good employers do sit down
with the unions involved and discuss issues affecting their members.3 2 Therefore,
the management might be blamed; however, if the lay representatives had adopted a
different style of working the union might have received a different response. The fact
that the FrO had attended this workplace regularly suggests that the union organisation
30 Very often, where an independent workplace union organisation existed issues of concern to
members never actually reached the attention of the national union. If they did it was usually at a
shop stewards' meeting where the representatives would give a report on the progress of the union at
their workplaces.
31 This was not just a local trend; the AEEU's Manufacturing Industry's Employment Trends Survey
for 1994 found that a high number of the companies surveyed were still reporting redundancies.
32 Radio 5 Live, 12.3.95, 11.30 am.
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was not able to negotiate with management itself. Stewards from other workplaces
believed that the union organisation at firm M was rather poor and had allowed
management to "walk all over" its members for years. Certainly, former AEU
members who had been made redundant from firm M some years ago were not happy
with the way that "the union" had handled the situation, especially because they had
not been informed of particular decisions made to help them until they had already
accepted management's offer after advice from their steward. These former union
members also had a very low opinion of unions in general and related them to their
time at firm M. This suggests that their experience of unionism at firm M actually
influenced their perceptions, not only of the power of the union at firm M, but also of
the power of trade unions generally. It could be argued that how well the lay
representative performs does influence members' perceptions of their union and of
unions in general.
The change in the economic and employment climate may have induced local firms to
introduce new working practices. Many of the local companies that had introduced
HRM did appear to be following the trend identifted by the Labour Research
Department (1994) by attempting to secure changes in the way that their employees
worked. It also appears that some managers did expect their employees to show more
commitment to their company. For example, at firm C, according to the convenor,
there had been a big change in management's attitude over the last few years, and they
had begun to "lean on workers more now over really silly things." This point,
according to the workers' representatives, was relevant to many companies. Whether
it is a sign of a change in employers' attitudes in general, an effect perhaps of the
economic climate and increased competition, or whether knowledge of the current
legislation makes management more confident to deal with their workers as they wish,
is another question. The fact that union representatives must step in in these situations
and stand up for their members was a shared feeling of all the stewards observed.
At firm C the convenor had 76 members in the four units that he covered; in all the
years that he had been there he said that there had been problems, but they had not
been "massive ones". However, over the last few years more individuals seemed to
be experiencing work related problems, possibly due to the fact that management had
brought in a team of advisors to help them save money,33 One particular week he
saw sixteen individuals with management related problems, the majority of them
relating to changes to their contracts of employment. The convenor admitted that there
was not much that he could do about changes to employees' contracts except to
negotiate to ensure that his members got a reasonable deal "rather than let management
have their own way totally at the expense of the workforce". However, the convenor
felt that in a way management were "winning", because "they seem to be bullying
workers mentally" and even though the union was backing them, individual workers
33This may also account for the fact that management at firm C kept withdrawing certain unwritten
privileges that the workers had enjoyed over the years; for example shop stewards were paid £2.00 a
day for meals when attending TUC courses; this bad been stopped and management actually denied
having paid it in the past. Also the free provision of special footwear for workers had been stopped.
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were beginning to feel that they should look for another job and were talking of
redundancy if it came up.34 Therefore, once these workers leave the firm management
could employ new workers under new contracts and those employees would know no
difference, except that they may eventually find themselves "run off their feet",
especially if their contracts stipulate a 24 hour commitment to the company.35
In the majority of local firms, the AEEU workplace organisations had
coped rather well with any changes. The change in the economic and
employment climate may have altered the attitudes of trade unions,
whereby they are more willing to accept change than previously;
however, they have not lost the will to fight management and ensure
that changes are implemented to the advantage of their members rather
than allowing management a free rein to introduce change as they wish.
As the Labour Research Department survey (1994) concluded
"management cannot expect to have it all its own way when it comes to
changes in working practices" (pI3).36 Nevertheless, the personalities
of those involved may be a significant factor contributing to the success
or failure of the union when negotiating new terms with management.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that the national union
and its workplace organisations are two entities and as far as the shop
stewards were concerned their own workplace organisation was the
most important one. Certainly the workplace appears to be the place
where most union work is encountered and first hand experience
enables stewards to advise each other on how to deal with problems
better than the advice offered by FTOs. The legislation may be a
predominant concern for the national union; however, it does not
appear to have made a great impact upon the local stewards or their
shopfloor organisations.
7:6 The legislation
The national union and its officers were well aware of the legislation relating to trade
unions and tried to instil into their shopfloor representatives the necessity of its
34 At firm C, like firm A, all redundancies had been voluntary and the union had had no problems
with forced redundancies.
35 One individual electrician was expected to do the work of two others who had left as well as his
own. He offered to do sixteen hours overtime a week but management did not think this was enough,
arguing that the employee was not committed enough to the firm. The convenor himself backed by
his members thought that 41/2 hours overtime was a reasonable amount and anything over that that
members were expected to do against their will was unreasonable. After the electrician was threatened
with dismissal, the convenor sought advice from the district secretary and after quoting the ACAS
Code of Practice to management they "backed down". The member concerned does have a new
contract but it does not mention anything about doing extra overtime which management originally
wanted to add. The convenor argued that "they don't want to admit defeat".
36 Bargaining Report 00.147, February 1995.
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observance."? The check-off legislation was a good example; every union journal for
at least the eight months before the legislation actually took effect was reminding
members of the benefits of remaining a union member, and every time the district
secretary met a shop steward the word "check-off" never failed to be aired. At least
locally this appears to have paid off. The ABEU lost very few members as a result of
the mass signing of the check-off forms, in fact, locally and nationally some
workplaces found that they actually gained members because workers who had never
been approached about becoming a member were discovered and many willingly
joined the union. This was contrary to the fears of some of the stewards who had
been "getting a lot of flak" about the increase in union subscriptions; some even
thought that "more and more members are looking to get out of it." The fact that the
union actually gained members was viewed by many as "one in the eye" for the
Conservatives; popular opinion tended to be that the check-off arrangements were
designed specifically to dissuade workers from being in a union as well as to cause a
lot of administration problems at workplaces and head office. The legislation does put
the onus on the employer to ensure that the appropriate check-off forms are signed
every three years by all those concerned; however, to make sure that all employers
kept their check-off arrangements, the ABEU officials prepared the forms for members
to sign and enlisted (or cajoled) the help of their shopfloor representatives to ensure
that every member and any potential members signed the sheet before the due date.
The balloting procedures were constantly being updated to stay within the legal
boundaries. Each time there had been publicity about industrial action ballots the
ABEU revised its procedures and sent out new copies to their FfOs to distribute to all
shop stewards in their area. These were all rather lengthy documents covering the
whole of the balloting procedure. For example, in May 1993 guidelines were issued
that supplemented those already in circulation and referred to proposed overtime bans
and the fact that an overtime ban, whether it be voluntary or compulsory, must be
treated as industrial action. Because of the confusion about whether this action
constituted strike action or action short of a strike the new guidelines set out in precise
detail the wording of the ballot papers if an overtime ban was to be included in the
ballot; when different types of action including an overtime ban are being considered,
so as to impose an overtime ban members must vote yes to two questions - that they
are prepared to take action short of a strike and strike action. In August 1993,
following the introduction of TURERA, new guidelines complying with the statutory
requirements replaced the previous ones and a new Industrial Action Ballots
department responsible for all ballots involving AEEU members was set up. And in
February 1994, following the Court of Appeal's decision in Blackpool and the Fylde
College v. NATFHE , the procedures were again revised to replace the guidelines
issued in 1993. The ruling by the court was that when giving notice of industrial
action unions must give the employers sufficient information to enable them to easily
37 In addition to the legislation relating to unions, shop stewards were also kept up to date on other
issues, such as part time employees' pension rights, the law relating to race and sex discrimination
and even what Britain's opt out of the social chapter denied the average worker, through union journals
and shop stewards' meetings.
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identify the individual employees who will be called upon to take action. The AEEU
interpreted this to mean that in order to comply they must attach a list of the names of
all members covered by the ballot to the notice of ballot and the notice of proposed
industrial action.
The national body realised how important it is for them to remain within "the law"
when a workforce decides to take some form of industrial action.
"It is essential, ..... , that these guidelines are studied and followed in every respect. It is
only by maintaining discipline that the union will be able to continue to protect and
advance our members' interests despite the best efforts of the Tory government. In
particular:
- No one should call for industrial action until it has been authorised by the Executive
Council.
- Members must be advised to await the outcome of the ballot."
(p2 AEEU Secret Ballots Before Industrial Action, 1994).
However, on the shopfloor this may be seen differently. At least at firm A if union
members had what they considered to be a legitimate grievance,38 they were prepared
to walk out over it without the "properly conducted" ballot.39 This tactic, or more
appropriately the threat that "the lads will be out", had worked several times even
though management were aware, and informed the union representatives, that the
grievance procedure should be followed and that things should be conducted
according to "the law". The shop steward's manual says that to allow for peaceful
resolution no action should be taken before the stages of the procedure are exhausted.
The national union will give no support to members acting in breach of their
obligations. However, on the shopfloor it appears that some members will act in the
name of their union whether they have the support of "head office" or not. More
appropriately, perhaps, they see themselves as "the union", and, therefore, head office
is not given a thought.
The AEEU's guidelines stressed that all union lay officers must advise members
against taking unauthorised action, and if any action should be taken unofficially
officials must notify head office immediately that they become aware of it so that it can
be repudiated, as "[t]he union will not be able to organise a ballot of our members and
call for industrial action if unlawful industrial action has not been repudiated at the
earliest opportunity." (p4). In many respects most unofficial action never reaches the
attention of any union official as the dispute itself is usually resolved quickly so that
production is maintained. But if a strike is repudiated by the National Executive it is
highly likely that the members concerned would still continue with their dispute; if they
believed in their cause enough to take action immediately in the first place, there is no
38 Legitimate grievance, here, is used to identify a problem other than a wage claim. When pay
negotiations were the subject of dispute at firm A the correct procedure was followed and if necessary
the "external" union was brought in. However, the convenor preferred where possible to conduct the
negotiations himself.
39 At firm A the shopfloor did conduct workplace ballots when issues, including wage claims, were
being decided on. The stewards found that a show of hands did not work in these situations and
preferred to allow the workforce to vote in a secret ballot.
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reason to suppose that they should wish to stop that action so that head office can put
their house in order; after all, officials at head office were considered to be remote by
those lay officials who had contact with them let alone the members themselves.sv
Members probably realise that if this is done, their employers have a substantial
amount of time to devise ways to offset the effects of an official strike, whereas when
a strike-t takes them by surprise the effect on employers can be devastating with the
workers hoping for a quick solution. Nevertheless, this may depend upon what the
problem is. The Executive Council Reports in the "Union Review" show that when a
strike ballot has been held and a strike sanctioned, it often results in an amicable
arrangement with management, usually involving substantial improvements in wages
and conditions, sometimes after a one day stoppage and sometimes without any action
taking place at all. This confirms the conclusions of other studies that ballots may
strengthen the union's hand when bargaining and do not necessarily lead to any action
taking place (see, for example, TUC 1995a, Elgar and Simpson 1993a, Brown and
Wadhwani 1990). The AEEU acknowledged that the legislation was "clearly designed
to make it increasingly difficult to organise industrial action and in particular to ensure
that there are substantial delays before any action can be taken." (Secret Ballots Before
Industrial Action 1994, pl.)42 Nevertheless, the balloting procedures were looked
upon by the local FrO as one of the positive aspects of the legislation.
A shared opinion of all the shop stewards observed was that the national organisation
was "scared of sequestration". This may indeed be the case. All the guidelines on
secret ballots stress compliance, and while members stand to lose their jobs with no
claim for unfair dismissal if they strike unofficially, the union may lose substantial
sums of money if it supports the strike, which may be the reason why the Executive
Council wish to repudiate unofficial strikes as soon as possible, rather than just a
concern for their members.43
Whether workers are prepared to take immediate action or at least give a threat of it
appears to depend upon the personalities at the workplace, because, according to their
convenor, workers at firm B, for example, would "moan and groan about something
but are not prepared to do anything about it", Indeed, a strike ballot was held at firm B
in the late summer of 1994 in support of a pay claim; the employees had had no pay
40 An example of a national organisation being ignored by its members was during the Scottish
postal workers' strike in November 1995; members voted (unofficially) to continue striking despite
pleas from the Communication Workers' Union officials to return to work so as to allow them to
conduct a ballot on official industrial action.
41 The term strike is used loosely here. Members may not even consider that their decision to stop
working is strike action; that is, they remain at the workplace but refuse to work until their grievance
has been rectified.
42 At some local firms, but particularly at firm A, it was considered best to impose an overtime ban
voluntarily rather than officially; that is, all members were not available to work overtime because of
other commitments if asked by management. The district secretary did not condone this action but
turned a blind eye to it.
43 The district secretary, when reminding stewards to ensure that all their members re-signed for
check-off, commented that "to carry out an efficient business it takes money; therefore, it is
important that check-offtakes off."
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rise for a couple of years. A lot of time was taken up by official duties, such as
distributing and collecting in signed papers from every member involved in the ballot
to confmn their names and addresses, union officials found that members were not
returning these forms on time and at least three weeks were taken up on this task
alone. The ballot resulted in a vote for an overtime ban; however, when it was due to
start management announced that there was to be no more overtime. According to the
convenor, the situation did not last long, even though in his opinion the ban "was
hurting management, they were pretending that it wasn't", and the employees began
"moaning" that they needed the extra money. When the convenor returned from his
holidays his members were working overtime again (minus a pay rise) as though
nothing had happened. It might be understandable that the convenor had "lost faith in
the shopfloor"; however, perhaps "the shopfloor" had no faith in him.s+ It is possible
that his personality and style of working were not of the type needed to induce
membership participation in union affairs and the level of success that the union had at
that workplace reflected this. Unofficial overtime bans had been observed at firm A
and won the union its goals which indicates that membership participation in
workplace unionism can lead to successful outcomes and the key to that success
appears to be the workplace leader.
Welch (1993) argued that his fmdings indicated that trade unionists were more likely to
favour compliance with the law, which might explain the members' attitudes at firm B.
Yet at the same time Welch contended that many lay representatives generally favoured
what they considered to be the relevant action, irrespective of whether they thought it
was contrary to the law. This would explain the actions of the representatives at firm
A. However, their members were also prepared to back them; therefore, the shop
stewards must have stimulated an interest in membership participation (Fosh 1993,
Fosh and Cohen 1990). In some situations at firm A, the MS convenor had
confronted management over particular issues which the other shop stewards had
shied away from believing that the convenor would not get his way. However, when
the outcome had been achieved, the stewards and members alike were generally happy
with the result. This could be another reason why members were prepared to follow
their representatives at fmn A; they saw their "loyalty" rewarded by getting their
grievances resolved. How well the lay representative performed influenced his
members' perceptions about the "power" of their union.
It appears that employers were aware of the legislation and would let their union
representatives know this when a problem was being negotiated. Elgar and Simpson
(1993b) found that whilst managers did have an increased awareness of the law,
where possible they preferred to resolve their disputes with the union negotiators.
This was certainly the case at firm A. Yet at firm B management seemed to threaten
the workers with "the law" each time they complained. Whether they would carry out
44 The district secretary commented a few times that he could not see anything coming from this
ballot and that he wished the workforce at firm B would settle their problems themselves, which
implied that the union situation at firm B was not the same as at those firms who preferred to settle
problems themselves and succeeded in doing so.
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the threat is another matter; generally the workforce carried on working normally so
that the threat was never put to the test. Elgar and Simpson (1993b) concluded that if
industrial action became a more central management concern, the law would
undoubtedly play a significant role in the strategies of both employers and unions.
According to the convenor from firm B, someone had told his management (before the
strike ballot was held) that the workforce had already voted to take industrial action.
They told him that "you had better make sure that you've got every detail correct with
the balloting procedures, otherwise ..." Maybe they would have carried out their
threat.
Interestingly, while representatives may not always choose to observe "the law" when
negotiating, they did remain loyal to the principles which governed the union
movement as a whole. For example, the "Bridlington principles", which are now
rendered ineffective because of the individual's right to join the union of hislher
choice, were still in the minds of shop stewards when recruiting new members. They
did not like to think that they were "poaching" from another union. However, this
may sometimes be done without their knowledge; those union members who do notify
changes in their situation and are therefore excused contributions may, on starting a
new job, not realise that they are still on the register of their previous union, in which
case they may unwittingly be members of two different unions. At least from the point
of view of local stewards, suggestions of deliberate poaching from other unions were
unfounded.
It does appear that the legislation had had a great effect upon the
national organisation of the AEEU. The district secretary commented
"there's now a lot of cross-over between legal action and industrial
action, so we must be very careful." However, if union members in
some workplaces have been prepared to take action irrespective of "the
law", it suggests that the legislation is likely to have had little influence
on their opinions about the power of their union. Nevertheless, this
may reflect upon the lay representatives, if at workplaces, such as firm
H, members are threatened with the law by management and they
experience little success in achieving their goals, they may not only
blame their representative but also the legislation for their union's
apparent failure.
7:7 Workplace & union
It appears that how dedicated the shop steward is, in particular the senior shop steward
or convenor, and how he/she conducts himlherself when addressing a workplace
problem may be the key to successful unionism at the workplace. One of the strongest
convictions put across by most of the local lay representatives was their dedication
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towards their members.45 However, how this dedication is applied may vary from
steward to steward, creating differences in different firrns in the ways of dealing with
management and also between different workshops within the same factory. The
convenor from firm e admitted that when it came down to dealing with management
his shop stewards were not "too bothered" and preferred to let him get on with it. But,
he, like many other convenors, thought that stewards should accompany him when
confronting management so that they could gain experience (which only comes with
practice) as one day some one will have to take over the senior position. A complaint
of most senior stewards was that when they returned to work after a long period of
absence-s the situation between the shopfloor and management tended to have "gone
to pieces", which indicates that they were the driving force behind "the union" in their
workplaces. The way that they worked secured the union's relationship with
management, when they were away for a long period a different style of working led
to a different type of management/workforce relationship.
Management-union relationships do differ at workplaces represented by the same
union (see for example, Edwards 1978, Edwards and Heery 1989b). This could be an
indication that it is the differing personalities and styles of negotiating at the workplace
which influence the outcomes of bargaining (Fosh and Cohen 1990, Fosh 1993). The
senior representatives from firm A and firm C both appeared to have a relatively good,
albeit not over-friendly, relationship with management; mutual respect was the key
here. The representatives had no hesitation in contacting management as soon as a
problem needing attention occurred, and it appeared that a common tactic when dealing
with management was to "call their bluff". Certainly, in the machine shops of firm A
the solution always seemed to be forthcoming, perhaps because the convenor was
fairly confident that he had the backing of the shopfloor. Management must also have
been aware of this because in general a threat of taking a predicament to the shopfloor
brought about a speedy solution. At fum A industrial action was very rare; instead the
union and management preferred to "get round the table" and discuss any problem. In
fact, only one dispute (a pay deal) had been taken outside the factory to the "external"
union in the nine years that the convenor had held his position.s? This was eventually
settled to everyone's satisfaction; moreover, it was the convenor rather than the
district secretary who put forward the final settlement. At firm e, which had been
divided into different sections owned by different companies under the umbrella of
"firm C", the ABEU convenor was generally accepted by the managers of the different
workshops even though in some the ABEU had no negotiating rights because they
were not the predominant union there. He argued that because he had spent time
visiting these workshops he had built up a relationship with the managers, who had
45 It should be noted that with a few exceptions these observations are from those stewards who
attended either the branch or the district shop stewards' meetings; therefore, it is possible that they
were more dedicated than those stewards who failed to attend.
46 Two of the convenors from different firms had in the period covered by the study been off work
after accidents for at least six weeks.
47 Similarly at firm e, in the eight years that the convenor had held his post a PTO had only been
called in twice.
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begun to acknowledge him and listen to his opinions; therefore, if a problem should
occur it would be easier for him to help his members. Yet at firm B the convenor may
have taken up particular issues with management but nothing much was done about
them. Certainly, from his comments it seemed that the workforce whilst complaining
about particular issues were not prepared to do anything about them. "They are
scared." The convenor gave the legislation and "the miners' strike" as the reasons for
this; however, there is a possibility it could have been his methods of communicating
with his members and management. Moreover, if he felt that his members would not
back him, then any "bargaining power" he may have had would be lost. On the other
hand, his members may have perceived him as having no bargaining power and
therefore did not wish to act upon their grievances. Alternatively, management may
not have been prepared to give an inch at that particular fIrm.48 The convenor did say
that when employees complained to management, the reply was "well you can always
get out there and march up and down with your banners. I'll sack you and then get
another workforce and pay them £50 or £60 less." However, it is possible that
management were calling "the bluff" of their workforce, unless they were prepared to
employ a whole new workforce who may have had little knowledge of their
production systems (see MacInnes 1987, Martin 1992).
Indeed, management at firm B imposed a new pay structure and productivity deal
which involved regrading all the workers; unfortunately some had been downgraded.
The shopfloor blamed their convenor for the downgrading as well as the fact that they
had had no pay rise since rejecting a £10 deal over two years ago. The convenor
argued that there were only five or six members who "kicked up a fuss" and that the
rest were not bothered. However, it could well be that it was him that was not
bothered; he always appeared pessimistic rather than fighting a cause with conviction.
Maybe the shopfloor had lost faith in him and perceived him as having no bargaining
power whatsoever. This would explain why the convenor of firm B said that he had
never known "the men to be so fed up with the union". It may be the case that they
were just fed up with him (the union representative being perceived as "the union").
This is also an indication that the morale of union members may be connected to the
perceived power of the union in their workplace. There used to be seven shop
stewards at firm B but there were only two at the time of the study and one of those
had threatened to resign unless someone else was nominated: an indication perhaps of
the lack of leadership and guidance at this workplace. The convenor had no faith in
his members, even before the industrial action ballot had taken place he was saying
that he did not think they would vote for it. In fact, the convenors from three other
firms were discussing this situation and one of them oommented that "they've got no
leadership down there." A change of leadership style and possibly a different
48 Firm B bad been sold to another company during the research period; however, the convenor's
comments remained the same after the changeover of management. Marsh (l992b) may have been
correct when he suggested that it was the history and current state of relations between an employer
and hislber workforce which had the most effect on the outcomes of industrial relations in that
company. However, it could still be argued that the personalities of those concerned will largely
determine the type of relationship that a workforce has with management, the main union
representative initiating the type of relationship.
162
personality might alter the situation for the better+? Relating this to Fosh's (1993)
conclusions, the style of leadership at firm A, for example, determined membership
participation in those affairs that involved the union and the high level of participation
secured them their goal, whereas at firm B the style of leadership was not effective at
determining membership participation and, therefore, the union's dealings with
management was much different from that at firm A.
The different situations at firms A and B indicates a vast difference in the "bargaining
power" that the union carried in each workplace. Whether this was to do with the
union representatives, members' attitudes or management's approach is another
matter. But whichever it was, it was still a case of the different personalities in the
workplace. The ABEll representative at firm D had begun to have his "union mail"
delivered to his home; his employers were opening it before passing it on to him. This
fact astounded representatives from other firms, but it does indicate the different
approaches taken by different employers. At firm C the workforce in a workshop
owned separately to the rest of the firm wanted to become ABEU members. During
the process there was "some sort of a cock up" with the direct debit forms and no
payments had been deducted. After learning of this management spoke to the entire
workforce telling them "why be union members when we'll look after you?" "They
fell for it", and the employees began to be paid different wages for the same work.
"Management are looking after some and not others. I told them that we would have
ensured that they were all getting the same pay. But management have pitched worker
against worker and it has got to a stage where they daren't tell each other what wage
rise they have got!" A retired member's reply to this was "it's sad that they fell for the
con. It's management propaganda against the unions". Another retired member
commented wisely, "we still need unions but people don't realise it until something
happens".
This is a good example of individualism overriding collectivism. The pursuit and
maximisation of self interest had become each individual's goal and each worker was
working in competition with each other rather than together. However, it could not be
argued that trade union power was reduced in this situation as a union organisation had
never existed in this particular workshop and the workers had no history of working
together to achieve their aims. The competitive nature of the employees (stimulated by
management) had created a hostile atmosphere in the workshop which may prevent
solidarity among the workers. Nevertheless, if Fosh (1993) was correct that no matter
what the circumstances at a particular workplace if a leader with the right style of
working should emerge positive reactions to unionism may follow, it is possible that
the situation in this workshop could be reversed and workers and management may
fmd that workplace relations become a lot easier. It has been argued elsewhere that the
49 A new steward has since been sworn in at firm B; his style of leadership may reverse the apathy of
the members there. The convenor did once comment that "it used to be a good union down there at one
time but it's all changed now." Indeed, the new steward reported at the last stewards' meeting
observed that "we're quite happy as things are going at the moment. We're getting there with our
negotiations." This remark suggests that the situation between the union and management may have
been changing after a new person had begun bargaining with them.
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promotion of collective organisation was the best way to secure increased productivity
(Brown 1994) and that there was no evidence to suggest that a union presence
damages a company's long term performance (Machin 1995). It may be, as Martin
(1992) contended, that to maintain their market position firms require labour co-
operation which is secured much easier with a good relationship with the workplace
union. Indeed, some local employers recognised that having a more or less fully
unionised workforce was an advantage, especially if the union organisation was well
established, as many workforce problems, particularly with individual employees,
could be sorted out much quicker by union representatives than by members of
management (see also Beynon 1973). The fact that with union co-operation the
running of a business is made much easier has been documented before (see for
example, Edwards and Heery 1989b).
The fact that union representatives must step in and stand up for their members was a
shared feeling of all the stewards observed. However, whether they always did this
depended on the individual representative. An incident at firm B divided some of the
local stewards. According to the convenor, two members had been dismissed for
"blatant fraud"; they had been claiming overtime at weekends for work that they had
completed in the week. Their convenor refused to go to their tribunal because he did
not want to lie, whereas the convenors from firms A and C argued that management
should have noticed this discrepancy before it got totally out of hand; therefore, the
action should have been fought on a case of bad management. They both saw the
situation as one of "letting your members down"; they would have supported them as
far as they and their workplace organisation could. Again this shows the difference in
the personalities and styles of working of those involved. A second retired member
who attended the branch commented that at one time the shop steward knew if you
were not working and chastised you. "You knew if management dragged you in that
they couldn't defend you. The shop steward was as good as a gaffer in those days",
and you did "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay". "But it's all changed since Mrs.
Thatcher". It appears that some members expect to be defended by their stewards
when they've done something they know that they should not have done and become
very annoyed when the representative tells them the truth. However, some
representatives are prepared to stick their necks out and defend their members as far as
they can regardless of their actions. In some cases this has paid off (usually in those
firms where an independent union organisation exists and where management
cooperate with the union representatives to a certain degree) and the member was
grateful and tended to refrain from repeating the offending actions, for example, being
drunk at work.50 The convenor from fum A argued that he always did what he could
for any member who came to him with a problem but he admitted that "half of them
aren't worth fighting for". Whether this referred to the members themselves or the
problems that they have is not clear, although I suspect it might refer to both!
The fact that some stewards were prepared to try to defend their members regardless of
50 "Bullet makers" is a name that has been used to describe members who continuously and blatantly
make trouble for themselves and then expect their steward to defend them.
164
their actions also highlights another difference between the national and shopfloor
unions. At a shop stewards' meeting the local FrO, when talking about the benefits of
membership, declared that when grievances are taken out of the workplace there "is
always the backing of the union on issues that can be pursued." Therefore, some
members may be better served within the workplace than outside it; some dismissable
offences would not be pursued by the "external" union whereas the shopfloor unit
might be prepared to back a dismissed member and get himlher reinstated.
All the shop stewards observed felt that "we are in the union to support each other".
Whether members feel the same, though, may depend upon a number of factors and
especially the amount of bargaining power that they perceive their representative as
having. Schuller and Robertson (1983) concluded that well organised shop stewards,
who were visibly effective, tended to promote better relations. In fact, the MS
convenor at firm A was constantly reminded by his members that he had "power over
management". This might be seen as an indication that the workers under his
jurisdiction did perceive their "leader" as being able to negotiate terms for them, which
workers at firm B, for example, may not have felt that their representative could do.
However, the convenor did not see himself as having "power". To him it was more a
case of standing your ground and being confident even if you have to "call
management's bluff". All he cared about was "those on the shopfloor and that they get
the best possible deal." The convenor from firm C had a similar attitude: "I never ask.
management, I just tell them." Being seen as confident and perceived as "knowing
what you're talking about (even if you don't)" when dealing with management appears
to be a key element in negotiations which allowed these representatives to "win" many
issues. This may be where the convenor at firm B lost out - he was not confident
enough to fight out issues with management.
Edwards (1978) argued that constraints on union representatives' negotiations with
management were felt to come from the membership rather than from the "union
hierarchy". In both firms A and B the shopfloor representatives acted upon the wishes
of their membership; however, in one firm the members tended to want to take the
problem further, whilst in the other they preferred to let the matter stand. The point
above, where the convenor put forward the fmal settlement in the disputed pay claim,
illustrates this. The district secretary had been called in and negotiations were taken
"out of the hands" of the convenor. The FrO had negotiated a deal that was
satisfactory in all respects but one: the initial payments were not to begin until
October. The secretary was satisfied with this whereas the members wanted the
payments to be backdated to April and were not prepared to accept the deal. The FrO
was not willing to put this to management; however, when the convenor was allowed
to explain the situation, management agreed. The convenor was loyal to his members
and their wishes rather than those of the district secretary. Similarly, at firm C the
district secretary did not get a very good reception from members after he had been
called in over a dispute about their pay claim. It is the stewards and their members
who determine the final outcome, not necessarily the union officials.
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This largely confirms the conclusion of Heery and Kelly (1990) that lay
representatives retain most control over the setting of union objectives. However,
their assertion that the FrO then refines those objects and guides negotiations towards
a settlement is only partially true in the above example. Certainly the district secretary
guided the negotiations but not totally to the satisfaction of the shopfloor. It was the
lay representative who put forward the proposal that ended the deadlock, something
the FrO was not prepared to do. It might also be the case that in some situations,
usually involving money, rank and file members on the shop floor do not agree with
what their stewards are arranging with management. Two similar incidents at two
different firms indicate that in some cases shopfloor members believe that management
can afford to give them a higher pay rise than the one that they are offering; in both
cases the stewards had fought bitterly with management to gain the workforce a deal
worth around £10 a week. At one firm the shopfloor had been told by "some
hotheads" that management had a lot more to give and after a ballot of members the
offer was rejected. That particular firm had not had a pay rise since then. At the other
workplace, the shopfloor rejected the proposed deal at the same time as one of the
firm's main orders collapsed. This collapse led to the original offer being withdrawn
and the shopfloor ended up with an extra £5 a week instead of the proposed £ IO. This
shows that in some instances the shopfloor can, by rejecting a deal worked out by their
representatives and management, actually do themselves more harm than good. In
both these cases the stewards had negotiated with management to get the best deal that
they could and this had been rejected by the shopfloor whose wishes they followed.
"We know that that is the best that we can get for them; they don't realise how much
we go through to achieve what we do," complained one of the convenors involved.
This indicates that in some cases the workplace representatives, or at least the senior
representatives, appreciate that management do have certain restraints that prevent them
from offering higher deals whereas the shopfloor do not always take into consideration
problems that management may have to face, whether financial or from competitors.
The economic environment may have altered the attitudes of trade unions within the
workplace so that those negotiating appreciate the problems that management may
face. However, the attitudes of some union members may not have changed; that is,
they presume that management can and should give them more than they are offering.
In this type of situation the personality of the lay representative is important so that
he/she can convince his/her members of the most advantageous thing that they should
do and of the likely consequences should they decide to reject a negotiated offer. Yet,
as past studies also concluded that stewards largely worked on management's terms
and that while trade unions did have a certain amount of bargaining power in the
workplace, decision making remained the prerogative of management (for example,
Beynon 1973, Boraston et a11975, Marchington 1980, Wilson et aI1982), it could be
argued that workplace relations have not changed a great deal. However, it may
sometimes appear that union representatives have "backed down to management"
when in reality they may have shaped and altered management's original offer in such
a way that it may not be fully what their members would have liked but it may be
substantially better than management's own proposal.
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In firms A and B the ABEU was the predominant union on site. In workplaces where
only a few employees are ABEU members their amount of "bargaining power" may be
slight, unless the workers are essential to the workforce or other unions on site are
prepared to back them on an issue. At firm F the workforce was represented by four
unions. In the summer of 1995 the new management decided without any consultation
with the workforce to make the company a "single status" one, with all workers,
whether blue or white collar, being treated the same. The AEEU representatives
demanded to be involved and had a meeting with management which was "not very
productive" but the company did admit that they should have consulted the workers'
representatives earlier; however, the representatives were told that the other unions on
site had accepted the proposals and signed the relevant document, which undermined
the stance of the ABEU representatives who reluctantly accepted the situation. A
senior steward from firm A was adamant that the problem at firm F would not have
happened at his firm: "we would not have let it happen". However, when it was
pointed out that firm F was a multi union firm which firm A was not, he agreed that it
can make a big difference. As previous studies have pointed out (for example,
Beynon 1973), in these situations a joint shop stewards' committee (JSSC) is a
valuable thing, where stewards from all the unions on site come together and form a
strategy covering everyone. It appears that in Xtown this did not always happen.
Nevertheless, at firm F, the problems encountered by the ABEU representatives had a
positive side; after a restructuring of management the firm decided to recognise only
one of the unions on site, which brought together (perhaps for the first time) all the
unions to talk. The GMB, which represented the majority of workers on site, became
the recognised union. However, even though the deal did not include the ABEU, the
AEEU convenor felt that the issue had brought the four unions together and that they
would start working together rather than as separate entities.
Firm C was another example of a multi-union firm. According to the AEEU convenor
the other five unions on site "delight in signing agreements" and very often the AEEU
was not consulted at all during negotiations, perhaps because the AEEU convenor felt
that the other unions allowed too many "silly changes" to go through (without
consulting their members first) that he would not have entertained.51 The AEEU was
the dominant union in one workshop at firm C and, according to the convenor,
members of other unions had asked about joining the ABEU because of the
representation that they saw its members getting. A member from firm K astounded
branch officials when he asked their advice on the legitimacy of a new clause that had
been added to his contract of employment stating that a personal search could be taken
of all employees. Apparently, there were only four AEEU members at firm K and the
GMB had negotiating rights for the factory. The latter had agreed with management
about the new clause without consulting even their own members. In these particular
51 For example. the convenor was asked by one of his members if he would go into a meeting "to
speak for him" even though he had no negotiating rights as such. (the worker was the only AEEU
member in this particular workshop). The convenor could not believe what the GMB was prepared to
agree to for its members and especially without consulting them first.
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examples it appears that the predominant union on site preferred not to consult with
their members before agreeing to deals with management. Where the AEEU was on
site, such as at firms F and C, it may have been the case that management realised that
the AEEU representatives took a harder stance than the other union representatives and
they therefore found it beneficial to approach the other unions first, knowing that they
would agree to their proposals, which would then leave the AEEU out in the cold.
In some respects it could be argued that to have a single union on site would benefit
the workers as well as management; that is, where all the workers are represented by
the same union, if they are not satisfied they can stick together as one force rather than
one set of workers being pitched against another because their different unions do not
agree to the same things. Nevertheless, at firm F, the problems encountered by the
AEEU representatives had a positive side, bringing all the unions together. But at firm
C where a single union deal had been implemented in one of the workshops, the
AEEU was finding that it was losing members to the recognised union. According to
the convenor they did not realise that they could remain ABEU members even though
they had no negotiating rights within that workshop.
Even with multi-union firms it can still be argued that the personalities
in the workplace are the driving force behind any kind of relationship
that each union may have with management and with each other. The
evidence does support Fosh and Cohen's (1990) and Fosh's (1993)
conclusions that it is the local leader's style which is essential in
determining membership participation and interest in workplace
unionism. They argued that local leaders who are committed to
collectivism and have a participatory style are more effective than other
local leaders. It was also found that a high level of participation was
effective in winning advances and concessions from management during
collective bargaining.
As we shall see, the union members at firm A did seem to be prepared
to act together to alleviate their grievances, which members at flrm B
were not prepared to do. Other factors may also have been at play, but
overall, it appears that the differences between and within flrms are
connected to the distinct personalities and styles of action of the lay
union representatives and in particular the main representative on site.
7:8 Union benefits
There was a difference in what might be called the main attractions of unionism as put
forward by the national union and the local unit. Whilst stressing the need for
solidarity on the part of members and the need to address inequalities etc. the most
striking thing that hits the reader of union journals is the fact that the national union is
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constantly providing incentives in the form of benefits. 52 The new benefits (extended
legal assistance to ABED members' relatives injured in a road traffic accident, initial
free legal advice to ABEU members and a free wills service) were probably introduced
in an attempt to attract more members as well as to encourage existing members to
continue re-signing their check-off forms.53 This coincides with the argument that the
role of the national union has diminished and become a source of expert advice and a
provider of services (Martin 1992). A few members at firm E had been reluctant to re-
sign the check -off forms arguing "well, what has the union done for me?". Their shop
steward was pleased with the new benefits and thought that they might persuade the
doubting members to re-sign. He was right; the wills service enticed his members to
re-sign. However, the steward was particularly annoyed at the following shop
stewards' meeting because he had sent in 6 wills forms but his members had heard
nothing about them since. His argument was that he was selling the service as a benefit
of union membership and his members were not receiving the service. He stated very
clearly that he was becoming "disillusioned" with head office and that he had "got
enough on at work without falling out with those outside work". The point is that
many representatives were going out of their way to sell these" extra" union benefits to
members (despite their already overburdened workload) and their members did not
appear to be getting the benefits on offer: rather than complaining to head office they
blamed their stewards, thereby adding to their problems.54
However, while benefits can playa large part in members' lives, especially where
accidents are concerned, the initial attraction of unionism as espoused by those who
represented the shopfloor was the satisfactory resolution of workplace problems with
the emphasis on protection and "strength" against employers. Indeed, previous
surveys of union membership found that protection from future problems was one of
the most common reasons for membership (for example, Stevens et a11989, Millward
1990). Keeping a check on the health and safety aspects of the workplace was also
considered a significant union activity.55 Job retention and protection may be
significant reasons for union membership. Certainly at firms A and C the union
representatives could recall situations where members' jobs had been saved and times
where management had withdrawn warnings given to members. At firm A when
52 A union lawyer actually described the provision of legal services as one of the main advantages of
unionism and argued that the AEEU probably operated the best legal advice and assistance scheme in
the union movement.
53 "We must make ourselves more attractive to potential members. The services we offer must meet
the needs of the people we seek to represent." (Divisional Organisers' Weekend School Pack 1995 -
"Future Structure of the New Amalgamated Union." p4.)
54 At the following shop stewards' meeting the district secretary's final word was that the wills
service had been extremely popular creating a backlog of people wanting to use the service. However,
a few of those present at the meeting expressed the view that he had only said that to placate those
stewards who had complained at the previous meeting.
55 A comment by the district secretary indicated that some employers may not be so hot when it
comes down to health and safety matters: "I wish companies would take health and safety matters
with as much zeal as they do 'no smoking' matters. There is plenty of interest in making premises
all no smoking areas but when it comes down to things like welding fumes there is no zeal on the
part of employers to provide extraction fans. "
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some members had been reallocated to different jobs, the union negotiated terms which
allowed those members to keep the various benefits that had been attached to their
original jobs but were not linked to their new job descriptions. The convenors from
firms Band C had both ensured that after working for longer than three months
"temporary" employees were given permanent status; "management just like paying
for temps if they can get away with it. "
Attitudes at the workplace may to a large extent depend upon the personalities there.
There was a vast difference in the ways that stewards conducted their business at work
and also in how they talked about their members and their attitudes towards the union.
The majority of the members who attended the branch (that is, those from small
workplaces where either only a minority of the workforce were AEEU members or
where the workforce was very small) tended to see the protection side of unionism as
the major benefit, especially in terms of representation and accident benefit. However,
at firm G, where only four workers were employed two of whom were AEEU
members, the union did negotiate their pay and conditions and the other two
employees also benefited from this, but as one of the members stressed "if they have
an accident at work they will be stuck". This was an attitude taken by most shopfloor
representatives; that non-union members did not realise what they might miss out on.
All the branch officials gave examples of workers who had dropped out of the union
and then had an accident. Each of these ex-members still tended to go to a steward for
advice, but, "it's too late then, the consultation fee with a solicitor alone could be about
£250". At a shop stewards' meeting it was claimed that an accident at work could cost
the individual at least £2,000 and "that's before any court costs!" In fact, union
officials claimed that "it is good economics to be in a union for the insurance policy
alone. Union subscriptions are a very cheap form of insurance", especially when legal
aid is looked upon as being more or less only for the unemployed. However, it
appears that members do not look at it like this, (see chapter 9); they may not even be
aware of the different benefits on offer as one of the union's solicitors claimed.56
The shop stewards argued that the major benefits of unionism were
first, protection, especially job protection, and second, legal aid. This
contention is perhaps significant due to the high level of
unemployment. By 1993 job security was regarded as a more important
goal for unions to work towards than improving pay (Hedges 1994).
Therefore, being a union member may increase a worker's sense of job
security. Indeed, at firm A, where union membership was constantly
upheld, new workers voluntarily joined the union. Even junior
members of management had begun to make enquiries about joining the
AEEU rather than the MSF. This may reflect the fact that those
workers saw the AEEU rather than the MSF as being effective at firm
56A point worth noting is that a substantial number of claims forms had been for industrial deafness.
This can be seen in both the above categories: it is a benefit that members are entitled to in terms of
legal aid and representation against the employer and it could also be termed protection against the
employer who should now provide adequate ear protection for all employees.
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A. According to the convenor, new workers were joining for
protection. Perhaps some members of management had begun to realise
that their jobs were not as safe as they had once thought. In today's
economic climate workers may have realised that job protection is a
necessity. If this is true it would affirm the argument put forward by
Blanchflower et al (1990) that if unions offer "insurance" against
victimisation and arbitrary dismissal, risk-averse workers would
willingly join a union even though there may be no wage gain from
doing SO.57
7:9 Perceptions of members
Perceptions of individual members by the local stewards can be described as mixed. It
was recognised "that people have it easier than they used to do. They've forgotten
what it used to be like - they've got houses, cars, children - they are more opulent".
Yet at the same time it was argued that the Conservatives had created an atmosphere
where people no longer felt secure in their jobs, homes or financially, "at one time you
felt relatively safe - but not now, you're on your own". And members have so many
different interests; the union is only one of them. The convenor from firm C was
convinced that the majority of his members were only in the union for "accident
security and pay rises" because "when the pay rounds come around everyone's
interested, but otherwise they're not". This may portray the self-interested nature of
members, also shown in the comment made by firm B's convenor that his members
would not stand up for themselves because they were scared of losing their pay.
However, as chapter 5 concluded, the majority of union members have always been
self interested (see pp135 - 141). In fact, self interest has always been a significant
reason for union membership, but some workers recognise that their self interests are
best achieved by collective means; individual self interests become collective interests
because each individual's interests tend to be the same, for example, higher pay.
The above quote from firm C portrays members as only being interested in monetary
gain. However, the main issues brought up at the district shop stewards' meetings
were redundancies, changes in contracts of employment and changes in working
practices, and it also emerged that many workers in the local area had not had a pay
rise for at least a year.58 Therefore, the issue of pay, while a significant concern for
members, cannot be the only reason that they join/remain with the union. Firms A and
C had had many new members in the period covered by the study and firm B had had
a few, which indicates that workers were still willing to join a union. However, their
reasons for doing so may vary according to the workplace organisation. Job retention
may be a significant reason for membership; at firms A and C members' jobs had
57 A point brought up at the first conference of the joint union was that some self employed workers.
especially electricians, were wanting to join the AEEU.
58 During 1994 the district secretary had made many visits to local firms regarding redundancies and
wages; "many companies are clamming up more than usual". though he did add that where workers
had had a pay increase they had been "reasonable ones".
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been saved. Even if workers do not receive a pay rise they have a self interest in
retaining their employment and all the benefits that go along with it. Some members
may be content to use their union as an individual problem solving agency, particularly
if they perceive the union at their workplace to be ineffective when bargaining with
management. Yet the evidence does suggest that in some workplaces members are
prepared to stick together to achieve their aims. The key to this appears to be the lay
representative's style of working and the amount of bargaining power that he/she is
perceived as possessing. Indeed, this could have repercussions far beyond achieving
collective goals, for some members will stick together over issues which may initially
only concern one individual. For example, members at firm A had stuck together over
issues which initially affected only one particular member (see following chapters).
This indicates that individualism has not yet taken over from collectivism. However, it
could still reflect the self-interested nature of individual members. Anything to do with
the protection of work related benefits, changing working practices and threatened
dismissal has implications for the whole workforce. So, sticking together over an
issue which may only initially affect one worker can be looked upon as the workers
acting in their own self-interests albeit "collective self interests". Therefore, the
Conservatives may have underestimated the self-interests of individuals in the
workplace, at least where a leader exists who can convince his/her members that it is in
their long term interests to work together.
Nevertheless, workers may join the union for job protection and at places such as firm
A and firm C they may be fully satisfied with the return that they get. Yet at
workplaces such as firm B, where the convenor had never known members so "fed up
with the union", members may feel that their expectations are not fulfilled. The
different styles of working and the different personalities of the convenors are the key
to understanding the differing attitudes of members towards their union. An example
relates to how the convenors dealt with their members' problems with head office; at
firm B the convenor was getting "fed up" because there was "a lot of disquiet on the
shopfloor about head office" over various expulsions and arrears when the members
were paying by check-off. The convenors from firms A and C reacted differently;
they did get problems on the shopfloor over correspondence from head office, but
because they and their stewards sorted these problems out their members tended to be
satisfied. One thing that all the convenors agreed about was that "you're running
around left, right and centre [for members], then you hear nothing. They've settled
their problem, but they never come back and tell you." There are a minority of
members who do thank their representatives for helping them and show their
appreciation and "this makes the job worthwhile in a sense."
One of the concerns of the senior shop stewards was that no one appeared prepared to
take over their role when they retired. Shop stewards did not want to "learn" how to
conduct negotiations with management by accompanying senior stewards into
meetings. The convenors recognised that shop stewards do "come in for the most
stick" from members and management alike; companies, it seems, are putting shop
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stewards under increasing pressure (or "they try"). It appears that not many young
people were interested in standing as a representative, despite the fact that there were
always a number of members who constantly "moaned" about the way that their
steward was doing his/her job, no one wanted to take it on.59 One "moaning" member
at firm A did become a steward and found that his opinions began to alter as a result.
This suggests that once members do become more involved in the decision making
process higher up the hierarchy, they do begin to appreciate that there are certain limits
when bargaining with management. (See also Fiorito et al 1988).
The reluctance to become a lay representative could be part of a general trend: the third
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS3) found that there had been a drop in
the number of workplaces which had lay union representatives (Millward et al 1992).
Union members it appears are more reluctant today to take on the role of "leader",
which might eventually reflect upon the perceived "power" of the workplace
organisation. WIRS3 also found that those workplaces without lay union
representatives were much more likely to be represented by paid union officials than in
the past. This could be another factor creating a difference in unionism between
different workplaces. Paid union officials will not be familiar with the particular
issues at a specific workplace and, at least locally, appear to be less "militant" than lay
representatives when negotiating with management. After all, they do not have to
work regularly in the workplace where they are bargaining. On the other hand, it
might be argued that having a paid union official to represent the shopfloor is better
than no representation at all. In some circumstances it may also be the case that the
FrO is seen by the shopfloor as doing a better job than their representative. Of
course, in this situation members may have no confidence in their lay representative,
but this could be the reason why Heery and Kelly (1990) reached the conclusions that
they did. If the shop steward is seen as ineffective it may make the FTO appear to be
more effective.ee
The fact that members were reluctant to become lay representatives may also indicate
the self interested nature of individual members. They are willing to join the union for
their own protection and benefits, even, in some cases, to act in solidarity to rectify a
grievance, but they are not prepared to take on the job of representing the whole
collective. Arguably, there is a lot more to it than that, especially the extra
responsibilities which can be time consuming as well as mentally tiring. The
dedication that is needed to fulfil the role of representative must contribute to the
effectiveness of unionism in the workplace and if no one is prepared to take on that
role and show that dedication, then, that effectiveness could be diminished. The
foundry at firm A was a good example of this (see following chapters). Many of the
59 "When the pay negotiations come around and you are stood on the rostrum, there are 350 shop
stewards. But when the notice goes up asking for shop steward nominations. there are none"
commented one of the convenors.
60 The district secretary had represented many members at industrial tribunals. As a rule he was
always happy with the settlements made; however, it appears that sometimes the member was not
satisfied, "because they have preconceived ideas about how their settlement should turn out",
commented the district secretary.
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local stewards who regularly attended the shop stewards' meetings had thought about
giving up the role of steward but they had not done so because they "had the union to
think about". By this they were referring to their own members on the shopfloor.
This indicates the dedication and responsibility that some representatives do feel
towards their members.
Members are viewed by their representatives as largely self-interested.
However, some members are prepared to work collectively to achieve
those interests and this appears to relate to how well their lay
representative performs in the workplace. Reasons for membership
may vary according to the perceived power of the workplace union.
7: 10 DISCUSSION - The AEEU in Xtown
The evidence confirms that there are two different strands to unionism, the shopfloor
unit and the national organisation.s! The fact that different shopfloor units experienced
similar situations at different times with varying outcomes is an indication that separate
union organisations with different ways of working did exist at each workplace. The
local unit, which was made up of the shopfloor units brought together at branches,
shop stewards' meetings and district committee meetings, it seems, was nothing more
than a go-between for the national and shopfloor organisations. However, the local
unit in Xtown was often opposed to proposals from the Executive Committee and local
activists were able to express their feelings and impart information to workplace
representatives about the national union that may not have been communicated to them
otherwise. Therefore, the local unit was a valuable route of communication between
the national and shopfloor organisations, though the information conveyed may not
always have been in the direction that the national organisation would have liked. It
could be argued that by dismantling the shop stewards' meetings and district
committee meetings the national organisation of the ABEU may be trying to curb the
influence that the local unit could exert over workplace representatives in Xtown.
The two components of unionism reveal the different dimensions of trade union
"power"; that is, the ability of the union to achieve a desired goal and produce effects.
The national union provides services and benefits to members, which can be seen as
an exercise of power, especially when members are contesting a decision made by an
employer such as an unfair dismissal case. The shopfloor unit displays the bargaining
power that it may possess. It is clear that different ways of bargaining existed within
the shopfloor units, and each may have had varying success rates. This variation
could to a large extent reflect the different personalities at the workplace and in
61 The national organisation is taken here to include all officials who are paid solely by the union,
even though the divisional and regional organisers and district secretaries may sometimes represent a
different outlook to the Executive Council.
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particular that of the main union lay representative.62 The fact that two shopfloor
units within the same workplace have totally different relationships with the same
management appears to confirm this assumption. (See following chapters).
The two different strands of unionism can also be distinguished by the effects of the
legislation upon them. One is restrained by the various legal restrictions and the other
may be prepared to act on impulse without any regard for "the law". On the whole it
can be argued that the shopfloor unit is more concerned with the pressing, and often
immediate, realities of the workplace than the legal boundaries within which they
should work. This is also suggested by the lack of interest in attending TUC courses
designed to inform workplace representatives of the legislation. Nevertheless, there
are differences between shopfloor units. The legislation may have an inhibiting effect
upon some workforces, or at least at first sight this may seem to be the ease. Firm B
was an example here; however, factors other than the legislation, in particular the style
of "leadership", may have had something to do with the attitudes of the membership.
It could be argued that the national union is being saved a lot of money by those union
organisations which generally solve their problems themselves without recourse to the
"external" union or the law. Where the full balloting procedure is followed and
nothing comes from it, the national organisation has spent a lot of unnecessary
money.63 Therefore, in many respects a workplace union organisation which can and
does work largely independently of its FfOs is beneficial to its national body. In tum
the independence of the shopfloor organisation may largely depend upon the
personalities involved.
The general feeling was that the shopfloor is the "backbone" of the union. It could be
argued that the "power" of a trade union does lie at the bottom of the union hierarchy,
with the members. The members are the essential components making up the
shopfloor units. Despite the differences between shopfloor units, it appears that it is
here that any "bargaining power", especially in terms of job protection or perhaps
more appropriately "employee protection", is exercised. When required the "external"
union might be ealled in; however, where the shop stewards of a shopfloor unit are
well organised and more importantly are seen to be effective by their members, this is
62 This argument is largely confirmed by the fact that after the initial observations had taken place,
the convenor of firm B referred to in the report gave up his position. The new convenor had begun
new pay negotiations with management and was quite happy with how things appeared to be
progressing. This contrasts sharply with the opinions and actions of the previous convenor. Perhaps
the change in leadership at this firm might also change the fortunes of the union and indeed the
opinions of the members there too.
63 It could be argued that at firm B the management actually counteracted the members' intentions by
undermining the overtime ban by announcing that there would be no overtime anyway. Yet at the
same time it all revolves around the personalities of those involved and in particular the leadership of
the members. If the members had been assured that the ban was having an effect they may have
continued the action and eventually gained a wage rise. As it was there was little or no contact
between the members and their convenor at the time, let alone with the outside union.
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rarely necessary .64 In addition, the FrO may not be seen as efficient or as effective
as the lay representatives. The fact that the district secretary stressed that when a
grievance is taken outside the workplace there is always the backing of the union "on
issues that can be pursued" suggests that in some cases members' grievances might be
left unresolved if referred to the Fl'O, Therefore, members may get a better deal when
a problem is solved within the workplace. A similar argument could be put forward
regarding members attending tribunals for unfair dismissal, for example. Dismissed
employees who belong to a workplace union with dedicated leaders may find that they
are reinstated rather than having to attend a tribunal. Examples of this can be cited
from firms A and C, but a dismissed worker from another workplace may find that
he/she has to enlist the help of the national union at a tribunal, which very often does
not lead to reinstatement even if the dismissal was classed as unfair; while figures
vary each year, under 3% of successful applicants are reinstated It can be argued that
independent workplace organisations do not always use the resources available to
them, saving the national union time and money, and yet at the same time their
members may receive a better service than when the outside union becomes involved.
This is recognised by the national organisation; the district secretary did urge stewards
to try and solve problems themselves, because the further into the procedure they get
the harder they become to settle.
Head office was considered to be out of touch with the realities of the workplace and if
that is where members' first priorities lie it could be argued that while the national
union does try to do what it thinks is best for its members, as indicated in all its
leaflets, magazines and correspondence, it is perhaps too remote from the roots of the
union. This can be illustrated in many ways: the national union described the branch
as the basic unit of the union where any member can raise for discussion any matter
affecting the union. Judging by branch attendance this was no longer the case; the
basic unit of the union must be the shopfloor, with the possible exception of those
workplaces where only a few employees are members. Members, at least in Xtown,
appeared uninterested in the national union's business unless it affected them
personally; that is when claiming some sort of benefit. Evidence from the shop
stewards' meetings also suggests that lay representatives had little interest in the
national body. During the chairman's talk on the five day conference concerning the
future of the union, many of those present showed no interest in what was being said.
"This is boring. I wish he'd hurry up and finish" was whispered by a couple of those
present.
The national organisation needs the local units, made up of the separate shopfloor
units, to be able to operate; through the branch and the district secretary it supposedly
keeps informed of the membership and any problems encountered It was argued by a
district committee official that "the commitment is there at head office, but they are just
64 It appears that the well organised shopfloor units tend to have a small hierarchy within their
steward structure. Where this exists problems are passed up the hierarchy until they are solved. A
dedicated senior steward or convenor also tends to take a lot of the burden of work from the stewards,
such as taking claim forms to the appropriate branch meeting.
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not getting the right information and when they do they can't always act immediately
on it." However, evidence tends to point to the fact that this is not always the case;
lost claims forms and missing details from the union register suggest the system at
head office was not as efficient as it should have been.
Benefits offered by the union, especially those which are unconnected to the
workplace, tend to be directed at members as individuals and yet it appears that not all
members are aware of their existence.65 Legal representation and benefits are provided
solely by the national union but these are seen by the union lay representatives as
secondary to job protection and protection from the arbitrary practices of employers
when considering the prime benefits of unionism. The fact that lay representatives
referred to the national union as "head office" gave it a remote feel and the impression
of administration and paper work rather than as a "powerful organisation". Even in
terms of providing legal aid in pursuit of damages, it might be argued that the national
union exerts no power at all. During a talk by one of the union's local solicitors at a
shop stewards' meeting it became apparent that perhaps rather than "union power" it is
the solicitor's expertise that gains union members their awards against employers; the
object was to try and obtain maximum compensation in the least time possible. The
union may pay the legal costs but it also receives 5% of any compensation that a
member gains. It is possible, then, that benefits in the form of legal aid should not be
classed as union power as such. However, without the union initiating the
proceedings, there would be no outcome at all and no exercise of power, whether by
the union or their solicitors, so perhaps this issue is best left to each individual's
interpretation.
The evidence so far indicates that shop stewards and their members consider "the
union" to be their shopfloor/workplace unit and the main lay representative as the most
important person in "the union". It may even be the case, as other researchers have
suggested, that for most members the shop steward is "the union". To a certain
extent, this may depend upon the representatives, but even if they are considered to be
ineffective members may still consider them as "the union". This would then be
reflected in those members' perceptions of their union and could also make a
difference to their reasons for continued membership. Workplace problems and
getting the best they can out of their employers are the primary concerns of members,
or at least their representatives, when at work; outside the workplace most members
have other interests. The benefit side of unionism is important to members, but
benefits can be largely connected to the workplace and the problems encountered there,
workplace accidents and industrial disease for example.66 However, the forms of
legal assistance have been extended to activities outside of the workplace. This may be
an attempt by the national union, not only to attract new members, but also to
encourage existing members to think of "the union" in terms other than the workplace.
The national union argued that it is "good economics" to be in the union for the
65 Union Review no.3 May 1994, pll and no.5 July 1994, pS.
66 It is a priority of the union to prevent accidents occurring in the first place by ensuring efficient
health and safety rather than relying solely on accident benefits.
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insurance alone; subscriptions are a cheap form of insurance. It could be argued that
the national union is now little more than an insurance agency (see also Martin 1992)
and that the original objectives of trade unionism remain in the workplace where they
originated. A comment by the chairman of the shop stewards' committee that
"somewhere in the midst of all this we are losing where we came from", appears to
apply to the national organisation rather than the majority of shopfloor units.
How the union operates in a workplace may have an effect upon members' reasons for
remaining in the union. Members in workplaces where the union is seen to be
effective may give different reasons for membership than those who feel their union is
doing nothing for them. The convenor at firm B felt that since the 1984/5 miners'
strike, unions were not as strong as they used to be. If this attitude was passed to his
members, then, they may have seen benefits as the only reason for their continued
membership. If members at firm B had been employed at firm A, for example, their
perceptions of unionism may have been different. Indeed, they may alter now that
they have a different leader, who appears to have a different style of working to his
predecessor. Particularly relevant at this point is the conclusion reached by Fosh
(1993) after her research in five workplaces. Her argument is so apt it is worth
repeating in full:
"The participation surges observed in the workplace centred on issues that brought to the
surface the members' underlying beliefs in the unity of members as a countervailing
power against that of management. The study suggests that local leaders, by their
ability to lead in a way that encourages members to become involved and to see the
collective implications of the issues that arise, can build upon surges of participation
and interest, thus increasing the strength of workplace unionism. Of course, different
local leaders have dissimilar material with which to work: members have different
initial commitments to unionism, experiences of union membership and work and
community backgrounds; further, relations between management and unions in a
workplace can differ sharply. Some local leaders will have an easier job encouraging
members to take part in workplace activities and to become more solidaristic in their
approach to the union. However, the study suggests that a careful choice of local
leadership style can yield results even when members' experiences and situations are not
the most favourable for the development of unionism." (p589).
Therefore, if Fosh's argument is correct, a new style of leadership at firm B might
encourage members to act collectively, in a way that achieves them their goals.
What about trade union "power"? The Conservative government wanted to reduce
trade union "power" and introduced legislation designed to do just that. The main
aims of the legislation were to empower employers to resist trade union demands and
the promotion of individualism; that is, the idea that each individual would pursue
hislher own self interests in such a way that they would in effect be in competition
with each other, rather than working collectively to pursue their goals. Or, as it was
described at a shop stewards' meeting, "the Tories are trying to demoralise union
members and make them think 'well, what's the point of being in a union?"
Employers are aware of the legislation but the majority, where possible, prefer to settle
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any disagreement with the union representatives (see for example, Elgar and Simpson
1993b) and with the exception of possibly firm B, although the change of union
leadership there may alter that situation, and firm M, this appeared to be the case
locally. As far as the district secretary was concerned there were positive aspects to
the trade union legislation, in particular the balloting arrangements, (which Elgar and
Simpson 1993a found union officials had taken on board as part of their negotiating
tools), and the cheek-off arrangements, which in some instances had actually gained
the union members. As far as the legislation on members' rights vis a vis their union
goes, it is possible that many members do not know of them, let alone care. The fact
that many subscription paying members tend to be non-existent as far as the union
register was concerned is an indication that no one cheeks the register until a claim
form is submitted; even then it was the branch officials who sorted out any
discrepancies rather than the member exercising hislher right to cheek his/her register
details.
The promotion of individualism may have failed, at least among union members. The
pursuance of self interests, at least in relation to work matters, appears to be done
more effectively collectively rather than alone. The example of the non union members
at firm C indicates this; worker becomes pitched against worker. Conservative claims
that they had created an "enterprise culture" out of a collectivist one may be true where
trade unions do not operate in a workshop, but where they do, it appears that this
claim could be refuted. If suggestions that a union presence seeures increased
productivity (Metcalf 1993a, Brown 1994) are true, then, workplaces that actively
encourage competitiveness among their employees could lose out. As Burkitt (1981)
said, employers rely not upon the employment of an individual to keep up production,
but on the work force as a whole working in harmony. Individualism seems to be a
predominant disposition amongst trade union members. However, it seems that many
members realise that the most effective way of realising their goals and self interests is
by acting collectively, at least in cases of everyday workplace grievances. It can be
concluded that individualism and collectivism work together to achieve the same goals,
rather than being two separate entities as envisaged by the previous Conservative
government. "Instrumental collectivism" (Goldthorpe et al 1968) ideally describes the
situation. Therefore, conclusions, such as Metcalf's (1993a), that legislative changes
had undermined collectivism do not appear to be convincing, at least in the area
studied. Nevertheless, this may depend upon one crucial factor - the lay
representative. The differences between workplaces (and within them) may be due to
his/her style of working and personality and in particular on how much bargaining
power the membership perceive himlher as having. The important thing, at least
where a tight union organisation exists, must be that members are together in the
workplace and at workplaces where members work in teams the benefits of acting
collectively rather than alone probably become more apparent to employees.
The employment climate appeared to be in the minds of most members, with job
protection being an essential component of unionism. Even in those firms with a
strong union organisation job protection was still a major concern for employees. As
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the convenor from firm C commented "many members are running rather scared.
Most people seem to want to look after their jobs and are very complacent." Wage
increases may be important to members and at those firms with an independent union
organisation they usually got a satisfactory one, albeit the fortunes of those firms were
usually promising; at firms which were struggling to keep afloat, members appeared
to accept what they could so as to keep their jobs. About job retention the district
secretary insisted that "we must see that the members are well represented ... but it is
difficult operating under market conditions such as where European competition enters
into it." It appeared that competition was a particular concern of local employers who
had to keep updating their machinery and managing their costs to ensure that they
remained within the market. It seems that this applies in most places today; however,
a few local firms had begun to beat the recession and had expanded their operations.
The union organisations within these firms seem to have ridden out the storm and
appeared unscathed, determined to fight for their members' rights.
However, past experiences do tend to shape the way that representatives negotiate with
management, perhaps bringing the union and management closer together. Working
to ensure the survival of the firm (see also Brown 1986, Terry 1986) does not
necessarily mean a change in the structure or role of unionism as Brown (1986)
suggested. The union's role appears to remain the same - the protection of its
members' interests, which in many local firms the AEEU appeared to be doing quite
adequately. Management concerns about the future of their companies are taken on
board; however, rather than seeing this as a reshaping of the structure of unionism
towards the needs of management (Brown 1986) it could be argued that it is actually
protecting members' interests - their employment.
The essential thing when talking about "power" is how each individual interprets the
concept. Union power, the ability or capacity to achieve effects, can be looked on in
more than one sense. The type of union power most commonly thought about is the
union's bargaining power with the employer, carried out at shopfloor level, with
varying degrees of success between workplaces. But the benefit and legal services
side might also be considered to be an exercise of power, particularly against the
employer (whether it is an exercise of power by the union or the legal expert). An
individual alone would find it a costly exercise to take on an employer, though it
appears that some union members do do this (perhaps they are not informed of their
entitlements). However, the thought of power may not even be considered. As a
former district secretary stated rather clearly: "The legislation is not new. It was
thought necessary because we were strong. But we were not powerful. If we were
powerful we could get what we wanted and wouldn't have had to strike. We've never
had power." However, members may perceive their representatives as having power
and it could be argued that because workers at some workplaces do not have to strike
to get what they want they could be seen as being powerful.
Whether they see their union as powerful or not, workers are remaining members and
new members are not a thing of the past. It could even be argued that at firms such as
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firm A, the vast influx of new members indicates an upturn in the fortune of the firms
and, therefore, the union organisations within them; that is, the company is doing so
well that it has to set:on new employees to cope with extra production and in turn these
workers become union members which adds to the strength of the shopfloor union
organisation. Trade unions still operate in every plant in the local area where they did
before 1979, and as it is the members who make that existence possible, workers must
see some advantage in joining/remaining with the union. Self interest may prevail but
that self interest leads workers to see that it is best served by being in a union, even if
for the benefit side alone. Where the union does display a vast amount of bargaining
power, that "power" is on the shopfloor rather than with the national organisation.
Nevertheless, whet:her the hub of trade union activity and therefore its power is on the
shopfloor is dependent on the place of work and the personalities there. Studies which
base union power on the national organisation alone are therefore misplaced. The
shopfloor is "the union" and how well the lay representative performs will influence
hislher members opinions as to the "power" of "their union". Whether members
perceive the provision of benefits as a "power" is another matter. It is highly likely
that while seeing them as an advantage of unionism, they will not count this as an
exercise of power.
7:11 Conclusions
It can be concluded that there are two different strands to unionism and that
the shopfloor unit is the most important one at least as far as members
are concerned. Each shopfloor organisation may have their own ways
of working which to a large extent may reflect the personalities of those
involved, in particular that of the main lay representative. This is of
the utmost importance when considering the power of each union
organisation. For example, the comment "it used to be a good union at firm X, but
it's all changed now", can be applied to at least two local firms and when analysed
further it appears that the change of fortune of the union began with a new convenor.
Statements by lay representatives such as "I've got enough on at work, without all the
problems created by head office", implies that "union work" is in the workplace. The
fact that the AEEU is now the fourth largest union probably has no interest for them or
their members. Their immediate concerns lie in the workplace with the everyday
realities that they encounter. At least locally, it can be accepted that the
shopfloor is considered to be the union by the lay representatives
observed, and the evidence does indicate that it is the shopfloor
leader's style which is essential in detennining membership
participation and interest in workplace unionism and, therefore, the
level of success that the shopfloor unit has when dealing with
management. It follows that the personality and style of working of the
lay representative are essential ingredients for successful unionism in
the workplace.
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It is hard to say at this point whether changes in the economic climate have changed the
role of the union organisation within workplaces; unions may be more willing
to accept change than previously, yet the role of the union appears to
remain the same, negotiating for the best deal it can for its members
even though it may be working within a limited bargaining arena.
However, this may depend upon the personality and style of working of the lay
representative bargaining within each firm. It certainly appears to be the case that
managements are introducing new working practices and contracts for their
employees, but where the union is perceived as effective the workforce do not seem to
be adversely affected by any changes. One of the major changes appears to be the
introduction of PRP, which, it was argued by officials of the shop stewards'
committee, had been encouraged by the Conservatives because they were hoping that it
would eventually take away the union's negotiating rights. However, it is recognised
locally that the scheme can be profitable to employees if it is worked out and
implemented correctly. In those firms where it has been implemented the union tends
to have negotiated a good deal for its members, on top of their basic wage, and
everyone appears to be happy with the results. In addition the union's involved had
retained their negotiating rights.
Workplace union organisations may be working with employers so as to ensure the
survival of their companies and, therefore, the jobs of their members; however, where
the union appears to be effective members' attitudes do not seem to have altered much;
they still appear to presume that their employers can give them more than they are
offering. The employment environment during the 1990s may have given workers a
feeling of job insecurity (Hedges 1994), but becoming a union member may
give employees an increased sense of job security. This may again depend
upon the perceived "power" of the union organisation within the workplace; where
employees' jobs have been saved, such as at firms A and C, workers appear to
voluntarily join the union. Job protection appears to be one of the major
benefits of unionism in today's economic climate. Therefore, if unions
offer "insurance" against dismissal, especially in areas of high
unemployment, it appears that workers will willingly join a union (see
also Blanchflower et alI99O).
It also seems that, at least locally, the legislation has had little influence on
the lay representatives' opinions and ways of bargaining within their
workplaces; however, in those workplaces where the representative is
not seen to have much, if any, bargaining power with management the
legislation tends to play a larger part because the outside union is called
in.
The following two chapters outline a case study of the union organisation within a
particular local firm. The bulk of the study is made up from observations of the firm's
shop stewards' committee meetings, interviews with some of the stewards, analysis of
a number of the convenor's notebooks and questionnaires which were completed by
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shop stewards and members. The study is particularly concerned with the members'
attitudes towards their union and compares them with the opinions of their shop
stewards. The next chapter concentrates on the views of the shop stewards and
chapter 9 analyses members' opinions about the union organisation within their
workplace.
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Chapter8 A CASE STUDY: UNION ORGANISATION -
THE SHOP STEWARDS' PERCEPTIONS
8: 1 Introduction
The information presented in this chapter was gained by extensive formal and informal
interviews with the convenor of the machine shop union organisation at firm A,
informal conversations with some of the stewards, questionnaires that were completed
by some of the machine shop stewards,' observations from two of the annual shop
stewards' committee meetings and from the analysis of three of the convenor's original
notebooks.2 Various works documents such as the "Industrial Relations - General
Agreement Within The [Areas'] Works" and the "Health and Safety Policy statement"
were also looked at.
8:2 Firm A - a brief history
Firm A was established in the nineteenth century and was predominantly a coal
industry. An iron works was built as a major part of the company's business
producing high quality iron used, amongst other things, for naval vessels.
Throughout the nineteenth century iron production was subsidiary to the coal industry
and the engineering capacity of the firm tended to be used to maintain the colliery
machinery. Around 1900 the iron section of the plant was modernised leading to the
production of exceptional quality pig iron ensuring the company a large share of the
railway wheel and castings market. The company had built up a reputation for the
reliability of its products from its engineering shops, for example pipes for the
municipalities, and around 1920 a new company was formed in joint ownership with a
firm which had developed castings of cylinders for the rapidly expanding car and
aircraft industries. The reputation of the firm became recognised worldwide and it
became the principal supplier to British aero-engine manufacturers.
With the prospect of nationalisation looming the iron and steel elements were separated
and a retainable engineering business was built up and in 1948 a parent company was
formed which acquired the three engineering companies in the group. In 1979 the
company changed ownership and by the late 1980s major changes to working
I The twelve stewards from the machine shops were asked to fill in a questionnaire and ten were
returned; an 83% return rate. Out of those returned the three senior stewards had answered the
questionnaire.
2 The convenor of the machine shops took up the position in 1987 after being a steward since 1979.
He took his "job" very seriously, and for the first four years he carried with him a notebook jotting
down any queries from members, problems occurring and generally everything that happened on a day
to day basis. These were not diaries as such but notes to remind himself of things that must be done.
Entries in the books included members' individual problems, accidents, who was off sick, retired or
died, who had been moved to another workshop, changes to working practices, breakdown of
machines, shopfloor meetings and stewards' meetings, overtime, issues involving payments,
management changes and general information on the firm itself.
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practices began to take place; for example, the workshops were reorganised into
manufacturing cells, each serving different customers.
Anti-unionism was never a feature of the company's policy, though until the late
1880s neither side of the industry was formally organised. In 1873 the miners' unions
and their representatives were accepted and it was during World War two that the trade
union movement strengthened within the industry.
8:3 Firm A in the 1990s
Firm A was part of a multi national engineering company, consisting of a foundry
(casting shop) and machine shops, with about 750 employees (including managerial
staft). One of the firm's major products was liners for the automobile and ship
building industries. The firm had been struggling since about 1980 and around 1993
ran into major difficulties and encountered a short period of problems with their order
books which resulted in short time working; however, the majority of the workforce
was kept on with only those employees who volunteered for redundancy being let go.
The order books picked up substantially and in 1995 around 150 new employees were
set on. In fact a new factory was built to accommodate a new product for the
automobile industry and management were constantly looking at new technology,
particularly abroad, to update their production and keep ahead of any competition.
The firm was more or less 100% unionised, at least on the shopfloor side, with all
union members belonging to the AEEU. On the staff side some were members of the
MSF and others had joined or were considering joining the ABEU. However, not all
the staff were unionised as management tended to discourage them from doing so,
whereas new employees on the shopfloor were advised by management that there was
a union on site. There were two workplace organisations of the AEEU, one in the
casting shop (foundry) and the other covering the eight machine shopss: each
negotiated separately with management.
The machine shop organisation consisted of a convenor and twelve stewards, three
who were senior stewards and the foundry had three stewards and a convenors none
worked as full time union representatives. Management provided them with a room,
aptly called "the union room", notice boards and secretarial help if it was required.
The shop stewards (from the foundry and the machine shops) had their own shop
stewards' committee with their own funds raised by fund raising activities.
"Organisation for Improvement Meetings" took place at different workshops and staff
working places on the site and monthly information meetings were attended by the
convenors and sometimes the senior stewards. At these meetings general information
about the firm was discussed, such as how well they were doing, how the order books
3 This was the organisation that the study largely concentrated upon.
4 So as to avoid confusion. when necessary the machine shop convenor will be referred to as the MS
convenor and the foundry convenor as the CS convenor.
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were shaping up and how each workshop on site was performing, as well as any
proposed changes. The union did see company information and management
generally provided all the information that was asked for. The firm was governed by
the national agreement between the EEF and the CSED, but they did have their own
written domestic procedure agreed between management and the shop stewards. The
national agreement was only relied upon when no internal agreement could be reached.
Employees' pay was determined locally between the stewards and management (the
"external" union was only brought in if "a failure to agree" was registered).5
8:4 The shopfloor organisation
The union organisation at firm A was a fairly tight-knit organisation with its own joint
shop stewards' committee, which raised its own funds through various means
including a weekly numbers draw. In 1993 they sold their shares in firm A,
originally bought to ensure access to company information, and were considering
investing the money elsewhere. The committee used its funds to help members; for
example, they paid the back subscriptions of a member who had left the firm but
whose accident claim form had gone missing at head office. The member had been
excused contributions but because he had not been signing on as unemployed there
had been a problem as to whether head office would pursue the claim unless his
subscriptions were up to date. The shop stewards' committee paid these on the
understanding that if his claim was successful he would reimburse them. They also
distributed sick, retirement and Christmas grants and every year a number of retired
firm A members were taken on holiday at a substantially reduced rate. The stewards'
committee also paid for things such as the development of photographs after a member
had an accident so that the photographic evidence could be used in any future claim.
They also donated money to other workers' causes or to local organisations.
Management did support the shop stewards' committee, donating a sum of money
each year and they also participated by deducting money from those members' wages
who wished to participate in the numbers draw.
However, support from shop stewards was not always forthcoming; the committee
only held a meeting once a year because attendance at their quarterly meetings had
become almost non-existent. These meetings were held at the local Labour club on
Saturday afternoons. A point brought up at one of the shop stewards' committee
meetings was that the majority of union work was done in the workplace where all the
stewards and members were together. The secretary of the committee, a senior
steward, and the chairman, the MS convenor, admitted that if meetings were held at
work and in work time attendance would probably be 100% every time; many
stewards had complained that they never had meetings any more but when they were
arranged outside the workplace some did not attend. "Most stewards are good at work
but they forget about the job when they leave the work gates", commented one senior
5 This had only happened once during the nine years that the MS convenor had held his position.
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steward. The stewards only met at work "whenever anything serious" took pJace6, for
the wage negotiations and at their yearly AGM outside the workplace.
Union membership among the shopfloor workers was virtually 100%. During 1995
approximately 150 new workers were set on and all of them joined the AEEU; "they
know that they get protection" commented one of the senior stewards. Management
did advise new employees that there was a union on site but it was up to the worker to
seek out the union representative or vice versa. At a shop stewards' meeting the
auditor asked if new workers joined the union; a steward replied "we coerce them into
it". While this comment was said in jest and workers were not forced physically to
join the union, (in fact many approached the stewards themselves), it could well be the
case that non-union members were sometimes cajoled mentally to become members
because of peer pressure. For example, a non-union worker was moved from one
workshop to another; when members in the new workshop discovered that he was not
a union member they refused to work with him, resulting in him being swiftly moved
back to his original workshop? . According to the convenor the man eventually joined
the union "because of the pressures put on him" when working with union members,
and he remained a member. This also portrays the solidarity of the union members
within firm A, and according to a steward "the lads always know if someone's
dropped out of the union" and the comments that they made about these workers are
not worth repeating.
Even junior members of management had enquired about joining the AEEU rather than
the MSF. This may reflect the fact that these workers perceived the AEEU rather than
the MSF as effective at fum A; members of management were beginning to realise that
their jobs were not as safe as they once thought. The AEEU had helped a young
female member to retain her job on the management side and some of the newer
management recruits had joined because "they know that their boss is on their backs"
and they wanted "protection". In today's economic climate workers appear to realise
that job protection is a necessity and becoming a AEEU member at firm A gave these
workers a sense of job security.
The union itself could be described as an independent workplace organisation.
Stewards were elected every two years and it was rare that a steward was opposed by
another member. The convenors had access to all three levels of managements: the
shop stewards were only allowed access to their own shop managers, except the
senior stewards who sometimes accompanied the convenor, or if he was away stood
in for him. According to procedure the convenor should have begun with the lower
managers and worked his way up the hierarchy until he reached a settlement. He
6 "Serious" issues were those that the convenor felt needed the opinions of all the stewards and maybe
even those of the members involved. As the convenor put it, "we", (meaning the senior stewards),
"only have [the stewards] together if we want their backing, which usually involves a big problem."
7 Convenor's notebook, 1988.
S Lower management - shop managers and personnel, middle and higher management- managing
directors.
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tended to approach the member of management that he felt was best suited to the
problem, regardless of which level of management that person was. Over the years he
had found that instead of wasting his time "going up the line" certain people provided
answers to different problems. He had never encountered any difficulties approaching
the level of management that he felt he should be talking to, though sometimes this
caused a little animosity on the part of those lower levels who had been excluded from
the procedure. An example involved an agreement made between the union and a
managing director, who then told the convenor to inform a particular lower manager
about it. According to the convenor this person would not accept the decision until he
received confirmation from his superiors; he, perhaps understandably, did not like his
authority being overridden. Very often the foreman was ignored as well as the
relevant shop manager if they were considered to be wrong.
It appears that management did not place any restrictions upon their stewards. Only
one of the stewards who answered the questionnaire said that management placed
restrictions in his way which hampered him in carrying out his duties as a steward but
he did not stipulate what they were. This steward also stated that management/union
relations were not very good. It might have been the case that this particular steward
did not get along with management and that they did place restrictions in his way;
indeed, it might possibly have been his particular shop manager (whom he would have
had to deal with) that hindered his work as a steward, the other stewards dealing with
different shop managers. However, when asked "are you satisfied with the
opportunities to contact members at your workplace?", all the stewards replied that
they were; four were very satisfied and six fairly satisfied. Therefore, the restrictions
placed in the way of the one steward did not prevent him contacting his members.
Stewards were allowed to leave their job to contact their members or other stewards
with permission from their shop manager, which was never withheld.? The
convenors were allowed to leave their jobs and contact any members or stewards
whenever they needed to. They effectively had the freedom of the factory: an
argument between the MS convenor and a shop manager in the foundry illustrates this;
the manager was of the opinion that the MS convenor had no right to be in the
foundry, the MS convenor refused to leave until he had finished what he had gone
there for. When this dispute was brought to the attention of higher management, they
backed the MS convenor, agreeing that he had the right to walk in any workshop
whenever he wished, much to the annoyance of the shop manager.
The shopfloor organisation at firm A was an independent, tight knit
organisation which was largely supported by management as well as the
majority of employees. The change in the economic and employment
climate may have altered the attitudes of some members of lower
management, wherefore they become union members in the interests of
protecting their own jobs. As Hedges (1994) found, members'
9 After listening to the stewards I believe it is highly likely that they probably did not even ask
permission before they moved from their job to see a member or each other.
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attitudes may be changing so that job security has become a more
important goal for unions to work towards.
8:5 The machine shop stewards 10
All the stewards were male, worked over 30 hours a week and paid their union
subscriptions by check-off. Of those who returned the questionnaire six were aged
between 31-40, three were aged between 41-50 and one was over 50, with a senior
steward belonging to each age group. All the stewards had been union members for
over ten years with five of them having been a member for over twenty years; two of
those for over thirty years. The senior stewards had been union members for
eighteen, twenty five and thirty years. The length of tenure of their stewardship
ranged from under a year to twenty years.
Table 1. Table showint: how lont: each respondent had been a steward
Re§l!Qndem Number Qf ):e8.fS
MD§l~war~
1 *15
2 9
3 3
4 "'10
5 5
6 0
7 9
8 * 20
9 3
10 3
11 **16
'" denotes a senior
steward
** denotes the
convenor
As can be seen from table 1 the senior stewards had been in their position considerably
longer than the majority of the other stewards; this perhaps reflects their experience
within the firm, especially when dealing with management. With the exception of the
newest steward the length of time that the respondents had been representatives
indicates that if they were elected every two years they were either unopposed or beat
any opponent; it is highly likely that they were unopposed. When asked "are
stewards opposed very often?" the convenor replied "not often". This may indicate
that members were satisfied with their representation and that stewards were only
opposed at election time if they were considered to be ineffective (depending on
whether another person was willing to stand for the post); two of the answers to the
question, "why did you decide to stand as a shop steward?" suggest that this may be
the case:
10 The information, unless otherwise stated, refers to the machine shop union organisation.
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"Because people were unhappy about the previous shop steward, so 1 was asked to put
my name forward. I did and was elected."
"I didn't think I was being represented properly."
Another of the answers to the same question suggests that not many members were
interested in becoming a steward themselves:
"One of our stewards was retiring, nobody else was interested so I decided to give it ago."
Five of the other reasons given for becoming a steward related to helping the
respondent's fellow workmates, such as:
"I felt that I could help my fellow workers by voicing my views to management."
"Because I thought I could do a goodjob for the men I work with."
One of the senior stewards became a steward so that he could "have a say in how
management run the company", and another steward because he "realised that he could
not do anything about working conditions stood in the background". These reasons
suggest that for the majority of stewards their major concern was for their fellow
workers, in particular having a workers' voice in the workplace and ensuring that
working conditions were the best that they could get. Indeed, of the eight stewards
who answered the question "as a shop steward what kind of issues are you most
concerned with?" five of the answers related to the pay and working conditions of the
stewards' fellow workers. Of these five answers, job security, job satisfaction and
health and safety on the shopfloor, were additional concerns. The three answers
which did not include payor working conditions were:
"Fair treatment of all workers and all concerned are consulted before action is taken.
The workplace should be a pleasant place to work."
"Management's inability to manage fairly."
"Solidarity among the workforce."
While not mentioning pay and conditions, these stewards appear to have their
members' interests as their chief concern: that is by trying to ensure that everyone was
treated the same and had a say in any action that may affect them.
When asked to rate a list of possible reasons for joining a trade union in terms of how
important they were (see table 2) the majority of the stewards endorsed every given
reason with the exception of "it's a family tradition")l However, there were
differences over whether some of the reasons were "very" or "fairly" important. It is
perhaps significant that more stewards thought that the "self interested" reasons, that
is, those that benefit the individual, were "very important" compared to the
"collectivist" reasons, that is, those that involve working together. This confirms the
11 Two of those who thought that this was an important reason were senior stewards. Maybe family
tradition was more important for the older members.
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findings of previous surveys of union membership, for example, Stevens et al (1989)
and Millward (1990). The steward who thought that protection from future problems
was not a very important reason for union membership had stated that his main
concern as a shop steward was health and safety on the shopfloor, which could be
interpreted as protection from future problems. This same respondent also thought
that "to use as a workers' voice against management" was "not at all important" as a
reason for union membership, which appears odd when the steward is considered to
be the spokesperson for his/her members. However, the other nine stewards felt that
this was an important reason for membership, which corresponds with the suggestion
above that the majority of the stewards felt that they could help their fellow workers by
voicing their opinions to management.
Another odd answer when considering the role of the shop steward as the
representative of hislher members was that one steward felt that "to show solidarity
with those I work with" was "not at all important" as a reason for union membership.
This might say something about the style of working of this steward; it could be that
he was looking after himself as an individual first rather than working as the leader of
a group of members. He was the only steward whose reply to the question "what
issues concern you most as a shop steward?" did not directly mention the members;
he replied "management's inability to manage fairly". He also stood as a steward
because he did not think that HE was being represented properly. It might be the case
that this particular steward would like to gain promotion within the firm; a comment
made by the convenor that sometimes stewards were not interested in their members
but only in "getting a white coat", that is, a supervisor's job, suggests that this could
possibly have been the case. However, this was a contentious issue among the
stewards and not much was ever said about it. Nevertheless, it appears that the
majority of stewards were concerned about their members first and foremost and
resented anyone who looked at the position as a means of bettering themselves within
the firm.
Eight of the sample felt that "most of my workmates are members" was an important
reason for membership. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, this reason for
membership may have been interpreted differently by different respondents. It was
intended to mean that because a person's workmates were union members they felt that
they should join; however, from some of the comments on the members'
questionnaires it became apparent that some respondents took this statement to mean
that "it is very important that all workmates are members", that is, a closed shop
situation; "all workmates should be members" stated one response. This also
corresponds with the occasions when workers had refused to work with people who
were not union members. The solidarity of the workforce appears to be essential to
the majority of union members as well as their representatives.
When asked "which single reason for belonging to a trade union is the most important
to you" the results were evenly divided among "higher pay and better working
conditions", "to use as a workers' voice against management" and protection.
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Tahle 2. The importance to individual shop stewards of a list of
possible reasons for joinin~ a trade union
Possible Reasons very fairly not very not at all
important important important important
To get higher pay & 8 2 0 0
better working conditions
To protect me if problems 9 0 1 0
come up in the future
To get members' benefits
such as financial or 9 I 0 0
health schemes
To help safeguard my job 9 1 0 0
To use as a workers' voic 6 3 0 1
against management
I believe in them in 6 4 0 0
principle
To campaign against 7 3 0 0
inequality & injustice
To show solidarity with 4 5 0 I
those I work with
Most of my workmates 4 4 0 2
are members
It's a family tradition 1 3 0 6
However, as can be seen from table 3, two stewards actually stated the particular
problem they felt it was most important to be protected from. One steward did not
answer this question, possibly because he felt that there was more than one important
reason to be a union member. Nevertheless, while the stewards may have had
different priorities, these three reasons appear to be the major ones. The fact that two
of the senior stewards thought that "to use as a workers' voice" was the most
important reason for membership may reflect their position. The convenor thought
that "protection against management intimidation" was the most important reason for
membership. These results correspond with those from previous surveys; the two
most common reasons for union membership appeared to be for future protection and
higher pay and better working conditions (Stevens et al 1989, Millward 1990).
However, when taken as a whole the results suggest that the majority of stewards
were concerned with protecting their members' interests as well as their own;
therefore, rather than working solely in their own self interests they were working for
the self interests of all their fellow workers.
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Table 3. The most important reason for joinin~ a trade union
Reason number of
stewards
Higher pay & better
working conditions 3
To protect me if problems 1
come up in the future
To use as a workers' voice 3
against management
Protection from unfair 1
dismissal
Protection against an 1
accident at work
* The figures only add up to 90% because one respondent failed to answer this question.
It is possible that he felt that there was more than one reason for union membership.
t It is possible that all these three reasons could be combined together because even
though the last two reasons state the particular incident that the respondent wanted
protection against, both cases also come under the umbrella of "protection from future
problems".
The stewards endorsed the "two faces of power" identified by Flanders (1961). The
"sword of justice" aspect of unionism can be identified with campaigning against
inequality and injustice and the "vested interest" aspect can be linked to using the union
as a workers' voice against management. However, even though all the stewards felt
that to campaign against inequality and injustice was an important reason for
membership none thought that it was the single most important reason, whereas three
thought that to use as a workers' voice against management was. Therefore, it could
be argued that the vested interest aspect of unionism appears to be the most important
"face" of unionism as far as the stewards were concerned. Indeed, it could be argued
that rather than using unions to campaign against injustice on a national scale, the
stewards also linked this to the workplace and their own members. Taken as a whole
the results suggest that while the stewards may see individual advantages in
membership, that is, protection, higher pay and financial benefits, they were also
largely collectivist in their outlook: using the union as a collective voice, campaigning
against injustice, showing solidarity with their workmates and overall believing in
them in principle. Not surprisingly, all the stewards thought that workers achieved
their goals by sticking together rather than by working hard on their own. This
suggests that collectivism is still a major feature of unionism, rather than unions being
seen solely as insurance agencies for individuals as envisaged by the Conservative
government. It may be a necessary part of an individual's personality that they have a
collectivist outlook in order to wish to become a steward and successfully carry out the
role (see also Posh 1993).
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Table 4. Whether stewards thou~ht that bein~ in a union made a difference
to a number of probable circumstances
Number of stewards replying
Circumstance yes no don't know
Higher wages 7 3 0
Being unfairly dismissed 10 0 0
Being accused of something 9 0 1
by your employer
Having your conditions of 8 2 0
work changed
Efficient health & safety 6 4 0
Having an accident at work 10 0 0
Preventing harassment & 8 I 1
discrimination
Job protection 9 1 0
In comparison, when asked do you think that being in a union makes a difference to a
number of particular things, the answers were not all positive. Table 4 shows that
while the majority of stewards had replied "yes" in each case, there were some
stewards who thought differently. The fact that all the stewards felt that being in a
union made a difference to unfair dismissal suggests that the union at firm A did
protect their members in this way (see below). This may also be why the majority of
stewards thought that union membership helped job protection. All the stewards also
said that union membership made a difference if an accident happened at work.
However, even though all the stewards thought that "to get higher pay and better
working conditions" was an important reason for membership, three said that being in
a union did not make a difference to higher wages. Due to the fact that every
workshop was covered by the same pay deal, no explanation can be offered for this
discrepancy, except perhaps the different perceptions of respondents about what
constitutes "higher wages". However, the differences in opinion for the other
circumstances could be due to the different workshops and different stewards (and
members) working in them; that is, some stewards may have been able to negotiate
themselves if, for example, working conditions were changed in their workshop,
whereas others may not have succeeded with their shop managers especially if they
had no backing from their members, and if their members were not prepared to back
them then they may not have felt it necessary to call in the convenor. The two
stewards who felt that being in a union did not make a difference when having your
conditions of work changed were also the two whose main concerns as stewards were
with improving working conditions; maybe they felt that as stewards they could make
a difference. Of the four who did not think that membership made a difference to
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efficient health and safety, one who had been a steward for under a year had said that
his main concern was health and safety on the shopfloor; perhaps he will be able to
make a difference in his own workshop. It is perhaps significant that some health and
safety problems were only solved after an accident had happened and the member's
claim had succeeded. Very often these problems had been reported to management
long before the accident occurred, but it appears that in some cases it took an accident
to rectify the problem.
The shop stewards were concerned about their members' welfare; for example, they
insisted that a particular member was taken off a certain machine "for his own safety",
which management did.12 Members always received adequate information on how to
make claims for accidents, deafness and anything else that may have affected them and
the convenor took the majority of claims forms to the relevant branch taking the onus
from the members. It was not uncommon for members to contact the convenor at
home, usually over problems related to sick and accident pay, problems that related to
individual issues which were dealt with by head office rather than workplace issues.
While the stewards did display a self-interested nature towards
unionism their overriding concern for their fellow members indicates
that their own self interests were overshadowed by a collectivist
attitude. As Fosh (1993) said "[a] collectivist outlook is one where
issues are seen by local leaders as relating to a shared situation of
employment" (p581). Therefore, at least at firm A, collectivism had
not given way to individualism, whereby each individual made
decisions in hislher own interests. The interests of the collective were
the most important goals of the stewards. As the majority of stewards
felt that being in a union made a difference in all the given
circumstances (see table 4) it suggests that the union at firm A was
largely effective and especially in unfair dismissal cases, when accused
of something by the employer and for job protection; indeed, union
membership at firm A may have given workers a sense of job security.
8:6 Members' grievances
Eight of the stewards replied to the question "what kind of issues do members bring to
you?" The majority of the answers referred to working conditions, pay and shift
working patterns, but two of the answers described more specific issues including
individual problems. All the answers are set out below:
"Most of them are pay related."
"Money. Want overtime."
"Shift working problems. Cell system profit."
12 Convenor's 1987 notebook.
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"Putting new times on jobs. Bonus points in cell working. Sometimes overtime."
"Change of work patterns with no notice. Not working hard enough. Health and safety.
Victimisation. (pick on the quiet ones)."
"Having no money to buy new parts or replace broken tools. Men being messed around
ie. changing shift patterns and altering shift starting times."
"Pay. Hours worked. Health and safety. Management making bad decisions on production
levels. Marital problems. Funeral benefit. Hospital attendance. Pension problems. Income
tax enquiries. "
"General departmental issues on working conditions instead of making a site issue of it."
While the majority of answers referred to pay and working conditions,13 one senior
steward made a list of problems that were brought to him which also included personal
problems, suggesting that the stewards (or at least some of them) were seen not only
as workplace representatives but also as individual problem solvers (see also Schuller
and Robertson 1983, Terry 1982, Goodman and Whittingham 1969).
Sometimes members' grievances may be considered trivial by the stewards involved.
The convenor was asked "do you ever refuse to raise an issue with management on
behalf of any of your members?" he replied: "If it's trivial. A lot of individual
member's complaints are trivia." The convenor always did what he could for his
members, he listened to everyone who brought a problem to him, but told them if he
could not help them. The stewards' questionnaire asked "are your members' demands
reasonable ones that you can do something about?" Half of the respondents replied
"usually", and four said about half of them were, none of the stewards replied that
they "always" were. These responses suggest that some grievances taken to stewards
were complaints which had no real substance and were probably passed over. The
other steward was more specific in his answer: "I can do nothing about any of [the
members' demands] because when management refuse to do anything [the members]
say alright and will do nothing to help themselves." This may have been because
members in a particular workshop were not prepared to back up their grievances or it
may suggest that they did not have enough confidence in their shop steward to sort the
problem out to their satisfaction; the steward who made this comment had also said
that he was not satisfied with the outcome of his discussions with management. Some
members did take grievances to the convenor which should have been taken to their
steward or foreman suggesting that they perhaps saw him as the person to get the
13A door that would not close in Winter. cell working rates, bank holiday working rates, wages
being paid straight into the bank and management's expectation that productivity would remain the
same when workers had been moved into other workshops were just a few of the problems the
convenor encountered during the period of study. Between 1987 and 1991 many individual member's
problems also related to pay and working conditions. The convenor had recorded some of the queries
and problems that members had taken to him, which included; queries about redundancy and sick pay,
bonus payment problems, "not getting a chance to work his day off', members on four days
complained about their foreman working five days and "taking up their tools of the trade", labourers
queried the fact that contractors were cleaning the machines, changes of working patterns and in
particular coming back to work after being off and finding that they had been moved to different
workshops or had had their shifts altered and a few members had received verbal warnings.
(Convenor's notebooks 1987 - 1991.)
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problem solved. The convenor did say that stewards did not have the same influence
as himself (as convenor) with management and when asked "do you think your
stewards treat problems as individual ones only or do they try and involve the whole
workforce in solving a problem collectively?" he replied that they treated problems as
individual ones, whereas he treated some as individual ones and involved the
workforce in solving others depending on the problem.
Nevertheless, the majority of the stewards thought that their members did see them as
leaders of a collective approach to problem solving which may have a direct bearing
upon why the union at firm A tended to "get its own way" on many issues; the
collective approach encouraged membership participation in union and workplace
affairs which in turn helped them to secure their goals (posh and Cohen 1990, Fosh
1993). However, one thought that he was used only as an individual problem solver
and three did not know. Nevertheless, members, it appears, at least according to their
stewards, could be divided into those who took the steward's work for granted and
those that appreciated what was done for them; one steward went further and
commented "some appreciate it, others laugh at you". Only two of the stewards
thought differently; one, who also thought members viewed him solely as a leader of
a collective approach to problem solving, said that most of his members appreciated
what he did for them, and another that most took his work as a steward for granted.
Certainly, where the convenor was concerned, some members had shown their
appreciation after he had helped them, by presenting him with a small gift.
Meetings of union members took place only when there was an issue to discuss. They
took place during worktime with management permission, which was never withheld.
The convenor felt that he could get members and stewards to see things his way and
do what he believed was right when a dispute arose. However, the stewards were
divided as to their influence upon their members. They were asked "do you feel that
you can get members to see things your way when a particular dispute arises and get
them to do what you believe is right?" Only one respondent replied "yes", and,
perhaps significantly, he also thought that his members viewed him as a leader of a
collective approach to problem solving. Four felt that they could "sometimes" get
members to see things their way, but five said "no, everyone has their own opinion".
The majorfty of members' grievances could be considered self
interested ones, that is, ones that affected them personally, and many
members tended to take their steward's work for granted and used him
as an individual problem solver. However, the majority of stewards
felt that their members did see them as leaders of a collective approach
to problem solving, and if Fosh (1993) was correct, a leader who
stresses the importance of involving all members in the decision making
process can encourage members to participate more in the union atTairs
that involve them and, therefore, increase their chances of success.
Steward training and experience may enhance the abilities of stewards to be able to do
this.
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8:7 Steward Training
Only five of the stewards, including the senior stewards, had taken part in some kind
of training or instruction for their role as a shop steward. Four had attended more than
one course. All had attended at least one union representative's course, two had
attended health and safety courses and one a pensions course.
The convenor had recorded in his notebooks that in 1987 out of fourteen stewards,
including himself, nine had attended a shop stewards' course and three a health and
safety course and in 1989 a new steward had attended both courses. Therefore, it
appears that those respondents who had become stewards after 1989 were probably
the ones who had had no specialist training. In fact four of the respondents who had
had no training had only been stewards for five years or less. The other had been a
steward for nine years and therefore could not have been included in the convenor's
figures.
Whereas the convenor originally informed each steward about forthcoming courses he
admitted that over the last couple of years he had only put up notices and left the
stewards to ask about courses. The reason for this was that over the last five years
there had been such a lack of interest from the stewards (also indicated by the fact that
half of those who answered the questionnaire had not attended any courses) and in the
past he had gone through the whole process of getting particular stewards the time off
work to attend courses and then they did not go because they preferred to work
overtime and earn extra money. However, one steward who had held his post for
three years did comment that although he had taken no courses he had wanted to.
Perhaps he did not read the notice boards.
When asked if the courses had helped them in their role as a steward, the answers
were varied. One senior steward replied that they had helped him a lot, two thought
that they had helped a little but the last two said that they had not helped at all. It could
be argued that for most stewards they learn more about their role as a steward through
experience. While the convenor found the shop stewards' courses and weekend
schools that he had attended useful he also agreed that "you learn more through
experience on thejob itself'. One steward at a shop stewards' committee meeting was
worried that he was not doing the right things. The others present assured him that he
was; "You're just becoming experienced and you'll become more knowledgeable as
you go along." Therefore, the stewards tended to learn from each other's experiences
as well as their own and within the firm they supported and helped each other.
Indeed, the convenor was, in his words, as "green as grass" when he took up the
position and regularly kept in touch with his predecessor (who had retired) for
information and guidance on how to conduct his business. This guidance, along with
the experience of dealing with management himself, led him to develop his own ways
of working, which appear to have worked well. The senior stewards were also
"learning" from their convenor. In fact, one particular senior steward could have been
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called the convenor's" right hand man"; he always attended stewards' meetings
outside the workplace and he was the one who tended to step in for the convenor if he
was not available. However, this was not the steward who was most likely to replace
the convenor on his retirement; he admitted that though he could see a problem from
the perspective of both the shopfloor and management he tended to agree with
management more readily than the convenor would. Many situations had occurred
where the convenor had refused to agree with management. This steward admitted
that he would not have done the same and that he was amazed when the convenor
"won" these particular cases. Nevertheless, the steward had learnt a lot from
accompanying the convenor and was beginning to copy his tactics, which he found did
work. However, he preferred to remain a senior steward and another senior steward
had been chosen to follow in the convenor's footsteps. By accompanying the
convenor during his negotiations with management the senior stewards were learning
more about bargaining tactics than they might at a training course.
The stewards at firm A appeared to be upholding the local trend of poor attendance at
trade union training courses, identified in the last chapter. Not one of the respondents
had indicated that they had completed all four stages of the union representative's
course: stage 2 appears to be the highest stage completed. It appears that stewards did
not take up the training courses because they preferred to eam extra money; however,
it might also be the case that once they had attended one course they felt that they were
leaming nothing new or nothing relevant to their own workplace situation. However,
knowledge gained at courses may not become immediately apparent; after attending
the two weekend schools the convenor acknowledged that he had felt as though he had
not learnt anything new, but he realised at a later date that he had in fact stored a certain
amount of useful information. Therefore, stewards may not be taking up the
training on otTer for a number of combined reasons: in their own self
interests they may wish to earn more money if the opportunity arises;
and where an independent workplace organisation exists it appears that
stewards prefer to learn "on the job" and from each other which
suggests that the steward's role is related to the workplace rather than
to "learning" or "education". There appears to be a perceived
difference between what can be learnt in theory and what actually
happens in practice.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that steward training courses might
build up the confidence of those attending and in tum build up their
style of working so that they develop the right one for determining
membership participation in unionism. However, while this may be
true in a broad sense, the "best style of working" may differ from
workplace to workplace; it is only through experience and practice that
individuals learn the best means of bargaining with their own
managements. Certainly a commitment to collectivism (Fosh 1993)
appears to be a necessary component of determining membership
participation; however, it could be argued that that commitment is
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already there within those that make the best stewards; stewards
without that commitment may find that their members' support is not
forthcoming. The personalities of those involved cannot be altered by
training courses, and it may be that different personalities approach the
role in different ways. It does appear that the personality and style of
working of the convenor are the key to the success of the union at firm
A and if the stewards beneath him learn from his experience and
develop a similar style of working there should be no reason why the
union cannot continue to be successful even after his retirement.
8:8 The management - union relationship
One of the most striking things about the union at firm A (or at least in the machine
shops) was that it appeared to run the firm almost as much as management did.
Almost everything conceivable was bargained about: terms and conditions of
employment, wages, bonuses, working conditions, engagement I non-engagement I
termination I suspension of workers, allocation of work, matters of discipline, health
and safety and anything else that may have affected a worker within the factory.
Nothing was seen as management's prerogative. Examples from the convenor's
notebooks were numerous; in one instance the stewards had a meeting to vote on
whether they should allow management to use a stopwatch on the machines to get a
norm to use for the bonus scheme. Whenever a change was proposed by management
which affected members, those members were balloted and their vote was used to
negotiate with management.
The union monitored all new jobs and any new ideas or proposals that management
put forward and everything was discussed with management before any documents
were signed. When asked the question "when dealing with management do you accept
their views readily, compromise or argue?", the convenor replied "yes and no. We
argue the case until it is won or we compromise in certain cases." One entry in the
convenor's notebook stated: "Fitters required to work PlO shop days and nights,
management tried to do it without consultation. Ongoing. "14 When contractors were
brought in while the workforce were on a four day week, the convenor had written
"view it as a provocative act" - the union "won" and the contractors left the factory.
These examples indicate how the union did not like "enforced" changes within "its"
factory without prior consultation and its acceptance.
This is not to say that the union always "won" its case outright, but it certainly tended
to end up with an amicable agreement and members never ended up worse off than
they had been. For example, a dispute flared up in a particular workshop that had
been part of the machine shops but which was being merged with the foundry. The
foundry workers already worked Sunday nights, which those in the workshop being
moved were refusing to do. Because this workshop eventually became part of the
foundry the workers had no choice and had to work Sunday nights: however,
14 PlO shop referred to a particular workshop at firm A known as "the parting off shop".
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problems began because these workers were not receiving the same bonus and cover
as those already in the foundry. A meeting with management settled this problem and
full bonus was paid to all the workers in that workshop. Therefore, the union did not
prevent those workers from having to work Sunday nights but it did manage to get
them the same bonus rates as the workers who were already working a similar shift.
The union did not "win" as such but neither did its members end up worse off than
they might have done without a union to fight for them. Therefore, the union at firm
A could be considered as powerful. It had the capacity to produce effects by
defending and advancing its members' interests. Even when members did not achieve
their overall goal the union managed to shape and alter management's decisions in
such a way so that its members' interests were protected. This "power" was also used
in a way that helped management as well as members. For example, if the union had
demanded that its members should not work Sunday nights a conflict situation may
have erupted to everyone's disadvantage.
"Working overtime over 24 hours in 4 weeks - request from management. Okayed
reluctantly by stewards until Xmas then to be reviewed." Or "Staggered holiday no. I
shop (co-operation with management)" are two examples from the convenor's
notebooks which indicate steward co-operation with management. They also show
that management did request things of the workforce through the union rather than
demanding that it must be done; this is also reflected in the notebook entry, "wishing
to check floor to floor times with our co-operation". Management sometimes assessed
the stewards' reactions before they put forward a proposal; "[manager's name]
sounding me out on voluntary redundancies. Coming back. No way." According to
the convenor management did seek advice from the union over proposed changes or
new ideas, and unofficial chats with members of management, rather than only
speaking to them when the procedure was followed, were not uncommon. Very often
issues were settled between the convenor, senior stewards and management without
even reaching the shopfloor or the other stewards, which may explain some of the
answers from members and shop stewards, which appear to contradict the impression
given of the union's authority in this section; members may not have been aware that
certain problems had even arisen let alone been solved. (See next chapter.)
All agreements and concessions made between the union and management were
written down either as a separate agreement or as an appendix to an existing
agreement.re These written agreements were not legally binding, but the workforce
and management did abide by them. It was not unknown for a particular written
agreement to be made between a steward and his shop manager that did not pass
through personnel so that higher management were not aware of it. Higher
management did abide by these agreements, even if they had to ask for a copy of a
particular one when a dispute that involved it had flared up. The convenor found these
written agreements very useful, not only to remind management if the need arose but
also to "keep the workforce in check"; "if an argument begins you can always say
15 The original works agreement was known as the "works bible"; it was still referred to, but had
been amended several times.
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'look we agreed this, it's written down here. '"
The convenor said that he got on well with managementie and that the union and
management had an amicable relationship; rather than seeing that relationship as one
of conflict he saw it as one of conciliation. "We vie. We talk our way out of trouble,
that's why there's no strikes. We benefit and they benefit" was how he described the
relationship. Management at firm A accepted the work of the convenor willingly, one
manager admitting "that in actual fact you are part of management, even though you're
on the men's side". According to the convenor there was nothing that he could not
discuss with management and there was nothing that they regarded as their own right
to decide without first consulting the union. This is not to say that the convenor was
hand in hand with management; he certainly had no qualms about marching straight
into a manager's office if he felt that he needed to. One of the senior stewards
delighted in telling how during a heated dispute with management the convenor once
banged the table so hard with his fist that the other end sprang up and nearly hit one of
the managers under the chin. Members of middle management might have felt
intimidated by the convenor; a senior steward after being left with a manager by the
convenor recalled how the the manager told him "I don't mind telling you that when 1
saw [convenor] my heart sank into my shoes. I've had enough of him in the last few
days." The explanation for this was that in the days previous to this meeting that
particular manager had not been able to "get: his own way" with the convenor, which
indicates that the convenor very often did "get: his own way". The manager probably
thought that he would be able to "get his own way" with the steward but he had begun
to use the same tactics as the convenor having learnt that they appeared to work to the
union's advantage. It appears that management were sometimes afraid that the
convenor "could swing it with the shopfloor", despite being assured that members
were only told the truth about disputed issues. However, issues rarely went as far as
the shopfloor because "we swing it with management without getting to the
shopfloor", indicating that the solution was usually forthcoming, possibly because of
management's beliefs about the "power" of the union.
Only six of the stewards who answered the questionnaire agreed with the convenor.
In reply to the question "in general how would you describe relations bet:ween
management and your union at your workplace?", one said "very good" and five
"quite good". Of the other four, two stewards thought that management/union
relations were "not very good" and two "not at all good". This could reflect the fact
that it was the convenor and sometimes the senior stewards (and if a dispute was
affecting a particular workshop the steward involved) who dealt with the higher levels
of management. The majority of stewards only dealt with their own shop manager and
they, or at least four of them, may have viewed their own relationship with the
member(s) of management they negotiated with as a poor one and, therefore,
perceived the union's relationship as a whole with management as not a good one.
Two of the senior stewards thought that the relationship was "quite good", which
16 The question asked also had "very well" as a choice of answer but the convenor replied that he got
on "well" with management.
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corresponds with the convenor's answer that he got on "well" rather than "very well"
with management. Surprisingly, the third senior steward replied that the
management/union relationship was "not very good". It is possible that he did not
attend meetings with higher management as often as the other two senior stewards or
his perception of how the convenor negotiated with management may have given him
the impression that management/union relations were not very good.
All the stewards discussed and settled problems with management themselves; three
replied "yes" to the question and seven "sometimes"."? Three of the respondents
were satisfied with the outcome of these discussions and four were sometimes
satisfied. However, two stewards said that they were not generally satisfied with the
outcome of their discussions with management. These two stewards had also replied
that management/union relations were not at all good, possibly because of their own
relationship with their shop managers. This would suggest that stewards' perceptions
about the union within their workplace are influenced by the level of success that they
have themselves within their own workshops. If this is the case it follows that
members' perceptions about the power of their union may be influenced by how well
their own steward performs. Nevertheless, a change of manager could change the
relationship of the union (or the steward) with management from one of potential
conflict to one of conciliation. For example, a new shop manager in one workshop
had a totally different attitude from his predecessor; his first priority was to have a
faulty workshop door repaired, whereas the previous manager had allowed it to remain
causing immense friction between himself and the workers. It follows that a change of
manager might also change the relationship of the union from one of conciliation to
one of conflict.
When asked "how many times over the last twelve months have you met management
to discuss grievances and issues?" the convenor replied "a lot!" Problems occurred
on a daily basis and ranged from the small individual grievance, such as not getting
any overtime, to larger problems such as an entire workshop refusing to work a
particular machine.is Analysis of the 1987 notebook indicates that that particular year
was dominated by problems related to pay 19 closely followed by changes in working
practices and patterns (resembling the problems that the stewards had said were
brought to them). Depending on the problem, the convenor may have sorted it out
himself, but for serious issues the stewards were brought together; examples ranged
from whether to keep summer students on longer to whether to allow the firm to
employ contractors when the workforce was working a four day week.20 In each
case the stewards voted in favour of their members. Issues that directly affected a
group of members, for example a whole workshop, would have been discussed with
those concerned and if necessary a vote taken on the issue.
17 One steward who had replied "sometimes" had also written "convenor deals with management",
which confirms that the convenor did confront management on behalf of his stewards.
18 Convenor's notebooks 1987 - 1991.
19 For example, lieu rates, bonus payments, top up pay, overtime pay and redundancy money.
20 Convenor's 1987 notebook.
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According to the convenor members were always consulted on deals and proposals
that affected them before they were accepted or rejected and eight of the stewards who
answered the questionnaire agreed with him.21 The actual question asked of the
stewards was: "when an issue that affects your members is being negotiated at your
workplace, are all your members involved in the decision making process, that is are
they consulted on any proposals or deals offered by management?" Four stewards
replied a definite "yes" and four that it "depends on the issue", which coincided with
the convenor's answer to the question "do you keep your members informed of
everything that is happening at work?". "Only on serious problems, not day to day
issues" was his response, which suggests that not all members or even stewards
would know of everything that was negotiated about between the convenor and
management. Therefore, the stewards may not always have known if the convenor
had threatened to take an issue to the shopfloor and if management conceded to the
threat, the members would also have been none the wiser.
The union had an amicable relationship with management and used its
"power" effectively in the interests of its members. However, that
"power" was also used in a way that helped management, who, to a
certain degree, saw an advantage with a unionised workforce: "the
union controls the shopfloor to the advantage of management; if
anything goes wrong or a member is out of line the management will
say he's your responsibility you deal with it!" This relates to the
comment made by a retired member that ''the shop steward used to be as
good as a gaffer" (see previous chapter). At firm A perhaps this was
still the case; peer pressure may have more of an influence on an
unruly member than management themselves. Management at firm A
actually said that they preferred to have a union on site because it made
their job easier. In fact, management had begun to take many of their
own problems straight to the convenor. This is not a new aspect of
unionism. Beynon (1973) suggested that controlling the membership
was part of the steward's role and management may see no point in
destabilising an arrangement that offers a degree of order in the
workplace (Marchington and Parker 1990). Nevertheless, the stewards
tended to side with their members though management's opinions were
taken into account by the senior stewards and put across to the
members if necessary.22 Using Edwards' (1978) methods of decision
making, rather than both sides being opposed so that a conflict
situation arose which was resolved at the expense of one side or the
21 For example, one management proposal "still includes a 10 minute unpaid teabreak. Put it to the
lads." Convenor's 1987 notebook.
22 As the convenor put it: "we can see management's viewpoint but it's the members that count."
For example, a member received a four month prison sentence and management wanted to dismiss
him. While understanding management's viewpoint the stewards insisted that his job must be kept
open for him. (Convenor's notebook 1987).
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other, either the union and management tended to modify their
objectives in anticipation of each other's response or the union used
persuasive methods (perhaps by the use of threats) to bring the
objectives into line. However, the union's "power" overall within the
workplace appears to rest with the style of working of the main union
representative - the MS convenor. Individual stewards did negotiate
within their own workshops, but their perceptions of the
management/union relationship appeared to be influenced by their own
level of success.
8:9 The lay representative is one of the essential ingredients for
successful unionism in the workplace
The union's relationship with management hinged on the personality and style of
working of the MS convenor. The machine shops' union organisation, in the words
of one of the shop stewards, still retained "power" over the factory, whereas in the
foundry, which used to be the "bastion of power", management had "taken over". At
one of firm A's joint shop stewards' committee meetings this predicament was
discussed. It appears that after a particular convenor had left the foundry, the hold that
the union did have over management had disappeared. Whether this was the fault of
the new convenor, a lack of interest on the part of the union members in that particular
workshop or a new management attitude is debatable. However, whilst management
could very well have seen an opportunity to assert its authority, it seems highly
unlikely that this was the reason for the change in the union-management relationship
in the foundry. If the machine shops' union could "still handle management" generally
by "getting all the shop stewards together if something happens" and consulting their
members, then it is hard to believe that management alone created the new atmosphere
in the foundry and not also in the machine shops. Indeed, the shop stewards were
divided as to the reasons for the fall of the foundry union, it was argued that there
were some "good union lads in there", but this was not accepted because "they don't
stand together".
The relationship between the same management and the two different workplace
unions within the same factory must have had something to do with the union
representatives' personalities and styles of working; otherwise the two workshops
would not have been experiencing completely different managerial attitudes. Relating
this to Fosh's (1993) conclusions, the style of the MS convenor determined
membership participation in those workplace affairs that involved the union (which it
could be argued was all workplace affairs). The high level of participation usually
secured them their goal, whereas the style of "leadership" in the foundry was not as
effective in producing membership participation and interest and, therefore, their
dealings with management were much different. Apparently, the previous CS
convenor would "never just accept" management's word; he would demand that they
"got around the table and discussed the matter", and "management always did", very
often leading to management doing things that they had previously said they would not
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do. Hence the quote that the foundry used to be "the bastion of power".
A change of convenor had changed the union's relationship with management and with
its members. It appears that members in the foundry either took matters into their own
hands (contradicting the comment that they did not stand together) or they took their
problems to the MS convenor rather than their own representative. Two examples
illustrate this, the first in the words of the MS convenor:
"[The CS convenor] got the lads out who were clocking on at 7am because the showers
were flooded and the water was running over into their eating area, but he didn't get the
lads out who were already working. He was trying to sort it out with management and
negotiate pay for the lads while they couldn't work. [A member of management] told
me to go and sort it out, which isn't my job so I left it a little while so that lCS
convenor] could get on with it. A while later I walked into the foundry and was amazed
to find that [CS convenor] had gone back to his job satisfied with his deal with
management. The lads weren't having that. They were all sat up on a wall above the
showers refusing to work until they got what they wanted. [A member of management]
walked in and told the lads that they'd got what they wanted and someone was coming in
to sort the showers out.
Later on I was talking to [CS convenor] about bonus rates. They had negotiated a lower
rate in the foundry to our rates, I told him he should put a higher claim in to bring it in
line with ours, but he was satisfied with what he'd got, so he's not bothered."
This example illustrates how the CS convenor followed problems through to his own
satisfaction rather than that of his members; two examples in the above quote indicate
this. It could be argued that this particular union representative worked as an
individual rather than as part of a collective or more appropriately "the leader" of the
collective.23 Relating this to Fosh's (1993) argument, this could be the reason why
the foundry had "lost its hold over the factory"; the previous convenor worked for his
members, encouraging participation and securing the workers their goals, whereas the
present CS convenor worked as an individual which isolated him from his members.
The example about bonus payments clearly illustrates this; the MS convenor thought
that everyone's rates should be on par and would have negotiated with management to
ensure that this was the case if his members had been affected.24 Not wanting to go
over the head of the CS convenor, he suggested to him what should be done, but
because that convenor was satisfted he left things as they were rather than consulting
his members, who eventually took their grievance about disparity in bonus rates to the
MS convenor. The second example also illustrates this; a foundry member who only
had eighteen months before his retirement had been dismissed pending appeal. His
own convenor had "washed his hands of him" and the MS convenor was asked by the
member to take up his case. The member was sent to see the local community mental
health team, after which he was able to claim statutory sick pay, but management
23 This may not have been a conscious strategy. The CS convenor was a dedicated "union man" and
did try to work for the union where he could. For example, he would sell raffle tickets to raise funds
and always passed on any union information to his members. Like the branch secretary (see previous
chapter) he had had the position "forced" onto him through the retirement of the previous convenor.
24 The union would only allow students to do the same work as the rest of the workforce providing
they were paid the same rates. They did not see it as fair that people should be taken advantage of and
used as a cheap form of labour, especially at the expense of the usual workforce.
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refused to backdate any sick payments from the firm though they did offer him his job
back. Because the member was not fit to do the job, the MS convenor managed to talk
management around to paying the member ten weeks sick pay and giving him early
retirement on the grounds of ill health. If it had been left to the member's own
convenor he would have been dismissed with no sick pay and no early retirement.
It had even been suggested (by members and management) that the MS convenor
cover the foundry as well, but he did not want to go over the CS convenor's head.
However, management tended to recognise him as negotiating for the whole factory,
the point in the above quote where a member of management told him to go and sort
the problem out suggests that this was so, and when a foundry member took a
grievance to him he usually sorted it out. Even the factory health and safety
inspectorate acknowledged to management that they recognised the MS convenor as
the senior representative for the whole factory.25 Perhaps management also
recognised the difference in the two representatives' personalities and ways of
working. It might also be argued that management may have preferred to keep the
situation as it was, so as to retain some "control" over part of the firm. An entry from
the convenor's notebook stated "[member of management]. Package deal. Benefits we
have more costly than foundry." The evidence suggests that the machine shops' union
negotiated better deals for their members than the union organisation in the foundry.
The approach used by the MS convenor was that you must be realistic and recognise
that each member has got hislher own personal responsibilities which must be weighed
against each other before asking members to make any decisions. He also recognised
that "management can only give what they have got". For example, in relation to pay
rises, he said that "you must be reasonable in what you ask for depending on the
company's profits. This year they made a million more than last year so we'll ask for
a substantial amount. However, even if they were not making a profit I'd always ask
for a small rise." Management's points of view and problems must be treated with
respect even if "you don't agree with them". The key when dealing with management,
according to the MS convenor, was to be firm, confident and to "stick to your guns";
"sometimes you have to bluff your way through. But as long as you are confident and
management can see that. ...". When negotiations were taking place things may not
have looked friendly, but at the end of the day the convenor's aim was to come out
"amicable or on top". From his point of view management were quite happy and they
respected him and his methods; "they know where they stand" and appreciate that
"we are only going for the best".
25 The CS convenor may have felt overshadowed by the MS convenor or knew that the MS convenor
would always step in if necessary taking the onus away from himself. At a district stewards' meeting
the MS convenor told him that be must "get up there on the shopfloor and be a leader". He replied "I
can't. You're the leader there". The MS convenor may have taken the responsibility away from the
CS convenor by letting him know that if be could not settle a problem be could tell management that
"[MS convenor] will be in to sort it out!". Very often the CS convenor thanked the MS convenor
after a foundry problem had been solved telling him that it would not have been done without his
intervention.
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It can be concluded that it is the lay representative's style, and in
particular that of the main lay representative, that is essential in
determining membership participation in workplace unionism and
therefore the level of success that the shopfloor has when dealing with
management. Therefore, the personality and the style of working of the
lay representative are two of the main ingredients for successful
unionism within the workplace.
8: 10 Industrial action
If a problem could not be resolved between the stewards and management the
convenor had no doubts about informing his employers that he would "take it to the
shopfloor and ifthey don't like it we'll be out" or "the lads will put the buttons in!".26
The union representatives ignored management's claims that that was "undemocratic"
and usually an amicable solution was agreed upon. This is a perfect indication that the
machine shop union members at firm A were prepared to act together to alleviate their
grievances and, perhaps more importantly, that management believed the threat or
were not prepared to take the chance.27 As Martin et al (1991) put it:
"In collective bargaining the best means of exerting bargaining power is through being
perceived by management to possess bargaining power, not in actually using it." (p202).
When asked "at your place of work would you say a threat to walk off the shopfloor is
usually sufficient to make management concede to your demands?" the convenor
replied "yes, to fair and rightful demands" and "you've got to give threats otherwise
management walk all over you". Yet results from the stewards questionnaire revealed
a different picture. Only three of the respondents answered "yes" to the same question
and one did not know. However, as it was the convenor who issued most of the
threats against management, the stewards may not have done so taking any unresolved
problems to the convenor.28 These answers may also indicate that it was the
convenor who had the "power" to negotiate settlements with management rather than
individual stewards, who tended to deal only with their shop managers. The convenor
did admit that the stewards did not have the same influence he had. It was not
unknown for a steward to tell the convenor to "go and use your power" when dealing
26 "Putting the buttons in" means that the workers would stop working.
27 An example of a threat to take an issue to the shopfloor involved a management initiative to lay
off the long term sick beginning with those who bad been off for longer than two years. However,
the first worker on the list bad only been off for nine weeks. After arguing with management for
most of the day the senior stewards told them "we'll take it to the shopfloor and the lads will be out!"
and, according to a steward, when the members heard of the situation "they were up and ready to walk
out". The threat solved the problem.
28 Only one senior steward bad replied "yes" to this question; however, after the questionnaires bad
been completed the convenor was off work for a number of months, and the senior stewards conducted
negotiations with management themselves. In some instances they found that by resorting to the
same tactics that the convenor bad used (which two of the senior stewards bad been wary about
previously) they were beginning to get their own way. Therefore, it is possible that the two senior
stewards who had replied "no" to the question may now think differently.
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with an issue with management. The personality and style of working of the convenor
must have contributed to the success of the union; his confidence that the shopfloor
would back him was enough to make management concede to the union's demands.
Nevertheless, whether threats worked at firm A or not, the question remains, would
"the lads" have been prepared to carry out that threat? The convenor and one of the
senior stewards thought that they would; management must also have believed it and
evidence suggests that the shopfloor was usually willing to support a fellow member,
at least in a dismissal case. The convenor when asked "do you think your members
would be prepared to take immediate action without a ballot?" replied "possibly".
When asked "under what circumstances?", he said, "for instance, if any member or
shop steward was wrongfully dismissed." The shop stewards' questionnaire asked
the same question but had a list of possible circumstances which the respondents were
asked to tick if they thought their members would be prepared to take immediate action
over. However, the question also had a category "can't really say" which the
respondents ticked as an overall response to the question; therefore, it is possible that
those stewards who ticked a particular category might also have felt that they could not
really say for others. The answers, then, are rather vague, particularly because if the
steward had not responded by saying "I can't really say", the categories which were
not indicated could mean that the respondent meant "no his members would not take
action" or that he could not really say. Table 5 sets out the number of stewards who
replied "yes" or "can't really say" to each category, but as mentioned above care must
be taken when interpreting the results. Nevertheless, they still give an idea of how
strong the feeling of the membership may have been at firm A. In addition one
respondent did not respond at all to the question; whether this was because he thought
his members would not take action or whether he just did not answer the question is
not known.
At least half the stewards responded to each category indicating that they at least
thought that their members might take action. As each steward was responsible for a
different group of members it is possible that some members would take action over a
particular issue whereas others would not. One shop steward thought that his
members would take immediate action in all the given circumstances; maybe his
members were more inclined to take action than some of the other work groups.s?
One of the respondents who could not say whether his members would take action or
not, did add "forced redundancies" to the following section, "if there are any other
situations that you consider important enough to warrant immediate action please
specify". Therefore, he must have considered that depending on the circumstances
involved his members might be concerned enough to take some kind of action.
The one category where all the stewards who answered either thought that their
members would take action or they could not really say was for the dismissal of a
29 Incidentally. this respondent was the only steward who had replied that "to show solidarity with
those I work" was "not at all important" as a reason for union membership; yet if his answers were
true, his members were prepared to stick together to solve their problems.
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Table 5. The number of stewards who thou~ht that their members
would take immediate action under certain circumstances
Circumstances xes Qan't Rawly
Say
A Health and Safety Problem
2 4
The dismissal of a workmate
5 4
A pay dispute
1 4
Changed working conditions
1 4
To ensure that all workers doing
the same job get equal
2 4treatment
workmate; five replied a definite "yes" and four that they "could not really say". This
could be seen as backing the convenor's views and is a positive sign in terms of the
solidarity of the different workgroups within the factory: members would back their
fellow members. A ample of examples illustrate the strength of feeling of the
shopfloor: an entry in the convenor's 1989 notebook after a member was dismissed
read, "lads in PlO shop put buttons in. Management withdrawn notice." Apparently
this was done by the members themselves with no instruction from the senior
stewards; the members stopped work in support of a fellow member and on the same
day the member was reinstated. A later incident also led to the reinstatement of a
section 1 membeee who had been told by management that he was going to be
dismissed after just four weeks, rather than the thirteen weeks' probation period. The
reason was because his work was not up to standard, and yet, in some instances, he
had produced more liners than workers who had been there for years. The convenor
argued that he had only been there for four weeks, had not been shown his job
properly and had not been given any training. As the convenor put it at the time,
"word has already got round the shopfloor and the lads are prepared to back the man
all the way." The man kept his job. It appears that management at that time were
wanting to lose some of their most recent recruits, but as the convenor said, "they set
them on, not us" and he had no qualms about telling management that "you've set
them on, they're staying!" The strength of feeling on the shopfloor had some effect at
firm A; the examples show that the shopfloor was prepared to stop work (without a
ballot) over the dismissal of a workmate and in the foundry because of a health and
safety problem (see above).
30 A section I member is a craftsman. although the convenor insisted that it does not mean much
nowadays.
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However, not all members may have had the same level of commitment as others.
Relevant here are the views of an ex-shop steward speaking about the members in his
previous workshop:
"In number [X] shop they're useless. You're fighting a losing battle. They moan and
groan and then when you go into the office to sort things out the majority of them
disappear. They don't back you. There's no solidarity. How can you carry on like that?
They're a generation of I'm all right Jacks. Many of them would live at work if they
could, although they're the first to moan about always being at work! Management
keep putting men from no [X] shop into our shop and because we're on cell working;
many of the men aren't happy about it, especially because those from no [X] shop aren't
always competent with the work that they've been put on to. To make matters worse,
when we have no work in our shop we're sent home, they don't send us to no [Xl shop.
Even in our shop some men will complain, for example, about having to work two
machines, but they continue to do so rather than fight it, even though they know they
have the backing of the stewards and the rest of the workers in the shop ...."3 1
This statement indicates how in one workshop members were not prepared to stick
together even when their steward was prepared to act for them and in another
workshop some workers would carry on regardless of the implications of what they
were being asked to do. This corresponds with the comment from the steward cited
above; members will complain but when it comes down to confronting management
they do not wish to follow it through. Nonetheless, it is possible that even though the
particular stewards were prepared to back their members they lacked the necessary
working style to determine membership participation, which affected the success that
they had with management, so that their members preferred to carry on rather than
fight what they may have perceived as a losing battle.
In comparison, when asked "if any serious problem should occur in the near future do
you think your members would be prepared to take industrial action short of a strike?"
which did not mention whether there would be a ballot or stipulate the kind of
problem, six of the stewards said that their members would be prepared to take action
and two did not know. Only one respondent, a senior steward, thought that his
members would be prepared to take strike action, another did not know and three did
not answer, but five said that their members would not be prepared to take strike
action. There is a possibility that the term strike action means different things to
different people (see Batstone et al 1978). Examples of "the lads" refusing to work
until a problem had been solved were not uncommon occurrences at firm A, but may
not be interpreted as strike action because even though the workers were refusing to
work they were still at work and usually began production again as soon as the
problem was rectified. Even the convenor did not interpret these short stoppages of
work as strikes. He interpreted a strike as a stoppage of work where the workers did
not enter the factory. The senior steward who had replied that threats to stop work
were sufficient to make management concede their demands, also thought that his
members would not be prepared to take any industrial action and yet he could not
really say whether his members would be prepared to take immediate action without a
31 It was in no X shop that many members refused to take/respond to the questionnaires.
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ballot in any of the given circumstances; perhaps he too interpreted industrial action
differently from sudden short stoppages of work.
The answers to the question "what forms of pressure, if any, have been used in
disputes with management at your place of work, since you have been working there?"
indicates that members at firm A had taken various forms of action and might also
suggest that different work groups take different kinds of action; none of the stewards
replied that no forms of pressure had been used. A senior steward, said that workers
had used a "go-slow" as a form of pressure against management, six respondents said
that a "work to rule" had been used, nine said that overtime bans had been in
operation, seven that threats to stop work had been issued and six replied that strike
action had been implemented. This strike action probably referred to an all out -strike
that occurred at firm A some time during the early 1980s over a pay dispute.
As no ballots32 had been organised by the national organisation of the
AEEU at firm A any industrial action which had taken place since 1984
should be described as unlawful. Issues recorded in the convenor's
notebooks show that various forms of action had taken place since
1987; therefore, the law on balloting and industrial action appears to
have had little effect on the union or management at firm A.
8:11 The Legislation
Eight of the respondents (including the senior stewards) felt that the changes in the law
had had an effect upon the forms of industrial action used at their workplace and one
steward did not answer the question. The one steward who thought that the law had
had no effect on the forms of industrial action taken was also the steward who claimed
that his members would take immediate action without a ballot under all the given
circumstances. However, the questionnaire did not ask what kind of effect the
stewards thought that the law had had on the forms of action taken, and in the light of
the above answers it is possible that it is only strike action that the stewards felt their
members would not take. Yet examples from fum A, and the fact that nine of the
respondents felt that their members might possibly take action in the event of the
dismissal of a workmate, and immediate action usually consisted of a short stoppage
of work, suggest that the legislation cannot have had an overwhelming effect upon
industrial action at fum A.
Similarly eight of the respondents thought that the changes in the law had had an effect
on the way that negotiations were conducted between their workplace union and
management. However, two of those who thought the law had had an effect upon
industrial action did not feel that it had had an effect on the way negotiations were
conducted with management; one was a senior steward. The convenor felt that the
changes in the law had had no effect on how negotiations with management were
conducted and as it was him and sometimes his senior stewards who negotiated with
32 Secret workplace ballots were held at firm A organised by the workplace union.
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the higher levels of management, the other stewards may not have been aware of how
these negotiations were conducted. It is possible that their own shop managers quoted
the law to them when they were trying to negotiate. It could also be argued that as the
convenor had only been bargaining with higher management since 1987; some of the
legislation was already in force and, therefore, his negotiations would not be greatly
affected by the changes made after that date. However, he insisted that the legislation
did not enter into his or "our", as he would have said, dealings with management.
Not all the stewards were aware of all the trade union legislation, which might indicate
that despite their replies to whether it had had an effect at their workplace it had
actually had little effect upon firm A's union organisation and its relationship with
management. When asked to indicate whether they thought a list of statements were
true or false, there was only one statement which all the stewards (including the
convenor) identified correctly as false: "A person can be rightfully dismissed because
of his/her union membership". For most of the other statements the majority of the
stewards, including the convenor, knew the correct answer, (see table 6); however,
there were three statements which only a minority of the respondents knew the answer
to. It is significant that not all the stewards were aware of the law and how it may
affect them and their members. If stewards are not aware of certain facts, especially
where industrial action is concerned, it suggests that their members may be even less
informed. This was not confined to the stewards at firm A. Welch (1993) also found
that misunderstandings of the law were oommon, especially in relation to the legal
liability of the balloting procedures and picketing; he found that lay representatives
believed that a breach of the criminal law was involved. This, it appears, was still
true. The union journals, especially the one for union representatives, were
informative on legislative matters which may affect workers and union members; the
results suggest that stewards do not pay a lot of attention to these. The convenor at
least could be seen as up to date in his knowledge of the law: he knew all the answers
except one which he was unsure off - the employer's right to dismiss employees for
taking industrial action based on working to oontract.
The most surprising result was the fact that three of the stewards replied that it was
false that "an employer must get an employee's written permission every three years
before deducting union subscriptions from hislher wages". After many union
journals advertising this and the fact that all the stewards paid their subscriptions by
this method (and all union members except one had re-signed at firm A) makes one
wonder if some of the stewards paid any attention to what was happening in their
workplace let alone in the union as a whole! Nevertheless, it is perhaps significant that
all except one respondent knew that members of the union's executive committee can
no longer retain the post as long as they wish; this may indicate that the stewards do
vote in their union's elections.
It is a good sign that a oommon misconception that postal ballots protect strikers from
dismissal was not believed and the majority of stewards knew that their national union
was protected from legal liability by the organisation of a postal strike ballot. Yet there
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Table 6. Shop stewards' awareness of the legislation
Thenumbe of stew an s replying
Statements True False Don't
Koo_w
It is a criminal offence for industrial action to be 8 3 * 0
organised without first holding a secret ballot.
Postal ballots protect strikers from dismissal. 0 10* 1
The organisation of a postal ballot protects the 9* 0 2national union from legal liability if a strike is
called in support of a pay claim.
The employer has no right to dismiss employees
5 4* 2for taking industrial action based on "working to
contract", such as an overtime ban.
Even with a majority vote in favour, striking in 7* 0 4support of workers at another workplace is
unlawful.
Organising industrial action short of a strike 8* 2 1without a postal ballot could involve your
national union incurring legal liability .
A trade union member can obtain a court order to 7* 1 3stop a union from taking industrial
action without a properly conducted ballot.
It is only lawful for a person to peacefully picket 9* 2 0at or near his/her own place of work.
Each member ofa trade union's executive 0 10* 1committee can retain the post as long as they
wish.
An employer must get an employee's written 8* 3 0permission every three years before deducting
union subscriptions from bislber wages.
A person can be rightfully dismissed because 0 11* 0of bis/her union membership.
When an employer makes a single union deal
with a particular union, all union members in 5 5* 1
that workplace must be members of that union.
Stewards were asked to indicate whether they thought a list of statements were true or false. The answers are
set out above; the convenor's answers are included. An asterix against the result indicates the correct answer
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were mixed feelings about whether a trade union should comply with a court order to
call off a strike; four thought it should, four that it should not, one was not sure and
one did not answer the question. These answers suggest that there may have been a
difference of opinion among the stewards as to whether the law should be observed.
It could also be argued that the answers may depend upon whether the respondents
were thinking of their workplace union or the national union as a whole when
answering the question; there may be a difference in a court telling the national union
to call off a strike and the workplace union actually doing so.
Balloting at firm A took the form of a workshop secret ballot so that there was no
intimidation ofmembers.33 However, one steward said that voting was carried out by
a show of hands and a workplace secret ballot; therefore, it is possible that some
individual workshop issues, where the convenor was not involved, may have been
voted on by a show of hands or by other means; one steward replied that a vote was
usually carried out by "other" means to those indicated but he did not say how.
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that all "serious" issues were voted on by a workplace
secret ballot; eight of the respondents said that voting was usually carried out by this
method. Judging by the results of ballots (recorded in the convenor's notebooks) the
secret ballots did prevent intimidation; the majority of the recorded results had been
fairly close with the odd exception; for example, there was an overwhelming vote in
favour of a week of choice for their annual holidays.
The firm had never held a postal ballot organised by the national union, even though a
number of overtime bans had been implemented during the last ten years. Rather than
balloting34 their members on whether to impose an overtime ban, the union
representatives imposed a "voluntary ban", whereby members refused any offer of
overtime due to other commitments.35 The district secretary did not agree with this
method and preferred to "turn a blind eye" to it. However, this method of taking
action appeared to work. One example can be quoted from the convenor's notebook:
"Monday 6.7.87.
Had stewards together regarding 25p drop in bonus ....
Ban on overtime immediate.
Had a meeting of shopfloor nights on above.
Tuesday 7.7.87.
Meeting shopfloor. Bonus overtime.
Plant overtime ban until bonus system on overtime is sorted out with [member of
management].
WednesdAy 8.7.87.
Meeting with [two members of management] 10.30 am regarding drop in bonus in relation
33 According to the convenor there had only been one vote using a show of hands since 1987 and "it
was such a farce", that every vote taken at firm A, whether for steward elections, a pay claim or some
other issue, was made by a secret workplace ballot.
34 This is not strictly true. A workplace secret ballot may have taken place to determine whether
members wished to impose an overtime ban; however, the correct procedure relating to industrial
action, that is a postal ballot, carried out to the specifications stipulated by statute, was not followed.
35 Even though the national agreement stipulated that members must be willing to work overtime if
called upon to do so.
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to machines working above 39hrs. Gone back to status quo everything back to normal.
Back pay to personnel who should have received full bonus will be paid.
Shopfloor meeting 12.45 pm.
Shopfloor meeting 9.0Opm ....
Plant management conceded on all points. Ban on overtime off Thursday 9.7.87. 7.30 am."
(Convenor's notebook 1987.)
This overtime ban, which was implemented immediately, with no delay due to having
to organise a postal ballot, lasted three days and succeeded in its aim. The workers
backed the stewards and they were rewarded for it; however, if the correct procedures
on industrial action had been followed it is highly likely that the time limit between the
problem occurring and the ban taking place may have led to a different situation.
Two of the stewards said that they would be prepared to go against a majority vote in a
ballot and two were not sure. If a shopfloor representative is prepared to go against a
majority decision made by his/her members, it could be argued that it is not a very
good example of leadership or democracy. However, as the question did not ask
anything about the type of situation or vote; it might be possible that the steward
would back his members if they voted overwhelmingly opposite to the rest of the
workforce in a factory wide ballot rather than just an individual workshop ballot.
The check-off regulations are perhaps the only other aspect of the legislation which
may have had some effect at firm A. The check-off forms were all signed by August
1994 as required by the legislation; however, it was the union who did the work not
the employers, whom the legislation puts the onus on to ensure that everything is done
correctly. In addition it was the full time officer (PTO) who was pushing the lay
representatives to get the check -off sheets, which had been prepared by the national
union, signed by every check-off paying member. Whether they will be re-signed in
each three year period is a good question; it is most likely that the FrO will make sure
that everything is signed and up to date before the next due date. The management at
firm A certainly did not appear to be concerned about whether members gave their
written consent every three years or not; according to the convenor, the managers in
the cash office had said "well who's going to come round and check up?". The
convenor argued that it was a lot of unnecessary work taking up valuable time. In
addition members at firm A were not notified in their wage packets of the increase in
their subscriptions deducted from their pay, which employers are required to do.
The ten shop stewards felt that the changes in the law had had a negative affect upon
trade unions in general. However, the convenor replied that it had had a positive
effect. When questioned further on this it emerged that the convenor believed that the
legislation had had a positive effect on trade unions from the point of view of the
Conservativesse: "the legislation has shackled us up", he commented; "all the union
leaders now say is 'you've got to tow the line"'. He was of the opinion that his
national body was constantly trying to keep workplace organisations in check, which
36 The convenor also believed that during the 1970s trade unions nationally did act recklessly,
especially by holding tbe country to ransom. They, therefore, only bad themselves to blame for the
anti-union stance taken by the Conservative governments.
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was not a good thing for workplace organisations. However, he believed that the
balloting arrangements were the one good thing to stem from the legislation even
though they were not strictly followed at firm A.
Despite the stewards' replies, it does appear that the legislationhad had
little effect upon the union organisation at finn A, at least in terms of
its "power" and the willingness of members to take action in support of
a grievance. With the exception of short, unofficial stoppages of work,
unofficial overtime bans appeared to be the normal route taken. The
fact that the stewards were not aware of some aspects of the legislation
suggests that, either, the national union was not getting its infonnation
across or that because the union at firm A was independent and acted in
its own way regardless of the law and the "external" union, shop
stewards felt no need to ensure that they were aware of "the law".
Indeed, it was rare that the "external" union was notified of any
problems encountered.
8:12 The national union
The FrO responsible for the fum was not considered to be a prominent or even
necessary figure within the workplace. The convenor thought that a better deal was
gained by himself and the leading stewards through workshop bargaining than by
FIOs and an example from the 1994 pay negotiations confirms his argument. This
was the only dispute to be taken outside the factory to the "external" union while the
convenor had held his position; it was eventually settled to everyone's satisfaction,
but it was the convenor rather than the district secretary who put forward the final
settlement. After the district secretary had been called in negotiations were taken out of
the convenor's hands. The FrO had negotiated a deal that was satisfactory in all
respects but one; the initial payments were not to begin until October. The secretary
was satisfied with this whereas the members wanted the payments to be backdated to
April, (which they had previously enjoyed), and were not prepared to accept the deal.
The district secretary would not put this to management; however, when the convenor
was finally allowed to explain the situation, management agreed.
At firm A the shopfloor representatives did act upon the wishes of their membership;
the point above where the convenor put forward the fmal settlement in the disputed pay
claim illustrates this. This supports Edwards' (1978) argument that constraints on
union representatives' negotiations with management were felt to come from the
membership rather than from the "union hierarchy" and largely confirms the
conclusion of Heery and Kelly (1990) that lay representatives retained most control
over the setting of union objectives. However, their assertion that the FrO then
refines those objects and guides negotiations towards a settlement is only partially true
in this example. Certainly the district secretary guided the negotiations but not totally
to the satisfaction of the shopfloor. It was the lay representative who put forward the
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final proposal that ended the deadlock, something the FrO was not prepared to do.37
The FrO did not play an important role in firm A's negotiations and the convenor
would not have liked to see him play one.38 All the senior stewards agreed with him;
however, two of the stewards who completed the questionnaire replied that the FrO
did play an important role in negotiations at their workplace. The explanation for this
may lie with the fact that if the FrO was called into a firm it was the convenor who he
dealt with. Therefore shop stewards, other than the senior stewards, may not be
aware of what did happen. Indeed, one of these respondents said that he never met a
FrO and the other only when the "need arises" (see below). The fact that the district
secretary was called in in 1994 may have influenced their answers. These
explanations are also suggested by the fact that another two stewards replied that they
were not sure whether the FrO played an important part in their workplace
negotiations.
When asked "how often do you meet a FrO on union business?" seven stewards
replied "never", one replied "every 3 months" ,one "every 6 months" and the last one
replied "whenever the need arises". The two stewards who met their FrO every 3 and
6 months were both senior stewards who attended the branch "whenever possible";
therefore it is possible that it was here where they met their FrO. Indeed, the
respondent who met his FrO every three months was also the only steward to reply
that it was "necessary to meet a FrO often", oddly enough with the exception of the
fact that he did not see the workplace union as different from the national union, none
of his other answers indicated any dissatisfaction with his workplace union and
therefore give any reason as to why he felt it necessary to see his FrO often. The
senior steward who replied that he met a FrO every 6 months on union business also
stated that he felt it was not necessary to meet a FrO often; it is highly likely that this
steward attended the six monthly shop stewards' meetings where he was certain to
meet the district secretary.
The respondent who met his FrO "whenever the need arose" also attended the branch
"sometimes". It may be the case that he thought of the branch officials as Fl'Os; he
thought of his workplace union as different from the national union and therefore the
branch may have been seen as part of the national union especially as it was not part of
the workplace. Regarding the workplace itself all his answers were positive and he
had said it was not necessary to meet a FrO often; perhaps he did not meet the FrO at
37 At firm A, management, the convenor, the senior stewards and a shop steward bargained about pay
around the table. The negotiated proposals were always put to the members who voted on whether to
accept them or not in a secret workplace ballot. The votes were counted by members watched over by
a steward.
38 The convenor did not see the FrO often. He contacted him only if he had a problem that he could
not sort out himself, such as some of his members not having the correct union numbers according to
the branch register. These kinds of problems were those which were not directly related to the
workplace but which caused immense problems when a member wished to make a claim.
Alternatively, the district secretary at times contacted the convenor; this was usually when he wanted
something doing, such as the signing of the check-off forms, or if he had any special information for
him, such as to "tell all your members to vote 'yes' to the proposed rule book changes".
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all because the "need never arose". However, he did reply that the FrO played an
important part in negotiations at the workplace. This could be due to the reasons
mentioned above.
It was evident when talking to the convenor and senior stewards that they had grave
reservations about the district secretary and their national union's policies. In
particular there was a feeling that the Executive Council were trying to impose their
wishes upon the membership rather than the reverse. For example, the proposed rule
book changes of 1996 stirred up a lot of unrest locally as well as at ftrm A. A letter
was sent to all members with a ballot paper, recommending that members vote "yes" to
the proposed new rule book. Concerned unionists thought that the letter actually told
members to vote "yes" rather than asking their opinion. The letter set out the proposed
changes in such a way that it created the impression of improvement for members and
yet, as the local district committeea? illustrated clearly, the proposed changes actually
abolished many of the existing beneftts; these were not set out in the letter from the
Executive Council. Many members at ftrm A were upset when they learned of this
because they had already sent their ballot form back to the union, which shows how
even a union which prides itself on being "membership led" can deceive its members
into doing things that are not in their best interests. This according to the stewards at
firm A was undemocratic; members should have been told all the facts so that they
could make their own decision. "We've been misled again" commented the convenor.
The district secretary was looked upon as working for the national union and "looking
after his own job" rather than his ftrst concerns being with the members. The shop
stewards saw themselves as working for their members rather than for the national
union. The example above about the pay negotiations when the district secretary was
brought in indicates to the senior stewards where their different priorities lie; the
district secretary could not understand why the members would not settle for his
negotiated deal with management; the stewards knew the reason as they worked
alongside those members. A similar argument was put forward by the convenor as to
why full time stewards are not to be recommended: full time stewards are not as in
touch with the shopfloor as lay stewards and they might be looked upon as part of
management. If anything happened in the plant that affects the workers it also affects
lay stewards, whereas full time stewards would not be affected, for example, by
bonus rates or overtime rates. In addition a full time steward may be, like a FrO,
more affiliated to the national union than hislher members and as the national union
abided by the law, for example governing industrial action, members may not get the
best deal possible by being able to act on a grievance immediately.
Again it could be a case of the different personalities of those involved. The MS
convenor contended that the previous district secretary was very different from the
present one and "was much better". The convenor's notebooks referred to the
previous secretary now and again; however, it appears that he used him more for
39 The district secretary, who was a member of the district committee would not, publicly at least,
endorse the criticisms made by the district committee.
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information than to use his services in the workplace, for example, one notebook entry
said: "Check [name FrO] payment of wages into bank for new starters (is it legal?)".
It could also be the case that in the years covered by the notebooks the convenor
needed more guidance as he had just taken up the position; "I used to be led when I
first started; then I realised what was happening. It's a matter of experience."
The MS convenor was interested in national and local union policy as well as his own
workplace union and he attended most union meetings arranged outside the workplace;
however, there was a distinct dissatisfaction with the Executive Council and a feeling
that the higher up the union hierarchy a person moved the more he/she lost hislher
afftliation to the realities of the workplace and members' problems.sv It may be the
case that a person becomes afftliated with those that he/she works for; the stewards
viewed themselves as working for their members, whereas even though Fl'Os are
responsible for the members under their jurisdiction, because they work for the
national union, they tend to follow its instructions, which may be contrary to
members' wishes. Of course, it is important that the national union remains within the
law so as to protect its members. It may be the case that where an independent
workplace organisation exists which might solve members' grievances by taking
immediate, albeit unofftcial action, members may view their national union as
inefftcient due to the length of time that it would take to organise offtcial action,
especially because of the time limit between the grievance, for example the dismissal of
a member, and the go ahead for any action to take place. The convenor had thought of
putting himself forward for the district committee, but had second thoughts because
"I've got enough on at work". If this was the case for many dedicated shop stewards
then local union organisations outside the workplace may eventually become isolated
from the realities of the workplace because those with the best knowledge of their
members' needs and problems may remain within their own workplaces.O A
comment from one of the stewards aptly sums this up:
"I have no confidence in the officials running the union no better than our management.
Most of the union work is now done at works level. May as well have our own local
union. In my opinion most top union officials, same as politics, see it as a job with no
real feeling for principles. Nobody wants to fight anymore. "
It appears that, other than union journals, communication between the national union
and the shopfloor was virtually non-existent (with the exception of the critical stance of
the local unit). The lack of information on the presidential election illustrates this.
Any information about the AEEU generally that the convenor was informed about he
passed onto his members; however, they were only informed by word of mouth and
40 When asked about the previous district secretary the convenor said that since he had moved further
up the union hierarchy he had changed again. (Beynon, 1973, found similar changes among the
stewards who became officials in his study of Ford.)
41 Indeed, now that the district committee and district shop stewards' meetings have been disbanded,
local organisation may disintegrate altogether, unless a suggestion by a prominent figure within the
local movement is taken up: that is, that local stewards who wish to meet as before should do so
unofficially, to ensure that knowledge of local issues is shared between workplaces and that stewards
can help each other to overcome their problems.
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information pasted onto the notice boards; regular meetings were not arranged at the
workplace. However, the information passed onto the convenor was usually about the
AEEU locally rather than nationally and this tended to be when local activists were
opposing a particular national decision. Nevertheless, the convenor insisted that the
majority of members at firm A were interested in general union information as well as
their workplace organisation and the example about the proposed rule book changes
indicates that members did pay attention to the information that they were given. It
also shows how local activists gave members more information than their national
union; the rule book changes have led to every disadvantage highlighted by the local
district committee, including its disbandment.42 The only way that the central union
got its message over to members on the shopfloor was by sending them mail
individually and this, it seems, was only when the national union wanted membership
support.
The majority of the stewards considered their national union to be a different entity to
their workplace organisation and they were more concerned with the politics of the
workplace. When the convenor was asked "in your opinion, when members think of
the union, would you say they think of their shop steward or yourself as opposed to
the national union?" he replied "the members are the union, along with the
stewards and the convenor". Six of the stewards said that they thought of their
workplace union as different from the national union. Of the three stewards who did
not see the workplace union as different from the national union, two gave relatively
favourable answers about the union in the workplace and saw the union as effective.
However, one felt it necessary to meet a FrO often, which may explain his answer; if
he met a FrO every three months as he stated, his conception of the union may merge
the two organisations; that is the workplace and the national organisations remain as
one. The other steward also thought that the FTO played an important part in
workplace negotiations which may explain why the two organisations were seen as the
same to him. However, the third steward's questionnaire answers painted a rather
negative view of the workplace union and overall he felt that the union was not
effective at the workplace.
The union was in the workplace where "most union work is done,
where the lads are together"43 and the workplace organisation was
considered to be more effective than the FTO, who did not play an
important role within the tirm. Indeed, the stewards worked for their
members rather than the national union. This is not to say that the
national union was unimportant, but it was considered to be totally out
of touch with members' tirst priorities. Martin's (1992) assertion that
the national union is a provider of information and services appears to
be upheld. Even the national union's assertion that membership is a
42 It is possible that the national union wanted to dispose of local organisations, such as the district
committees, because of their opposition to national policies and the way that they could influence
local opinions.
43Comment made at one of firm A's shop stewards' committee meetings.
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cheap form of insurance was only agreed to by four of the stewards.
However, all the stewards thought that "to get members' benefits" was
an important reason for membership but they saw the insurance aspect
of unionism as secondary to the realities of the workplace. This would
confirm the opinions of stewards locally (see previous chapter).
8: 13 The importance 0/ the leadership role
The convenor contended that members were united at firm A and that when he was
dealing with management he was confident that if necessary he would get their
backing. Examples did tend to confirm that members at firm A were prepared to stick
together over an issue, even if that issue may have only initially affected one particular
member, which may indicate that individualism has not yet taken over from
collectivism. However, it could still reflect the self-interested nature of individual
members. Anything to do with the protection of work related benefits, changing
working practices and threatened dismissal has implications for the whole workforce.
Sticking together over an issue which may only initially affect one worker could be
looked upon as the workers acting in their own self-interests albeit "collective self-
interests" or "instrumental collectivism" as Goldthorpe et al (1968) termed it.
The cohesiveness of the workforce most likely revolves around the personalities of its
representatives and in particular the main representative or "leader" - the convenor,
who with his own methods of negotiating with management managed to involve the
workforce in all major decisions affecting them and usually secured a deal that was
satisfactory to all concerned. The convenor was dedicated to his job and felt an
overwhelming sense of responsibility towards his members; "I do the job from the
heart not from the pocket or anything else". He had thought about giving up the
position but he had "got the lads and lasses to think about" and he would put himself
out to ensure that "the lads and lasses are OK". He even attended work out of his
normal hours to make sure that members were informed of various things that were
happening, and even when he had broken his fingers he still attended work regularly
to ensure that things were running smoothly. This ties in with his answer to the
question "what kinds of issues are you most concerned with?" "To look after the
rights of all union members (men and women) under my control" was his reply.
Not all members may agree with the stewards. On at least one occasion a shopfloor
meeting was effectively sabotaged by an unknown person who altered the time of the
meeting on the notice that had been put up, so that many members arrived after the
meeting had been adjourned after being disrupted by one member who did not agree
with the proposals that had been put forward. The situation was eventually resolved to
the satisfaction of the majority of the workforce. The member who disrupted the
meeting also became a steward at the following elections and, according to the
convenor, had begun to see things in a slightly different light. Stewards were also
aware that some members "will say we should do this and that but whether they are
prepared to do it is a different matter". They tended to blame the fact that "many
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people have been pushed into a corner by the [Conservative] government". It might
have been a good thing that threats issued to management by the convenor were
usually sufficient to secure a deal. Even some of the stewards at times acted on their
own and then backed down; as the convenor put it: "Some stewards override you and
then back down later. As a steward they can say what they like and then hide behind
the wall. As convenor it's me who has to go into management and face the music."
This indicates the importance of the leadership role of the convenor.
The fact that he rarely said "I" when talking about the union and its
dealings with management, he always said "we" or "us", signified that
rather than working for himself he was working for the union. He had
a commitment to collectivism that was passed down to his members.
Even though the convenor and the senior stewards admitted to an
awareness of the problems faced by management and that the
union/management relationship appeared to be quite good there was still
a distinct impression of an "us and them" approach, the workers versus
management; "it's a battle" was one comment. In fact stewards at firm
A did perceive the MS convenor as having bargaining "power over
management" and he was often reminded of this. However, while the
convenor saw the "union" as having a certain amount of bargaining
power, he did not see himself as being "powerful"; to him it was not a
case of having "power", it was more a case of standing your ground
and being confident even if you have to "call management's bluff".
The convenor was seen as the person with the "power over
management"; yet, without the backing of the members that "power"
would most likely not have existed at all.
8:14 Trade Union Power
When asked "do you feel that oyerall your union is effective at your workplace?"
seven of the stewards who answered the questionnaire replied "yes" and the convenor
agreed with them. However, one steward was "not sure" and two thought that the
union was not effective in the workplace. These two stewards may have had particular
reasons for believing this. It may have been the case that they had bad relationships
with their shop managers and that in their particular workshops their members were
not prepared to back them on any issues. Both these stewards thought that
management/union relations were "not at all good", and neither was satisfied with the
outcomes of their discussions with management. As it appears that it is actually the lay
representative who influences members' perceptions about their union, it is possible
that neither of these stewards had developed the style of working necessary to
determine membership participation in the affairs that involved them and as
membership participation appears to be related to the level of success that the shopfloor
unit has when negotiating with management, they had less success than their peers in
adjoining workshops. One of them had only been a steward for less than a year; so it
is possible that he may develop his negotiating skills with experience. However, he
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must have felt that the union had some effect at firm A, even if not overall, because he
had replied that being in a union did make a difference in the case of being unfairly
dismissed, being accused of something by your employer, having your conditions of
work changed, having an accident at work and in preventing harassment and
discrimination. Similarly, the other steward who did not think that the union was
effective only replied that being in a union did not make a difference to two of the
given circumstances: efficient health and safety and having your conditions of work
changed; so he, too, must have thought that the union at firm A had had an effect on
some issues. It might be significant that these two stewards were also the only two
not to mention pay and working conditions as their major concerns as shop stewards;
they may have had other ideas about what the union should have been doing at firm A.
The evidence suggests that the union at flrm A did have the capacity or
ability to produce effects, and if trade union power is defined as the
union's capacity to defend and advance its members' interests, by
achieving desired goals, the union at firm A could be described as
"powerful". Members' interests were protected; for example,union pressure
had retained the jobs of people dismissed for legitimate offences under the work's
"Industrial Relations Agreement"; workers moved to less skilled jobs had retained
their skilled bonus and brothers and sisters in law were allowed paid days off for
"funeral leave" negotiated as part of the pay talks. Yet only two of the respondents
(one a senior steward) and the convenor felt that their workplace union had "about the
right amount of power", seven thought that it had "too little" and one "far too little".
Perhaps they expected more from their union. It may be the case that once members
become accustomed to the benefits that a workplace organisation provides they take it
for granted that those benefits are a normal part of the working day and think that their
union should do more. Two members at fum A, who had previously left the firm,
admitted that it was only when they obtained employment elsewhere that they realised
just how effective the union was at fum A when protecting members' interests.
When asked if they thought that in the country as a whole, trade unions have too much
or too little power, the answers were very similar; two stewards and the convenor
thought that they had "about the right amount" and eight felt that they had "too little
power". Only one of the stewards who thought that the workplace union had the
"right amount of power" thought that unions in the country as whole did; therefore,
one steward felt that whereas unions in the country as a whole had "too little power"
his workplace union had "the right amount", suggesting that he did perceive the union
at fum A as "powerful".
Management did back the workplace union but not necessarily the national union+";
the check-off arrangements are an example here. It is possible that a change of
management may change the nature of the management/union relationship. A point
44 Management did not like to have to resort to their superiors outside the factory. which they saw as
an admission of not being able to manage efficiently. If the national union should have been called in
then they would have had to call in their outside sources.
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brought up at a shop stewards' committee meeting was that managers from a firm
supplied components by firm A apparently did not agree with the type of relationship
that the union had with management. In particular, the fact that union representatives
were not frightened to talk to their employers and were generally given all the
information that they asked for astounded them and they were amazed at the freedom
the shop stewards had to move around the factory to see their members. This indicates
that unions at the customer firm did not have the same kind of relationship with their
employers, either because of the employer's attitude or maybe because of the
communication styles of their union representatives.
The MS convenor was perceived as being "powerful" by some of the
stewards and the union's effectiveness appears to revolve around how
he worked with management and members. He felt that the union had a
lot of influence upon what actually happened within the workplace and
thought that it was actually helping management to run the firm and
solve their problems more efficiently than they would have done alone.
This confirms Brown's (1994) suggestion that without a union presence
companies merely manage labour badly; the union benefits its
members, management and the firm overall. The personality and style
of working of the main lay representative do appear to be essential
ingredients for successful unionism within the workplace. However, a
change of leadership style could be disastrous and lead to a different
management/union relationship as happened in the foundry;
nevertheless, the senior stewards were beginning to learn from the
convenor and build on his experience when negotiating with
management themselves. If they continued in the same way there is no
reason why the union organisation at firm A should not continue as it
has done for many years to come, even after the present convenor
retires, providing that they use the right style of working and ensure
membership participation in the workplace. Following Fosh (1993),
there is no reason why a change of leadership in the foundry should not
alter the fortunes of the union in that workshop.
8:15 Conclusions
The evidence suggests that for the majority of stewards the workplace union was seen
as a different entity from the national union and the national union was not considered
necessary to the efficient running of their "union" or their firm. It can be
concluded that the shopfloor is "the union" as far as the majority of
stewards are concerned.
It appears that the stewards did base their perceptions of how successful the union was
at the workplace on the success that they had with their own workplace managers;
those who were not satisfied with the outcomes of their own negotiations tended to
feel that the union was not effective overall. Therefore, it is most likely that to
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members the extent of their union's power will be measured by the
level of success that they have in the workplace in achieving their aims.
However, the majority of the stewards did feel that overall the union
was effective and the evidence suggests that a "powerful" union did
operate within the workplace.
It appears that the union's overall relationship with management and the success that it
had related to the personality and style of working of the main lay representative - the
convenor. However, without the backing of the members his level of success might
have been much less. It can be argued that it is the local leader's style
which is essential in determining membership participation and interest
in workplace unionism and therefore the level of success that the union
has when dealing with management. The main lay representative, then,
at least at firm A, appears to be one of the essential ingredients for
successful unionism in the workplace.
The legislation appears to have had little effect on the convenor's ways of bargaining
with management, though it may have affected some of the individual stewards.
However, as the stewards were not aware of all the legislation it is most likely that
overall the legislationhad had little effect at firm A; certainly members appeared to be
prepared to stop work immediately if they felt that an issue worth fighting for had
arisen, particularly in relation to the dismissal of a workmate, and overtimes bans had
been successfully implemented without the properly conducted ballot. It can be
concluded that the legislation is likely to have had little influence on
members' opinions about the power of their trade union.
While members, and even stewards, may be self interested they appear to realise their
goals collectively. All the stewards portrayed a sense of solidarity and realised that
workers achieved their goals by sticking together rather than by working hard on their
own; at least from the stewards' viewpoint collectivism is not yet dead.
The conception that by promoting individualism trade union power will
be reduced does appear to be based on a flawed interpretation of
individualism; that is, members are self interested but many realise
their self interests by collective means. Individualistattitudes may prevail but
they have not necessarily led to the demise of collective organisations. However, this
may depend upon the lay representative and the way that he/she approaches members'
problems; if the representative can portray to members a sense where grievances are
seenas relating to a shared situation of employment rather than as individual problems,
they develop a conception of the union that "encompasses group action" (Fosh 1993,
p581).
Changes in the economic climate had not altered the role of the union at
firm A. In fact, during the firm's short troubled periods the union
appears to have worked even harder to defend and advance its
members' interests; and it succeeded. Even when a union works to
management's advantage as well as its members', it cannot be argued that the role of
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the union has altered. Most established workplace union organisations, it appears,
were acknowledged by managers as helping their companies to run more smoothly
than they might otherwise have done, even before 1979. The union at firm A appears
to be no different to the workplace union organisations of years ago and closely
resembles those organisations identified by researchers in the 1960s and 1970s (for
example, A.I. Marsh 1963, McCarthy 1966, McCarthy and Parker 1968, Goodman
and Whittingham 1968, Batstone et al 1977). However, the economic and
employment climate may have altered the attitudes of some employees
towards trade unions: job protection now appears to be one of the
major benefits of unionism; workers who once may not have
considered joining a union appear to be willing to do so if they feel that
the union is effective at protecting their jobs.
The following chapter sets out the results from the questionnaires which were
completed by union members at firm A and compares them to those of their shop
stewards outlined above. Ifmembers measure the extent of their union's power by the
level of success that they have in the workplace, different members may perceive this
differently depending on the level of success that their own steward has with his shop
manager rather than the success that the union has overall in the workplace.
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Chapter9 "THE UNION" - THE MEMBERS' POINT OF VIEW
9: 1 Introduction
The information presented in this chapter was obtained from questionnaires which
were completed by a sample of members from firm A. 178 questionnaires were
distributed to members in five of the eight machine shops. 119 were returned; a 67%
return rate. The answers may reflect upon the workshop that the respondents worked
in; however, as members were not asked to indicate which workshop they were from,
it is not known exactly how many were returned from each individual shop, though it
is known that some members in one workshop were reluctant to answer the
questionnaires.!
The majority of respondents were male (116), two were female and one did not
answer the question. They all worked over 30 hours a week. 43% (51) were aged
between 31-40, 24% (28) were over 50, 19% (23) were aged between 41-50 and 14%
(17) were 21-30. When the replies to how long they had been union members are
compared with the respondents' age groups many of them had been union members
for all or most of their working life; some members had written "life" against the
question, and others had noted that they had been a member for "x" number of years
but not always with the same union. Only two respondents, both aged over 40, had
been a member for only one year.
Three quarters of the respondents said that they paid their union subscriptions by the
check-off method, 20% said that they paid by direct debit and 4% did not answer.
However, it is possible that some members did not know that having their
subscriptions stopped out of their wages is known as "check-off"; some members had
replied "other" to the question "how do you pay your union subscriptions?" and added
"deducted out of wages".2 All members at firm A were on check-off, so it is possible
that those members who replied that they paid by direct debit were confusing the
methods of payment. It also suggests that at least a quarter of members were not
familiar with some of the terms used by trade unions which might indicate that they
were not interested in unionism other than for personal gain.
9:2 Reasons for membership - individualism or collectivism?
When asked to rate a list of possible reasons for joining a trade union in terms of how
important they were, (see table I), all respondents thought that "protection from future
problems" and "to get higher pay and better working conditions" were important
reasons for membership. However, even though four respondents did not think "to
safeguard my job" was important, this was the reason which the highest percentage of
! This was also the workshop referred to by the ex-shop steward in the previous chapter.
2 This was recorded as "check-off' for the purposes of the study.
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members thought was a "very important" motive for joining a union closely followed
by protection from future problems. When the average score for each reason (omitting
those who "did not know") is taken into account, "to safeguard my job" became the
reason which was considered the most important (see table 2). This substantiates
Hedges' (1994) suggestion that job security may have become a more dominant
concern for workers than improving pay.
Table 1. The importance to individual members of a list of possible reasons for
belon~n~ to a trade union
Possible Reasons very fairly not very not at all don't
important important important important know
To get higher pay & 91 26 0 0 0
better working conditions (76.5%) (21.8%)
To protect me if problems 96 23 0 0 0
come up in the future (80.7%) (19.3%)
To get members' benefits
such as financial 70 31 15 1 0
or health schemes (58.8%) (26.1 %) (12.6%) (0.8%)
To help safeguard my 99 16 3 0 I
job (83.2%) (13.4%) (2.5%) (0.8%)
To use as a workers' voice
against management 70 35 10 3 0
(58.8% ) (29.4%) (8.4% ) (2.5% )
I believe in them in 50 47 13 5 3
principle (42%) (39.5%) (10.9%) (4.2%) (2.5% )
To campaign against 81 26 7 3 I
inequality & injustice (68.1 %) (21.8%) (5.9%) (2.5%) (0.8%)
To show solidarity with 62 36 15 5 0
those I work with (52.1%) (30.3%) (12.6%) (4.2%)
Most of my workmates 49 24 17 24 3
are members (41.2%) (20.2%) (14.3%) (20.2%) (2.5%)
It's a family tradition 20 II 20 64 2
(16.8%) (9.2%) (16.8%) (53.8% ) (1.7% )
On their own each of the first four reasons for membership could be considered as
individualistic reasons; it is in the person's own interests to get higher pay, better
working conditions, protection from future problems, safeguard his/her job and to get
members' benefits. However, when the other given reasons for membership are taken
into account, individualism, at least for the majority of the sample, was merged with
collectivist attitudes which supports the argument that individual goals, such as higher
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pay, become collective goals. Despite the fact that 85% of respondents thought "to
get members' benefits" was an important reason for membership, benefits ranked
sixth, behind workers' voice and to campaign against inequality, when the average
ratings for each reason were taken into account (see table 2). Over 80% of
respondents considered that "to show solidarity with those I work" and "to use as a
workers' voice against management" were important reasons for membership, with
over half replying that they were "very important" ones, which suggests that
collectivism is not yet a thing of the past. As trade unions tend to be viewed as
embodying collectivist principles, the fact that over 80% of respondents believed in
them in principle also endorsed this)
"Most of my workmates are members" was considered an important reason for union
membership by 61% of the respondents. However, this reason for membership may
have been interpreted differently by different individuals. Rather than taking it to mean
that because "my workmates are members I should join", some members interpreted
the statement as "it is important that all workmates are members", that is, a closed shop
situation. One member had written "all workmates should be members" underneath
the question. If this was how those members who said this reason was an important
one interpreted the statement, it confirms the view that collectivism is not yet dead and
suggests that if the Conservatives wished to replace the collectivist outlook of union
members with a purely individualistic one, they had failed, at least at firm A. This
argument was also substantiated by the fact that the majority of respondents (88%)
thought that workers achieved their goals by sticking together rather than by working
hard on their own.s
However, individualism may prevail for a small minority of trade union members. At
least eight respondents thought all the collectivist reasons for membership were not
important. Yet, all these members thought the individualistic reasons were important
suggesting that they had only a personal interest in union membership. One of these
respondents also thought that "most of my workmates are members" was an important
reason for membership, suggesting that, perhaps, he was coerced into membership
because his fellow workers were members. Nevertheless, it would be expected that
these respondents would have considered that workers achieved their goals by
working hard on their own, but this was not the case. Therefore, even though the
collectivist reasons were not considered important enough to warrant union
membership, it was still acknowledged that the best way of achieving goals, even if
those goals were individual ones, was by working as a collective rather than as an
3 The only given reason for membership not rated important by the majority of respondents was "it's
a family tradition". However, except for one, those wbo considered family tradition to be important
also said that all the other reasons were; family tradition may instil in workers a deeper commitment
to unionism.
4 One member had commented that workers achieved their goals by sticking together "especially in a
large firm. In a small firm by working bard on their own." Suggesting that individualism alone may
prevail in smaller firms where only a few employees work; hard work may gain the worker personal
concessions, especially if the employer can see wbo is doing what. This environment would become
very competitive. Therefore, the work situation itself may foster collective strategies.
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individual. Therefore, even if workers are solely individualistic, individualism has not
yet removed the need for collectivism in the workplace. Authors (for example,
Roberts 1987, Metcalf 1993a) who claimed that collectivism had been undermined by
the promotion of individualism appear to have been wrong.
Those members who did not rate the collectivist reasons as important and those who
thought that workers achieved their goals by working hard on their own, belonged to
either the 31-40 age group or the over 50s. The replies from all the youngest
respondents, the 21-30 age group, indicate that support for trade unionism and its
collective principles is not waning in those workers who had only been employed
since Mrs Thatcher came to office in 1979. This is slightly different to the results of
the 7th British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS7): Millward (1990) concluded that
solidaristic reasons for membership were more relevant for the older age groups.
Millward also found that family tradition was more often cited as a reason for union
membership by older men and this was borne out.5 This suggests that reasons other
than family ties are driving young people to become union members. The changes in
employment conditions during the 1980s and 1990s may have enhanced the need for
workers' protection, particularly for younger workers. They tend to be more
vulnerable to employers' new contracts of employment, which stipulate, for example,
a certain commitment to the company, and lower rates of pay than the more established
older workers. Therefore, when there is a union on site younger employees may feel
that they are better protected by becoming a union member than by being left to the
mercy of their employer.
Table 2. Reasons for membership ranked accordini: to the
ayeraee ratin~s of each
Reason Average rating
Safeguard job 1.174
Protection from future problems 1.202
Higher pay I better working conds 1.211
Campaign against inequality 1.404
Workers' voice against management 1.523
Members' benefits 1.550
To show solidarity 1.670
Believe in them in principle 1.752
Workmates are members 2.165
Family tradition 3.101
Rating scale - very important = I, fairly important = 2,
not very important = 3, not at all important = 4.
The average ratings do not include the "don't know" responses.
Eighteen members had added other reasons which they considered important ones for
5 Only 6% of the 21-30 age group said that family tradition was an important reason for membership,
whereas a quarter of members in each of the 31-40 and 41-50 age groups thought so and 39% of those
who were over 50 said that this was an important reason.
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membership. Seven of these referred to having an accident at work. One member
elaborated further on this: "in 1995 I feel the only reason for being in a trade union is
if I have an accident my union lawyers will protect and fight for me." Yet, despite this
rather negative opinion this member had rated all the other reasons for membership
positively. Five referred directly to the use of the union's lawyers: "professional
advice if problems occur at work". "Compensation claims". "For legal claims". "To
cover any legal costs if incurred" and "use of union's lawyers so as to be treated
fairly". All these reasons could also be classed under the heading "to protect me if
problems come up in the future"; however, the members concerned must have
considered that protection against accidents and legal costs were singularly important.
The other reasons related either to management: "To keep management from getting
too greedy. To prevent victimisation." "To fight against injustice by management"
and "health and safety". Or to the union's campaigning role: "The insurance it
provides for a worker's legal rights" and "retirement for all at 60 years of age with
state pension". These reasons could be classed as "to use as a workers' voice against
management" or "to campaign against inequality and injustice" but the individual
members obviously felt that they merited being mentioned separately. Another had
added "to help improve working conditions", which suggests that some members may
consider "improving working conditions" to be more important than "to get higher
pay". As the two were classed together on the questionnaire this is not known,
perhaps they should have been classed as two separate reasons for membership.
Table 3. The most important sin21e reason for belon~in~ to a trade union
Reason number of members
Higher pay & better working conditions 15 (12.6%)
To protect me if problems come up in the 17 (14.3%)
future
To get members' benefits 1 (0.8%)
To help safeguard my job 24 (20.2%)
To use as a workers' voice against 3 (2.5%)
management
I believe in them in principle I (0.8%)
To campaign against inequality and 4 (3.4%)
injustice
To show solidarity with those I work with 4 (3.4%)
Other 33 (27.7%)
No answer 17 (14.3%)
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When asked "which single reason for belonging to a trade union is the most important
to you?", unlike the stewards whose answers were divided between higher pay and
better working conditions, protection and to use as a workers' voice, the members'
replies covered a wider range of reasons. (See table 3). The highest number of
respondents gave a reason other than those cited; most of those who had said that the
collectivist reasons for membership were not important also fell into this category. A
third of these reasons referred to accidents at work and a similar amount referred to the
legal help side if required. This implies that these workers may be union members
purely for the individual benefits if needed, especially when combined with the fact
that they did not rate the collectivist reasons for membership as important. Yet, only
four of these respondents agreed that trade unions were a cheap form of insurance.
Seven members listed a number of reasons for membership, which included health and
safety, wages, accidents and working conditions, but perhaps more significantly,
every one of these replies included job protection. These answers along with some of
those which were coded into the "to help safeguard my job" category, actually referred
to the protection of all jobs rather than just their own; "to help safeguard all jobs" was
a typical answer. This suggests that to some members it is important that the union
looks after everyone's jobs rather than just their own, indicating a collectivist outlook
rather than an individualistic one.
Other answers tended to relate to the union's role in general:
"So as to be treated fairly."
"Security."
"Security and backing for any problem with management."
"I f we didn't have a union the management would just be able to tread allover us."
"To secure the best possible deal for its members."
"For all members to stick together and fight for better or improving relations with each
other or the management."
"For the strength and back up of any problems which may arise."
"To protect and safeguard your rights."
Two answers elaborated further:
"As I was brought up you have nothing if you are not in a union."
"Without unions and with this type of government in power, the 19308 would return to
the workplace, profit at all costs, and wages and safety would go to the wall."
When taken as a whole "to help safeguard my job", or as some answers stipulated, "to
safeguard all jobs" was considered the most important single reason by the
respondents. 20% said that this was the most important single reason and a further
6% thought that this was an important reason along with other reasons, compared to
13% who said that "higher pay and better working conditions" was the most important
reason and 2% who thought it was important along with other reasons. This upholds
Hedges' (1994) conclusion that employees regardedjob security as the most important
objective for unions to fight for. Protection was the second most important single
reason and it could be argued that if the "other" reasons, such as "protection against
exploitation by organisations", are taken into account, this was the most important
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reason for membership for the majority of respondents. Protection from future
problems might also include compensation for accidents and job protection.
These results correspond with those set out in table 2: job protection, protection
generally and higher pay and better working conditions tend to be the top three reasons
for membership. Personal or self interested reasons tend to top the bill for the majority
of respondents. However, when all the answers are taken as a whole they suggest that
for the majority of the sample collectivism was still a significant part of unionism.
Those members who thought that "to campaign against inequality and injustice" was
the most important single reason for membership also felt strongly about this type of
role:
"Working together to protect and generate a better standard of living. a better welfare state.
to fight political injustice. no matter which way you vote."
"To assist in stamping out inequality both sexual and racial."
However, these members were in the minority when considering the most important
single reason for membership. The "vested interest" aspect of unionism (Flanders
1961) appears to be the most important "face" of unionism for the vast majority of
members. "Instrumental collectivism" (Goldthorpe et al 1968) is probably still an apt
description as far as many members are concerned.
The results set out above are similar to those found by the seventh BSAS (Millward
1990). Millward (1990) found that improving pay and working conditions along with
job protection were the most frequently mentioned objectives that members thought
their unions should be trying to achieve. So members at firm A were no different to
the norm. However, in Millward's survey "to get members' benefits" was rated fourth
in terms of the number of respondents who said it was important for union
membership, just below "to help other people I work with", whereas the present data
has "to get members' benefits" rated above "to show solidarity with those I work
with" though only by 3% (see tables 1 and 2). This may be due to the different
wording used; respondents may have interpreted "to help other people I work with"
slightly different "to show solidarity with those I work with". However, it could
"reflect the increased emphasis" put on benefits by the ABEU in recent years, which
was the likely explanation given by Millward (1990). Since 1990 the AEEU has
introduced many new benefits which could have increased members' perceptions as to
the importance of this reason for membership. Indeed, the AEEU have used survey
evidence to conclude that:
"[T]he significance of instrumentalism as a prompt for union membership is not just in
the importance of unions delivering advantages to members. It lies crucially in the type
of benefit identified: individual assistance and individual support on the issues of advice
and representation on disciplinary matters, on grievances and accidents at work - all of
them individual concerns rather than collective problems. Straight collectivism. in
terms of collective bargaining. only comes in at fourth place in this survey - and that
in a union still largely buttressed by employer support. and extensive. if to some extent
devolved. collective bargaining. If this is an indication that individualism now
outweighs collectivism in what union members want. and if individualism is the clear
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direction being pursued by employers in their relations with their employees, trade
unions need to examine their supply side, to reassess what they do, in order to rebalance
their traditional mix of the individual and the collective, and to meet the new individual
demand." [Divisional Organisers Weekend School Pack 1995, "Future Structure of the
new Amalgamated Union". AEEU.]
The survey used by the AEEU identified advice on discipline, legal assistance and
advice on grievances as the top three reasons for joining a union (Basset and Cave
1993). Respondents at firm A did identify legal assistance and advice as important
reasons for belonging to a union but only a minority thought that these were the single
most important reasons. This could be a reflection of the different workplaces and the
union organisations within them (NUPE in Basset and Cave's survey). However, it
could also be a matter of interpretation; all these reasons for membership may come
under the heading "to protect me if problems come up in the future", which, as argued
above, was the most common reason when all the information was taken into account,
and was also found to be the most important reason for membership by Stevens et al
(1989).
Union members at firm A were self-interested in their outlook towards
unionism. However, despite the views of the AEEU nationally, the
majority also portrayed a collectivist view, suggesting that, at least at
firm A, collectivism was seen as the best way of achieving goals, even
if they were essentially individualistic ones. The view that by
promoting individualistic attitudes collectivism will whither away does
not appear to be bearing fruit, especially as those workers who have
only been in employment since 1979 appear to endorse collectivist
principles. Compared to past studies the attitudes of individual
members do not appear to have changed significantly (for example,
Goldthorpe et al 1968, Stevens et al 1989, Millward 1990).
Nevertheless, one important change has surfaced: job protection
appears to be one of the most important things that union members want
from their union. The economic and employment climate may have
increased the emphasis that workers put upon safeguarding their
employment (see also Hedges 1994).
9:3 Members' grievances
A slightly different picture emerges when respondents' answers to "what kind of
issues are raised by members with the shop stewards at your workplace?" are looked
at. 60.5% of the sample replied to this question, some gave a list of grievances
others just cited one or two. As table 4 shows, the most commonly mentioned
grievance was wages/pay, and when the other grievances which involved money
(bonus payments, overtime, shift allowances) are taken into account, money appears
to have been the major priority for many of the respondents. Job security was only
mentioned twice; however, this could be because at that particular moment in time
firm A were expanding their workforce rather than laying people off, therefore, job
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Table 4. Issues raised by members with their shop stewards
Issues raised by members with Number of
their union representatives respondents who
cited each reason
Wages I Pay 32
Working conditions 22
Health and safety related problems 14
Shift patterns (particularly alterations to) 9
Bonus payments 7
Working practices 7
Accidents (enquiries about injuries) 6
Workplace problems 5
State of workload I increased workload lextra jobs 5
Overtime 4
Personal grievances 4
Management I workforce relationship 4
Anything I too many to list 4
Mismanagement / bad management 3
Inequality 3
Holidays (type of! choice of) 3
Being moved to other jobs 3
Don't know 3
Job security 2
Short time working 1
Management I foreman expecting too much work 1
Threats by management 1
35 hour working week 1
Too many non-production staff I
ReduOOancies 1
Victimisation 1
Incentives 1
Accusations of not doing work correctly 1
Treatment by managers 1
Shift allowances 1
None 1
security may not have been a significant concern at the time of the study. Working
conditions, which might also include grievances such as health and safety issues and
workplace problems, were also commonly raised with the stewards. Therefore, pay
and working conditions did appear to be the major concerns of those within the
workplace. It could be argued that this is because these are concerns which relate to
the members' everyday working environment, whereas issues such as job protection
and campaigning against inequality are not things which are encountered everyday.
Twelve answers directly cited management in their grievances; for example,
"problems that management create" or "the way management expects us to work",
which suggests that some members may have resented management's right to manage.
Three respondents did not know what grievances were taken to the stewards which
indicates that they either had no problems or did not take them to their steward; more
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importantly, they may not have involved themselves with other members who did
complain. Another member said "no" grievances were taken to the steward. Yet, in
comparison, four members said that "anything" could be raised with the steward;
"almost all issues that tend to turn up" or "everything from bad lighting in shop to
wage negotiations and job security". This suggests that in comparison to those who
did not know, these members involved themselves in workplace issues and "the
union". These conflicting answers may reflect upon the different workshops that
members worked in. Members in one workshop may not have used their steward in
the same way as members in another. If this was the case, it could also be argued that
it may have been a reflection of the steward and whether members perceived him as
being an effective problem solver.
The grievances cited agreed with those that the stewards said were
brought to them and the majority could be considered self-interested
ones, that is, ones that affected members personally. However,
whether members at firm A were largely collectivist or individualist in
their outlook, the vast majority of respondents (87% ) agreed that
workers needed trade unions to protect their interests, particularly at
work.6 Therefore, even members who might be individualistic in their
outlook considered that unions were necessary to protect their interests,
even if they were solely self interests. This confirms the conclusion of
Rentoul (1989) that "[i]f attitudes towards trade unions have changed,
there has certainly been no 'transformation' in the attitudes of trade
union members themselves to the basic principles of trade unionism."
(p88).7
9:4 Union effectiveness
When asked do you think being in a union makes a difference in a number of particular
circumstances, the majority of respondents thought that it did in all the given settings.
However, when the circumstances are listed according to how many respondents
replied "yes", job protection (one of the most important things members appeared to
want from their union), while endorsed by nearly three quarters of the sample, falls
towards the bottom of the list, with only "preventing harassment and discrimination"
falling below it (see table 5). Yet, when the members who did not know are excluded
a slightly different picture emerges. Table 6 lists the circumstances according to the
mean rating of each ("yes" in each case). As can be seen, while the first three
circumstances remain the same in both tables, "preventing harassment and
discrimination" moves up into fourth place and "higher wages" and "changed working
6 Of those who disagreed with the statement, the majority of whom were in the 31-40 age range,
only two thought the collectivist reasons were not important reasons for membership.
7 Rentoul backed his argument with the results of the MORI polls, which had seen no significant
change in the proportion of union members agreeing that "trade unions are essential to protect
workers' interests". 88% agreed in 1979 and in 1987; at firm A, 87% of the sample agreed. Again,
members at firm A appeared to be no different to the norm.
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Table 5. Whether members thought that being in a union made a difference in
a number of probable circumstances
CIRCUMSTANCE YES NO DON'T
KNOW
114 I 4
Being Unfairly Dismissed (95.8%) (0.8%) (3.4%)
Having An Accident At 108 6 5
Work (90.8%) (5%) (4.2%)
Being Accused Of 91 8 14
Something By Your
(81.5%) (6.7%) (11.8% )
Employer
Efficient Health And 92 19 8
Safety (77.3%) (16%) (6.7%)
Having Your Conditions Of 92 21 6
Work Changed (77.3%) (17.6%) (5%)
Higher Wages 91 21 7
(76.5%) (17.6%) (5.9%)
Job Protection t 88 18 11
(73.9%) (15.1%) (9.2%)
Preventing Harassment And 80 18 21
Discrimination (67.2%) (15.1 %) (17.6%)
t The figures for job protection do not add up to 100% because one
respondent did not answer this question and another replied "yes and no".
Table 6. The circumstances that union membership makes a difference to
ranked accordin~ to the avera~e ratin~ of each
Circumstance Average rating
Unfair dismissal 1.013
Accident at work 1.063
Accusation by employer 1.063
Preventing discrimination 1.127
Efficient health & safety 1.139
Job protection 1.152
Changed working conditions 1.165
Higher wages 1.177
The rating scale - 1 = yes, 2 = no.
The average ratinzs do not include the "don't know" responses.238
conditions" both fall to the end of the list. This may be no coincidence. Money and
working conditions were the most frequently mentioned grievances brought up by
members with their stewards suggesting that some members were not satisfied with
certain aspects of their pay and working conditions. Nevertheless, according to those
members with a firm opinion, it could be argued that on the whole the union at firm
was considered to be effective for each of the given circumstances.s
Being unfairly dismissed was top of both tables, which may reflect the number of
times that members had been reinstated at firm A through union pressure (see previous
chapter) and could be seen as an indication that the workplace union did protect the
jobs of its members, despite job protection being endorsed by slightly fewer
respondents. The one respondent who said that union membership did not make a
difference in the case of unfair dismissal had replied "no" to each circumstance and had
a negative attitude towards the union in general. He had been represented at work by a
union representative and was not satisfied with that representation. It is not known
whether this representation took place at firm A, but as the representation took place
one to two years ago it is likely that it was. It can be assumed that if it was at f111Tl A it
was most likely not for dismissal; if the respondent said being in a union made no
difference in the case of dismissal he would not have been working at the firm. It has
been argued (in the USA) that workers with negative attitudes towards unions tend to
be less satisfied with their performance than other workers (Fiorito et al 1988).
Members who had been represented at work by a union representative might be
expected to rate their union's performance according to how they perceived their
representation; for example, members who were not satisfied with their representation
might be expected to rate their union's performance negatively. However, the results
revealed mixed feelings. Just over half (53%) of respondents had been represented by
a union representative, 65% of them were satisfied with that representation, 13% were
not sure and 21% were not satisfied. The majority of these respondents had been
represented at work, which, if this was at firm A, would have been by one of the lay
representatives, most usually the MS convenor, and as all those who indicated how
long ago this was said it was fifteen or fewer years ago, it would have been the present
convenor who had represented them.? Two members had been represented at a
8 It is possible that some members may have based their answers upon unions nationally rather than
on their workplace organisation, as the question only asked if being in a union made a difference to
particular circumstances. However, the evidence presented in the previous chapter shows that at firm
A the workplace union actually dealt with all the above situations, with the exception of "having an
accident at work", without any outside assistance (except in exceptional circumstances). So it is most
likely that the respondents did base their answers upon their perceptions of the workplace union. In
the case of having an accident at work, while the member was advised and helped to make a claim by
the workplace organisation, the national union was the body that secured the member any
compensation.
9 Respondents were not asked to indicate at which workplace their representation took place;
therefore, some of the answers may not refer to firm A. It is possible that those who were not
satisfied were actually represented elsewhere. One respondent had indicated where his representation
took place and this was not at firm A, he was not satisfied with the representation that he received.
However, it is possible that this experience could lead to a negative view of unions generally.
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tribunal and both were satisfied with the outcome and another respondent had been
represented both at work and at a tribunal; he was also satisfied. (See appendix 5 for
tables.) It appears that satisfaction with representation does not necessarily influence
the member's perception of his/her union's performance; some members who were
not satisfied with their representation replied positively to questions and other
members who were satisfied replied negatively. However, though the numbers were
very small, the ones who were not satisfied were more likely to reply negatively,
whereas those who were satisfied, if they did not respond positively, were more likely
to say that they did not know.IO One respondent had been represented on "a regular
basis" at work and he was not sure if he was satisfied with that representation;
nevertheless, he thought that being in a union did make a difference to all the given
circumstances with the exception of health and safety and job protection; therefore, his
union membership probably had made a difference to him while at work.
Overall, the answers indicate that the respondents did consider their union to be
effective at firm A. For the vast majority being in a union did make a difference in
each given circumstance. However, in comparison, when asked "do you feel that
overall your union is effective at your workplace?" only 41% of the respondents
replied that they did, 34% said that it was not and 24% were not sure. I I This may
have some bearing on whether the respondent was basing his/her answer on the
workplace union itself or on the national union as a whole. The results were similar to
those obtained to the question "do you think of your workplace union as different from
the national union?" (see below). However, when examined closely only half of those
who did not think their union was effective either did not view their workplace union
differently from the national union or did not know if they did. In addition, 20% of
those who did not view the two organisations differently were not sure whether their
union was effective in the workplace. It could be argued that at least 17% of the
sample may have based their assessment of how successful their union was in the
workplace on the national union rather than their own organisation within the
workplace, and this was a poor assessment. However, just over a third of those who
thought that their union was effective also did not view their workplace union
differently from the national union; therefore, if they also based their assessment on
the national union they felt that it was effective. There was also no connection
10 Receipt of benefit may influence members' opinions. Fifty respondents had received some form
of union benefit and four were having their claims processed. The majority of the claims were for a
work related illness and judging by the comments on the questionnaires these were mainly for
industrial deafness. Accident at work benefit was the second most commonly received. Seven
respondents had received more than one type of benefit. (See appendix 6.) All those who had received
accident benefit said that union membersbip made a difference if an accident should occur at work.
11 The differences in the answers, probably reflect more about the respondents' perceptions than how
effective the union actually was. There is a distinction between general questions such as "does being
in a union make a difference in the case of ... T" and specific questions which ask directly whether
members feel that their union is effective. The specific question referred directly to the union's
effectiveness (in the opinion of the respondent) while the more general questions were indirectly trying
to establish whether the union at firm A could be described as effective, and therefore, as "powerful";
if members felt that being in a union did make a difference in the given circumstances it is an
indication that their union was producing effects, even if they replied that their union was not effective
overall in the workplace.
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between those who had been represented by a union representative and how they rated
their union in terms of overall effectiveness. A third of those who had been
represented thought that their union was not effective overall in their workplace and
just over a fifth were not sure. Almost half (49%) of those who were satisfied with
their representation said that their union was effective in the workplace, a fifth were
not sure, but over a quarter (29%) said that it was not. It could be that these
respondents had been represented at another workplace; however, the most likely
explanation for the difference of opinion is that members base their perceptions of how
effective the union is upon the success that their own steward has with their workshop
manager.
Despite just over a third of respondents saying that the union was not
effective overall, the fact that the majorlty of respondents thought that
union membership made a difference in all the given circumstances
indicates that the union at rmn A did have the ability to produce
effects. If trade union power is defined as the union's capacity to
defend and advance its members' interests by producing effects, that is,
desired outcomes, the union could be described as "powerful";
members' interests were protected. In particular, the union helped
members to retain their jobs. Being unfairly dismissed was endorsed
by over 95% of respondents and when taken with the evidence that
members were prepared "to put the buttons in" when a fellow member
was dismissed (see previous chapter) suggests that the union at firm A
was successful at keeping workers their jobs even if they had been
"rightfully" dismissed by management.t- Therefore, the union could
also be seen as protecting the jobs of its members.O
It appears that satisfaction with individual union representation does
not necessarily influence a member's perception of his/her union's
effectiveness. However, union representation at work is usually in
front of higher management and it is likely that members base their
perceptions of how successful the union is upon the performance of
their own stewards within their particular workshops. Nevertheless, it
is probable that Fiorito et al (1988) were correct, that workers with
negative attitudes towards unions tend to be less satisfied with their
performance than other workers.
12 One member had commented that he had been "represented at work for threat of sacking over time
off'; he was satisfied with his representation.
13 However, job protection in this sense, that is, preventing a worker from losing his/her
employment, may be looked upon differently by employees. They may consider that the job
protection aspect of unionism refers to jobs as a whole; that is, saving those jobs that managers wish
to axe altogether by making employees redundant and not replacing them with other workers. As
Firm A was employing more employees at the time of the study, job protection in this sense was not
a big issue.
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9:5 The management-union relationship
The majority of respondents (62%) when asked "in general how would you describe
relations between management and your union at your workplace?" replied that they
were "quite good" and 2% said that they were "very good". 21% of the sample
thought that management/union relations were "not very good", 7.5% that they were
"not at all good" and 7.5% did not know. These results correspond with the stewards'
answers; 60% of the stewards who answered the questionnaire said that
management/union relations were good and 40% that they were not. The similarity
between the two sets of results may reflect the different relationships between the
individual stewards and their shop managers, which would suggest that members see
their steward as "the union" and base their perceptions of how well the union gets on
with management on his communications with his shop manager rather than on the
relationship of the union organisation within the workplace as a whole with
management. This would indicate that how well their lay representative performed
actually influenced their perceptions of managementJ union relations.
One respondent who thought that the union/management relationship was "not at all
good" added "too friendly", which might suggest that to some members the
relationship should be one of conflict rather than conciliation. It might also indicate
that some members, as suggested by union representatives, do not appreciate the
process that stewards have to go through to get them the best deal that they can.
Indeed, it has been suggested that it is only the more active members who tend to
appreciate the constraints on union influence and the significance of union
achievements (Fiorito et al 1988); therefore, those members who do not involve
themselves in union affairs would not understand the type of relationship that "the
union" did have with management. A minority of members may have considered that
their union representatives were actually "too close" to management; "too friendly"
might suggest this and two other comments implied that this may have been the case:
"It is known that some union officials have received 'perks' from the company."
"How can a union rep who bas recently purchased a ex company car at a knock down price
really represent the men on the shopfloor honestly."
The company were selling many of their used cars, telephones and other accessories
after they had upgraded their offices. These items were available to anyone to
purchase and one of the senior stewards bought a car. In some respects, it could be
argued that rather than judging their representatives on their union activities and
effectiveness, these members judged them by things which had nothing to do with the
union. However, while only a minority of members felt this way, this type of
opinion could undermine a shopfloor representative; members who have firm ideas
may influence other members and tum them against the steward's suggestions. These
types of members were termed "opinion leaders" by Batstone et al (1977) who also
identified "grievers"; those members who frequently complained about union
behaviour or sought to use the union for individualistic complaints. Firm A's
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members, then, were no exception to the rule with their different attitudes.
Over three quarters of respondents thought that their union/shop steward usually did a
good job when negotiating with management over wage related issues.t+ 82% of the
sample said that their shop steward/convenor negotiated with management about work
related problems and 15% did not know. 62% of those who had said that their
representative negotiated with management were "satisfied in some ways but not in
others" with the way that work related problems were dealt with, 20% were satisfied
and 18% were dissatisfied. These results indicate that the majority of respondents
were satisfied with their union representation, at least some of the time. Stewards, the
main negotiators with management, (in many cases this may apply only to the
convenor and the senior stewards), are better placed to judge how far they can take an
issue, whereas members may expect that it should be taken all the way without any
compromise. The less active members may not recognise any restrictions that
negotiators have to work around and, therefore, do not appreciate the significance of
union achievements (Fiorito et al 1988).
It might also be the case, as the MS convenor commented, that some issues brought by
members are "trivial" and cannot be followed up in the way that they expect, which
would leave disgruntled members dissatisfied at the way their problems had been
treated. One member when asked "what kind of issues are raised by members with
shop stewards at your workplace?" actually replied:
"Trivial problems regarding pay and work methods, but they are never'so trivial' to the
members."
While this member had a valid point it could also be argued that if the stewards
concentrated their time on issues that they considered trivial (and possibly personal,
relating only to the individual member, such as not getting enough overtime) and knew
that they could do nothing about, the more important issues would be left in pursuit of
insignificant personal grievances. It might be the case that this member had at some
time had his problem dismissed; he was also dissatisfied with the way that work
related problems were sorted out. Many members may not even know when some
problems occur, let alone if they have been sorted out, unless they affect them
personally. The answers may reflect upon whether the respondents had based them
upon their shop steward or the convenor as the question did not stipulate which one.
However, it is likely that respondents based their replies upon their steward who was
the person that they should have taken their problems to; some members had
commented on the questionnaires, such as crossing out the term convenor and one
added "the convenor leaves our department to sort itself out". This again might
indicate that members' perceptions are influenced by their own shop steward's
performance in their own workshop, irrespective of whether the issue has to be taken
14 Just over half (55.5%) thought that they did a good job "sometimes" and just under a quarter
(23.5%) had replied "yes". Only 19% of the sample said that they did not think that the union did a
good job negotiating about wage related issues. The two respondents who did not know had not been
at the firm long enough to answer the question; as one commented. "haven't been here long enough
to see them at work".
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higher up the union hierarchy to the convenor.
The results indicate that the majority of the sample were generally
satisfied with the representation that they received, if not all the tlme.i>
Satisfaction with representation may depend upon the member's
steward. Members may have been satisfied with how major issues were
dealt with, for example, by the senior stewards, but not with how their
own steward dealt with problems (possibly individual problems) in
their workshop, which would explain why half the sample were only
satisfied "sometimes" with their union representation. This is indicated
by a respondent's comment: he had answered "no" and "sometimes" to
the question and added at the side "three reps available"; which
suggests that he might be satisfied, at least sometimes, with the
representation by one or two of his stewards but not the other. Some
stewards may be seen as successful and others may not be, which may
reflect upon the individual steward's personality and style of working
and leads to the argument that these are the essential ingredients for
successful unionism in the workplace. If members were not satisfied
with their union representation they were more likely to evaluate the
union's success overall more negatively than those who were satisfied.
It also appears that members base their perceptions of
union/management relations upon their perceptions of their own
stewards and a minority of members may judge their representatives,
not on their union performance, but on their personal activities.
9:6 Members' perceptions of their union representatives
Respondents were given a list of various descriptions and asked "which of the
following describes your workplace union representatives? Tick all which apply."
There were separate answer boxes for the steward and the convenor. The results are
shown in table 7.16
The results show that over half of those who answered the question regarded both
their steward and convenor as "easy to approach" and "willing to help". The fact that
more described their steward as such may reflect the fact that members should have
contacted their steward with any problems. Just over a third of respondents described
I 5 Only 11% of respondents were not satisfied with the union representation at their workplace and
2.5% were not sure. Half of the sample were "sometimes" satisfied and 35% said that they were
satisfied with their union representation.
16 Some respondents bad answered far either the steward or the convenor rather than both, which
might indicate that they only bad contact with one of them, usually this would be the steward.
However, it may mean that they did not think very highly of the one that they had not responded to.
The answers that only referred to the convenor suggest that the respondent did not think highly of the
steward. who was the person who should have been approached by members. In addition some
respondents had only indicated one description for each representative, which could be the only way
that they would describe them, but they may also have misunderstood the question and chosen only
one description rather than all those that applied. Three respondents failed to answer the question.
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their steward and convenor as "readily available". This may be understandable in the
case of the convenor who may have worked in a different shop to the respondent but
there was a steward available in each workshop and it was always arranged so that
workers on different shifts had access to a steward if necessary. If the steward is not
readily available, cases where a grievance might cause immediate problems could
result in members taking the situation into their own hands before any potential union
"power" is undermined.' 7
More respondents described the convenor as "knowledgeable" and "dedicated" than
their steward, which may reflect upon the convenor's position. As the main union
representative or "leader" in the factory it might be expected that the convenor would
be more knowledgeable than the stewards; this was also found from the results of the
stewards' questionnaires. Only a minority of respondents described either their
steward or convenor as "an individual problem solver" or as "a leader of a collective
approach to problems". The answers, while in a minority, reflect the findings from
the stewards themselves; more respondents described the convenor as "a leader of a
collective approach to problems" than their steward, which reflected the convenor's
own views. However, this could be because "big issues" which might have involved
a whole workshop, or even the whole factory, were passed to the convenor, who, if
necessary, involved all those affected in the decision making process. Only one in ten
respondents thought their representatives gave out advice and sorted out problems
unrelated to work. This may also reflect upon the steward; only one out of the ten
stewards who returned the questionnaire mentioned problems that were unrelated to
work as grievances which his members brought to him.
The results may reflect upon the extent of members' contact with their representatives;
some members may never contact their steward, even if they have a problem. When
asked "if you have a work related problem of any kind who are you most likely to go
to?" a small minority (9%) said that they would go to a workmate, no one, someone
other than those in the given list or they did not know. The majority of the sample
(52%) would have gone to their supervisor/foreman, which was the correct procedure,
4% would have seen management, 15% would have gone to their convenor and 19%
to their shop steward. If those who would have gone to either their supervisor or
management got a satisfactory result then there would have been no need to follow the
grievance further by taking it to the steward. However, because over half the sample
described their representatives as "easy to approach" and "willing to help" this
explanation is weak as half the respondents must have had some contact with their
representatives to describe them as such. Nevertheless, it appears that members who
had been represented by a union representative were more likely to describe them in
more than one way, maybe because they had had first hand experience of their
representative(s) at work; use of the services on offer enables the user to evaluate their
worth more fully than if the services had not been used. It might not be until a major
17 For example, by other members operating a machine that had been condemned by one group. If
another member was prepared to work the machine, then, any potential "power" to have the situation
put right would be lost.
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Table 7. Members' descriptions of workplace representatives
DESCRIPTION Shop Convenor
Steward
Easy to approach 67% 58%
Readily available 39% 38%
Willing to help 60% 54%
Knowledgeable 28% 38%
Dedicated 18% 32%
An individual problem solver 11% 12%
Gives advice and sorts out 11% 9.5%
problems unrelated to work
A leader of a collective 10% 17%
approach to problems
problem affects an individual member, for example, threatened dismissal, that they
actually realise the beneficial effect that their representatives can have upon their
position.
When the results are examined closely just over half the respondents who viewed the
convenor in a particular way had been represented by a union representative.l8 The
answers concerning the stewards were similar, though only in the case of
"knowledgeable" and "willing to help" had half of those who described the steward as
such been represented, for the other descriptions those who had been represented
made up just under half of those who viewed their steward in that way. Once a
member has had first hand experience of union representation they may evaluate their
representative differently to those who have not had to resort to the union for help.
This may reflect upon the person who actually represented them, if it was in front of
higher management it would have been the convenor possibly accompanied by the
relevant steward and the senior stewards. Those who had been represented by a union
representative did not necessarily describe both the convenor and their steward in the
same way; for example, only one of the eight who had described the convenor as "an
individual problem solver" described the steward as one, whereas another five who
had been represented described their steward as such and not the convenor. This
suggests that these members took their individual problems to their steward.
18 For example, out of the 63 respondents who described the convenor as "willing to help", 34 had
heen represented; of the 14 who described him as "an individual problem solver", 8 had been
represented; of the 37 who said he was dedicated, 20 had been represented; 25 of the 44 who said he
was knowledgeable bad been represented; and out of the 11 who described him as giving advice
unrelated to work, 7 had been represented.
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However, the fact that 15% of respondents said that if they had a problem they would
go to the convenor might indicate that these members found the convenor to be more
effective than their own steward. Indeed, 61% of those who had said that they would
go to the convenor had been represented at work, suggesting that they might have been
represented by the convenor and preferred to take any other problems they might have
to him.
If the union representatives are not seen as leaders of a collective approach to problem
solving it could undermine the union's position within the firm, If the theory that a
collective approach to problem solving, that is, involving all those concerned in the
decision making process, encourages participation in the union at workplace level and,
therefore, gains the union more concessions (Fosh and Cohen 1990, Fosh 1993) is
correct, then, members' perceptions of their representatives would lead one to believe
that the union at firm A was not as effective as it could be. However, the fact that only
a minority of respondents described their representatives as individual problem solvers
might also suggest that if they did not solve individual problems they may have solved
collective ones. It may be a matter of interpretation of the meanings. Members may
not consciously view their representatives as either individual problem solvers or as
leaders of a collective approach to problem solving, especially if they take the
stewards' work for granted (see previous chapter): some members may only think of
"the union" when a problem arises.
A collective approach to problem solving means involving all those concerned in the
decision making process. When asked "does your union representative generally
decide himlherself what action should be taken over any complaint, grievance or
problem or is this decided by the majority of members?" only a fifth of the sample said
that the union representative decided. 41% said that it depended on the problem and
29% said that the majority of members decided. This result coincides with the
answers from the stewards; members were only kept informed of the issues that
affected them personally and were consulted on all deals with management before they
were accepted or rejected. However, they were not necessarily informed about issues
which did not affect them, that is issues which may have affected one workshop but
not another, only those concerned were consulted. While each workshop may have
operated differently, depending on the steward, the answers indicate that depending on
the problem the members did decide what action was to be taken; 70% of the sample
endorsed this. Therefore, it could be argued that despite the union representatives not
being described as leaders of a collective approach to problem solving, a collective
approach was taken at finn A by the union; that is, all those concerned were involved
in the decision making process, and it could be argued that it was this collective
approach which usually secured them their goal.
Those members who said that the union representative decided upon the action to be
taken might have belonged to a workshop where the steward did not consult his
members. Alternatively, the steward may have tried to make his members see things
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from his point of view and they interpreted this as him making the decisions.l?
Indeed, one respondent commented "what he's decided then go to the vote". While
the respondent interpreted this as the representative deciding upon the appropriate
action, he had also indicated that members actually voted on whether to take it or not,
which suggests that members were involved in the decision making process even if it
was only the final decision. Two members who had replied that "it depends on the
problem" made further comments; "but the rep generally directs you into what
direction he would like you to go", and, "union rep advises a lot". These are fair
comments and imply that the union representatives tried to direct the workforce into
their way of thinking. A union representative's job is to advise and represent the
workforce, at the same time realising how far they can take an issue with management;
therefore, the representative puts forward the options that he sees as reasonable for the
workforce to vote on. If a vote is taken, the members have their chance to show either
their support or their objections to the steward's proposals; therefore, the system
cannot be described as unfair. One respondent described the situation as such:
..At a local level. decisions seem to be made by shop stewards / convenor then put to the
shopfloor. I think the shopfloor should be approached before decisions are made as a
greater pool of opinion and thinking could only help the debate or direction of the union."
This suggests that this worker felt that the opinions of the shopfloor were not taken
into account by the representatives and, yet, the stewards are elected by the members
to represent their opinions. Another respondent had commented that the only reason
he was dissatisfied with the union representation at firm A was because the convenor
"seems to assume what workers require rather than ask", suggesting that he too would
have liked members to have been consulted before decisions were made and taken to
the vote. However, if this was the only reason why he was dissatisfied, it indicates
that he may actually have been satisfied with the outcomes of certain negotiations with
management. Other comments made by members about their representatives suggest
that it was a case of the individual stewards and their ways of working:
"When my work area does have a shop steward he usually struggles with talking to
management, basically because he has a total background on the shopfloor."
This indicates two things; that the steward had not yet developed his style of approach
towards management and that the member saw his steward as part of the shopfloor
rather than as part of management. All the stewards at firm A had a background on the
shopfloor and all worked alongside their members. Another member had commented,
"senior union reps lack understanding of the work many employees they represent are
involved in". It could be the case that some members, albeit a minority, associate their
senior representatives with management rather than the shopfloor and, therefore, they
feel that they are not represented properly. Nevertheless, as the previous chapter
highlighted, once in a senior steward's position a person begins to recognise problems
not only from the workers' point of view but also from management's. How they put
this across to their members is crucial, because if they give the impression that they are
19 Half the stewards felt that they could not get their members to do what they believed was right as
each member had his/her own opinions.
248
taking management's side members will not appreciate that their stewards are working
for them but are restrained by certain managerial problerns.zc It has been argued that
those in a position to appreciate how far an issue can be taken with management tend
to evaluate union success more positively than those who are not (Fiorito et al 1988)
and this does appear to be the case.
Other comments included:
"The shop steward uses his position to benefit himself."
"Only interested in problems related to themselves."
"Doesn't really want to know."
"Hard to find."
"The shop steward is unknowledgeable and a complete idiot and not fit to represent himself
never mind anyone else."
Another member had written "no comment" against the list of descriptions for the shop
steward. These comments were only from a minority of members who perhaps
expected something more from their stewards. However, it may have been the case
that all these respondents were referring to the same steward, which would reflect
badly on him as a representative. Indeed, the convenor had commented that some
stewards used their position as a way of gaining promotion. Another respondent had
written at the side of "dedicated" for his steward, "to the union no!", which suggests
that he saw his steward as being dedicated to something else, perhaps promotion. If
members base their perceptions of how successful their union is on their own
experiences with their steward, judging by the above comments a rather negative view
would be expected from a small minority of members.
However, some members may not have given their backing to their representatives.
One questionnaire stated:
"Union members' reps when approached will mostly say my bands are tied it is up to you."
This was probably meant as a criticism of the union representatives. However, after
speaking to some of the stewards it became evident that this type of statement often
meant "I can't do anything alone, it's up to you on the shopfloor to stand together and
make your feelings known." So, "it's up to you", meant not that "you are on your
own", but that if members stuck together they would have more chance of getting their
own way. The comment from the ex-steward in the previous chapter, about members
moaning about an issue but then not being prepared to back the steward as he went to
see management confirms that some members would not follow up their grievances or
expected the steward to be able to do it alone. Stewards can only be effective if they
have (or are perceived as having) the full backing of their members. Some of the
respondents' general comments actually pointed to the members themselves rather than
20 Indeed, one member bad said tbat his steward was willing to help but with a "don't rock the boat"
attitude.
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the stewards as the source of dissatisfaction among the workforce. A comment from a
former shop steward sums this up in one:
"The convenor could be better, but this is only because he knows that he would not get
the backing of 3/4 of the members. The convenor can only, or any union body can only,
be as good as the shopfloor. Having been a former shop steward I found this out myself.
Example:
You can get some members, if some one else is earning a £1.00 more than anyone else,
they will complain to management, not to get an extra £1.00 but to get their £1.00
deducted!
The trouble with a lot of people is 'I'm OK Jack sod anyone else'. So how can a union
steward etc. represent anyone like that?"
Stewards can only work on what the shopfloor give them to work with; support is
essential. This member having been a shop steward was in an ideal position to be able
to evaluate the steward's and member's role and in many respects he echoed what
stewards from different workplaces had said; that their members were generally not
interested until something affected them personally, and even then, some were not
prepared to fight the case. Some members may consider that the steward is "the
union", that is, on hislher own, and that he/she should be "powerful" without their
support. Nevertheless, it could be argued that if the steward had a style of working
that determined membership interest and participation in workplace unionism, he
should be able to instil in those members a sense of themselves as "the union" and
ensure that he received their support when necessary.
The statement that a lot of people just think "I'm OK Jack sod anyone else" is also
suggested by the fact that just over a quarter of the respondents (26%) said that they
would be prepared to go against a majority vote in a ballot. As voting was usually
carried out at finn A by a workplace secret ballot to prevent intimidation, the voting
system could be considered to be democratic and, therefore, democratically minded
members should abide by the result. If a quarter of respondents were prepared to
undermine that vote, then, any union pressure could also be undermined. However,
in the light of evidence that shows that members at finn A had been prepared to stick
together, especially against working with non union members, it is likely that because
the majority of respondents (58%) would not go against a majority vote, those who
said they were prepared to, may not do so due to peer pressure. Nevertheless, it is
possible that members in one workshop may vote differently to other workshops in a
factory wide ballot and, therefore, the whole workshop may decide to go against the
majority vote and stick together over an issue.
Despite not seeing their representatives as leaders of a collective
approach to problem solving, it appears that when problems did occur
the affected members were involved in the decision making process;
that is by a vote on the proposals put forward by the stewards.
Therefore, it could be argued that a collective approach to problem
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solving was taken at firm A. Nevertheless, this may have depended
upon the individual representatives and their ways of working: a fifth
of members said that their steward decided upon any action to be taken.
However, some members' perceptions may have distorted this, as it
appears that even though members did vote on the options that they
might take, they resented the fact that their representatives put forward
the proposals without prior consultation.
Some members may take the work of their representatives for granted
and expect that the steward should be "powerful" without their backing.
Therefore, rather than seeing the shopfloor as "the union" some
members actually think their representative is "the union" and omit
themselves from the picture. However, with a style of working that
determines membership participation in workplace unionism, a steward
should be able to alter members' perceptions so that they see
themselves as part of "the union".
9:7 The union - shopfloor unit or national organisation?
Fewer members (in terms of percentages) viewed their workplace union as a separate
entity from the national union than the stewards. 42% of respondents thought of their
workplace union as different from the national union and 23% did not know. This
could be because the stewards were the ones who were actually carrying out duties on
behalf of their members as "the union". Members take their grievances to their
steward but do not necessarily have to take further action. The stewards were also
invited to attend more meetings arranged by the national side than members and had
more opportunity to meet their FrO, which would give them a different view of the
"external" union to that that members may have had. While the majority of
respondents did think of their workplace union differently from their national union,
because over half either did not or did not know, no firm conclusion can be made on
this issue from the results of this question alone.
However, when asked "for you personally, where would you say most union activity
takes place?" 60.5 % of the sample said the workplace. This suggests that for the
majority of members "the union" was in the workplace. In fact, one member had
written against the question, "the union is the men/women not the officials", so for
him "the union" was the shopfloor and not the national organisation. Another
appeared to condemn his national leaders:
"I have been a trade union member all my working life and in no way do 1 wish to condemn
any union, but 1 think the top members of the union are out of touch with how the shopfloor
people are being treated, in both conditions and threats such as 'do it or we can get someone
who can',"
This comment corresponds with the conclusions from the previous two chapters that
the national organisation is out of touch with the realities of the shopfloor. Only 9%
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said that most union activity for them took place at national level and 10% said the
branch. Just under a fifth of respondents did not know where most union activity for
them took place, which suggests that they were not involved with their union whether
at work or outside the workplace.
Nevertheless, two thirds of the sample felt that being in a union was a necessary part
of their working life, which was slightly less than those who said that workers needed
trade unions to protect their interests (87%). This may indicate that for a fifth of the
sample union membership was for self interested reasons; they did not consider the
union to be an essential part of their working life but used it to protect their own
personal interests. Rentoul (1989) also found that according to his interviewees
"trade unions were useful for what you could get out of them. " Only 15% said that
the union was not an essential part of their working life and 16% were not sure. As a
proportion of their age groups, slightly more respondents from the 21-30 age group
were not sure whether the union was an essential part of their working life than the
other age groups. This might be expected as this group would have been members for
a shorter period of time than their older counterparts. However, many more
respondents from the 31-40 and over 50 age groups said that the union was not an
essential part of their working life. Therefore, it could be argued that unionism has not
diminished as an integral part of the workplace for those workers who had only been
employed since the Conservative reforms were introduced to try and overcome
collectivism. Where unionism was not seen as essential to the working environment it
was mainly by those who had been members before any reforms were introduced.
It appears that the majority of members do not participate in union activities outside the
workplace. The majority of respondents (91%) never attended a branch meeting.
However, it could be argued that the convenor took the onus off members by taking all
their claims forms into the relevant branch himself. Nevertheless, it was rare that a
member had a claim form to deliver to his/her branch; therefore, their attendance would
not necessarily have increased if they had had to do this themselves. The fact that the
majority of respondents did not attend their branch may also indicate that the union
body at firm A actually fulfilled the role of the branch by answering member's queries
and sorting out any problems which should have been taken there. One respondent
did reply "when I was shop steward I used to attend regularly, but have not attended
since", he may have found it useful to attend as a steward, possibly for information on
behalf of his members, but as a rank and file member did not feel the need to attend.
Therefore, it could be argued that most members must have been satisfied with how
their queries were answered if they did not find it necessary to attend their branch.
However, some members may not have known where their branch was, let alone
when it was held; two respondents had commented that they received no notification
of when they occurred, although whether they would attend if they knew is another
question. All members were notified of which branch they were in and when they
were held as soon as they were accepted as a member; therefore, it is possible that
these members had been informed of their branch but through nonattendance had
forgotten when they took place, which was a set day each month. A member who had
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said that for him most union activity took place at the branch had commented "where
ever union activities take place we on the shopfloor are the last to know." He echoed
the feelings of the MS convenor that members tend to be the last to know about many
things that were happening within their own union nationally.
Only 5% of the sample said they attended a branch meeting "whenever possible" and
4% sometimes attended. However, only one of these respondents had replied that the
branch was the place where most union activity took place; therefore, the other
members who had said that the branch was the unit of most union activity did not even
attend. The only explanation must be that some members do not participate at all in
their union whether at work or not and these members must presume that the hive of
union activity is at the branch (which it used to be according to retired and older union
members) or with the national union. This may also account for the fact that nearly a
quarter (23.5%) of the sample did not know whether they thought of their workplace
union differently from their national union or not. These members may not
particularly think about the union at all other than when they need to make a claim, for
example, for an accident at work, and even then, some members have to be told that
they should do so.
The claim by the ABEU that trade union membership is a cheap form of insurance,
even for accident benefit alone, was only endorsed by 28% of the sample, 20% did not
know and half disagreed. As insurance is taken out as a protection against problems it
might have been thought that members would agree with this claim especially as many
of them thought that protection was an important reason for membership. Half of
those who agreed that unions were a cheap form of insurance had received some form
of union benefit themselves; however, only a third of those who had received some
form of benefit described unions this way. Members may not think of their union as
an insurance agency, and especially if they associate "the union" with the workplace;
examples from union journals of members who had used their own solicitors at
tremendous cost to themselves indicates that some members may not realise all the
benefits that are on offer and if they do not read union information they will be none
the wiser unless told by their representatives. Alternatively, members may consider
membership as a form of insurance, but not as a cheap one; "we pay £1.65 per week
and I think we are not getting value for money, as our wages, as with the standard of
living, are not all going up at all in line with inflation. The top union leaders are not
getting us any wage rises as they were 20 years ago". This statement was from a
disgruntled member, obviously complaining about wage rises, but his comment
suggests that the amount members pay per week was not considered cheap.»
With branch attendance so low, members seeking information would have had to
contact their representative or read the union notice boards as regular union meetings
were not held at firm A. They were only held when there was an issue to discuss and
2 1 This comment also indicates that the respondent viewed his national union leaders as the ones who
influenced wage increases rather than the workplace representatives. Judging from his statement he
thought that trade union power had been reduced over the last twenty years.
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90% of the sample attended these "whenever possible" and 7% "sometimes" attended.
Those who sometimes attended were probably interested in personal gain rather than
working as a collective; all their replies to when this was were to do with the annual
wage negotiations. But, as the vast majority of respondents said that they attended
meetings whenever they could; it might be argued that union members at firm A were
interested in what their union was trying to do for them and in having their say in the
decision making process.
When the results presented in this section are taken as a whole, it could
be argued that for at least 60% of the sample "the union" was
considered to be the workplace organisation, even though a third of
respondents did not think of it differently from their national
organisation. As most of the sample never attended a branch meeting,
it could be argued that their only contact with ''the union" was with
their workplace representatives and possibly through reading the union
journals. Even when members received voting papers, for their general
secretary, for example, many took them to work and asked the advice
of their representatives before filling them in. This indicates two
things; that postal ballots do not necessarily lead to members voting
without being influenced by other members and that the nearest many
members will get to unionism is in the workplace. It can be concluded
that "the union" is in the workplace rather than at national
headquarters, at least for the majority of members. Even those who
may be a member solely for personal gain still use their lay
representatives as their major source of information, for example, on
how to make a claim.
9:8 Industrial action
The majority of respondents (70%) felt that the recent changes in the law had had an
effect upon the forms of industrial action taken at firm A. 14% said that the law had
had no effect on the forms of industrial action taken and 15% did not know. One
respondent had gone even further and added: "prior to the last fifteen years any
questions could be answered with a tick", and another, who had ticked all the forms of
pressure taken, had added "before 1982", indicating that they felt the legislation had
had a devastating affect upon union action.22 This could reflect upon the workers in
different workshops; those in one workshop may have been prepared to act against a
problem whereas those in another may not. The answers to "what forms of pressure,
if any, have been used in disputes with management at your place of work, since you
have been working there?" indicates that some workers had taken certain forms of
action. A fifth of the sample had said that no forms of action had been taken since they
had been working there. It is possible that some of these members had not been
22 It is possible that media attention on industrial disputes where employers had resorted to the law
had shaped some members' opinions about trade unions and the law generally rather than members
basing their opinions on their own experiences within the workplace.
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working for the firm for very long; at least one respondent had commented that he had
"not worked for the company long enough to have seen such action". The highest
majority of respondents (67%) said that an overtime ban had taken place, which
corresponds with the evidence from the stewards; a "voluntary" overtime ban was the
most frequently used form of pressure at firm A. 33% said that strike action had taken
place, 29% that a "work to rule" had been in operation, 11% that a go slow had been
used and 28% said that threats to stop work had been issued. These varied numbers
indicate that members may have taken action in their own workshops, which did not
affect the rest of the factory, with the exception of the overtime ban, which was
generally used as a factory wide form of pressure.
It is possible that workers do not always associate their actions as industrial action as
such; for example, overtime bans, a work to rule and even a go slow campaign, may
not be considered as doing anything contrary to "the law"; the workers are still
working even if it is not as efficiently as they normally would. They just see
themselves as protesting against a perceived injustice. Industrial action tends to be
associated with "all out strikes", even short stoppages of work were not perceived as
strike action (see below). Therefore, the fact that the majority of respondents thought
that the law had had an effect on the forms of industrial action taken may not have
included their usual ways of objecting to something.
Compared to the 28% who had said that threats to stop work had been issued, only
18% of the sample thought that "a threat to walk off the shopfloor was usually
sufficient to make management concede to their demands". 23% did not know if
threats were sufficient, but the majority of respondents (51%) said that they were not,
which corresponds with the stewards' answers. This may also reflect upon the
different workshops, the different stewards and their relationships with their shop
managers. A threat issued in an individual workshop may not have carried as much
weight with the shop manager as a threat issued by the convenor to higher
management who may not have wished to risk having production interrupted. If a
steward knew he would get no satisfaction from his shop manager he may have taken
the issue straight to the convenor, who some of the stewards regarded as "having
power over management". In this respect some of the stewards were similar to their
members; that is, they regarded the convenor himself as "powerful" rather than seeing
the source of his "power" as being "the union", that is, the cohesion of all the
members on the shopfloor.
The styles of working of the stewards may also have determined whether a threat to
stop work was sufficient to make management concede to their demands. The
convenor had become experienced in his role and confidently told management that
"the lads will be out" arguing the point until a compromise had been reached. An
element of bluff may have been involved in the convenor's threats but his confidence
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ensured that management believed that his members were prepared to back him.23 An
individual steward may not have been so confident with his shop manager, who may
have dismissed any threat. It could also be argued that shop managers were in a better
position than higher management to be able to determine the strength of feeling of the
workforce within their own workshops. Nonetheless, if the convenor had been
involved members' problems may have been solved but they may not have realised
that a threat had been issued to higher management in order to secure them their goal,
especially if previous threats to their shop manager had failed. One respondent had
echoed the convenor's views that threats were sufficient to make management concede
to workers' demands "as long as the demands were reasonable". This may be another
difference between the convenor's and the stewards' styles of working; the convenor
recognised that management would only concede to reasonable demands and would
work on them until a compromise was reached which was suitable to his members as
well as management, whereas some stewards may have expected management to
concede to members' demands without any prior adjustments.
The use of different actions by different workshops might also be connected to the
shop steward within those workshops. One respondent stated that "none of these
actions are used because the union rep usually •suggests' that it would not be good for
the 'workers' to threaten the management with action". As the convenor had no
qualms about telling management that "the lads will be out!". it can be assumed that the
union rep in this statement referred to the member's shop steward. Therefore,
according to the member the shop steward prevented any action (or threat of any
action) taking place, which suggests that the members in this particular workshop
might have been prepared to take action but their steward persuaded them not to. The
fact that 71% of respondents said that if a serious problem should occur in the near
future they would be prepared to take industrial action short of a strike confirms this
suggestion. Only 2.5% said that they would not be prepared to take industrial action
short of a strike. 45% said that they would be prepared to take strike action and 17%
did not know, only 10% said they would not be prepared to take strike action.24 But,
it must be remembered that the term strike action may mean different things to different
23A former convenor from the milk marketing board was convinced that the element of bluff was the
key to his success within his workplace. "The union" ran his workplace more than management, but
he knew that it was only his confidence in assuring management that if they did not do something no
lorries would be taken out that achieved the union its goals; he knew that while the majority of his
members would back him there were a few workers who would have been prepared to do as they had
been told by management, which would have undermined any threat that work would not be done.
Fortunately management believed that the workforce were behind the convenor and always conceded to
his demands.
24 However, the answers to this question, while showing that the majority of respondents would be
prepared to take some form of industrial action if necessary, may also be marred; 19% of the sample
did not answer the industrial action short of a strike section and 29% did not answer the strike section.
This may be due to the fact that both sections were incorporated into the same question (see appendix
2 question 26) and these respondents had replied to either one or the other of the sections rather than
both. Therefore, it could be the case that the 29% who had not replied to the strike section would be
prepared to take industrial action short of a strike as they had indicated but not strike action, which
would make the figure for those not prepared to take strike action 39% rather than 10% as indicated by
the responses.
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people. As the evidence presented in the previous chapter demonstrated that some
members at firm A had stopped working until particular problems were corrected,
there may be a difference in the way members perceived industrial action, especially
strike action (see Batstone et al 1978). A short stoppage of work, for example, until a
workmate has been reinstated, appears not be identified as strike or any other action by
those involved; it is perhaps considered to be a normal part of the working day. One
respondent had added to the question on forms of pressure: "stopped work when
workplace cold. No heating in winter." He had not indicated that strike action had
been taken, suggesting that he did not classify this stoppage of work as a strike.
"Striking is pointless as proved by the NUM, in my opinion", stated another
questionnaire. This indicates that this member associated a strike with an all out
situation rather than just refusing to work until a problem had been solved.25
Nevertheless, the answers reflect the strength of feeling among the sample of members
from firm A. However, the question did not stipulate whether the correct balloting
procedure would be taken before any action was taken. A similar question asked
"would you be prepared to take immediate action without a ballot under any of the
following circumstances?" and then gave a list of particular situations. However, the
answers must be treated with caution; they do show how many respondents would
have been prepared to take immediate action, but, not necessarily how many would
not; the question had a category "can't really say" which respondents ticked as an
overall response to the question. Therefore, it is not clear whether those who ticked a
particular category meant that they would not be prepared to take action for those that
they did not indicate or whether they could not say that they would take action in those
circumstances.
Just over a quarter (27%) of respondents said that they "could not really say"
indicating that they might possibly be prepared to take some form of action. The
number of respondents who said that they would be prepared to take action in
particular circumstances is set out in table 8. Just over half the sample said that they
would be prepared to take immediate action without a ballot over a health and safety
problem and if those who could not really say, indicating that they might take action,
are taken into account over three quarters of the respondents might have taken
immediate action over a health and safety problem, which is backed up by the
examples of various stoppages of work at firm A over complaints such as no heating
in winter, doors that would not close properly and flooding in an eating area. 43% of
the sample said that they would be prepared to take immediate action over the dismissal
of a workmate and depending "on what he had done to bring about his dismissal", a
25 These results could have implications if a correctly organised ballot was to be conducted at firm A.
Overtime bans had been supported by members and secured them their goals. However. the AEEU
balloting rules stipulate that if an overtime ban is to be implemented members must vote yes to two
questions - that they are prepared to take action short of a strike and strike action.
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Table 8. The number of respondents who said that they would be prepared
to take immediate action under certain circumstances
Circumstances
53%
A pay dispute
35%
A Health and Safety Problem
The dismissal of a workmate
43"/0
Changed working conditions
34.5%
To ensure that all workers doing
the same job get equal
treatment
36%
few other members might also support a dismissed fellow worker;26 this reason might
also apply to those who could not really say if they would take action or not.
Therefore, at least three quarters of the sample might have been prepared to take
immediate action over the dismissal of a workmate. Coupled with the 27% who might
take action, at least half of the respondents might have been prepared to take immediate
action without a ballot in the other given circumstances. Other reasons over which
some members may have taken immediate action included changing shift patterns
without prior notice, workers using machines without proper training, bad
management and victimisation.
It could be argued that for at least half the sample of members at finn A, and in some
circumstances as many as three quarters, the legislation would not deter them from
taking some form of industrial action, despite the feelings of almost three quarters of
them that the law had had an effect on the forms of industrial action taken at their
workplace. They may have felt that because their shop steward argued against taking
action the legislation had had an effect. However, in cases where immediate action
was the only solution, refusal to work normally until the problem was rectified may
have happened without a thought for the law or that their actions could be classed as
industrial action. The depth of feeling may have been so strong that the affected
workers may not even have voted on whether to take action.
When asked "if a vote is taken at your workplace how is that vote usually carried
out?" 79% of the sample agreed with the stewards that a workplace secret ballot was
conducted. However, the rest of the respondents were divided, perhaps reflecting the
different practices used by members in different workshops: 2% said that a show of
hands was usually used; 4.2% said that a show of hands and a workplace ballot was
26These comments were made in the "other" section of the question. The respondents had not ticked
"the dismissal of a workmate" box but had added that "depending on the circumstances" they would
support himlher. Another respondent had added "unfair dismissal" to the other section.
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used; 1% said a show of hands and a postal ballot was used; 1% said a workplace
ballot and a postal ballot was used; and 2.5% did not know. These results indicate
that some workshops may have voted on various issues more often than others.
Those who said a postal ballot was used as well as another method were probably also
thinking about their national union's voting system. However, interestingly, 9% of
the sample said that a vote at their workplace was usually carried out by a postal ballot.
Members at firm A had never voted by postal ballot on workplace issues; however,
members had voted by this method for issues which involved the national union, such
as voting for the new general secretary or for the changes to the rule book. Therefore,
these members may have confused how they voted at work with voting for issues
involving the national union (unless they were conscious of the legislation on balloting
and answered the question accordingly).
Industrial action of one kind or another had been taken at finn A since
1987 and only workplace ballots had been held as opposed to postal
ballots organised by the "external" union. Therefore, the legislation
cannot have had such a large effect upon industrial action there. Maybe
members are less likely to consider taking strike action (as indicated by
the results) if it meant all out strike action rather than the short
stoppages of work which do not appear to be defined by the workers at
firm A as strikes.
9:9 The legislation
The majority of respondents (71%) thought that the recent changes in the law had had
an effect on the way that negotiations were conducted between their workplace union
and management. The remainder of the sample were divided between those who did
not know and those who thought that the law had had no effect on management/union
negotiations. As the members did not negotiate themselves with management, (unless
they took a problem to their supervisor/foreman or management), and as the majority
of stewards also thought that the law had altered the way that management/union
negotiations were conducted, it is possible that different shop managers reacted
differently to the workforce and their steward's requests. Therefore, it is possible that
the law had had an effect upon negotiations between individual stewards and shop
managers, whereas the senior negotiators found that the law had had no effect upon
their negotiations with higher management. This would suggest that members base
their perceptions of "the union" on their own shop steward rather than on the outcomes
of negotiations between higher management and the senior stewards.
At least one of the respondents was conscious of the legislation even though he had
made the common mistake of confusing the civil with the criminal law; referring to the
forms of pressure indicated in question 24 (see appendix 2) he commented "I think all
the above are now illegal until registered a 'failure to agree'!"27 and after question 27
"again Ithink any of the above actions would be illegal nowadays." This is a common
27 Even this could be interpreted as a distorted view of the law.
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misconception. When asked to indicate whether they thought a list of statements were
true or false, the majority of respondents thought that it was a criminal offence for
industrial action to be organised without first holding a secret ballot. (See table 9.)
Welch (1993) had found that a significant number of lay officers also believed this and
he commented that "[tjhis belief was and is even more likely to be held by the passive
union members who will be aware that there are laws requiring strike ballots but not
understand the ways in which the relevant rules operate." (p239). It could be argued
that firm A members realised that a secret ballot should be held before industrial action
was taken; however, they may have viewed their workplace secret ballots as sufficient
to cover these rules. Only 49% knew that the organisation of a postal ballot protects
the national union from legal liability if a strike is called in support of a pay claim,
though slightly more knew that organising industrial action short of a strike without a
postal ballot could involve their national union incurring legal liability. However, if
members do not associate their methods of protesting, such as overtime bans and short
stoppages of work, as industrial action they would not consider this when taking such
action. As with the stewards, it is perhaps a good sign that at least over half of the
members knew that postal ballots do not protect strikers from dismissal.
It could be disastrous for members taking action such as a "work to rule", which 28%
said that they had taken at firm A, because the majority of members wrongly thought
that their employer had no right to dismiss them for taking industrial action based on
"working to contract". Only a fifth of the sample knew that this was false and as
fewer than half the stewards also knew this, members at firm A could find that they are
walking on thin ice, if the management there wanted to exercise its rights (see also
Welch 1993). But, it appears that at firm A this type of action had secured the workers
their goals, perhaps because management were aware of the competitive nature of their
industry and did not want to jeopardise their order books. This could be taken as an
indication that the legislation aimed at giving employers more incentive to stand up to
trade unions had not had any real effect at firm A.
Half the sample were aware that a trade union member can obtain a court order to stop
a union from taking industrial action without a properly conducted ballot. As one of
the aims of the legislation was to try and weaken trade union "power" from within its
own organisations by empowering union members to challenge their own union's
decisions, this result could be considered a poor one. If only half of union members
know their rights against their union, the legislation could be said to have failed in its
aim to encourage members to keep their own unions in check. However, it could be
argued that those members who do know their rights could be the ones who would
challenge their union if they felt that they were doing something "undemocratic". On
the other hand, those members who are most likely to keep themselves informed of
everything relevant to their union are usually the ones who are most active within the
union and, therefore, are the ones most likely to stick by their union rather than
condemn it.28
28 These activists are also more likely to condemn their national organisation rather than the
shopfloor organisation.
260
Table 9. Members' awareness of the legislation
Statements ~ ~ DlliLt
Krulli'
It is a criminal offence for industrial action to be 87 16 '" 15
organised without first holding a secret ballot. (73.7%) (13.6%) (12.7%)
Postal ballots protect strikers from dismissal. 20 68 '" 30
(16.9%) (57.6%) (25.4%)
The organisation of a postal ballot protects the
58 '" 13 47national union from legal liability if a strike is
called in support of a pay claim. (49.2%) (II %) (39.8% )
The employer has no right to dismiss employees
71 24 '" 23for taking industrial action based on "working to
contract", such as an overtime ban. (60.2%) (20.3%) (19.5%)
Even with a majority vote in favour, striking in 57 '" 27 34
support of workers at another workplace is (48.3% ) (22.9%) (28.8%)
unlawful.
Organising industrial action short of a strike 62 '" 15 39
without a postal ballot could involve your (53.4%) (12.9%) (33.6% )
national union incurring legal liability .
A trade union member can obtain a court order to 59 '" 11 48
stop a union from taking industrial action (50%) (9.3%) (40.7%)
without a properly conducted ballot.
It is only lawful for a person to peacefully picket 78 * 18 22
at or near hislher own place of work. (66.1 %) (15.3%) (18.6%)
Each member of a trade union's executive
committee can retain the post as long as they 10 69* 39
wish. (8.5% ) (58%) 33.1%)
An employer must get an employee's written
46* 40 32permission every three years before deducting
union subscriptions from his/her wages. (39%) (33.9%) (27.1 %)
A person can be rightfully dismissed because 8 86 * 24
of hislher union membership. (6.8%) (72.9%) (20.3%)
When an employer makes a single union deal
34 52 * 32with a particular union, all union members in
that workplace must be members of that union. ( 28.8%) (44.1 %) (27.1%)
Members were asked to indicate whether they thought a list of statements were true or false. The
answers are set out above. An asterix against the result indicates the correct answer.
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With regards to the legislation not related to industrial action, the highest majority of
respondents correctly replied that a person cannot be dismissed because of hislher
union membership and over half knew that members of a union's executive committee
cannot retain the post as long as they wish. However, it might be disappointing for
unions that members may not be aware of the legislation which may affect them
directly in the workplace. Only 39% of the respondents knew that an employer must
get an employee's written permission every three years before deducting union
subscriptions from hislher wages. This result may indicate that some members do not
pay any attention to things that they are signing; three quarters of the sample had said
that they paid their subscriptions by check-off, and according to the convenor (who
also insisted that all AEEU members at firm A were "on check-off") every member
except one re-signed the check -off forms; therefore, almost half of the check -off
paying members could not have realised what they were signing. In addition,
members cannot read their union journals very closely, if at all. In the months leading
up to the fmal date for the check-off forms to be signed, every union journal was
constantly reminding its members about the need to re-sign and the benefits of union
membership. Less than half the sample knew that if an employer makes a single union
deal with a particular union, that union members do not necessarily have to be
members of that union. This in itself could have disastrous results for those unions
who have members in a workplace but are not party to any deal. If members feel that
they have to join the recognised union the other unions will lose out. Members could
lose out too, especially if they leave a union which offers them better "insurance",
benefits and even workplace representation than the one which they may decide to
join.29 Indeed, non-recognised unions may still play an important part in resolving
disputes at some workplaces (for example, Millward et al 1992).
It appears that the law as far as trade unions are concerned is not a
universally known thing among those it may affect; i.e. union
members. At least a quarter of members did not know the correct answers to two
thirds of the questions and as many as a third of the respondents did not know a third.
These figures could be even higher; it is possible that some respondents guessed at the
correct answer rather than claiming that they did not know. Not one respondent knew
all the correct answers and only four knew them all but two; three of these were
confused by the criminal and civil law. This confusion could inhibit members taking
action because of fear of the law. However, when asked "do you believe a trade union
should comply with a court order to call off a strike?", only 31% said it should and
30% did not know, but a narrow majority (39%) said that it should not. This result
indicates a difference of opinion among the respondents as to whether the law should
be observed whether they understood it or not. Welch (1993) argued that his findings
permitted "speculation that there may be circumstances where industrial action, not
sanctioned by a secret ballot, will take place and continue, notwithstanding attempts to
repudiate by the relevant union." (p239.) Evidence from firm A confirms this,
29 Firm C was an example. AEEU members were joining the union which became party to a single
union deal in one workshop, yet they had enioyed better representation by the AEEU steward than the
representative of the recognised union even though he had no negotiating rights within that workshop.
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however, the action at this workplace tended to be short lived, usually gaining the
union its goal, and had never reached the attention of the national organisation.
Nevertheless, the majority of the sample (73%) felt that the changes in the law had had
an affect upon trade unions in general, only 9% said that they had not and 18% did not
know. The fact that 18% of the sample did not have an opinion indicates that just
under a fifth of union members may have no real interest in trade unions generally,
perhaps with the exception of what they can get out of them (Rentoul 1989). Of those
who thought the law had had an effect, 63% thought that it had had a negative effect
and 32% a positive effect. However, as the convenor's answer to this question
showed, respondents may have answered the question with a different focus in mind;
one respondent who had said that the legislation had had a positive effect had also
commented "for management" and another who had said that it had had a negative
effect had commented "mainly". Another respondent thought that the law had had a
negative effect on trade unions in general, but had added at the end of the
questionnaire: "the secret ballot system is better than a show of hands as some people
are intimidated by militant workmates if a show of hands is asked for at a shopfloor
meeting." This member may have been referring to the workplace secret ballots held at
firm A, but it is also an indication that the balloting procedures have been accepted as
democratic by some union members.
9: 10 Trade union power
Despite the fact that only two fifths of the sample positively viewed their union as
effective at firm A when other answers are taken into consideration, such as whether
being in a union made a difference in a number of probable circumstances, it appears
that for the majority of respondents the union did have the capacity to produce effects.
If trade union power is defined as the union's capacity to defend and advance its
members' interests, the union at firm A could be described as powerful. It was
certainly the workplace organisation which had the ability to achieve desired goals in
the workplace; the outside union had only been called in once since 1987 and even
then it was the main workplace representative rather than the FrO who secured the
desired outcome. Therefore, the workplace organisation could be described as
"powerful" .
Nevertheless, when asked "do you think your union at your workplace has too much
or too little power?" only 23.5% said that it had "about the right amount" and one
respondent thought it had "far too much" power. Like the stewards, the majority of
respondents thought that their workplace union did not have enough power; 57% said
it had "too little" and 17% thought it had "far too little". The evidence portrays the
union at firm A as fairly confident about getting its own way "as long as its demands
are reasonable" and compared to other workplaces the union organisation there could
have been described as having a certain amount of "power". Therefore, the results
suggest that members may expect more from their union. Members may take for
granted the work of their representatives and the concessions that they gain; it is
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accepted that "the union" can and does do certain things and therefore, members expect
it to do more. In addition, some members may expect problems to be sorted out
without their backing, which would undermine any potential union power and leave
the representative isolated; members may make the mistake of presuming that the
steward is in a "powerful" position without their support. A steward can only be as
"powerful" as his/her members allow him/her to be; that is, if he/she does not have the
support of his/her members any potential capacity to achieve a desired outcome could
be lost. This is confirmed by some of the comments from former stewards who
argued that some members complained but disappeared as soon as their support was
needed. A member's comment also suggests this could be the case:
"I am very disappointed with the way the union power has been cut by the government. It
is very apparent when you approach a shop steward nowadays how powerless they seem to
be and this, at times, can be very disheartening. The management seem almost blase
when the union approach them sometimes."
This member displayed a fairly positive attitude towards "the union" at firm A and
would have been prepared to take industrial action if the need arose. However, he was
not sure if the union was effective in the workplace and described it as having "too
little" power and judging by the above comment he blamed the Conservatives for this.
Nevertheless, he spoke as though the steward himself should be "powerful", rather
than the steward being the leader of a workgroup, which, by its solidarity, might
become a powerful group. This is also an indication that some members may see the
steward as "the union", rather than including themselves in that description. Members
at firm A were not an exception to the rule. Other studies had found that members
invariably acted this way. Batstone and his colleagues (1977) concluded that the
"extent to which stewards can act as leaders is influenced by their members" (p99) and
he/she has no power unless he/she has membership support (see also Nichols and
Armstrong 1976). However, past studies also add weight to the argument that if the
steward has the correct leadership style, he/she will have more influence over his/her
members in determining their participation and, therefore, the effectiveness of the
union (see for example, McCarthy and Parker 1968, Beynon 1973, Batstone et al
1977, Fosh 1993).
The above comment also shows how some members may presume that the
Conservative legislation had affected management/union relationships when the main
negotiator, the MS convenor, felt that it had not. They based their perceptions on how
well their own shop steward negotiated with their workshop manager, indicating that
members do base their perceptions of the "power" of their union on how well their lay
representative performs. Members' perceptions may also have been shaped by the
media, particularly tabloid accounts of the legislation and its effects upon trade unions,
rather than by its actual effect in their workplace. Hutton (1996), in particular, noted
how the focus of newspapers had narrowed to a "right-wing populism that pays scant
attention to accuracy" (P9) and Rentoul (1989) illustrated "the effectiveness of the
government's propaganda" by the way that people hostile to the Conservatives actually
used their slogans to claim that the unions had been "given back to their members"
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(p89).
When asked about trade unions in the country as a whole, 2.5% of the sample thought
they had "too much" power, and one of these respondents thought that unions had "far
too much" power, 23% said that they had "the right amount", 56% that they had "too
little" and 11% thought that trade unions in the country as a whole had "far too little"
power.tv However, only half of those who thought that the union in their workplace
had the "right amount" of power said that unions in the country as a whole did; 7%
said that they had "too much", 25% that they had "too little" and the rest did not know.
This analysis indicates that for a minority of respondents their workplace union was
seen as powerful when compared to trade unions in the country as a whole. However,
14.5% of those who said that their workplace union had "too little" power thought that
unions in the country as a whole had the "right amount" or "far too much", which
suggests that another small group of respondents thought that compared to trade
unions in general their workplace union was not powerful. One respondent, who
thought that the recent changes in the law had had no effect on management/union
relations or on the forms of industrial action taken at firm A, said that the workplace
union had "far too little" power, yet for unions in general "some have too much
[power and] others not enough". Some respondents blamed the Conservatives for
what they saw as loss of union power; "I think with the government of today there
will eventually be no power in the unions. So let's get out the Tories or suffer being
put on even more" was a typical response. However, this type of comment suggests
that the respondent's perceptions of union power were based on a general picture of
trade unions rather than on the workplace itself.
The essential thing when talking about "power" is how each individual
interprets the concept. Even though, when asked specifically about
union power, the majority of respondents did not perceive their union
as powerful, when all the answers are taken into consideration the
union organisation at finn A could be described as "powerful"
according to the definition of power employed by the study. The fact
that the majority of respondents thought that being in a union made a
difference if an accident should occur at work indicates that the national
union also bad the capacity to produce effects and achieve the desired
goal: compensation against the employer at no extra financial cost to
the member.
However, members' perceptions of the power of their union within the
workplace appear to be influenced by the way that their own steward
performed rather than on the outcomes of issues that had been taken
higher up the union hierarchy to the convenor. Therefore, rather than
30 Compared to previous surveys, (Stevens et al 1989, Millward 1990), many more respondents from
firm A felt that unions bad "too little power". This could be an indication that trade union power is
perceived as baving been reduced even more over a five year period. However, the previous surveys
also included non-union members who may have perceived trade unions differently to members.
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members measuring the extent of their union's power by the level of
success that they have in the workplace as a whole, the benchmark that
they use tends to be the level of success that their steward has in their
own workshop. The style of working of the lay representative then, is
one of the main ingredients for successful unionism within each
workshop; the leader's style detennines the level of success that the
separate shopfloor units have when dealing with their shop managers.
However, while the personality and style of working of the lay
representative are important in detennining membership participation
and interest in workplace unionism, the members themselves may to a
certain degree determine how much "power" that representative
displays; that is, by the level of support that they are prepared to give
him/her. Following Fosh (1993), it could be argued that if a steward
whose members were not prepared to support him/her altered his/her
style of working he/she may be able to determine greater membership
participation and, therefore, enhance his/her own level of success
within the workshop.
9:11 Conclusions
It can be argued that for the majority of members "the union" is in the workplace rather
than at national level. However, it appears that for some members when they speak of
the union they refer to it as a whole rather than their workplace organisation, merging
the two different strands of unionism together. Judging by a minority of comments,
such as "the top union leaders are not getting us any wage rises as they were 20 years
ago", the members who viewed the union as the national organisation considered it to
be less "powerful" than it was some years ago. These members also seemed to be the
ones who held defmite views about trade union power in the country as a whole, and
rather than basing their perceptions upon the workplace they tended to reflect their
overall opinions onto the workplace organisation. In this respect the aims of the
Conservative's could be seen as having had an effect upon some trade union members,
albeit a minority, in that they accept that union power has been reduced rather than
measuring it by the overall outcomes of situations at their own workplace. This could
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby members believe that union power has
been reduced and therefore, they act accordingly and do nothing to help themselves.
Indeed, a few members who viewed their union as the national organisation disagreed
that workers needed unions to protect their interests and yet they thought that workers
achieved their goals by sticking together. This suggests that they may not have had
much respect for their national organisation (which they considered to be "the union")
but felt that workers needed to stick together in the workplace to achieve their aims
indicating that a workplace based organisation rather than a nationally based
organisation was what they wanted.
It appears that the morale of union members may be connected to the perceived power
of the union in the workplace. Those with negative views about unions in general
266
tended to rate the union at firm A in a similar fashion. And, while in a minority, these
respondents also appeared to be unhappy in their general outlook towards their work
situation:
"In my view this workforce has been broken into small easily managed groups (cells)
which [management] can easily overpower on every issue. The union offers little
resistance to this bullying leaving the members totally demoralised and wishing they
worked somewhere else."
It should be stressed that only a very small minority of respondents (about 7%) held
negative views of the union and this may reflect more upon themselves than the union
itself. For example, other studies have concluded that those members who hold
negative views of unions in general tend to evaluate their own union in the same light
(for example, Fiorito et al 1988). Workers employed at firm A who had also worked
elsewhere commented that their present union did get them a better deal than the union
organisations in other workplaces where they had been employed. Therefore,
members may not realise how effective their own union is unless they are able to
compare their own workplace with another. It has also been argued that participation
in union affairs enhances satisfaction with the union (for example, Kuruvilla et al
1993, Fiorito et al 1988) and those members with negative views of unions in general
are likely to be the ones that have very little contact with their representatives. Indeed,
these also tended to be the members who only attended union meetings at the
workplace when it was for the annual pay negotiations. This attitude suggests that
these members are essentially individualistic in their outlook.
Virtually all the respondents could be described as individualistic when their reasons
for membership are looked at. However, the vast majority of respondents also
thought that the collectivist reasons for membership were important. Therefore, even
though individualism may be a predominant trait for trade union members collectivism
is also an essential part of that membership. This is not a new phenomenon;
individualism has existed in British culture for possibly centuries (Kingdom 1992,
Marquand 1988) and trade unionism first appeared as a defence of individualism
(Phelps Brown 1983). Collectivism and individualism still seem to be working
together in pursuit of the same goals; in the case of trade unions - the advancement
and protection of all members' interests. Therefore, the national organisation of the
AEEU may be moving in the wrong direction if it believes that "individualism now
outweighs collectivism in what union members want")1 This may be another
indication that the national organisation is out of touch with the realities of the
workplace. It can be argued that the aim to reduce trade union power by the promotion
of individualism has failed. Largely because it was believed that individualism would
lead to individual members being in competition with each other, the Conservatives
misinterpreted the fact that collectivism appears to be the only way that some workers
can achieve their aims, even if those aims are individualistic in nature. Rentoul' s
(1989) description of trade unions as "vehicles for collective selfishness" (p96) is an
31 Divisional Organisers Weekend School Pack 1995, "Future of the new Amalgamated Union."
AEEU.
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apt way of putting it.
More importantly, those individuals who had only been employed since 1979 believed
that the collective aspects of trade unionism were important, which suggests that the
promotion of individualism had not reached those workers who were not union
members before the Conservatives began their assault on trade unions. This may also
have an important bearing upon the economic climate. The changes in employment
conditions, in particular the large numbers of people who have been made redundant
and the decline of the manufacturing industries, seem to have made workers more
conscious of the need to safeguard their own jobs. It could be argued that the changes
in the economic and employment climate in Britain has actually made workers more
aware of the need for trade unions to protect their interests. Changing patterns of
work, such as splitting the workforce into smaller units (or cells), rather than allowing
management to "easily overpower" the workgroup, as suggested by one member,
could permit the union to become stronger; cell working involves employees working
together to achieve their "cell rates" rather than individuals working for "piece rates".
Therefore, competition between individuals should be at a minimum and members of a
united cell, with a leader who has the right personality and style of working, might
find that they are able to achieve their aims.
It can be argued that the style of working of the lay representative is one of the main
ingredients for successful unionism in the workplace. How well each individual
steward performs within his/her own workshop appears to influence members'
perceptions about the "power" of their union. It is the leader's style of working that is
essential in determining membership participation and interest in workplace unionism
and, therefore, the level of success that they have when dealing with management.
However, it appears that, at least at firm A, the style of working of the main union
representative, that is, the MS convenor, was actually the most vital component
ensuring the success of the union. The achievements of the union relied upon the
support of the members, which at times was 100% among those who were affected,
however, the style of the convenor was such that the union had the ability to achieve
its desired goals purely because management believed that membership support would
be forthcoming.
Despite the fact that the majority of members at firm A believed that the legislation had
had an effect upon management/union relations and the forms of industrial action
taken, the evidence points to the fact that the legislation had actually had little effect
upon the union and the forms of action taken at firm A. Members were still prepared
to take industrial action without a ballot over certain issues and it appears that many
members, including stewards, did not necessarily define short immediate stoppages of
work as strike action. Therefore, as far as the union organisation at firm A was
concerned attempts to curb trade union power appear to have failed. However, even
though the union at firm A could be described as "powerful", the legislation, despite
not being fully understood, may have influenced members' opinions about the power
of trade unions, at least when they were asked directly what they thought about trade
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union power. The concept "power" appears to be interpreted as something more than
the capacity to achieve effects. As Kirkbride (1985) suggested, it appears to be "a
taken for granted" term in the industrial relations arena; those who use it rarely
question its meaning. Though it does appear that the concept tends to be associated by
some members with unions at a national level rather than as a capacity (to achieve
effects) that members through their solidarity might possess.
The following chapter combines the findings presented in the last three chapters and
presents the overall conclusions and implications about AEEU "power".
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Chapter 10 CONCLUSIONS - THE AEEU
"Theunion is the men/women not the officials" - union member
"I have no confidence in the officials running the union... Most of the union work is
flOW done at works level. May as well have our own local union. In my opinion, most
top union officials... see it as ajob, with no realfeeling for principles ... - shop steward
10:1 Introduction
Using the evidence documented in the last three chapters this chapter presents the
conclusions about the AEEU in Xtown and generally and relates them to the general
issue of trade union power and the hypotheses presented at the end of chapter 5.
Evidence from the case study (chapters 8 and 9) reinforced the conclusions made about
the AEEU locally (chapter 7). The shopfloor organisation is the most important to the
majority of members and the key to successful unionism within the workplace appears
to be the main lay representative. The role of the national union may have changed,
but where independent workplace organisations exist nothing much appears to have
altered on the shopfloor.
10:2 The shopfloor is "the union"
There were three strands of unionism within the AEEU: the national organisation, the
local unit and the shopfloor units. With the exception of the branch, the local unit has
more or less disappeared after the rule book changes. However, even though it may
only have acted as a go between for the shopfloor units and head office, its important
function was the dissemination of information to shop stewards and sometimes this
information might have been in addition to that that the national union was issuing to
members. For example, the national union were asking members to vote "yes" for the
proposals for the new rule book and informed them of the new benefits that the
changes would yield. The local unit were advising members to vote "no" and telling
them of the things that the proposed changes would abolish: these had not been
mentioned by the national union.
Nevertheless, even though the local unit was an important information provider via
shop stewards, the rank and file members had little or no direct contact with it. The
union organisation within the workplace was the most important to the majority of
members and for many it was the only union contact that they had. The politics of the
workplace rather than the national union, or even the branch, was the main concern for
most members and for the local stewards, who did recognise the national organisation
as such, but considered that it was totally out of touch with members' concerns and the
everyday realities that they encountered Indeed, local stewards argued that the major
benefit of unionism was protection; protection in the workplace and especially job
protection. The shopfloor was the place where any bargaining power against the
employer was displayed and at firm A that "power" had worked to the members'
advantage. The national union only appeared useful to members at firm A for
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compensation claims, such as for an accident at work or industrial deafness, though
most members thought that benefits such as financial or health schemes were an
important reason to join a union. It can still be said that ..the officials are not part of
these workers' world" (Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, pp30-31).
Where a shopfloor organisation is well developed and works independently of its
national body, fewer problems tend to escalate into major disputes, which is
advantageous to everyone concerned. At workplaces where the shopfloor union was
reliant upon its FrO to solve its problems, members appeared to be less united and
their morale was much lower than members in workplaces with independent
organisations. Firms M and B were examples. This suggests that the morale of union
members is connected to the level of success that they perceive their union as having at
their workplace. Former union members from firm M held very negative attitudes
about unions in general and they related this to their experience of unionism at firm M;
therefore, previous union experience can shape an individual's perception of unions in
general.
It was argued in chapter 7 that each shopfloor organisation has its own way of
working. The findings from firm A suggest that this even extends to the different
workshops within one organisation. It appears that the success each workshop has to
a large extent reflects upon the personalities and styles of working of the lay
representatives in charge. As Fosh (1993) argued, if the lay representative adopts a
careful choice of leadership style he/she could encourage his/her members to become
involved in workplace unionism and increase its potential to produce effects. Without
a "leader" who can encourage this type of participation and support for workplace
unionism, it appears that conceptions of unionism by members may become distorted;
they view their steward as "the union" and make the mistake of assuming that he/she is
"powerful", that is, has the capacity to produce effects, without their support. This is
not just characteristic of the 1990s. Researchers in the 1960s and 1970s reached
similar conclusions (see for example, Nichols and Armstrong 1976). Members must
be made to understand that any potential "union power" rests with them (as the union)
and not the steward alone. A successful steward should have the ability to reinforce
this message.
10:3 The style of working of the main lay representative is one of the
main ingredients for successful unionism in the workplace
The findings do portray the union organisation as a whole at firm A as "powerful",
and it was the main lay representative - the MS convenor - who, by his style of
working, had built up a reputation with management that tended to secure the union its
goals. However, without the backing of the members (or the perceived backing of the
members) many issues might not have been solved in the union's favour; the
management team believed that the shopfloor was behind their "leader" and did not
want to take the risk of interrupted production. Very often agreements were reached
before the shopfloor even got to know of the problem. As Martin et al (1991) said, the
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best way of exerting bargaining power is through being perceived by management to
possess that power rather than actually using it. This would also explain why members
did not necessarily know that threats were issued to management, let alone if they
worked; the style adopted by the convenor ensured that the union achieved the best
possible deal for its members, usually without any action being taken.
However, when problems involved particular groups of members, they were
consulted and kept informed of the proceedings and their agreement was sought before
anything was settled with management. This indicates that, when necessary, a
collective approach to problem solving was taken by the convenor and this may also
have given management the impression that the shopfloor would back him. It has
been argued that feelings of solidarity among members tend to be most common when
issues that concern them are being discussed (Fosh 1993, Batstone et al 1977);
therefore, when members are involved in the decision making process their unity may
become apparent.
It could be argued that the management at firm A took a softer approach towards the
union than managements at other workplaces.l However, the fact that the
management had taken a firmer stance in the foundry after a change of convenor
suggests that this was not so. The management could very well have seen an
opportunity to assert its authority but it seems highly unlikely that this was the reason
for the change in the relationship between the union and management in the foundry.
The relationship between the same management and the two different union
organisations within the same factory must have had something to do with the union
representatives' personalities and styles of working; otherwise the two union
organisations would not have been experiencing different attitudes from management.
Even the foundry convenor recognised that in some instances if the machine shop
convenor had not intervened on his behalf many issues would not have been solved to
the satisfaction of the members.
It might be suggested that the foundry members were to blame by not showing their
support for their "leader". However, as the examples in chapter 8 show, these
workers had taken a united stance against management when they had a grievance, so
they were prepared to take action. It was the CS convenor who did not want to pursue
issues any further with management than he, himself, felt was necessary, and these
issues were usually ones which he was under pressure from his members to sort out.
It could be argued that he did not have enough confidence to raise an issue with
management that he thought might involve a conflict situation. The example of the
dismissed member who the MS convenor finally secured a settlement for (see pp 206-
207) is a good illustration: the CS convenor did not wish to fight the member's case,
whereas the conviction of the MS convenor that the union must stand up for all its
members, regardless of the situation, led him to contest management's decision to
1 Though it could be argued that the management at firm A recognised that it was to their advantage
to have a union on site that was able to "control" its members and ensure that the workplace ran
efficiently.
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dismiss the member and eventually a satisfactory settlement was reached. The CS
convenor lacked the confident manner which the MS convenor used when approaching
management (even if he was calling their bluff); the representative must be perceived
as "knowing what he/she is talking about" even if he/she does not. Management must
have been aware of this, especially as they asked the MS convenor to intervene into
situations where foundry members would not return to work. This is also an
indication that management realised that the MS convenor could resolve disputes to
everyone's satisfaction. It can be argued that it was the different personalities of the
two convenors and their different styles of working that influenced their own
relationship and, in tum, the relationship of their separate union organisations with
management. McCarthy's (1966) suggestion that the degree to which management
initiate discussion with union representatives depends upon their views as to the
strength of the workers' organisation and their personal relationships with the
stewards involved appears to be still relevant at firm A.
The MS convenor's style of working and negotiating with management had developed
over time; guidance from his predecessor and practical experience had aided that
development. Stewards may be able to develop a more suitable style of working
which would encourage their members to participate in union affairs and, therefore,
strengthen their own hand when dealing with their shop managers (taking the onus
away from the convenor) through steward training courses. No amount of training
can match experience when learning the best ways of dealing with certain people and
problems, but training may help stewards to become aware of their own potential for
leadership by adopting particular ways of working. This along with experience on the
shopfloor itself may speed up the development process. The personality of a steward
may influence hislher style of working, in particular being confident and portraying
this to others appears to be one of the essential traits needed to carry out the role. The
convenor of firm B referred to in the text did not appear confident with his dealings
with management or his members and this may have added to his apparent lack of
success within the workplace. Some personalities may adapt to the leadership role
more easily than others, but if Fosh (1993) was correct, stewards who adopt a
collectivist outlook to problem solving, that is relating issues to a shared situation of
employment rather than treating them as individual grievances, will have a higher
degree of support and, therefore, a higher success rate than those who do not
encourage membership participation in solving problems. (See also, McCarthy and
Parker 1968, Goodman and Whittingham 1969, Batstone et al1977, Fosh and Cohen
1990, Hammer and Wazeter 1993.) This has implications for workplace union
organisations everywhere.
The differences between the different workplace organisations of the AEEU was
highlighted in chapter 7 and may largely have a direct bearing upon the personalities
and ways of working of those concerned. If stewards could be encouraged to attend
training courses, these differences may begin to recede. Indeed, now that the district
shop stewards' meetings have ceased, steward training courses may become more
important in developing the stewards' role: through the meetings stewards from
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different workplaces were able to advise each other about the best ways of dealing
with particular problems; therefore, stewards learnt from each other. Batstone et al
(1977) contended that the contact that stewards had with each other supported the
conception of the steward role. Unless local stewards meet unofficially, this will no
longer happen and training courses may be the only way that stewards from different
workplaces can learn from each other. Advice from Fl'Os was not always sufficient to
deal with particular situations. Representatives from workplaces who had experienced
similar predicaments were better placed to suggest solutions, which may have been
unorthodox compared to the official advice but appeared to work. Therefore, stewards
must have a means of contact with each other, especially if they wish to
become/remain independent of their national body. In the present economic climate
this contact may be even more essential as companies appear to be introducing more
and more changes into their workplaces in order to assist their output and keep up with
the competitive nature of their product market.
10:4 The economic and employment climate
The economic climate may have induced local firms to introduce new working
practices, particularly because of the competitive nature of their industries. However,
in the majority of local firms the AEEU workplace organisations had coped rather well
with any changes ensuring that they were implemented to their members' advantage.
The economic climate does not appear to have had an adverse effect upon the union
organisation at firm A; if anything it had probably strengthened the determination of
the senior representatives to protect their members' interests. When the company
experienced a down tum in trade the union ensured that the best deal possible was
secured for those who volunteered for redundancy and for those who remained
working; for example, the union was opposed to contractors working on the site
while the workforce was on a four day week and it won its case. However, the
convenor's recognition of management's problems, especially in times of recession,
confirrns Terry's (1986) suggestion that workers and management share a common
interest in the immediate survival of the finn; union "power" is not only used to
defend (and advance) its members' interests but also to assist management in running
the firm more efficiently.
The change in the economic and employment climate may have altered the attitudes of
trade unions, whereby they are more willing to work with management than
previously and accept changes so as to ensure the survival of a company. But it does
not appear to have altered their role: they still protect their members' interests. Mutual
respect seems to be the key factor between those union representatives and managers
who appear to work together: the main representatives try to understand the problems
that management face and management appear to see advantages in a unionised
workforce, especially if they can see that its "leaders" are working for the overall good
of the company as well as for their members. However, as research in the 1960s
reached similar conclusions this is not necessarily characteristic of the 1990s (see for
example, McCarthy and Parker 1968, Goodman and Whittingham 1969). As
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McCarthy and Parker (1968) concluded, managers and stewards had reached a level of
mutual tolerance and acceptance and this appeared to be the norm. Arguments that the
promotion of collective organisation is the best way to achieve increased production
and does not damage a company's long term prospects (Brown 1994, Machin 1995)
appear to be appropriate, at least in Xtown. The fact that union co-operation makes the
running of a business much easier (Edwards and Heery 1989b, Brown 1994) may be
more beneficial to employers in today's economic climate because of the competitive
nature of their product markets; as Martin (1992) contended, to maintain their market
position firms require labour co-operation which is secured much easier with a good
relationship with the workplace union.
Nevertheless, even though unions may be more willing to work with managers than
previously, they have not lost the will to fight and ensure that changes are implemented
to the advantage of their members rather than allowing management a free rein to
introduce change as they wish. As past studies also concluded that shop stewards
largely worked on management's terms and that while trade unions did have a certain
amount of bargaining power in the workplace the final decision making remained the
prerogative of management (for example, Beynon 1973, Boraston et al 1975,
Marchington 1980, Wilson et al 1982), it could be argued that workplace relations
have not changed a great deal. In reality unions tend to shape and alter management's
original proposals in such a way that they may also claim to have made the final
decision (Edwards 1978).
Nonetheless, the personalities and styles of working of those involved appear to be
significant factors contributing to the success of the union when negotiating new terms
with management, and indeed, in being able to convince its members that they are
taking the right course of action. The attitudes of some members may not have
changed towards management; they presume that management can and should offer
them more than they do and sometimes these members can create problems for the
stewards by persuading other members that this is the case (see also Batstone et al
1977). Members' expectations can become out of touch with reality to the
disadvantage of themselves and management. Therefore, the ability of the steward to
"lead" hislher members is of the utmost importance; he/she must have the confidence
and respect of both hislher members and management so that he/she can act as a
mediator between them.
The economic and employment environment may not have altered the role of trade
unions but members' attitudes about what unions' priorities should be do appear to
have changed. Job security seems to be one of the most important things that
members want from their union. Hedges' (1994) conclusions that job security had
overtaken higher wages as the priority that members' thought unions should work
towards appear to be upheld. However, while firm A members were aware of the
need to protect their own jobs (and in some cases all jobs), because the fortunes of the
company had improved dramatically, members still appeared to be "money oriented";
many of the grievances taken to stewards involved money. This was not a new
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phenomenon; researchers in the 1960s and 1970s also concluded that union members
were instrumental in their motives for union membership (for example, Moran 1974,
Goldthorpe et al 1968). The economic climate may actually have been working in
favour of the union organisation at firm A. The competitive nature of the engineering
industry ensured that management wanted to keep production running to fulfil their
order books and to win even more contracts; therefore, any threatened work
stoppages were dealt with swiftly or an important contract could have been lost.
Nevertheless, junior members of management had joined the AEEU in anticipation of
job protection, and union members who had been dismissed had been reinstated
through union pressure. Indeed, the results from the third Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS3) suggested that unions played an important role assisting
members in disciplinary and dismissal procedures (Millward et al 1992). It could be
argued that union membership gives workers an increased sense of job security, at
least where the union organisation is seen to be effective. As Blanchflower et al
(1990) suggested, workers will readily join a union if it offers insurance against
arbitrary dismissal.
10:5 The legislation
The legislation did not appear to have made a great impact upon the majority of local
stewards or the way that they conducted their negotiations with management.
However, the determining factor appears to be the level of dependence of the
workplace organisation on its FrO. Those workplace organisations that were capable
of conducting their business independently of the national union did not appear to be
influenced in any way by the legislation, whereas those organisations which relied
upon the FrO to help sort out their problems were more inclined to follow the law, for
example, on industrial action balloting. This was probably because the FrO made
sure that all the correct procedures were followed before any action took place so as to
ensure that the national union was in no danger of being threatened with legal liability .
Where this occurred, the lay representatives and their members would become more
aware of the law and the way that it might affect their negotiations. Therefore, the law
only played a part during negotiations when the "external" union was brought in.
The legislation appears to have had little effect upon the negotiations at firm A; that is,
between the convenor and/or the senior stewards and middleJhigher management.
Stewards may have found that their own negotiations with shop managers had been
affected, but this to a large extent may have reflected upon themselves and their
members.z It appears that higher management did not wish to risk ignoring threats
issued by the convenor irrespective of the fact that the law would have been on their
side. It was also the case that the managers preferred to deal with their own union
representatives (see also Elgar and Simpson 1993b). "The cult of privacy", as A.I.
2 This could be part of a general trend. A Labour Research survey found that two thirds of union
representatives felt that the law had affected the way that they negotiated (l990b ). Awareness of the
fact that the legislation exists, but not necessarily awareness of its full contents, may lead stewards to
think that their negotiations with management have been affected, when in fact they may not have
changed at all.
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Marsh (1963) called it (see chapter 3, footnote 9), still survives; if the external union
was to be called in management's superiors would also have had to be called in and
management did not like to give the impression that they could not manage their own
affairs. (See also, Clegg, Killick and Adams 1961, McCarthy and Parker 1968,
Goodman and Whittingham 1969.)
The concept of secret balloting was seen as a positive aspect of the law by FTOs,
stewards and members alike. Even if they were not always conducted by the national
union, secret (workplace) ballots were seen as more democratic because they reduced
victimisation among the workforce. The suggestion that strike ballots had made a
universal impact while the other labour legislation had not made such a general
impression (Elgar and Simpson 1992) appears to stand up locally. Even the
procedures for ensuring that union elections are more democratic may have failed (see
also Martin et al 1995). The turnout for the first round of the presidential election was
24%, and 28% of the electoral roll voted in the second round; approximately three
quarters of those eligible to vote did not do so, even though the ballot papers could be
filled in in the privacy of members' own homes and returned at no cost to themselves.
However, the Conservatives justified the use of postal ballots by arguing that high
levels of participation are not the most important factor ensuring that a democratic
decision is reached; more important is the fact that postal ballots are least susceptible
to union manipulation. But the findings also show that members do not necessarily
vote as individuals in the privacy of their own home. Rather they take their voting
papers to work (or to their branch if they work in a workplace with few employees or
few union members) and ask the advice of their representatives. Therefore, postal
ballots have not increased the involvement of members as individuals in the decision-
making forum of their union; many of those who do vote still vote as part of a
collective or take advice from other members.
The check-off regulations appear to have worked in favour of the AEEU; workers
who had never been approached to join the union became members. So this part of the
legislation, while it may create an administrative nightmare for those involved, was
actually advantageous for the union. The fact that no firm A members had complained
that they were not informed by management of the increase in their subscriptions
indicates that members either do not know their rights or are not interested in
exercising them.
Welch (1993) argued that his fmdings:
"[Sluggest that in the here and now legal controls are working to restrain the forms of
industrial action that trade unionists take, and that the law has an inhibiting impact at
workplace as well as national level." (pp240- 241 ).
Welch talked about "the forms of action that trade unionists take" and other studies
have looked at the way the legal reforms had restrained industrial action, in particular
strike action. It appears that the majority of grievances at firm A (possibly excluding
pay claims) were resolved amicably without any action being taken. However, the
277
above statement seems to imply that legal restrictions had actually restrained any action
that workers might have taken, and therefore, that they had lost any leverage that they
may have had in the workplace. Strike action could be looked upon as a sign of
weakness rather than strength in the workplace, and therefore, a lack of strike action
could be taken to indicate the strength of workplace unionism. Certainly, at firm A the
law does not appear to have had an inhibiting impact upon the forms of action that
members took. Evidence shows that workers may be prepared to stop work
immediately to rectify a problem, and indeed, industrial action had been taken without
a postal ballot organised by the outside union (and this action had secured the workers
their goals). However, it is possible that members did not define their actions as
industrial action. As Elgar and Simpson (1993b) found, most industrial action tends
to be unballoted (at least officially) and over workgroup issues. This type of action
rarely reached the attention of the union organisation outside the workplace, with
perhaps the exception of the district secretary, who preferred to tum a blind eye rather
than report it to head office.s which would then have had to repudiate it and perhaps
organise a postal ballot, at tremendous expense to themselves when the unofficial
action cost them nothing and tended to sort out any problem much quicker.
The national union appears to have been affected much more than workplace
organisations by the legislation, especially in relation to industrial action and the
balloting procedures. It appears that those authors who argued that very little had
actually changed on the shopfloor were right (for example, MacInnes 1987, Batstone
1988, Towers 1989, Marsh 1992a, Martin 1992). There are differences between
shopfloor units but this has always been so (for example, Edwards 1978, Brown et al
1978). The legislation may have an inhibiting affect at some workplaces, but this most
likely relates to the style of "leadership" there. On the whole it can be argued that the
shopfloor unit is more concerned with the pressing realities of the workplace than the
legal boundaries within which it should work.
However, despite the lack of knowledge about the law relating to trade unions,
evidence from firm A suggests that the legislation had influenced members'
perceptions about trade union power; that is, knowledge that legislation had been
passed which sought to undermine union power influenced members' perceptions
about that power. Even though the majority of firm A members appeared to be
satisfied with the union at their own workplace and the evidence pointed to the
existence of a powerful union, the feeling was that the legislation had reduced trade
union power. Conservative propaganda against trade unions and well documented
disputes where trade unions had lost their fight with their employers, such as in the
printing industry and particularly the 1984/5 miners' strike, appear to have given
members the impression that the legislation had worked and trade unions had been
undermined.
The evidence suggests that, at least in Xtown, the legislation has not reduced trade
3 This is not a phenomenon of the 1990s. In 1973 Beynon suggested that by turning the occasional
blind eye the local FrO could protect stewards from the formal control of the national organisation.
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union power; it remains the same as it always has, with some workplace organisations
being more successful than others in achieving their aims. Researchers, such as
Marsh (1992b), who claimed that it was the history and current state of relations
between an employer and his/her workforce that had the most effect on industrial
relations within that workplace rather than the legal framework, appear to be correct.
Therefore, it could be argued that those members who felt that trade union power had
been reduced had taken claims that the legislation had been effective at face value rather
than judging for themselves by the outcomes at their own workplaces.
10:6 Individualism versus collectivism
Members attitudes towards unionism have not changed a great deal over the years;
they have an overriding self interest in union membership. However, whereas the
national organisation of the AEEU appears to be taking on board the notion that
individualism outweighs collectivism in what its members want and is providing more
and more individual incentives to join, at least at firm A, collectivism seems to be seen
as the best way of achieving those self interested goals. Indeed, members appear to
want much more from their union than the individual benefits provided by the national
union; benefits may be seen as an important reason for membership, but they fall
behind reasons that relate to the workplace, such as, "higher pay and better working
conditions", "protection from future problems", "job security" and even to "use as a
workers' voice against management". Therefore, members' main concerns, even if
they are largely self interested ones, lie with their immediate working environment.
Where the workplace organisation is effective and achieves members their goals,
collectivism has not yet died away, though, "instrumental collectivism" may still be the
best way of describing it (Goldthorpe et aI1968). Nevertheless, the stewards, while
also possessing a self interested nature towards unionism, displayed an overriding
concern for their fellow members and a collective attitude. This indicates that those
who took up a leadership role had an increased awareness of the necessity for
collectivist principles within the workplace. It could be argued that if "leaders" did not
possess this attitude the collective aspect of the workplace might whither away. As
Fosh and Cohen (1990) and Fosh (1993) contended, local leaders who are committed
to collectivism and have a participatory style are more effective than other local leaders.
The argument that rather than being opposing ideals, the individualistic model and the
collectivist model fit closely together, that is, by working collectively each individual's
self interests can be fulfilled, appears to be upheld. Arguments that industrial relations
problems had been caused by too little collectivism rather than too much (MacInnes
1987, Marquand 1988) appear to be correct. In workplaces where collective
organisation and collective attitudes are almost non-existent, individual self interests
lead to such a competitive environment that each worker becomes isolated from each
other and a hostile working environment with low worker morale is created. (The
workshop at firm C was a good example, see pI63.) Suggestions that a union
presence actually increases production (for example, Brown 1994) are also relevant
because a unionised workforce is more likely to have the same gains per worker so
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that the competitive and hostile nature of the workplace is reduced.
However, individuals may not think of the collective aspect of unionism other than in
terms of the protection and advancement of their own self interests (see also Rentoul
1989). Even using the union as a workers' voice against management could be seen
as being in the self interests of each individual member; a collective voice tends to be
more effective than a solitary one. The individualist nature of trade unionists cannot be
attributed to the legislation as these attitudes have existed since the formation of trade
unions and as support for unions and their collectivist principles appears to be
continuing it could be argued that the Conservative aim of promoting individualism at
the expense of collectivism had failed. Even those union members who had only been
in employment since 1979 appeared to endorse the collectivist principles of unionism
rather than just the individual benefits offered by the national organisation (see also
Rentoul 1989).
Unionism and its collectivist pursuit of goals does not impede individualism; it
enhances it. Where the national organisation of the AEEU is concerned the promotion
of individualism may have had some effect, but at least where effective workplace
organisations exist it appears that collectivism still plays a large part in the strategies of
the union to achieve its aims. Therefore, it can be argued that individualism has not
yet undermined the collective principles of unionism. Nevertheless, this may depend
upon one crucial factor, the lay representative, or at least the main lay representative,
within a workplace. Differences between (and within) workplaces seem to relate to the
particular style of working of the shopfloor leader which is essential in determining
membership participation in workplace unionism and, therefore, the level of success
that the union has when negotiating with management.
10:7 Trade union power
The Conservatives wanted to reduce trade union power and introduced legislation
designed to do just that. However, as far as the AEEU is concerned it appears that
union power remains pretty much the same as it always has. If trade union power is
defined as the union's eapacity or ability to achieve desired effects, the AEEU, at least
locally, could be described as "powerful".
It seems that the machine shop union organisation at firm A actually "ran" their part of
the factory as much as management did, and in many respects, this function of the
union could be described as having had management's blessing. Brown et al (1978)
contended that managements actually played a major role in determining the strength of
their workplace unions and at firm A this may have been the ease. Management saw
an advantage with a unionised workforce because the union actually kept its members
in check more efficiently than the managers could; workers who did not pull their
weight were chastised by union representatives who warned them of the consequences
for themselves and the rest of the workforce, without taking action against them.
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Indeed, other studies have concluded that managements recognise that their job would
be much harder without the co-operation of the union in the running of the workplace
(for example, Beynon 1973, Edwards and Heery 1989, Marchington and Parker
1990). WIRS3 found that management support for unionism had remained high
throughout the 1980s (Millward et al 1992); therefore, there was nothing sinister about
the management/union relationship at firm A. Metcalf (1993) argued that labour
compliance appeared to be the reason why unionised workplaces had higher levels of
productivity and investment than their non-union counterparts. However, it could be
argued that unions are "powerful" in respect of the way that they can control their
members; after all, it appears to be the case that "a happier workforce" tends to
produce more, and if productivity is linked to a reasonable bonus scheme, workers
benefit from increased production as much as management.s
Nevertheless, it appears that unions do largely react to parameters defined by
management (Wilson et al 1982). Therefore, while the union at firm A could be
described as "powerful", that power was largely defensive, though at times the union
had secured advancements for their members, such as accident benefits paid by the
company and leave of absence for hospital visits. This coincides with what Carter L.
Goodrich termed negative and positive control in 1920 (see pp 33-34). The trade
union's role is still primarily negative and defensive, but this is of extreme importance
to members, the majority of whom believe that trade unions are needed to protect
workers' interests. Without that negative and defensive "power" workers might find
that things they considered their "right" could disappear altogether. However, it could
also be argued that where a "powerful" union organisation exists within a workplace it
may be used by management to secure the efficient running of the company, so that
even though the union's role may be primarily defensive it also plays a large part in the
management of the workplace.
The essential thing when talking about "power" is how each individual interprets the
concept. It appears that the notion of "power" on its own may mean more to
individual members than the ability to achieve effects. However, it might also be the
case that once members become accustomed to the benefits and concessions that their
union achieves for them they begin to take its role for granted and expect it to do much
more. It also appears that those members (albeit a minority) who viewed the union as
a national concern accepted that union power had been reduced rather than measuring it
by the overall outcomes of situations at their own workplace.
The role of the national union may have changed but where independent workplace
organisations exist nothing much appears to have altered (see also, WIRS3, Martin
1992). The AEEU still has workplace organisations in every plant in Xtown that it
had in the 1970s and where those organisations worked independently of their national
body they were still defending and advancing their members' interests quite
adequately. Workplace organisations vary as to the level of success that they have
4 As a steward at firm A commented "I believe better working conditions lead to a happier workforce
and a happy workforce will produce more and in tum will be paid more through bonus."
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when dealing with management but this appears to have always been the case (Brown
et al 1978, Edwards 1978, Edwards and Heery 1989b). Members may also get a
better deal through their workplace union than when the "external" organisation
becomes involved: the national union is restricted by the law, whereas on the
shopfloor outside influence might be limited so that some members may receive
support from their workplace which the outside union would not condone as the issue
could not be legally "won", for example, in the case of a person rightfully dismissed.
Trade union power, or at least potential trade union power, still belongs to the
workplace where it has always been; union power works upwards from the members
on the shopfloor, the "backbone of the union", and the ability of the lay representative
to instil membership interest and participation in workplace unionism is extremely
important. It appears that it is actually the style of working of the main lay
representative within a workplace that is the key to successful unionism within that
workplace. However, members' opinions about their workplace union seem to be
influenced by their own steward and the way that he/she performs within their own
workshop.
10:8 Implications for the AEEU
The findings have implications for the AEEU as a whole. It can be argued that the
national organisation does appear to be out of touch with the realities of the workplace
and members' needs. The fact that an overwhelming majority of members never
attend a branch meeting makes a mockery of the statement by the AEEU that the
branch is the basic unit of the union; the evidence points to the shopfloor as the basic
unit of the union. This point also raises the issue of the accountability, for example, of
delegates to AEEU conferences; if they are elected from the branches, then members
cannot have much say in the process if they do not attend. As the AEEU was altering
its structure to reflect the best aspects of the AEU and the EETPU, it might do well to
consider its commitments below branch level, at workplace level. However, the rule
book changes have abolished district committees and district secretaries have become
regional ones responsible to the Executive Council rather than the local membership.
While things were not perfect before, this tends to be isolating those on the shopfloor
further away from their national leaders rather than bringing head office more into
focus with the major constituents of their organisation. Local union activists
considered head office to be misleading its members; the statements from the
Executive Council about the changes to the rule book were one example. The changes
actually lost members some of their entitlements, such as funeral benefit and legal aid
for retired members; and phasing members who were permanently exempt from
paying SUbscriptions out of the union was being considered. However, dispute
benefit was to be increased by 33% which may be a considerable improvement for
members, but as postal ballots tend to achieve members their goals either without the
need to take action or after only a very short stoppage of work, how many members
would benefit from this improvement is debatable. Nevertheless, it could have been
offered as a ploy to cum unofficial action and ensure that members follow the correct
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procedures before they embark upon any action.
The fact that almost three quarters of the members who were eligible to vote did not do
so for the presidential election makes the statement by the AEEU that it ensures that all
decisions are taken by members as a whole rather than by small groups of committed
activists> appear rather weak. Indeed, a few local "committed activists" were quite
clear that the changes in the "new union" were designed so that eventually members
would not be able to question decisions made by their national leaders! This runs
contrary to the claims of the Executive Council. However, local evidence does give the
impression that the national organisation of the AEEU was out of touch with the
realities of the shopfloor and that ordinary rank and me members showed little interest
in their national body other than for what they could get out of it personally.
The AEED appears to be trying to attract members with packages aimed at them as
individuals rather than as members of a collective, which in itself could undermine the
general principles of unionism. Indeed, the national organisation saw membership as
a cheap form of insurance, but members did not agree. In this respect the legislation
aimed at promoting individualism may have had some effect but upon the national
organisation rather than individual members. The Green Paper "Industrial Relations in
the 1990s" argued that trade unions should offer their members professional services
in areas such as pensions, health insurance and legal advice, and the Employment
Committee's third report stated:
"We believe that the unions of tomorrow will extend or even maintain their membership
if there are clear and identifiable reasons for ordinary workers to pay their dues.
Whatever the future holds for collective bargaining, unions must attract new members
and keep their present ones. In practice, this means using extra benefits to give
demonstrable value for members' money." «1994), He 676 - I, pxxiv, para. 110.)
It appears that the national organisation was taking up these recommendations and was
beginning to resemble an insurance agency and information provider; protecting its
members against accidents and industrial illness as well as offering incentives such as
free legal advice and wills services. (See also Martin 1992). Yet the above results
indicate that members, while individualistic by nature, are more concerned with
materialistic issues such as pay, working conditions and protection against the
employer, issues that relate to their everyday shared working environment. Rather
than investing in more individualistic packages for their members the AEEU, (or at
least its members), might benefit more from insisting that its lay representatives take
up the courses on offer and develop the right style of working to strengthen their
influence over their members, to ensure solidarity and, therefore, their success rate in
protecting their members' rights in the workplace. "The challenge for trade unions is
greater than ever before... In future they will have to attract and retain members by
convincing them that they can serve their real interests", claimed the Conservative
5 Divisional Organisers' Weekend School Pack 1995 - "Future Structure of the New Amalgamated
Union." p4.
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government in 1991.6 However, rather than the provision of extra services, it appears
that members' "real interests" lie in the workplace and this appears to have always
been the case. The legislation has ensured that national union organisations cannot,
without putting themselves and their members at a severe disadvantage, call for an
industry wide or nationwide strike to campaign for workers' rights; therefore, it is left
to workplace organisations to protect their own members' interests within the
workplace.
The AEEU correctly stated "the more members we have the stronger our voice and the
more successful we shall be". However, it appears that this applies to individual
workplace organisations rather than the national union: the larger the union becomes
nationally the more distant the national leaders become from their members' aspirations
and immediate interests; these problems are encountered in individual workplaces
across the country. As others have argued, (for example, Fairbrother 1990), national
policies do not necessarily coincide with the circumstances of workplace organisation.
Therefore, it becomes more important that members have local representatives who are
in a better position to evaluate their needs and understand the problems that they face.
Indeed, effective independent workplace organisations are also beneficial to the
national body as they do not always use the resources available to them, saving the
national union time and money and at the same time their members may receive a much
better service than when FTOs become involved.
Brown (1986) suggested that "shop steward organisations are proving relatively easy
to isolate from the wider union movement. ...[11hey identify their interests more with
the success of the enterprise and less with the job controls, employment anxieties, and
concern for the poorly organised of the outside union" (p 165). This has perhaps
always been the case, but it is being highlighted more since the legislation has taken
effect upon the national organisations. If the Conservatives wished to develop a non-
political business unionism with a loosening of solidaristic bonds across industry and
encourage a greater identification of the union and its members with the workplace
(McIlroy 1988), then, it could be argued that this may be the case, at least in the case
of the AEEU; however, it appears that this has always been the case for shopfloor
organisations. Members tend to be interested in themselves and the fates of their own
workplaces rather than supporting workers elsewhere (Brown 1986). The 1984/5
miners' strike was a good example; some national union leaders, including those from
the TGWU, NUR and ASLEF, wanted their members to take action to back the NUM
but they received little support.
The role of the national organisation may be altering rapidly and the AEEU' s national
leaders appear to be trying to curb the influence that local activists may have had on
individual workplace representatives. For example, the dismantling of the six monthly
district shop stewards' meetings could be seen as a shrewd attempt to isolate local
workplace organisations from each other, so that rather than learning from the
experiences of other workplace organisations, the less developed shopfloor units must
6 "Industrial Relations in the 1990s" 1991, para 2.24.
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rely on FfOs more. This would bring them into line with the policies of their parent
body rather than developing their own ways of working, like the union at firm A. As
Boraston et al (1975) concluded, the outside union can actively encourage or
discourage workplace independence. In this way the national union would gain more
control over its workplace organisations, especially if information counter to that
provided by head office was not forthcoming. Nevertheless, as yet, at least locally,
where independent workplace organisations of the AEEU do exist, the role of the
union appears to be much the same as it always has, to protect and advance its
members' interests within the workplace. And they appear to be fulfilling their role
rather well. The original objectives of unionism remain in the workplace.
If a trade union's power is described as its capacity to defend and advance its
members' interests, then, where independent workplace organisations of the AEEU
existed, at least in Xtown, they could still be described as powerful. However, while
members do not seem to associate the term "power" with achieving effects, they do
appear to measure their union's effectiveness by the level of success that they have in
their individual workplaces in achieving their aims.
Contrary to the views of some (for example, Roberts 1987. Metcalf 1993) the
legislative changes have not undermined collectivism. Trade unions are still used as
vehicles for a collective voice, but that voice and any action which may accompany it
tend to be exercised at individual workplaces rather than as a collective voice
campaigning for nationwide issues. The "power" of a trade union lies at the bottom of
the hierarchy with the members and if they cannot be persuaded to show their unity in
order to achieve their goals any potential power will be lost. Even those workers who
are only members for what they can get out of the union personally can be persuaded
that the best way to do that is by working together. This research demonstrates that
the personality and style of working of the main lay representative are the key to
successful unionism within the workplace.
The next chapter documents the findings from the public service union UNISON and
compares the findings with those from the ABEU. Chapter 12 presents the overall
conclusions from the research findings and discusses the implications for trade unions
generally.
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Chapter 11 UNISON - THE PUBLIC SECTOR UNION
II: I Introduction
This chapter documents the findings from a local case study of UNISON, the public
sector union. Only one chapter is devoted to UNISON because of the low return rate
of the questionnaires from UNISON members. However, the quality of the
information obtained by other research methods was such that conclusions can still be
reached regarding UNISON and useful comparisons with the AEEU can be made.
The case study focused on the health care group of UNISON. The information
presented below was gained by formal and informal interviews with a UNISON shop
steward, an informal interview with an ex-NALGO steward, informal conversations
with UNISON members and ex-members, an interview with the domestic services
manager of one hospital, observation of a health branch meeting, a questionnaire
completed by the full time convenor for the local region and questionnaires completed
by UNISON rnembers.! The workers who had been asked to complete
questionnaires had also been observed at work over a two year period. Literature
published by UNISON and documentary materials regarding the hospital trust council
meetings were also analysed.
The main focus of the study was two hospitals catering largely for the elderly. The
larger hospital, hospital 1, had been established for many years and had eight wards,
some long stay and others short stay; it had two day centres and various departments,
such as physiotherapy, a dentist and a pharmacy and had a complex of houses for the
long term mentally ill. The smaller hospital, hospital 2, was four years old at the time
of the study and had two wards and a day care centre, but was constantly being
updated with services for the community it served, such as a doctors' surgery. Both
hospitals were covered by UNISON; however, the number of members at hospital I
was not known but there was only one steward. The shop steward interviewed was
the only steward at hospital 2 which had around 100 UNISON members, which
included all the porters, domestics, kitchen staff, most of the clerical staff and many of
I Thirty questionnaires were distributed to domestic workers at one hospital (hospital I) hut only
nine were returned to the researcher. However, it appears that some completed questionnaires may
have gone astray, as at least seven other members when asked if they would return their questionnaires
said that they had done so, hut these never reached the researcher. Questionnaires were taken to
another hospital (hospital 2) hy the steward, but members were reluctant to take them because they
had already completed two questionnaires for other projects.
Those members whose questionnaires reached the researcher were all female and were all aged over
40, two were over 50. They bad been union members for a varying number of years; two bad only
been members for one year, two for six years and the others had been members for between twelve and
twenty years. They all paid their subscriptions by check-off, but a." with the AEEU members the
majority did not know that deduction from their wages was ca1100"check-off'. Judging by the number
of hours that they worked per week, three members from each shift had returned the questionnaire,
The workers studied at hospital I worked on one of three different shifts, which for the purpose of the
thesis are referred to as shifts A, Band C. Shift A worked the most hours per week and shift C
worked the least.
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the nurses. This steward had also been a COHSE representative at the larger hospital
before the newer one had opened. Reference is also made to hospital 3, the main
hospital catering for the community of Xtown and its surrounding areas.
11:2 UNISON
UNISON was created in July 1993 by the amalgamation of NUPE, COHSE and
NALGO. With over 1.4 million members it is now the largest union in the country
with members throughout the public services and essential industries. The union is
divided into seven service groups: electricity, gas, health care, higher education, local
government, transport and water. Each group has the autonomy to determine its own
general policy and to negotiate on behalf of its members. According to a UNISON
leaflet UNISON has almost a million women members, "providing a powerful voice
and campaigning strongly on the issues that matter to women. UNISON is committed
to proportionality and fair representation giving all groups of members a real share in
the union. "2
A UNISON recruitment leaflet stated:
"WORTH EVERY PENNY!
There's more to UNISON than great protection in
the workplace.
Your subscription also entitIes you to a range of
specially-negotiated benefits that could save you
hundreds of pounds every year.
We're sure you'll agree--
UNISON really is worth every penny."
Membership benefits include legal services for the member and his/her family, home,
motor and holiday insurance, travel and holiday discounts, mortgage and savings
deals, career qualifications and training, welfare help and convalescent home facilities,
car breakdown services and personal loans. As with the AEEU, UNISON appears to
be trying to attract members by offering services which are aimed at them as
individuals; a UNISON leaflet advertising Frizzell insurance claims "because you're a
UNISON member ... enjoy the benefits of insurance, banking and financial services as
individual as you are." (Italics are mine). Like the AEEU UNISON have also
introduced benefits such as free initial advice on any non-work related legal matters
and a free wills service. The free wills service appears to be attracting attention from
members in both unions but it also appears that the service does not hold members on
its own merit; there is more to union membership than just the provision of benefits.
As a public sector union UNISON campaigns about issues which not only affect
UNISON members but which affect members of the public too, for example, council
cuts, community care, defending the NHS, equality in employment, rights for part
time workers and about international issues such as health care in Cuba. The health
care group of UNISON was committed to campaigning for increases in the funding of
2 "UNISON. What we stand for".
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the health service and is opposed to a system where contracts are made because they
give a good financial return rather than the best possible service in health care. One of
the union's main priorities is to defend and improve the pay and conditions of
UNISON members. The union had gained recognition and bargaining rights in most
NHS trusts and argued that it has "the skills, experience and resources to bargain at the
level where power lies and to secure as good a deal as possible for our members."3
However, as the UNISON/Gallup 1995 pay and conditions survey+ found, UNISON
nursing members display low morale, nearly two thirds were considering leaving
NHS nursing and midwifery, half were dissatisfied with their levels of pay and two
thirds were worried about job security. In addition just over half of those who
responded to the survey thought that services to patients on their wards had
deteriorated and a third of respondents had reported job losses from their ward/unit
over the previous year. The survey concluded that its "findings are a cause for
concern and disquiet" (p3). They also indicate that UNISON had not improved the
pay and working conditions for some of their nursing members. In fact, the findings
suggest that dissatisfaction with pay levels and job insecurity were actually increasing
within the nursing profession; since 1993, when the survey was first conducted, the
percentages of respondents replying negatively had increased.
11:3 UNISON health care locally
Locally (for Xtown and its surrounding areas) UNISON health care had a full time
regional officer and a full time convenor. Both were female. The convenor was paid
by the health authority rather than by the union itself. She had been a union
representative for ten years and was responsible for a large district, covering all
aspects of health care, such as hospitals, clinics and nursing homes. According to the
convenor she was constantly in contact with the different workplaces under her
jurisdiction and when her workload allowed she did try to visit all the workplaces
whether they needed her help or not. She was allowed access to all levels of
management and had no difficulties approaching the level that she felt she should be
talking to. When asked "what is the general attitude of the managers that you deal with
towards UNISON?" she replied "it depends on the manager, but usually I have no
problem." Managers usually provided all the information the convenor asked for and
they did discuss changes that they were considering making with her and sometimes
asked for her advice.
The community health care service NHS trust for the region employed 3,000 staff and
ran community hospitals in six local towns and worked closely with GPs through
nursing and therapy services. A trust staff consultative council met every three months
to discuss anything concerning the trust, any problems that staff may have
3 UNISON leaflet - "UNISON and the Health Service. The Challenge."
4 "A Change For The Worse. UNISON's evidence to the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Pay
Review Body 1996" UNISON.
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encountered, any proposed changes and health and safety." All unions with members
employed by the trust were represented on the council, some by more than one person,
including UNISON, depending on the number of members that they represented.
When necessary UNISON's regional full time officer (FrO) attended. The unions
also requested information from the trust through the council.
This council, according to the convenor, was the way that UNISON influenced what
actually happened within the different workplaces administered by the trust and when
asked whether members were consulted on deals and proposals made by management
before they were accepted or rejected, she replied, "this is what the joint unions of the
staff council does". The minutes from these meetings were distributed to all the
relevant parties, including UNISON stewards, who received two copies, one for their
tiles and one to circulate to their members; therefore, the onus was on the lay
representatives to ensure that their members saw a copy and to report back any
comments. However, the majority of members among the domestic workers at
hospital I did not know who decided what action should be taken about any
grievances; they certainly did not think that they had a say in the process. This
suggests that they were not always consulted about proposals made by management or
they were just not interested. The evidence indicates that both these suggestions may
be true (see below). It could be argued that not all UNISON members were involved
in the decision making process concerning their workplaces. As it was the lay
representatives' responsibiJity to inform members about proposals made at the council
meetings and report back their reactions, if members were not informed of things that
might affect them the blame must lie with their steward.
Nevertheless, the minutes of the trust staff council meetings reveal that the union
representatives within the trust did voice members' concerns to the councilor at least
those concerns that they knew about. Examples included concern over catering
facilities at one hospital, computer breakdowns, concerns that nurses were not
working on the terms and conditions that they should have been after transfer to
different hospitals and training in negotiating skills for the staff side, which the trust
agreed to fund if the staff side were supportive of joint training; this initiative did go
ahead. Of particular interest, in the light of the above UNISON/Gallup survey, was
the fact that at one meeting UNISON's convenor had expressed concern about staff
morale and the fact that nurses were resigning because of the way that they felt. In
particular staff were not happy with some of the things purchased by the trust, for
example, wall murals, arguing that they did not think they were an appropriate use of
resources identified for patient care; in other words, the trust was seen as wasting
money on decorative items while patients' needs were not being met. While the union
made its point at the meeting and members' concerns were fully discussed over the
issue of inappropriate use of resources, the minutes state that the convenor was not
happy with the outcome, that problems should be taken to the relevant locality
manager.
5 Meetings inbetween these would be convened if it was considered necessary by any party to the
council.
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UNISON did have a voice within the local NHS trust and some
members' concerns did find their way to their employers via their
UNISON representatives, and in some cases they were resolved to the
satisfaction, at least, of those on the trust council. However, as the
above example shows, some UNISON members were becoming
increasingly disillusioned with the way that the trust operated, for
example, in their allocation of money, and members were beginning to
leave the health service altogether. Therefore, even though the
convenor said that the union "would like to think that they are helping
managers run their workplaces more efficiently", and in some respects
this appears to have been the case, in other respects, the union was not
able to prevent what its members viewed as a diversion of resources
away from patient care and in turn members, particularly nurses, were
resigning their posts. It appears that within the health service
UNISON, at least locally, was able to influence certain decisions,
particularly those involving working conditions and health and safety.
However, it seems as though managers saw the financial side of
running their workplaces as their own prerogative and spent their
budgets as they thought fit rather than consulting with their staff first;
and once money has been spent it is hard to recover it to spend on
something else instead. Nevertheless, as the trust believed that staff
should be involved in the running of their workplaces (see below), it is
possible that staff concerns over the inappropriate use of resources may
be taken into account when future spending is being considered.
11:4 The branch
There was one local branch for the health sector which met monthly at Xtown' s
Labour club. The convenor was the branch secretary and a local lay representative
from hospital 3 was the chairman, The regional Fl'O attended the branch when she
could. UNISON branch meetings resembled the AEEU's shop stewards' meetings
rather than the AEEU's branch meetings. Any correspondence such as accident forms
or application forms were sent straight to the relevant officer, either the convenor or
the regional officer, by the member or their lay representative, which eliminated the
need to take anything to a branch meeting. In addition UNISON subscriptions were
paid either to a loeal representative, by cheque through the post, direct debit or by the
check-off method, which meant that members did not have to attend to keep their
payments up to date.
The branch was the place where stewards from di fferent workplaces eame together and
were able to discuss their problems with each other. However, unlike the AEEU's
shop stewards' meetings, members were also encouraged to attend. Nevertheless, like
AEEU members, UNISON members did not appear to be interested in the branch and
judging by the attendance of lay representatives they may have taken the same attitude,
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though a steward did comment that attendance was usually much higher. Only one
person who was not a lay representative was present at the meeting observed.s The
steward from hospital 2 said that the majority of members never attended. She would
have liked to have seen more members at the branch so that they would make their
feelings known to the FTOs; the more members voicing an opinion the more likely it
would be that they might take notice, whereas, when representatives put forward their
members' concerns, they were very often passed over. The majority of the
questionnaire respondents never attended the branch and conversations with UNISON
members revealed that not one of them was interested in attending, though two
different reasons for this emerged. Some were just not interested in the union at all,
claiming that "the union" did nothing for them and there was no point in taking
problems to the branch because nothing ever came from them, confirming the opinion
of hospital 2's steward. Others said that they did not attend because of the time that
they were held, in the evening. As one member put it: "people can't be bothered to
go up there, especially if they live a distance away". However, members would have
attended union meetings if they were held in their worktime and at their place of work.
This might indicate that workers associate unionism with the workplace but it could
also be argued that they are just displaying their self interested nature; they are only
interested in the issues that may affect them personally and not those that are affecting
others elsewhere. Also by attending a meeting during their working hours they would
not have to give up any of their leisure time to attend something that they see as part of
their working lives. The convenor recognised this problem and so did hospital 2's
steward. However, whereas the convenor appeared to resent this attitude, the steward
understood why her members felt this way: because she worked alongside them, she
realised that to them "the union" involved the workplace and those issues that might
affect them personally. The branch had no significance for them at all, especially as
they were informed about the things that involved them by their workplace
representative. However, it seems that not all workplace representatives were as
efficient as this.
The meeting was a formal affair, and information relevant to members, stewards and
the union in general was read out and passed around the meeting. Information about
things such as forthcoming conferences, seminars, rallies and shop stewards courses
were read out to those present. A number of leaflets were available for the stewards to
order and pass on to their members, for example; "Getting to know Europe",
"Sickness at work", "Bullying at work" and "Negotiating equal rights". However,
those present at the meeting dispersed as soon as it had ended and no one enquired
about the leaflets or any of the other information about courses and conferences,
suggesting that stewards were less interested in things of a general (albeit important)
nature than with the problems that they encountered at work. Similarly, the branch had
been asked to organise a workshop for young people, which the meeting hardly
discussed. In reply to the announcement about a UNISON black members'
conference, a member thought that it was wrong that it was called "a black members'
6 A full committee was present, two auditors, the regional fTO and eight memhcrs. They were all
women.
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conference" when many people objected to being called black. In addition the feeling
of the meeting was that they had not got many active black members. That issue was
left there rather than discussing what the union could do to encourage members from
ethnic minorities to become more active within the union.
Those at the meeting were informed about various problems that had occurred at
workplaces in the local area. For example, at hospital I a ward floor was being
repaired and the management there had wanted it to be done at night. After complaints
from staff on the ward the convenor intervened, telling the managers "no way" can that
be done while patients are trying to sleep. She proposed that the patients should be
transferred onto the day unit, so that the work could be completed in the day time
causing no disruption to the patients or staff. After consulting the health and safety
executive, who agreed with the convenor, the floor manager finally agreed to
UNISON's proposals. At another hospital the managers had wanted to clean the
carpets while the "clients" were in bed: the lay representative insisted that this should
not be done and got her own way. However, with other problems that involved the
«'TOs, it appears that managers had the final say, for example, concerning the closure
of sections of hospitals and moving services from one area to another. In one case,
where a new personnel manager was refusing to negotiate with UNISON, the regional
officer said "we must insist that we set something up there with management because
they are just doing what they want to". This indicates that in some health service
workplaces managers were "managing" their workplaces without consulting
UNISON, which was contrary to the trust's official policy of involving staff in the
running of their workplaces via their representatives (see below). However, it could
be argued that closing sections of hospitals and transferring services are usually done
for financial reasons; the PTO did comment that management had said that they
would only open the closed sections if it was absolutely necessary as they could save
money by merging the patients from different wards rather than keeping those that
were virtually empty open. As suggested above hospital managers seem to view the
financial aspects of the workplace as their own prerogative.
The major topic for the branch officials was the forthcoming pay negotiations and the
issue of local bargaining in trusts. The PTO was trying to convince those present that
the situation was not as portrayed by the media, as she put it, "after all they don't mind
if there is a dispute because that's good news for them". A major document was
outlined and the stewards were told that it was important that they took the information
back to the workplace and that a vote was to be held on the proposals in the document.
However, no one was given a copy or an outline of its main proposals, so the
stewards would have had to rely on their memory if they were to relay the information
back to their members.
The general feel of the meeting was a clinical one. Those running the meeting wanted
the upperhand all the time and gave the impression of not being prepared to accept a
different view to that of their own. This attitude appeared to isolate and annoy those
present, who were concerned with issues that were affecting themselves and their
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members rather than the opinions of the branch committee. This may be an indication
that those with connections to the national union become isolated from their members
and more connected with the outside concerns of the union rather than the intricate
realities of the workplace. This may also contribute to the lack of interest of rank and
file members in their union; many already felt that the branch paid no attention to their
worries and the attitude of the officials confirmed this. This suggests that a lay
representative with the right style of working is essential within the workplace to
ensure that members get the service they require and participate in the affairs that
involve them and maybe solve their problems without outside assistance.
It could be argued that because the bulk of those present at branch meetings were
stewards rather than rank and file members the Fl'Os would become isolated even
further from the concerns of their members. However, the stewards did attempt to put
their members' views and concerns across at the meeting but the officials appeared to
brush them to one side. A good example concerned the nurses' regrading issue. A
steward at the meeting brought up this issue, which was apparently brought up at
every branch meeting. The atmosphere of the meeting became quite heated over the
issue of compensation for those nurses who wished to appeal about their present
grading. All those present (excluding the committee) were backing the steward who
brought the issue up, but the "discussion", if it could be described as such, was
brought to an abrupt end by the chairman who insisted that if the conversation
continued it would take up the entire meeting. The issue centred on nurses who had
wanted to appeal against their new grades. There had been three stages of appeal: the
first was a local appeal with the member's workplace representative present; the
second was also local but with the branch secretary present and the third stage was at
regional level. All the nurses who had wished to appeal passed through the first stage,
but a group of about thirty nurses had had their meeting for the second stage cancelled
because a member of the management side did not tum up. It was promised by
management that another date would be arranged but it never was. Therefore, when
the health authority offered to pay £500 compensation to each nurse at the third stage
of appeal, those who had not had their second were not included in the offer. This
had caused a lot of unrest between the members and the higher levels of the local
union, who, according to one steward, did not seem to be bothered by the discrepancy
at all, which is another indication that local union officials and members were not in
tune with each other.
In fact, it appears that the union itself tried to keep members in the dark about what
was happening over the nurses' regrading issue. Evidence presented to the branch
meeting showed that some of the nurses who had not received compensation from
management had actually been for an individual interview with union officials and
some had received money from the union itself in return for signing a waiver saying
that they would not tell anyone else. However, someone must have said something
because other nurses who had attended an interview with the union and those who had
not were complaining that they had received nothing. The Fl'O's and convenor's
replies summed up their feelings to the situation: "We're getting this everyday and
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we're sick of it", said one. The full time convenor commented "at the end of the day
it's their appeal, but they think that the union should do it for them". This is probably
a fair statement. Members tend to take the work of their union (or union representative)
for granted, and expect them to do things which they themselves should do, this was
apparent in the AEEU. However, if the union had "secretly" paid some members
compensation and not others it could be argued that those who had not received any
compensation could hardly be blamed for complaining about the perceived unfairness
of the situation. In addition, the convenor's comment seems to contradict her
statement about the main benefits of union membership: "The union is there for them
[the members]. They are the union. We are there to look after their interests and see
that they are well represented." It appears that rather than these members "being the
union" and their representatives "being there to look after their interests and see that
they are well represented", the convenor was suggesting here that these members were
wrong to expect the union to look after their interests!
The FfOs also tried to diffuse the heated argument by adding that some members who
were not entitled to compensation were trying to jump on the bandwagon, moving
away from the argument that some of the original nurses who had had their second
appeal cancelled had not been compensated. They were also annoyed that some
members were pulling out of the union after receiving compensation. However, it
could be interpreted as a reaction to the way that those members felt they had been
treated. As shall be seen, UNISON members in one particular workplace were
resigning their membership in great numbers, which may reflect the treatment that they
felt they had received from their union and may also reflect upon their lay
representative within the workplace.
The branch was the main route of communication between shop
stewards from different workplaces. It was also the major way that the
national organisation of UNISON communicated with its members.
However, the lack of interest from members towards the branch
suggests that they were not interested in this aspect of their union.
Members felt that their local officials were not interested in their
grievances and the evidence suggests that unless the problem was
related to working conditions or health and safety matters, which were
generally solved satisfactorily, other grievances, such as the nurses'
regrading issue, were brushed to one side. From information presented
to the branch it also appears that UNISON had little influence over the
financial aspects of the trust or the individual workplaces within it;
managers seemed to consider this their prerogative, even if their
decisions were contrary to the wishes of their staff and in some cases
did not contribute directly to patient care.
Within UNISON, not only did the national organisation appear to be
out of touch with its members' concerns but the local organisation,
which had more contact with the workplaces under its jurisdiction, also
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seemed to disregard members' anxieties unless they corresponded with
the beliefs of the branch committee. If members are not satisfied with
the service that they get from their local union organisation, it is
essential that effective union organisations exist within individual
workplaces so that members feel that their interests are being protected.
11:5 Workplace and union
In comparison with the workplace union organisation of the AEEU at firm A which
could be described as close knit, UNISON organisation within the health sector may
be described as scattered; that is, members may be clerical workers, ancillary
workers, porters or nurses, with many working different shift patterns daily or
weekly. Therefore, as well as working in different jobs, UNISON members are not
always working with the same group of members regularly. Indeed, the members
observed, while belonging to a particular workgroup, that is, domestic workers on
shift A or shift B for example, usually worked on their own rather than as part of a
team, though it could be argued that they were part of a team on the wards or
departments that they worked on, that is, without their work certain other tasks would
not be able to be carried out properly. If the argument that the lay representative is the
essential ingredient for successful unionism in the workplace is correct, then, within
hospitals, for example, the lay representative must be an extremely dedicated person;
he/she must be willing to contact all his/her members when necessary and in this way
the steward should be able to generate a feeling of togetherness so that certain groups
of members do not feel isolated from their "union".
Studies have concluded that union organisations within the public services tend to have
a greater reliance upon their FTOs than those in the private sector, usually because of
the nature of the dispersed workforce (for example, Brown et al 1978). It has also
been suggested that with a scattered workforce the shop steward is little more than an
individual problem solver (Terry 1982). However, this may be largely dependent
upon the personalities of those concerned and indeed the members themselves. As
Fosh (1993) argued the local leader's style is one of the most important factors
influencing members' conceptions of unionism; a leader who stresses the importance
of involving all members in every grievance, individual or not, can encourage
members to work collectively, whereas the leader who does not involve his/her
members does not portray to those members a perception of unionism "that
encompasses group action" (p581). Evidence from hospitals 1 and 2 suggests that this
is the case.
As can be seen in section 11:7 below, some workers at hospital 1 were prepared to act
as a group but not necessarily as "the union". Indeed, all the questionnaire
respondents, except for one who "did not know", said that workers achieved their
goals by sticking together; however, as will be seen, a few employees did tend to look
after themselves rather than the group. Nevertheless, the fact that some groups of
workers were prepared to show solidarity and stick together until a problem was
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solved indicates that those workers were aware that by acting collectively they could
achieve their goals more effectively than by acting alone. As the majority of UNISON
members studied at hospital I saw their membership purely in terms of what they
could get out of the union individually, they did not associate their collective action
with their union membership. It is highly likely that this attitude developed because
the UNISON steward was not known to many of the members spoken to and they
viewed the full time convenor as their representative? and saw the union as external to
the workplace; therefore, they acted as a work group rather than "the union".
However, as at least two of the work groups studied at hospital I had demonstrated
that they were prepared to work collectively, a steward with the right style of working
could influence those workers' conceptions of unionism so that they associated it with
their actions in the workplace and not just for what they could get out of it personally.
At hospital 2 the situation was different. The UNISON organisation there appeared to
be fairly tight knit and the lay representative was very confident and was able to
operate within the workplace independently of her Fl'Os; in fact she was very "union
minded" but from the members' side rather than the national union's side. As there
was only one steward at the hospital, there was no stewards' committee or stewards'
network for her to work with. She took sole responsibility for ensuring that all new
employees were informed about the union, for health and safety within the hospital,
dealing with management and members' grievances and problems. It appears that all
new eligible employees did join the union at hospital 2, that is, if they were not already
members. The workplace leader's style of working influenced her members'
perceptions of unionism. She involved all those concerned in the problem solving
process within the workplace, which gave them a sense of belonging to their "union",
the workplace unit, rather than viewing the union as an outside organisation like some
members at hospital 1. The steward passed on general and local union information to
her members, though she was aware that unless issues affected members in some way
they were generally not interested. However, she was able to gain support for
UNISON rallies and demonstrations from her members by stressing the need to show
solidarity about issues that may not affect them at that moment in time but might do in
the future if things were not changed. Hospital 2's steward's style of working was
such that she maintained her members' interest and participation in all the affairs that
involved them directly and indirectly.
Unionism took on a different meaning for workers at hospital 2 than for those at
hospital 1. Workers at hospital 2 associated "the union" with the workplace and saw
themselves as part of "the union" using it to solve their workplace grievances
collectively. At hospital 1 many members saw "the union" as something external to
the workplace and used it for individual complaints. If workplace grievances were
solved collectively at hospital 1, this action was not associated with "the union". The
difference between workers' attitudes at the two hospitals appears to be due to the lay
7 Members should have contacted their steward with any problem and if the steward could IX)tdeal
with it he/she would contact the convenor. This procedure appeared to have broken down at hospital I
due to the lack of communication between the steward and members.
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representative at each workplace. At hospital 2 the representative had built up and
maintained her members' interest in unionism and through their participation in those
affairs that involved them the workplace organisation largely achieved its goals. This
gave members a sense of belonging to an effective workplace organisation. At
hospital 1 some members were unaware of who their steward was, let alone about
unionism within the workplace, which left them with no conception of a workplace
organisation. They did not view themselves as "the union"; to them the union was
based outside the workplace. It can be argued that it is the lay representative that is
essential in determining membership interest and participation in unionism and,
therefore, in building up their conception of themselves as "the union".
Nevertheless, even hospital 2' s members were still not interested in the branch or the
national union's policies; it was only those issues that might affect them in their own
workplace that concerned them. The "external" union organisations made no difference
to them as their problems were sorted out by their lay representative; they did not need
to interact with officials from outside the workplace as their grievances were solved
internally.
When asked if she had much contact with her stewards, the convenor replied "all the
time. I could not do the job with out the good work and support they give me."
However, when members' opinions are taken into account (see below), not all
UNISON stewards were as in touch with their members as the convenor said she was
with her stewards. Even the branch chairman commented that whereas some shop
stewards are active and do a great job there are others "who do sod all", which
suggests that even those who were responsible for the running of the local union knew
that some of their stewards were not pulling their weight and, therefore, their members
may not have been receiving the representation that they were entitled to.
The convenor's statement that the main benefit of unionism was that
members' interests were looked after and that they were well
represented may not always be the case in some local hospitals. This
appears to relate to the style of working of the lay representative.
Where members felt that they were "the union" on the shopfloor, their
steward could work independently of the outside union, but where
members associated "the union" with organisations external to their
working environment, their opinions and use of the union were very
different. Members must be made to feel that they are "the union",
rather than the union being seen as some organisation remote from the
workplace. The lay representative is the key to being able to do this.
It can be concluded that how well the lay representative performs
influences members' perceptions of their union. The personality and
style of working of the lay representative are two of the main
ingredients for successful unionism in the workplace.
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11:6 Management/union relationship
The trust itself appeared to appreciate that communication between staff and
management was vital to the smooth running of all the workplaces it was responsible
for and according to the convenor the work by UNISON stewards was generally
accepted by managers. Notes from a training session on how to improve industrial
relations highlighted both what the staff side thought managers should do and what
managers thought their staff could do to improve industrial relations. The summary
concluded that:
"[T[here seem to be a lot of common areas where improvements can be achieved through
better communication ....the following principles will need to be adopted by both sides
to eradicate the current difficulties that exist within the communication process.
*Every chance is taken to share problem solving at the earliest possible stage.
*Staff representatives to attend management meetings and receive regular information on
activity and financial performance within the locality.
*Staff side will be involved in the setting of local objectives and will represent staff by
taking corporate responsibility for achieving the agreed objectives.
(March 1996.)
Therefore, the trust as a whole recognised that staff had a valuable role to play in the
efficient operation of the trust. As the staff were represented at the council meetings
by their union representatives, it can be assumed that the trust expected the
management/union relationship to be an amicable one. Indeed, the Agreement for
Consultation and Negotiation in the Community Health Care Service Trust (1994)
document stated that:
"The Trust recognises that it is to the mutual benefit of the Trust and its employees for
the latter to be represented by UPA'SS .... Further to this the Trust will encourage its
employees to belong to an appropriate UPA recognised by the Trust and will provide
facilities for UPA subscriptions to be collected at source.
The UPA's recognise the Trust's responsibility to plan, organise and manage the
activities of the Trust in accordance with its objectives. For its part the Trust recognises
the UPA's responsibility to represent the interests of their members employed by the
Trust and to seek improved conditions of employment and of work according to the
UPA's policies .
...All parties to this Agreement recognise that their pursuit of the common objectives
detailed above shall be by consultation, negotiation and a sharing of information."
According to the document the functions of representatives included responsibility to
and for a particular group of members within a particular constituency, to communicate
with their members, to be consulted and to negotiate on behalf of their members, to
organise meetings during working hours and, perhaps most significantly, " to seek full
membership amongst all employees in the constituency". Therefore, the trust
recognised that by having their staff represented by UPA's it was beneficial to the trust
as a whole as well as the workforce. Bryson et al (1995) concluded that "it is crucial
for unions to show that their presence is essential for a trust to provide an effective
8 UPA's stands for Unions and Professional Association".
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service" (pI32). In the local area UNISON (as well as the other UPAs) had managed
to do this.
The full time convenor appeared to have a reasonable relationship with the majority of
managers that she dealt with. As she put it "it depends on the manager, but usually I
have no problem." However, the management teams of different hospitals may not
always wish to implement the trust's recommendations; the workplace identified by
the FTO at the branch meeting was one example where the manager did not want to
negotiate with UNISON.9 The management team at hospital 2 also acted contrary to
the accepted policy of the trust.
According to the steward the management at hospital 2 did not want to communicate
with the union (or herselt). The management did not tell her anything voluntarily and
did not want to involve the union in anything, especially the decision making which
affected the hospital. In addition, the steward was not provided with a union office,
access to a telephone or a notice board which management should have provided.
They were also reluctant to allow her time off work to attend union conferences which
managers of other local hospitals allowed.
Nevertheless, the steward felt that she had a lot to offer management in terms of help
in running the hospital more efficiently and had, through her own intervention, built
up an amicable relationship with a female member of the management team. The
steward was not afraid to confront management over issues that she felt needed their
attention or those that were affecting her members. Rarely a day went by without her
having to see management about something. She appeared a very determined lady and
knew her job well and far from wishing to obstruct management in the running of the
hospital she appeared to be more concerned than they did with its efficient
administration. However, her main emphasis was on patient care and her members'
rights. The approach she tended to take when confronting management was a "softly
softly" one rather than a conflictual one; that is, demanding that various things should
be done. She argued that by taking this approach it gave the impression that she was
working with them rather than against them and, as a rule, eventually secured her
members their goal (or "us" as she would say, reminiscent of the convenor from firm
A).
Apparently the three main members of the management team had not had any previous
experience of management let alone running a hospital and very often attempted to do
things without taking them to be approved by the trust first. One of them had had his
"knuckles rapped a number of times" for taking things into his own hands, but was
not prepared to listen to the UNISON lay representative when she advised him against
doing things. According to the steward the management did not understand about
hospitals and how they operated and gave the impression that they had no real interest
9 One steward at the branch had been having her mail opened by management (similar to the AEEU
steward) which suggests that the managers at her workplace did not respect the confidentiality of the
union.
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in patient care. "None of the management team has a clue about health and safety and
pay absolutely no attention to the relevant health and safety documents", she stated.
UNISON was preparing another written paper for them on health and safety and what
health and safety representatives are entitled to do in the hope that they would take note
of the new document.
The female member of management (the nursing officer) was the only one who was
willing to listen to the steward. However, while this manager did take on board the
steward's advice, comments and suggestions she did not like to admit it openly. For
example, during an outbreak of diarrhoea and sickness, no barrier nursing had been
introduced and visitors were allowed onto the affected ward unprotected and
unwarned. Even the nursing officer had been constantly walking from one ward to
another; a possible way of transmitting the virus. The only precaution taken was to
isolate the nurses' changing room so that only nurses from the affected ward used it;
however, nurses who had been off work were not being informed of the situation and
were going on duty after using the affected changing facilities. When confronted the
nursing manager could not understand what all the fuss was about and according to the
steward did not appreciate the health and safety issues involved. After the steward had
explained the situation to her, "the manager went onto the ward and verbally laced into
the nurses". The talk with the manager solved the problem, but instead of taking
responsibility herself she had passed the blame onto the nurses which was not what
the representative had wanted "because they are my members and I'm trying to protect
them."
The management team at hospital 2 had had little experience of running a hospital and
were perhaps learning as they went along, but overall it appears that they wanted to
assert their right to manage with no interference from union representatives.
However, perhaps fortunately for all concerned, an experienced steward was willing
to try and work with them and help them run the hospital more efficiently. Admittedly
the steward was looking after her members' interests first, but one of the main
concerns of UNISON members, especially nurses, appears to be that of patient care,
which according to them should be the first priority of the hospital. The steward by
her attitude and approach towards management was able to convince one of the
managers that her suggestions were the better options for all concerned. If the steward
had taken a different approach, that is, a conflictual one rather than trying to work with
management, she may not have even been able to convince the one manager of her
intentions. As the management settle in, they may begin to realise that by working
with the union, or at least the steward, it is beneficial to themselves as well as the
hospital as a whole.
Far from wanting to take away management's right to manage, the steward just wanted
to see the hospital managed efficiently and to ensure that her members' concerns and
interests were safeguarded. For example, one of the three porters had retired and
management wanted to replace him with a part time worker and stop the night cover
altogether. The representative was against both these proposals and so were the
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nurses who worked nights. The hospital is situated in an insecure area near a
psychiatric hospital from which patients were constantly walking out. The nurses did
not want to work with no security at nights and their husbands said that they would
refuse to allow them to come in to work. The representative tried to explain the
situation to management but they would not listen. Believing the situation to be based
on financial considerations she asked for details of the hospital's finances, which she
was denied. Determined to fmd a solution to the problem the steward approached the
porters, including the one who had retired, and inquired about their income over the
last year. She worked out how much had been spent on them including overtime over
the last twelve months. She discovered that if the hospital set on another full time
porter and two part time porters the trust would actually save money. She took these
figures back to management who at first were reluctant to look at them, but after the
nurses had threatened to come out on strike they agreed to her proposals. The female
member of management studied the steward's proposals and was surprised by the
savings that could be made. The steward was loyal to her members, getting them what
they wanted, at the same time she was helping management to run the hospital more
efficiently, in financial as well as patient care terms. Therefore, the argument that
without a union presence companies merely manage labour badly (for example, Brown
1994) can also be applied to the health service.
In contrast the full time UNISON convenor was aghast when she learned of what the
steward was proposing, arguing that "you can't do that, you'll have to leave it as it is".
The convenor did not want to fight the case; however, the workplace union solved the
problem with no outside help. Within UNISON it appears that the higher union
representatives, those on the periphery of the workplace, did not want to "rock the
boat" with management. In the convenor's case this may have had something to do
with the fact that she was paid by the health authority rather than by the union itself.
However, this argument is a weak one as it appears that the higher up the union
hierarchy a person moves the more detached they become from members on the
shopfloor (Beynon 1973, Lane 1974, Sherman 1986, Darlington 1994a, 1994 b,
Kelly and Heery 1994). Perhaps, because they have many workplaces under their
jurisdiction, each with their own unique problems, as well as those issues which
involve all workplaces, for example, pay negotiations; the larger issues may be easier
to deal with because they are not peculiar to individual workplaces where intricate
knowledge of the situation is needed. For example, the domestic services manager at
hospital 1 said that she had a very good relationship with UNISON and that the
convenor was always "flitting in and out of her office", and yet the steward from
hospital 2 had portrayed a different picture about her relationship with this manager
and getting things sorted out for her members (when she had been a steward at
hospital 1). The convenor appeared to see things from a management viewpoint rather
than a members' viewpoint, perhaps because she did not work alongside the
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rnembers.! 0 Therefore, it is essential that stewards within the workplace have the
right style of working, otherwise members may lose confidence in their union's
"power" to help them (see below).
The trust recognised that a good management/union relationship was
essential to the efficient running of the trust as a whole. The summary
from the training session also appeared to advocate that the staff
representatives might have a say in how hospital finances were spent;
that is, by attending management meetings and receiving information on
activities and financial performance, they could voice their members'
opinions about how money is spent, and if managers took on board the
trust's recommendations these concerns should be incorporated into
their future strategies. However, some managers of individual
workplaces within the trust appeared to resent any interference in their
"right to manage".
The full time union representatives appeared to get along with managers
on management's terms, possibly because they had attended joint
management/union training sessions (see below) and did not want to
interfere with issues that they may have seen as management's right to
manage, such as setting on employees. But where a lay representative
existed who could work independently of the "external" union, it
appeared that even if management did not wish to involve him/her in the
administration of the workplace, if he/she took the correct approach
towards management he/she could protect his/her members' interests at
the same time as helping management to run the workplace more
efficiently.
11:7 UNISON - the workers' point 0/ view
Some UNISON members were disillusioned with their union and others had given up
their membership altogether. It could be argued that the fact that many members
would not take questionnaires when they realised that they were about their union
reflected their negative opinions about UNISON. I I When asked if they were
members of UNISON a typical answer from workers at hospital I was "for what it's
10 This would relate to the comments made by firm A's convenor that stewards who actually work
alongside their members are also affected by the consequences of their bargaining with management,
whereas full time stewards who do not actually work on the shopfloor are isolated from any deals that
they may have made.
II A substantial number of the domestic workers were not UNISON members. The younger workers
had never been approached about becoming a member and the older ones had either resigned their
membership Of had not rejoined after becoming re-employed. For example, at hospital lone worker
in her 50s said that she was "too old" now. But after further questioning it emerged that she had not
been allowed to join when she had originally applied because she had held a supervisory position at
another hospital. This appears to have influenced her decision. The fact that all those who returned
the questionnaires were over forty may reflect upon their past commitment to unionism, if not to
UNISON.
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worth!" The majority of comments about UNISON were very derogatory giving the
impression that those who remained members were only doing so for the benetit side
alone, particularly accident benefit; one questionnaire stated that an important reason
for membership was "to help in case of accident at work. Compensation." However,
as table I shows, those members who completed the questionnaire valued other
reasons for union membership, though that does not necessarily mean that they
thought their union fulfilled that criteria. For example, all respondents said that "to get
higher pay and better working conditions" was an important reason for membership,
yet only four of them thought that being in a union actually made a difference in the
case of higher wages. This suggests that some members did not feel that UNISON
was effective at improving their pay levels even though they felt that "to get higher
pay" was an important reason to join a union.
Table I. The importance to questionnaire respondents of a number of possible
reasons for belonging to a trade union.
Number of respondents
very fairly not very not at all don't
important important important important know
To get higher pay &
better working conditions 6 3
To protect me if problems
come up in the future 7 I I
To get members' benefits,
such as financial Of health 2 4 2 I
schemes
To help safeguard my job 8 I
To use as a workers' voice
against management 6 3
I believe in them in principle 5 I I I I
To campaign against inequality
and iniustice 6 3
To show solidarity with those
I work with 4 I I I 2
Most of my workmates are 4 2 I I 1
members
It's a family tradition 2 I I 2 3
The questionnaire respondents and those UNISON members who were informally
interviewed were largely ignorant of what their union did do for them other than on a
personal note. For example, four of the respondents did not know if their union did a
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good job negotiating about wage related issues or whether their steward/convenor
negotiated with management over work related problems. Indeed, one member, when
asked if she had completed her questionnaire, replied "well I don't know many of the
answers". As the questionnaire largely referred to issues involving the members' lay
representatives, union activities within the workplace and issues to do with unionism
in general, this suggests that this member did not know very much about the union
within her workplace. The fact that many UNISON members at hospital 1 had no
idea what their union did do for them could to a large degree reflect upon their
representative. If the representative does not introduce herlhimself to herlhis
members, (many members did not know who their representative was), then how can
she/he encourage participation and interest in union affairs let alone unity among
members? Half of the questionnaire respondents did not know answers to questions
such as "who decides what action should be taken over a particular grievance or
problem?" which indicates that they were not involved in the decision making process
as a group, unless of course these particular members had never encountered any
problems (though after observing these workers this is hard to believe). The only
issues that the questionnaire respondents said were raised with their representatives at
hospital 1 were wages and accidents; therefore, some members may not have used the
union for other types of grievances.
If these workers had had an active lay representative among them, with the right
personality and style of working, they may have viewed their union in a different light.
This suggestion is backed up by the fact that some of these workers had united over
certain issues and by doing so had "won" their case, usually without the intervention
of their representative or union. The problem was usually solved speedily and was
initiated by the workers themselves. In addition workers who were not union
members had also been prepared to unite with those who were, at least on shifts Band
C; therefore, these groups of workers did see themselves as a united front even
though "to show solidarity with those I work with" was not considered an important
reason for membership by all the questionnaire respondents. One worker who was
not a union member because of a bad experience during her previous employment'?
was adamant that unions were no good for workers and yet she stated:
"If we've got a gripe we just have to stick together. The only problem with not being a
union member would be if the union called a strike, then I suppose I'd have to come out
with them."
Therefore, this non-union member had still got a sense of solidarity and the fact that
12 In her opinion her previous union had "sold the members out". The management at her previous
workplace had implemented forced redundancies which many of the workforce were not happy about.
The union representative had talked those affected into signing a document which stated that they were
going to insist on more redundancy pay rather than to keep their jobs. After everyone had signed this
document they were told that the union had actually arranged a tribunal for those affected to contest the
decision, but because they had signed the document it was too late to do anything about this. This
unfortunate incident had led to the lady in question treating all unions and union representatives with
contempt rather than blaming the incident on the few people who were involved at the time.
Incidentally, this former union member had worked at firm M (see chapter 7).
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she thought workers should stick together over a problem in some respects signifies a
sense of shopfloor organisation without any outside body to direct it. She also felt a
sense of obligation towards her union member workmates by suggesting that she
would not break a strike. Nevertheless, she was adamant that unions were no longer
any use to workers, citing the 1984/5 miners' strike as an example:
"There's no power left with the unions. If the miners couldn't do it there's no hope for
anyone else!"
In a sense this worker appears to have made two contradictory statements. She
thought that workers should stick together to alleviate their problems, therefore, she
perceived solidarity as a "powerful" means of solving problems and yet she said that
unions have no power left. The only conclusion must be that this worker did not
perceive "the union" as being on the shopfloor with the members, but rather that any
potential "union power" lay with the national organisation itself or its representatives
(who sell their members out). Perhaps, if she had had a different lay representative at
her previous workplace, one who had been prepared to fight for his/her members, she
might have seen things differently. Indeed, Lewis (1989) found that the attitudes of
the unemployed towards trade unions were based upon their past experience of
membership. "The main anti-union views were based on the powerlessness of unions
and the fact that unions had done little or nothing for the particular respondent."
(p277).
The majority of UNISON members studied at hospital I did not associate "the union"
with the workplace; they saw it as a national concern: they had no conception of a
union organisation within the workplace. Those members who did not know who
their steward was or did not come into contact with him/her considered the full time
convenor to be their representative, which also gave them the impression that "the
union" was external to the workplace. The fact that all the questionnaire respondents
thought that "to use as a workers' voice against management" and "to campaign
against inequality and injustice" were important reasons for membership probably
reflected upon the national and local organisations of UNISON rather than the
workplace organisation; that is, because a conception of a workplace organisation did
not exist, these functions were seen as the domain of union officers who were not part
of the members' working environment. However, it is clear that where a steward
exists who can portray to his/her members a conception of unionism that involves
them, the workplace organisation becomes "the union" and while perceptions of the
external organisations may remain the same, unionism itself takes on a different
perspective for the workers.
The steward from hospital 2 knew that many members were not satisfied with
UNISON but she thought that the majority of her members were quite happy and
conversations with some of them confirmed this. This might be understandable as it
was plain to see that her main priority as a steward was her members and to ensure that
their rights and interests were protected. An example that suggests she was capable of
mobilising her members concerned a London demonstration organised by UNISON.
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At the branch meeting the branch chairman was bemoaning the fact that she had
booked a coach but no one had turned up to support the demonstration, yet the steward
from hospital 2 had organised three coaches for her members and each one travelled to
London without an empty seat.13 Her members' interest and participation in
unionism was encouraged by her enthusiasm and encouragement when dealing with
their problems within the workplace. However, she contended that members did not
realise "the hassle that you go through" and like the AEEU stewards she commented:
"Many when they bring niggly problems to you do not understand why you can't deal
with them. It is a lot of hard work and at times a real hassle but we get there
eventually. Many members do not appreciate what you do for them and only a few
thank you. One member did present me with a bunch of tlowers and a box of chocolates
after helping her, but these are few and far between."
Nevertheless, members at hospital 2 regarded their workplace organisation as "the
union". All their problems and queries were dealt with by their steward so that they
had no need to have any contact with officers from outside the workplace. The union
organisation (if it could be called that) at hospital I was dependent on those outside the
workplace and many members were dissatisfied with that representation. The fact that
many members at hospital I considered the convenor rather than the shop steward as
their workplace representative suggests that their steward did not have the right style of
working to encourage these members to use her/him as their representative and,
therefore, develop a sense of unionism that involved them in the workplace. They had
not been encouraged to see themselves as "the union" even though a sense of solidarity
did exist within some of the workgroups. Even the convenor did not do this; in fact
she may have contributed to the way that members viewed UNISON. All comments
from those interviewed relating to her were negative and demeaning.t+ The main
complaint from members was that you could never get in touch with her+> and if you
were lucky enough to see her at the workplace she was very often in a hurry and gave
members the impression that she was not interested in their problems. Those who had
had contact with her tended to describe her as "rubbish".
In contrast the convenor, who said that she sometimes dealt with members directly,
when asked whether the contact with the workplaces under her jurisdiction was on a
regular basis or just when a problem occurred replied "they know where they can get
me, but I try to visit when work will allow". This, it appears, was not always the
case, at least for members at hospital 1. Therefore, as with the AEEU, it could be
13 She was also organising her members to take part in a demonstration to be held in support of fifty
three sacked workers from Hillingdon hospital. The workers had been sacked because they refused to
sign new contracts accepting a £40 a week wage cut. The steward was even more determined to ensure
that local UNISON members attended the demonstration because the firm who had sacked these
workers had put in a hid to take over similar services at a hospital in Xtown and, as she put it,
"workers must be made aware of this and do something about it before it is too late".
14 Not one of the questionnaire respondents described the convenor.
15 It was extremely difficult to contact the convenor. When trying to contact her about the research it
took almost four weeks of telephoning her every day, leaving messages on her answer machine and
three letters containing stamp addressed envelopes, before J finally managed to speak to her. This time
limit may not always be convenient to members if they have an urgent problem.
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argued that where a workplace organisation has a leader who can work independently
of the outside union organisations it is beneficial to all concerned. Members develop a
sense of unionism that encompasses themselves and they are more likely to have a
favourable opinion of their union, at least within the workplace. Where members are
dependent on external help they tend to hold a negative opinion of unionism and do not
develop a conception of themselves as "the union".
When asked "do you think your members are generally interested in trade unionism?"
the convenor replied "only when they want something". And at the branch meeting
when discussing the fact that no one had turned up to go to the London demonstration,
she had stated:
"No one is interested, unless it's in their working hours and then when it is in their
working hours it is only to get out of work! In addition they are not interested unless it
affects them personally, especially at (hospital II."
Therefore, it seems that the members who did contact the convenor were those who
had personal problems and especially those at hospital I, which again indicates that
members at hospital 1 did not use their lay representative, even for individual
grievances. It could be argued that rather than moaning about the lack of interest on
the part of UNISON members the officials might find that if they and their workplace
representatives took a more active role and developed a styIe of working that promoted
unionism within the workplace and encouraged their members to participate in the
affairs that involved them, then, members might begin to appreciate the values of
unionism more for its general principles rather than for personal reasons. Beynon
(1973) had contended that despite representatives' complaints about their members'
lack of interest in the union if they had the correct leadership the members behaved
differently. A prerequisite for correct leadership, according to Beynon, was
continuous membership contact. Also, as Fosh (1993), argued, leaders who involved
members in the decision making process tended to promote a different view of
unionism to those who treated problems solely as individual ones. When asked
whether problems were treated as individual ones or whether the whole workgroup
was involved in solving them collectively, the convenor replied "it depends on the
problem, but mostly individually". Therefore, it could be argued that members were
not encouraged to develop a conception of unionism that involved more than individual
grievances. As Fosh (1993) suggested if grievances are treated as individual ones
members' participation in the grievance process is significantly reduced and they do
not develop a conception of unionism that encompasses group action. If contact with
members is confined to individual grievance processing it reinforces the tendency of
members to ignore the collective aspect of unionism (Schuller and Robertson 1983).
The representative at hospital 2 involved her members in all the affairs that involved
them, so even though the nature of the workplace may make it harder for some
stewards to keep in touch with all their members, hospital 2 proves that it can be done.
Hospital 2's steward admitted that it was harder for her at hospital I because of the
size of the workplace, which leads to the conclusion that for a union to be effective in a
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larger hospital more stewards must be incorporated to ensure that the workforce is
divided into smaller shopfloor units making the steward's task of keeping track of all
his/her members easier. As with the AEEU the issue of steward training must be made
a priority. However, when asked if enough people were willing to become stewards
the convenor replied with a definite "no"; therefore, without effective stewards, the
future of unionism for some workers at hospitals in the local area appears rather bleak.
UNISON recognised that the recruitment of stewards was difficult in some areas and
were planning a major campaign to recruit more. Its education and training department
were preparing a "recruitment and retention training programme" so that new stewards
could learn how to recruit and retain new members.!v
The suggestion that it is the stewards who are essentially responsible for maintaining
members' interest in unionism was also recognised by some members. A member
from hospital 3 was very derisive about many members there but also tended to lay the
blame for this, not with the members themselves, but with their representatives. She
argued that members were only interested in the union for any benefits that they might
get, such as accident benefit, but the reason for this was their shop steward:
"If a steward is capable of leading then they should do it and get the members interested.
But they're just not bothered half of the time. We had a young employee at our place
who WdS advised by (another member] that he ought to be in the union even if just for
accident benefit. He said that he'd never been asked to join or even told anything about
it. The shop steward was pointed out to him and even though it's her job to approach
new employees, she just said 'well there's notices up'. She's just not interested."
In the opinion of this member the stewards at her workplace did not do their job
properly and did not even encourage membership, let alone participation in anything
that may involve the union. This was a member who worked on a hospital ward;
therefore, there is scope for a shopfloor organisation to develop on the ward itself if
members could be made to see the advantages in doing so and had a steward who was
prepared to lead them.
Another UNISON member commented that union representatives "were now running
rather scared with all the job losses", which is another indication that not all lay
representatives were "leading their members". Members and ex-members from
hospital 1 felt that they were not kept informed of what the union was doing about
particular issues at their workplace. Many were annoyed that the regular workplace
meetings which had kept them up to date on what was happening had been
abandoned, apparently after the transfer of their previous steward to hospital 2.
Meetings were only held at hospital 1 when there was an issue to discuss, though a
few members did say that they were never held, which suggests that they did not keep
up to date with what was happening at their workplace. The majority of members said
that they attended these meetings whenever possible. However, observations of and
informal interviews with some of these members revealed that unless meetings were
held during their working time only the committed actually attended. Indeed, from the
16 "UNISON focus", no. 20,20 October 1995, p7.
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questionnaire answers it appears that, like some members at firm A, attendance may
only have been when the meeting had been held to discuss wage negotiations (and
observations of members showed that many did not even attend these meetings). Not
one of them attended branch meetings at the local Labour club. This may indicate that
members are not interested in the union unless a meeting is held at the workplace
during their working hours as commented on by the convenor. However, keeping
aside the fact that many members, especially female members, may have been working
all day and have families to look after in the evening.!? most members are only
interested in their own workplaces and the problems that affect them there. This was
the case with AEEU members and past studies also reached the same conclusions (for
example, Goldthorpe et al 1968). Workplace meetings would have concentrated on
issues relevant to them rather than issues of concern to the union as a whole. As it is
the responsibility of the steward to maintain union organisation and convene
workplace meetings (UNISON rule book), the blame can only be placed with the
steward. The steward at hospital 2 did this; however, at workplaces like hospital I, if
groups of workers receive no feedback from their representative, perhaps it is no
coincidence that they had little confidence in their union.
An ex-NALGO steward, who had represented the administration and clerical staff at
hospital 1 before transferring to hospital 3, also stated that:
"Members are just not interested. They are only interested in pay issues. It's different
in a factory or in ajob where everyone is paid the same. Different secretarial and admin.
jobs carry different rewards and wages, therefore, each individual is only interested in
what he/she can gain. When they used to moan about their pay rise I'd ask 'well are
you prepared to stick together and do something about it?' They'd reply 'a strike? oh
no!' and then you'd hear nothing more about it. There is no solidarity or unity, they are
all in competition with each other."
This steward had been prepared to "lead" her members but they were not prepared to
follow, at least over pay issues. The nature of these members' employment situations
may have influenced their attitudes; they worked largely as individuals with jobs that
did not necessarily overlap and affect other people's work, whereas on a hospital ward
everybody is part of a team and a problem for one part of the team will affect the other
parts. The clerical workers were aware that individual performance led to better pay
and promotion prospects and appear not to have wanted to jeopardise them by taking
any collective stance over an issue. These workers worked as individuals; therefore,
the general principles of unionism, that by working as a collective workers can
advance and protect their interests, was no use to them because of the competitive
nature of their employment.18 Shop stewards representing these types of workers
may have a much harder task than those representing workers who are not necessarily
in competition with each other, but if the steward develops the right style there is no
reason why she/he should not be able to convince her/his members that by working
I? Previous studies have also argued that meetings are timed, located and structured in such a way as
to exclude women or discourage their participation (Terry 1996).
1 8 See also Batstone et al (1977) whose description of the staff organisation that they studied was
remarkably similar to that of the clerical workers described by the ex-steward.
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together they have a much better chance of advancing their interests overall. (See Fosh
1993 who argued that no matter what kind of situation the steward has to work in,
with the right style of working he/she should be able to foster an interest in unionism
among his/her members.) The former NALGO steward actually thought that for these
types of workers it would probably be better if a full time steward, who did not work
on the premises, was brought in when problems occurred. She argued that this would
bring an element of impartiality into the situation and would prevent any "back biting"
that often occurred against the lay representative. However, since a full time convenor
has been appointed, problems do not appear to be solved any differently and for some
groups of workers they were not solved to their satisfaction.
The way that members' perceive their union appears to depend upon
their lay representative. Those with an active steward saw "the union"
as being in the workplace and valued unionism for more than just
individual benefits. Those who had no contact with a workplace
representative perceived "the union" as a concern outside the workplace
and largely held negative opinions of it. Therefore, it can be concluded
that how the lay representative performs will influence members'
perceptions of their union. It is the workplace leader's style of
working that is essential in determining membership participation and
interest in workplace unionism. At hospital t individualism appeared
to be a predominant reason for union membership; however, after the
change of steward there members had never been encouraged to view
unionism as anything other than for individual problems. Therefore, it
is perhaps no coincidence that the majority of UNISON members at
hospital t did not see "the union" as an essential part of their working
lives. A good lay representative should keep his/her members
informed about all issues which may involve them and should be able to
convince them that another person's problem is also their problem,
thereby encouraging a collective attitude. The fact that some workers at
hospital 1 had united over certain problems indicates that there is the
potential for a collective union organisation to develop if a leader were
to emerge who had a style of working that could convince those
workers that unionism encompasses more than an individual problem
solving agency. It can be concluded that the personality and style of
working of the lay representative are two of the main ingredients for
successful unionism in the workplace.
11:8 The steward is the key to successful unionism in the workplace
The UNISON steward is the most important union person within the workplace
according to the UNISON rule book. Stewards should: represent the interests of
members in their workgroup or workplace in any grievance, dispute or negotiations at
the level of the work group or workplace; establish and maintain union organisation in
their workgroup including the convening of workplace meetings; and report to the
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branch committee all developments affecting members in their workgroup or
workplace (UNISON rule book p31, section 5). According to the convenor stewards
were able to deal with management by themselves. She saw her stewards as "very
influential and effective" and argued that she could not do her job without them.
However, it appears that not all UNISON stewards were as effective as the convenor
made out. The argument that successful unionism in the workplace rests with the
personality and style of working of the lay representatives is supported by evidence
from hospitals 1 and 2.
The lay representative from hospital 2 was one of three stewards at hospital I until she
transferred to the new hospital.tv According to the steward while she was working at
hospital 1 she was "always in to see [the manager of domestic services)" on behalf of
the domestic workers, and she felt that problems were generally sorted out to their
satisfaction. However, she said that there were vast differences between the three
shifts of domestic workers regarding what they would do in a given situation.
Observations of these workers confirmed the steward's opinions. Shift A were not
very close knit and any unity within the group was usually broken by one or two
individuals. For example, if it was decided not to incorporate any extra duties into
their normal working hours (a common issue because of staff shortages; the argument
was that while ever the workers covered other shifts and did extra work no new
employees would be set on) there was always someone prepared to do the extra work
and, if necessary, overtime (perhaps indicating the self interested nature of those
workers). In contrast, shift B were prepared to stick together over an issue. One bank
holiday when the manager had decided that each worker should cover two wards
instead of their normal one the workers refused to do it and more workers had to be
called in on that particular day.
This highlights the difference between two sets of workers doing more or less the
same job. One shift was prepared to show solidarity and stick together but the other,
while initially showing unity, had so many individuals who were prepared to go
against a majority made decision that worker was pitched against worker.zu None of
these groups had a shop steward among them. But whether that would have made a
difference is another matter. According to the steward, shift C were actually the ones
who were prepared to stick up for themselves and unite together over an issue whether
the steward was involved or not. The union, then, had been used in the past for
different purposes by these workers; the majority of shift A had used it more for
individual grievances, such as injury claims (see also Terry 1982), whereas the two
other shifts had stood united over problems which had secured them their goals.
19 However, the steward was then a steward for COHSE, rather than UNISON, the other two
stewards represented NALGO and NUPE. Therefore, while certain conclusions can be drawn from the
evidence, especially regarding the personalities of those involved and their influence upon their
members and management, they should be treated with care, as workers were then represented by three
different unions rather than just the one.
20 The majority of questionnaire respondents were not sure if they would go against a majority vote
in a ballot. However, one did say that she would be prepared to do so and this worker was from shift
A.
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Solidarity and success within the workplace may also be connected to the morale of
workers; workers on shifts Band C appeared to have a much more positive attitude
towards their work and their workmates than those on shift A, who were constantly
quarrelling among themselves rather than solving their problems as a group. Even
their employer contended that many of the workers on shift A were "not very union
minded" and that they used the union for the wrong reasons. It could be argued that
whereas workers on shifts Band C had a collective attitude some of the workers on
shift A did not and, like the employees in the particular workshop at firm C (see
chapter 7), worker became pitched against worker so that a united workgroup was
hard to maintain; individualism dominated over collectivism and the union tended to
be used only for individual self interests, such as accident claims. However, if a
steward with the right style of working had had more contact with these workers it is
possible that their attitudes may have changed. For example, the actions of a
UNISON steward from the local community health team indicates that the key to
successful unionism within the workplace lies with the steward. When she moved to a
new office she was surprised to find that UNISON members there were apathetic
towards unionism, very much like the members at hospital 1. After a couple of weeks
she had managed to get things sorted out that the workers had been complaining about
for months, such as faulty equipment in the office. The members' response to the
union changed from one of indifference to one of a feeling of belonging and being able
to get things done. The steward's style of working had encouraged those members to
see unionism in a way that involved them in the workplace rather than as an external
entity that provided assistance for personal claims and problems.
The steward from hospital 2 also argued that there was a lot more to union
membership than benefits; solidarity is an essential part of being in a union, which, it
could be argued, may be part of the explanation for why she appeared to be able to
keep her members satisfied and prepared to act together if necessary. At hospital 1,
UNISON had lost many members, and some of those had been active members who
believed in solidarity and the general principles of unionism (indeed, a couple of them
had been NUPE/COHSE stewards). Many of these workers had lost faith in their
union, especially since the amalgamation of the three public service unions (see
below). However, most of them had resigned their membership after the particular
steward transferred from hospital I to hospital 2. When the steward was asked why
members were dropping out of UNISON, she was surprised at the number of ancillary
workers who had resigned their membership at hospital 1, yet at the same time she
was sympathetic because of the problems the creation of UNISON had caused. This
could be the reason workers were resigning their membership. However, the fact that
other workers were remaining members and new workers were becoming members at
hospital 2 suggests that the lay representative is the key to encouraging workers to
remain/join the union and to participate in union affairs within the workplace.
One domestic worker at hospital 1 resigned her UNISON membership because of how
she felt she had been treated by the union over her claim for compensation. She had
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put her hand into a black waste bag and a syringe needle (which should have not been
in the bag) pierced her hand. After two and half years UNISON had sent her what she
described as "an insulting and nasty" letter, saying that she should accept what was
offered by the health authority because "she was partly to blame" for putting her hand
into the bag; that is, she was contributorily negligent. The worker was very annoyed
and immediately resigned her union membership. This was also a worker who had
been an active union member; she believed in all the general principles of unionism and
was not just a member for the sake of benefits and "what she could get out of the
union" personally. She felt very strongly about how she had been treated: it was not
just a case of not getting what she felt she was entitled to, it was a stand on a matter of
principle. When the steward from hospital 2 was told about the outcome of this case
she was surprised because she had originally been fighting the case, and during that
time the union had recommended that the worker accept a certain sum of money which
the steward had advised against doing. However, when the representative moved to
hospital 2 the case was put into the hands of another representative, who could not
have wished to carry on fighting the case. The result was that the member became
disillusioned with the union and felt that the best thing was to pull out. It will never be
known if the situation would have ended differently if hospital 2's steward had carried
on fighting the case. She certainly did not agree with the outcome and would have
contested the suggestion that the worker was in any way at fault. This could be taken
as an indication that the new representative at hospital I was not as effective as the
previous one and UNISON was losing members as a result of the change.
When asked about their steward, many members at hospital I did not even know who
it wasP! Some workers at hospital Iactually said that they had never been asked to
join a union. This to a large extent reflected upon their current representative. The
questionnaire answers about the steward confirmed that some members did not see
their steward; "never see them" stated one. However, it may also have depended
upon the shifts that members worked on; when the hours that members worked are
looked at22 those that described their representative in some way worked over 24
hours a week and those that did not worked less. Therefore, it could be argued that
those workers on shift A came into contact with their union representative more often
than the workers on the other shifts)3 The representative was described as "easy to
approach" and "willing to help". One respondent said that the steward was
knowledgeable and dedicated and another that he/she gave advice and sorted out
problems unrelated to work. However, only one said that he/she was readily
available. This falls into line with the comments from members on each shift,
including shift A, that they never came into contact with himlher. The member who
21 When distributing questionnaires one member actually asked "are you the union rep'!" which
suggests that many members at hospital 1 did not know who their representative was.
22 This is an indication that they worked different shifts.
23This may have been because shift A were allowed a half bour dinner break and some of the workers
had their lunch in the staff canteen at the same time as other hospital workers were having their
dinner. Therefore, shift A workers may have had more opportunity to meet their steward (if they knew
who it was) than workers on the other shifts, who only attended the canteen when other hospital
workers were not present.
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said that the steward was readily available may have been in a different position to
other members and perhaps worked on a ward or department where the steward
worked. Indeed, one questionnaire stated '"I would like to see our union steward at
least once every three months". This indicates that contact between the members
studied and their lay representative at hospital I was almost non existent. A steward
should be in contact with his/her members regularly if he/she wishes to build up an
effective union organisation and even the UNISON rule book recognised this.
Satisfaction with union representation at the workplace appeared to be related to
whether the member had contact with the steward or not. The questionnaire
respondents who had replied that they were satisfied or were "sometimes" satisfied
with their representation were the ones who had also described their steward in some
way, whereas those who were not satisfied with their union representation or who did
not know had not described their representative at all indicating that they may have had
no contact with him/her. Members who were interviewed also reacted in the same
way. In addition, all the respondents were most likely to take any problems that they
may have had to their supervisor and observations of the domestic workers revealed
that all these workers did the same. This may reflect the fact that a union steward was
not readily available; however, it was also the case that all the domestic services
supervisors while seen as part of management in one respect, that is, workers were
careful not to be caught doing something they should not be doing, for example,
taking an unofficial tea break, in another respect they were treated as a part of the work
group and became involved with the workers under their supervision as "leaders". In
comparison to the supervisors/foremen at firm A, at hospital I they were not treated
with suspicion or in a "us" and "them" fashion; they were seen as part of the
workgroup and had usually worked alongside the domestic workers before their
promotion, in addition they were also UNISON members. Usually the union only
became involved at the instigation of a supervisor if she could not solve a problem
herself; these usually covered things like injury claims or in one case, a malicious
letter campaign against a worker; personal problems.
It could be argued that the domestic supervisors were seen as, and acted as, leaders of
the workgroup rather than as part of the management team. This may have reduced the
likelihood of a workplace union organisation being built up by these workers; that is,
because their supervisors dealt with the majority of their problems, the workers did not
see a need to insist that they had a steward in the workplace who was on hand if they
should ever need to contact herlhim immediately about workplace problems.
However, because the supervisors took on the role of problem solvers, this may have
increased the competitive nature of some of the workers. Whereas a union
representative should stress the collective nature of the workforce in solving their
problems, by, for example, all workers refusing to work overtime, a supervisor wants
to get the work completed and may encourage individual workers to work overtime
against the wishes of the majority. Therefore, some union members were being
encouraged to work as individuals rather than as part of a collective. This would
appear to add weight to Roberts' (1987) suggestion that if employers offered a system
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which satisfied employees that their interests were being protected trade unions would
cease to be important as a major institution. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the
lack of union representation for these workers also contributed to this situation and the
fact that two of the workgroups did work collectively to achieve their aims refutes
Roberts' (1987) contention that employees wish to be treated as individuals rather than
as collectivities.
The nature of the workplace itself may also be a significant factor when considering
the unity of union members (see for example, Sayles 1958). A close knit workforce,
who work together regularly, may be more likely to become united over an issue than
a scattered workforce who do not regularly meet up with each other or do not
necessarily work together. The steward from hospital 2 recognised that it was
sometimes difficult to maintain solidarity within a hospital, especially because of the
nature of the workplace. But she insisted that at hospital 2 solidarity was much easier
to maintain because the hospital was more compact than hospital 1 and members could
be contacted much easier; if a workplace meeting had to be called, for example, it was
easier to get all the members together. At hospital 1 it was much harder to get all the
members together because they were "dotted about all over the place". It was also
much harder at hospital 1 to keep track of an new employees and some tended to "slip
the net". Terry's (1982) contention that a key steward was crucial to the success of
workplace unionism where there was a scattered workforce does not appear to be
upheld in Xtown. The convenor was the "key steward" with access to all members
and management; however, because she did not maintain contact with all her members,
as Terry put it, trade unionism just became a label that went along with the job.
The evidence suggests that while the nature of the workplace itself can
hinder union organisation, it is actually the lay representative
him/herself who actually encourages union participation. The fact that
the steward at hospital 2 maintained her membership while at hospital I
and was still doing so at hospital 2 suggests that the dissatisfaction of
members at hospital 1 was created by their present steward. The fact
that the domestic supervisors acted as workplace problem solvers for
their workers may also have taken the onus away from the union on
these types of issues.
11:9 The national union
According to hospital 2's lay representative UNISON was "a shambles", basically
because of the amalgamation between the three unions. As a whole representatives
were finding that certain groups of workers did not like to be lumped together with
other groups; for example, many former NALGO workers, that is, white collar
workers, did not like to be combined with cleaners, porters and other manual workers.
Indeed, if the nature of the employment situation influences the way that individuals
choose to work, that is, as individuals or as a collective, then the amalgamation of
NALGO with NUPE and COHSE, rather than leading to a united workforce, may
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have actually created a union where members are divided about their priorities. The
steward agreed that COHSE and NUPE should have amalgamated years ago as they
were both representing similar workers, and in some instances the same groups of
workers, which caused difficulties when trying to get problems sorted out within the
hospital when the workers involved belonged to two different unions.
The ex-NALGO steward gave a good example of the difficulties faced by stewards
before the amalgamation. During a strike at a local hospital, if workers took one day
off they did not receive any reimbursement from their union but if they stopped work
for three or more days they were entitled to some form of payment. A rTO of one of
the unions had negotiated a deal for her members that entitled them to some form of
payment for taking only one day off work, whereas members of the other two unions
would not receive any payment unless they stopped work for at least three days. As
the ex-steward put it: "This was not fair and could have broken the strike. Those who
were being paid for the first day they stopped work did not all join the strike for
longer. The same deal should have been negotiated for everyone."
Problems for representatives still existed because of the traditions of the original
unions. The steward at hospital 2 was asked by a member who had been off work ill
for 13 weeks about that member's entitlement to a lump sum of money from the union.
The representative did not think that this was the case, but after making enquiries on
the member's behalf found that former NALGO members were entitled to a small lump
sum after 13 weeks of illness, whereas members of the other two former unions were
not entitled to this same benefit.24 Similarly, members wishing to contribute to
UNISON's political fund may have been confused to find that they could choose
whether to pay into the General Political Fund or the Affiliated Political Fund or to
both. The contribution rate to each fund was different; 22p a month to the General
Political Fund and 6.5% of their contribution to the union for the Affiliated fund. The
two political funds had been created by NALGO's political fund (now the General
Political Fund) and the combination of COHSE's and NUPE's political funds (now
the Affiliated Political Fund), and contributions from members were diverted into the
fund replacing their former union's. However, after January lst 1996 any UNISON
member can elect to contribute to either of the two funds. However, if evidence from
AEEU rnemberszs can be applied to UNISON members, members may not even
know which fund they are contributing to, if they are contributing at all.
UNISON's method of working out the level of subscriptions paid by each member
was also criticised by many members and was described as "a very unfair system" by
24 The UNISON rule hook stated: "Members who were members ofCOHSE, NALGO or NUPE on
Vesting Day shall retain entitlement to any financial benefits of membership of the former Union
which are not otherwise provided for in these Rules, providing that they continue to remain in
membership of UNISON." (1995, p51).
25 Many AEEU members did not know if they were contributing to their union's political fund.
Those that said they were not also commented that they appeared to be paying exactly the same
subscriptions as everyone else that they knew, which suggests that in Xtown, members either did not
contribute to the AEEU's political fund or they did not know that they were doing so.
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the ex-NALGO steward.26 Rather than a set rate, as paid by AEEU members,
UNISON members paid a different rate depending on their annual income; therefore,
each member's rate of subscription was based on the amount that they earned in the
previous year. According to the ex-NALGO steward, members who had worked a lot
of overtime were finding that any extra pay they had earned in the months before their
"anticipated income" for the following year was being assessed was being taken into
account, making their union subscriptions much higher the following year. Each
branch was also allowed to fix a local levy which was added to members' subscription
rates. This would also create differences in different groups of workers'
subscriptions.
The steward from hospital 2 gave the impression that she had no respect for the
national side of her union, its national officers or the Fl'Os for the region: "they are
more concerned with themselves and finances than with the members and issues of
solidarity" she stated quite clearly.27 This may be one reason why some UNISON
stewards take the "not bothered" attitude as described by the member above; if union
officers outside the workplace are not interested in encouraging solidarity and
participation in unionism, this attitude may be passed onto their stewards. So unless
stewards already possess the right qualities to encourage membership participation and
maintain unity among their members, it is highly likely that they will not learn these
traits from their superiors.
The steward was also critical of the "top levels" of the union, particularly because
"rather than let you make your own mind up over a particular issue they tend to tell
you to vote yes".28 She was also critical of the way issues brought up at conference
were dealt with:
"At conferences, if members are not satisfied with a particular issue, the union will say
'well we'll put it into remit'. We vote on it, it gets put into remit and then we never
hear about it again. So it has to be put across to delegates not to vote for issues to be
put into remit, then they can stay on the agenda and be discussed until members are
satisfied. "
It appears that UNISON as a national organisation does not even satisfy its own
activists let alone the rank and file members, at least in Xtown. As the steward from
hospital 2 said "the workplace is the place where the union matters, the top people are
totally out of touch."
As already mentioned the branch committee appeared to want to ignore their stewards'
26 This was also the reason that the former steward "fell out" with the union.
27 The former NALGO steward also reflected these views and had become very bitter about UNISON
and the way that it went about doing things after its creation.
28 Interestingly the branch officials also tended to take a particular stance regardless of what their
members might have thought. One member at the mooting had asked if it was possible to get Rodney
Bickerstaffe to come and speak to the members before they voted for their general secretary. After an
outburst from the chairman about making all the necessary arrangements for speakers to appear locally
and then no one turning up, she announced "anyway this branch is supporting Rodney".
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views and concerns. One rank and file member who had attended the branch meeting
had also questioned many of the things put forward by the Fl'Os and it was clear that
she was not happy with many of the answers she received. After the meeting she
commented that "they are very conservative at the top of this union" and went on to
say that she had stopped attending meetings because she had become disillusioned
with the union:
"The union is in the workplace. What the top level of the union does is made up on
their own decisions not what the members want."
When opinions like this are voiced, it is perhaps easy to understand why members
without an adequate lay representative, who is able to work on his/her own initiative
and sustain a workplace organisation, are either only in the union for what they can get
out of it themselves or pull out altogether. It is interesting that many members who
had resigned their membership since the union became UNISON tended to be those
who were most active within one of the three former unions; they believed in the
principles of unionism rather than in membership for the sake of benefits, attended
union meetings and were proud of their union membership. Those who remained
members at hospital 1 did not associate "the union" with the workplace and had very
low opinions oftheir union in general.
The UNISON rules state that two of the aims and objects of the union are: "To
promote and establish a member-led union and to carry out and fulfil decisions made
by members in a spirit of unity and accountability",29 and: "To promote and
safeguard the rights of members to have an adequate opportunity to participate in the
initiation and development of policy making, through meetings, conferences,
delegations or ballots, and to encourage the maximum democratic debate, together
with the right to campaign to change policy, while at all times acting within the rules
and agreed policy. "30 Members locally did not feel that this was the case and even
branch officials did not seem to want to take on board the opinions of their members.
UNISON activists in other areas also appeared to be unhappy with the way that the
national organisation of UNISON was working. For example, the front page story of
one "UNISON Focus", magazine declared that: "Health staff say yes. Ballot shows
82 per cent in favour of deal to end pay dispute". The article accompanying the
headline told the reader that "health workers have voted overwhelmingly to accept a
deal to end this year's pay dispute" and outlined the framework of proposals that were
voted for. Nearly three quarters of UNISON's 440,000 health members were balloted
and the turnout for the voting was 36%.31 In the following edition of the magazine32
two letters were printed objecting to the article. One stated:
"I o~iect to the blatant piece of propaganda contained in the front page article (UNISON
29 UNISON Rule Book as amended by the 1995 conference, p2, section 2.2.
30 Ibid, p3, section 2.5.
31 UNISON Focus no. 20, 20 October 1995.
32 No.21,3 November 1995
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focus 20, health staff say yes). To argue that the pay vote represented an overwhelming
acceptance of the deal is stretching things. When only 36 per cent of members voted, it
is a bit like saying the Tories have a mandate from a majority of the electorate to govern
the country. The reality is the massive majority of our members abstained. Who can
blame them when it seemed like a sham that they were being recommended by their
leaders to accept local pay bargaining when they rejected it in favour of strike action.
Our members do not feel confident that this deal will protect national pay and conditions
when they see that management is also saying that the deal represents a victory for
theml. "
This letter was written by a branch secretary, who, like the steward from hospital 2,
did not like the way that UNISON leaders recommended a "yes" vote. He also
appears to have hit the nail on the head when he complained about the vote being called
an "overwhelming victory" when the majority of members did not vote at all. The vote
held in Xtown was done by a show of hands and, therefore, many members may have
missed the vote altogether because they were not at work or may have been intimidated
because those conducting the vote were recommending a "yes" vote. The second
letter, also from a branch secretary, began; "What a sell out by full-time officers the
pay settlement for NHS staff is. It is yet another case of ignoring the members'
wishes ..." Therefore, despite the aims of UNISON cited above, the union was not
seen as a member led union, as some activists were of the opinion that members'
wishes are not taken into account. It could be argued that members should have voted
rather than abstaining and their wishes might then have been taken into account;
however, if the vote was conducted as it was locally, some members may not have had
a chance to vote. Others may have been resigned to the fact that whatever they voted
for was ignored anyway, as the above letter said, members had already rejected the
proposals in favour of strike action but another vote was taken anyway. While this
shows that many members around the country may not be satisfied with the national
side of their union33 it also indicates that not all local branches appear to support
national policies and ignore their members' concerns. Maybe locally this had
something to do with the fact that the full time convenor was the branch secretary and
the regional FrO was usually in attendance. Nevertheless, it indicates that members in
some areas may receive a better service than those in others, depending upon the
personalities and allegiances, that is to the national union or to their members, of those
involved.
Local active UNISON members and stewards echoed the views of the
AEEU stewards that the workplace is where the union should matter
and that their national leaders were more concerned with themselves
and the financial side of the union rather than with the everyday
realities that members encounter. Of particular concern, from members
33 To be fair to UNISON a letter from a shop steward in Wales, on behalf of fifteen members who
worked for a small employer, thanked their UNISON district office for the level of support and
expertise that was given during an organisational restructure. They were obviously surprised by this
because the letter said, "we were expecting the worst and got the best", and they asked "is this a
universal experience of the union membership since the amalgamation?" It appears that for many
members the reverse is actually true; however, at least one district organisation appears to be
satisfying its members.
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in both unions, was the way that their national leaders appeared to
ignore members' wishes and advise them to vote in the way that they
wanted. This makes a mockery of statements that the two unions are
"membership-led". Though it is significant that within UNISON, the
local organisation appeared to endorse national policies, sometimes
against the wishes of members, whereas the local organisation of the
AEEU was very often opposed to national initiatives. This difference
was probably due to the fact that full time representatives were in
charge of UNISON's local organisation, whereas lay representatives
administered the local organisation of the AEEU.
Even though the majority of UNISON members at hospital 1 agreed
that workers need trade unions to protect their interests and particularly
at work, it appears that UNISON was not delivering the goods as far as
some members were concerned. If stewards with the right styles of
working are not available to keep members happy within their
workplaces, it seems that, at least locally, UNISON is in danger of
losing more and more members.
II: 10 Legislation and industrial action
When asked if she thought that the legislation had had any effect on the way that
negotiations were conducted between UNISON and managements, the convenor
replied: "Yes. It is a new area for us all. We have had study days for combine
managers and union reps to work together, which we all felt were good." Therefore,
union representatives and managers within the trust were trained together in
negotiating skills, which, even though the convenor thought that everyone "felt they
were good" could be considered a bit of disadvantage because by learning these skills
together both sides would be aware of the bargaining tactics of the other side.
However, it appears that representatives from the management and staff sides tried to
work together and by the means of the staff council tried to solve their problems
amicably. Therefore, the legislation had had an effect on negotiations within the health
service as a whole in the local region and may have brought the managers and union
negotiators closer together, or at least the full time union representatives.
Nevertheless, the legislation had not had any effect on hospital 2's steward and the
way that she dealt with management. Not surprisingly, the majority of the
questionnaire respondents did not know if the law had affected the way that
negotiations were conducted between their workplace union and management. Over
half of them did not know if their steward even negotiated with their manager over
work related problems. Most of the UNISON members who were interviewed or
completed the questionnaire were not aware of many aspects of the law. Informal
interviews with some of those from hospitals I and 2 revealed that the only
information that some of them received about the law was from the television and
newspapers and most were not interested in this anyway. The majority of the
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questionnaire respondents did not know the answers to any of the questions relating to
the legislation, though of particular importance is the fact that not one of them knew
that the organisation of industrial action without a postal ballot could involve the
national union incurring legal liability.
The law had no significance for those UNISON members studied. However, like the
AEEU members at firm A, despite their lack of knowledge about the legislation
relating to trade unions they believed that union power no longer existed. It could be
argued that this was because they were basing their judgments upon the national
organisations of trade unions, and in the case of hospital I they did not have an
effective workplace organisation to base their measurements of union power upon.
Indeed, it could be argued that before hospital 2 was built, the union organisation at
hospital 1 was more efficient than it was at the time of the study; therefore, members
may have based their perceptions about the loss of union power upon the change that
had taken place at their workplace. This also coincided with the transition of the three
former public service unions to UNISON.
The majority of members interviewed did not think that the law had had an effect on
the forms of industrial action that were taken at hospital I or they did not know. This
is not surprising as the majority of the questionnaire respondents said that no forms of
pressure had been used at their place of work while they had been working there.
However, when action was taken, it was by individual workgroups, usually refusing
to do particular things, and this did not appear to be defined as industrial action but
was looked upon as "sticking up for our rights".
Regarding industrial action on issues that affect the health service generally, such as
the pay negotiations, the regional FTO commented at the branch meeting that
UNISON can get some areas to take action but not others and "if we can't get it
everywhere it breaks the ranks and if some areas accept a deal then it loses the impetus
for action. [Xtown] would have delivered industrial action, they have done before,
although it is sometimes patchy". Therefore, the FTO was confident that local
members would back the union if necessary. However, members may feel
differently, at least at hospital 1. Over half of those who returned the questionnaire
had said that they would not be prepared to take strike action if a serious problem
should occur and three did not know (and these were not nurses who were responsible
for patient care). However, industrial action, such as refusing to do the work of
another person, had been taken by members without a ballot, and this type of action
had secured them their goals. Nevertheless, this type of action depended largely on
the work group taking it. Only two of the questionnaire respondents would have been
prepared to take industrial action short of a strike, yet none of the respondents had said
that they would not be prepared to take immediate action without a ballot in the given
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circumstances.e+ This may indicate that depending on the form of action taken
members may be prepared to take part depending on the circumstances. It may also
depend upon how individuals define industrial action. As at firm A, it may be that
UNISON members do not necessarily define certain measures, such as refusing to do
the work of another person, as industrial action. It also appears to have been the case
that actual or threatened action was more likely to arise over workplace issues rather
than national or even local issues. (Elgar and Simpson 1994b also found that disputes
in the 1980s tended to be over local issues rather than national based ones.)
The example above, where the nurses threatened to go on strike, shows that union
members at hospital 2 were prepared to issue threats to management when they felt
very strongly about something and the threat certainly made management consider and
accept the steward's proposals. Nevertheless, the dispute was solved within the
workplace by the lay representative, if the convenor had had her way the dispute may
have been prolonged. Therefore, the argument that workplace bargaining within the
NHS might benefit those concerned was upheld on this occasion. However, when
asked if the nurses would have been prepared to take strike action, the steward
hesitated and answered" I doubt it, because of the patients. They've got us over a
barrel. It's not as though we just stop productivity, we care about the elderly patients.
But the threat was there." So whether the nurses would have taken action is another
question; the nature of their work makes it hard for them to do so without a guilty
conscience about the effect that it would have on their patients. The point is that the
threat worked.35 Indeed, Elgar and Simpson (1994b) found that the law relating to
industrial action was rarely used by NHS managers, usually because of the short lived
nature of most action and so as not to make the industrial relations atmosphere any
worse. In this case it could be argued that the steward had found a solution to the
problem which benefited management just as much as it did her members.
If the nurses had refused to work, they would have done so without first conducting a
postal ballot. The branch committee, backed by the regional officer, were discussing
the vote that was to be taken on the document outlining new framework proposals for
pay and local pay bargaining. All members were to be balloted on whether to accept
the proposals and the chairman announced that "the vote will mean a show of hands
because of the lack of time". When challenged by a member who asked "but is a
show of hands democratic? Won't members be influenced by other people?" she
replied with a very distinct "no!" and the regional officer backed her by adding "it is
not viable with what we've got to do and in the time we've got to organise a proper
ballot". Therefore, local union officers were prepared to take a vote of their members
in a fashion considered undemocratic by even some of their own members. The
34 The majority of the respondents could not really say whether they would take immediate action
without a ballot. Two had said that they would; one to ensure that all workers doing the same job
received equal treatment and for a health and safety problem and the other over the dismissal of a
workmate, a pay dispute, changed working conditions and to ensure everyone received equal treatment.
35 Yet the hospital I questionnaire respondents either thought that threats to walk off the shopfloor
were not usually sufficient to make management concede to their demands or they did not know. This
may indicate the difference between the two workplaces and the workers there.
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chairman, as if trying to vindicate the decision, stated: "I've very often been up at
[hospital 3] until two in the morning organising a vote by a show of hands from those
on every shift." However, this would not include those members who were not
working that particular day; therefore, the vote would not be taken by every member,
let alone the issue of whether it is democratic to vote this way. In many respects a
workplace secret ballot would not have taken an enormous amount of time up and
could be described as more democratic than a show of hands.36
As with the AEEU the legislation appears to have had more effect upon
the national organisation rather than the workplace organisations of
UNISON. Indeed, as far as the local organisation was concerned, it
may have brought managers and union officials closer together. The
convenor could not say whether she thought that the changes in the law
had had any effect upon UNISON as she felt that UNISON "had not yet
settled since becoming one union". This supports the comments made
by other representatives and members about ''the shambles" that
UNISON appeared to be in at that moment in time.
11:11 Trade union power
When asked "do you regard your union as powerful'?" the convenor answered with a
definite "yes", and in reply to the question "do you feel that overall UNISON is
effective locally?" she said "I would hope so". Despite the negative opinion of many
members towards the convenor evidence does show that if power is defined as the
union's capacity or ability to achieve a desired goal, UNISON locally had achieved
many things which were contrary to the original decisions of management. For
example, the provision of adequate catering facilities for staff at one hospital or the
restoration of a ward floor at a time convenient to staff and patients rather than
management. However, problems such as these which were solved to the satisfaction
of those concerned tended to involve health and safety issues or working conditions,
problems which in some instances should not have been allowed to happen in the first
place. Issues that management might regard as their "right to manage" tended to be
left unresolved, usually because they involved financial aspects which had already
taken place. Therefore, in the trust as a whole UNISON could be regarded as
powerful, that is it had the ability to produce effects and achieve desired goals, on
issues that related to health and safety and working conditions. But the union
appeared to be powerless over the financial aspects of the trust, though it should be
noted that this was largely because members' concerns were voiced over things that
36 The questionnaire answers were divided as to how a vote was usually carried out at hospital l.
Three said that a show of hands was used, three a postal ballot, one a workplace secret ballot and two
did not know. This may indicate that different work groups use different methods within the
workplace to vote, but it also shows that postal ballots may have been used by the national union.
UNISON as a national organisation bargains on behalf of all its members on issues which affect more
than one workplace, such as pay. Therefore, if industrial action was to be called for over these types
of issues, it could be presumed that the national union would ensure that the correct balloting
procedureswerecarriedout.
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had already taken place, such as new carpeting for administration offices when
hospital wheelchairs were in desperate need of repair. The convenor did say that as a
union representative the most important issues to her were "everything that appertains
to the health and safety and all working conditions for our members", and it appears
that, at least locally, UNISON was effective in ensuring that these kinds of problems
were solved to the satisfaction of those involved. In fact, a few members did comment
that "unions are good for health and safety issues".
The steward at hospital 2 felt that "the union" was effective there; however, it was the
workplace organisation rather than the outside union that she referred to; as far as
UNISON locally was concerned she did not have a high regard for it. The workplace
union organisation at hospital 2 did have the capacity to produce effects; therefore, that
organisation could be described as "powerful"; members' interests were protected.
However, like firm A's convenor, the steward did not see herself as powerful, she
looked upon what she did as an essential part of the working environment; the
protection of her members' interests and the best possible care for patients were the
two things that mattered most. However, the union's effectiveness revolved around
how she worked with management and her members. Her style of working
determined membership participation in the union affairs that involved them and also
enabled her to work with management despite their resentment of any interference in
their "right to manage". She did feel that she was helping management to run the
hospital more efficiently even though they were reluctant to include her in the decision
making forum. Her style of working accommodated management as well as her
members and ensured that she did have an influence over what happened in the
workplace. Even though the management did not acknowledge her intervention, she
shaped and influenced their decisions in such a way that she could have claimed to
have been involved in the process. However, her style of working was such that she
did not want to antagonise management: she was happy not to take any credit for
decision making as long as her members' interests were protected. It could be argued
that within a hospital the main emphasis for both union members and management is
patient care (or should be) and, therefore, even though conflict situations may arise
both parties are working towards the same goal. However, Brown's (1994)
suggestion that without a union presence management's merely managed labour badly
could be applied to hospital 2; without the union's (or the steward's) intervention the
management at hospital 2 would have managed not only labour badly but also patient
care. The union worked to the advantage of its members, management and the
hospital as a whole.
Only one of the questionnaire respondents said that UNISON was not effective at her
workplace (hospital 1), the others were equally divided; four did not know and four
thought that it was effective. However, even though the number of questionnaire
respondents was low, their answers to whether union membership made a difference
in a number of particular circumstances reflected the feelings of those hospital I
members who only gave their opinions verbally. As table 2 shows union membership
was considered to make a difference in unfair dismissal cases and if a workplace
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accident should occur. These functions of UNISON were carried out by the union
organisation external to the workplace. The answers indicate that while members at
hospital I may have had a negative opinion about their union, or at least their local
union, they did consider the national union effective where compensation was
involved. Indeed, evidence from WIRS3 showed that unions continued to play an
important role assisting in dismissal cases. UNISON, then, did have some use to
hospital 1members, even if it was only for issues of compensation.
The fact that a third of the respondents did not know whether being in a union made a
difference to those circumstances which involved the workplace directly, such as
"having your conditions of work changed" and "efficient health and safety", suggests
that the union was not used for these types of problems at hospital 1. If members did
not have contact with their workplace representative, then, these types of workplace
concerns, which at hospital 2 were dealt with without external intervention, would not
Table 2. Whether questionnaire respondents thought that being in a
union made a difference to a number of different circumstances
Circum, stance Yes No Don't
know
Higher wages 4 4 I
Unfair dismissal 8 0 I
Accusation by employer 4 I 4
Changed working conditions 4 2 3
Efficient health and safety 4 2 3
Workplace accident 8 0 I
Preventing harassment &
discrimination 5 0 4
Job protection 5 0 4
be brought to the attention of the steward. Indeed, as mentioned above, in the case of
the domestic workers they tended to use their supervisor to solve these types of
problems. Overall at hospital 1 the workers studied did not view their union as
powerful»? or as being particularly bothered about representing their interests. The
reason for this appears to be that they had not got an effective lay representative. The
lack of a workplace union organisation left the workers with no sense of belonging to
a union, union membership to them was like a form of insurance against unfair
dismissal, accidents and a last resort for personal work related problems.
37 Nevertheless, some of the questionnaire respondent s took a different view. ThL'Y were equally
divided Over trade union power in the country as a whole: three said they had the right amount, three
thought they had too little and three did not know. However, when asked about the power of the
union at their workplace, four said that it had the right amount, one thought it had too little, another
said it had far too little and three did not know.
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It can be concluded that UNISON within the trust as a whole was powerful on issues
relating to health and safety and working conditions, whereas on issues involving the
financial side of the trust the union had little authority. However, it could be argued
that within the local trust UNISON had the potential to exert its power, that is, its
capacity to produce effects, over these types of issues. Whereas, studies have
concluded that unions generally only react to already defined parameters (for example,
Burkitt 1981, Wilson et al 1982) UNISON had the capacity to do more than structure
management's final decision making. The fact that the trust recognised that staff had
a vital role to play in its efficient running and that they should be involved in setting
local objectives coupled with the participation of UNISON representatives on the staff
council indicates that UNISON could play a greater role within the trust than just
reacting to management decisions. Coates (1983) suggested that if union power was
equated with participation in decision making then union power had significantly
increased, though this power was limited. It could be argued that UNISON's power
has increased within the local trust and rather than this power being limited it's
potential has actually been enhanced by the trust itself. Nevertheless, if the full time
UNISON representatives are out of touch with their members' opinions, members,
like those at hospital I, may not feel that their union is powerful as their concerns
appear to be ignored. This would be particularly so if they considered the convenor to
be their representative. However, at workplaces where members' interests are served
by a workplace steward UNISON's "power" within the trust as a whole may not be
considered; their interests are protected within the workplace so that they have no
need to contact outside representatives.
Individual workplace organisations appear to be effective in achieving their goals
depending on whether they have a lay representative who can maintain his/her
membership and their interest in unionism. In those workplaces where an active shop
steward could be found UNISON membership was constantly maintained and new
employees also joined (see also Hancke 1993). In those workplaces where the
steward was not in contact with the members, they tended to view their union in a very
derisive way and used the full time convenor for their personal claims and problems.
Nevertheless, the fact that in these workplaces some groups of workers were prepared
to unite over particular issues and as a rule to their own advantage, indicates that there
may be an opening for a united workplace organisation to develop if a union lay
representative with the right style of working could be found to organise them.
While UNISON could be described as powerful in the trust overall on
issues relating to health and safety and working conditions, financial
considerations appeared to remain a management prerogative.
However, if the trust policy is taken literally UNISON had the potential
to achieve its members' goals over financial spending. Nevertheless,
members were more concerned with the problems that affected them
personally rather than those encountered at other workplaces within the
trust. Successful unionism within the workplace rests with the style of
working of the lay representative. Stewards who maintained a
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successful workplace organisation were those who could work
independently of the "external" union organisations.
11: 12 Discussion - UNISON in Xtown and its surrounding areas
The evidence points to three different strands of unionism within UNISON, the
shopfloor unit, the local unit and the national organisation. Whereas the local unit of
the AEEU appeared to function as a go-between for the national and shoptloor
organisations (or at least officially), the local unit of UNISON played a much larger
role within the union and the local area. The fact that pay bargaining within the NHS
was conducted locally rather than between individual workgroups and their managers,
as with most private sector companies, contributed to the added importance of the local
organisation of UNISON. The structure of the UNISON local branch also gave the
local organisation of UNISON a larger role than within the AEEU, especially as the
full time convenor was branch secretary rather than a lay representative. Nevertheless,
it could be argued that when the ABEU alter its branch structures by amalgamating all
local branches, its local organisation may begin to resemble that of UNISON.
However, an important point is that while the local unit of UNISON supported their
national union's policies, the local AEEU activists who were in charge of the district
shop stewards' meetings were largely opposed to many of their national organisation's
proposals and disseminated information to local stewards that they may not have
otherwise learned about.
It is clear that where the workplace has a UNISON representative who is seen to be
successful, that workplace is less reliant upon the local organisation for help. The
convenor said that workplace organisations were able to cope "up to a point" on their
own without assistance; however, evidence from hospital2 indicates that a workplace
organisation may actually solve problems more efficiently than when the convenor is
called in. The local organisation, headed by the full time convenor with assistance
from the regional FrO, dealt with problems at a vast number of workplaces and many
were solved to the satisfaction of the full time representatives. However, members
were not always satisfied. The full time representatives appeared not to want to "rock
the boat" with local managers and it seemed that the convenor may have had an over
friendly relationship with some of them. Her description of her dealings with a
manager at hospital 1 was different to the description of the dealings that the previous
steward there had had with the same manager. It was generally the steward rather than
the convenor who solved members' problems for them when she had worked at
hospital 1. Since she has left many members there have become disillusioned with the
union and some have even resigned their membership. This suggests that the steward
rather than the convenor was the person who had the capacity to achieve results for
members, or at least those that mattered within the everyday working environment.
The example where the nurses had threatened to stop working at hospital 2 also
confirms this suggestion; the convenor would not have interfered with management's
proposals wanting to leave the situation as it was, but the steward persisted and found
a solution that was beneficial to management as well as her members. Brown et al's
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(1978) conclusion that the existence of a well developed shop stewards' organisation
was associated with a reduced wish to see the FrO appears to be confirmed, however,
in UNISON: the existence of only one steward who could work independently of
outside sources was enough to develop an effective workplace organisation.
Local full time representatives did appear to work hard on behalf of their members and
accepted what they thought was the best deal for them; however, members may not
always have regarded this as the case. Union representatives from outside the
workplace do not appear to be as efficient at solving members' problems as workplace
representatives. They are more detached from the workplace and are not immediately
available should an urgent problem arise. They also appear to deal with managers
much more than their members; the convenor's visits to workplaces tended to be to
see managers. Members found her very hard to contact. It could be argued that
Fl'Os will gain more of a management than a members' viewpoint. In addition they
do not necessarily have to face the consequences of their actions in the same way that a
steward would. However, when no lay representative is available in the workplace
members may have to rely on the services provided by outside sources which might
explain why some members were dissatisfied with their union.
Studies have found that in the public services there was a greater reliance upon
representatives from outside the workplace and this was generally associated with a
scattered workforce (for example, Terry 1982) or with national level bargaining
(Brown et al 1978). However, local members' reliance on their full time
representatives was not because of national level bargaining or because they were part
of a scattered workforce: it was because they had no contact with their workplace
representative. Indeed, Terry (1982) had argued that where dominant senior stewards
were to be found in local government they exerted an important influence and may
have played an important role in local negotiations. This does appear to be the case.
Where a steward is available in the workplace who is able to work independently of
the external union, members are more satisfied with their union.
The national organisation provides services and benefits to members which could be
described as an exercise of power. UNISON has won some important cases for its
members and the results from these cases benefit many more people than just the
original member. For example, in 1995 UNISON won an Employment Appeal
Tribunal case which allowed claims for unfair dismissal to be lodged by employees
with less than two years service if they lose their jobs as a result of a transfer (since
overturned by legislation). Therefore, in this respect UNISON could be regarded as
powerful because it has the capacity to produce effects and achieve desired goals, and
in the long term these achievements benefit many more people than just UNISON
members. Indeed, hospital 1 members endorsed the fact that being in a union made a
difference in the case of unfair dismissal and if an accident should happen at work.
However, it appears that if an effective lay representative is not available in the
workplace, benefits and services alone are not enough to keep some members happy.
In fact, some members were not satisfied with the level of service that they had
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received from the local/national level of the union, for example, the worker who was
told that she should accept the health authority's offer rather than fight the case.38
As with the AEEU, the leaders of the national organisation were considered to be out
of touch with the realities of the workplace and their members' concerns; in fact, many
members thought that they did not even take account of what members actually
wanted. This sentiment was also applied to the branch. It could be argued that
UNISON as a whole is now too big. Even within the health care section, the union
represents many different types of workers each with different priorities. In this
respect it is essential that shop stewards who understand their members and their
concerns are incorporated into the workplace, so that small shopfloor organisations
might begin to maintain themselves. As Colling (1995) concluded, within the public
sector the national organisations of trade unions must recognise that the key to their
success is to encourage active and independent workplace organisations to develop.
The evidence does indicate that the main workplace representative is the most
important person to members and is generally seen as "the union". In some cases this
may be the steward but where members did not have any contact with their lay
representative they regarded the full time convenor as "the union". How that
representative performed shaped members' perceptions of their union and also made a
difference to their reasons for continued membership. Those members who had a
steward who was seen to be effective within the workplace and who encouraged
participation in union affairs valued unionism for reasons such as "solidarity within
the workplace". Members at workplaces where the convenor was looked upon as
"the union" tended to remain members for the benefit side alone. This coincides with
Colling's (1995) findings. He concluded that the vast differences between the
workplaces he studied as to the strength and maturity of the union organisations
"exposed and intensified divisions between the membership and had serious
consequences for the perception of the union locally" (p142).
It can be argued that within UNISON members view "the union" as their
representative and the way that representative performs influences those members'
perceptions about their union. Those with little contact with their representatives were
more likely to hold negative views of the union as a whole. Successful unionism in
the workplace depends upon the lay representative; a steward with the right style of
working determines membership participation and interest in workplace unionism. As
other studies have concluded, participation in union affairs enhances satisfaction with
the union (for example, Fiorito et al 1988, Kuruvilla et al 1993). Full time
representatives do not appear to be able to encourage this among members, perhaps
because they do not work alongside them on a regular basis. Some of the workgroups
at hospital 1 displayed a sense of solidarity, particularly if they had a problem;
38 Only two questionnaire respondents had been represented hy a union representative. both at work
and over two years ago suggesting that it may have been by their previous steward. They were both
satisfied with that representation, but as with the AEEU members, there was no connection between
this and their perceptions of the union, though it could be argued that a cbange of steward may have
altered their attitudes.
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however, at least after their previous steward had left, they did not see their collective
action as being in any way connected to unionism. They had no conception of
themselves as "the union". As the convenor was considered to be their representative,
this indicates that she had not encouraged members at hospital I to think of themselves
as being connected to the union in any way other than for what they could get out of it
in times of personal need, despite the fact that she had said that the members were "the
union ")9 Terry (1982) suggested that a stress on individual grievances put less of a
strain on dispersed work forces than collective issues might. However, it could be
argued that a stress on individual grievances puts less of a strain on the full time
representative rather than the workforce, as it appeared to contribute to the decline of
unionism being associated with a collective stance among employees. Yet at hospital 2
where the steward worked largely independently of the "external" union, members
encompassed a view of "the union" that included themselves. To them the workplace
was where the union mattered; that was where the majority of problems occurred and
were solved. When problems were solved without outside assistance, they tended to
be solved quicker and more to the satisfaction of members. Independent workplace
organisations provide a better service for their members than when outside sources
become involved. As Colling (1995) contended, unions, especially in the public
sector, must actively build and invest in workplace organisations.
It is hard to say whether changes in the economic and employment climate had
changed the role of the union organisation within the health service. It could be
argued that the union's role was the same as it always has been, the protection of its
members' interests. However, it is evident that the move to trust status of local
hospitals had made a difference to the work and status of UNISON in those
workplaces. The convenor felt that this was the case, though she did not say how the
work of UNISON had been affected. It could be argued that UNISON's role within
the trust had been enhanced; the trust recognised the need for employees to be
represented by unions and the fact that their staff had a role to play in the efficient
running of the trust. However, there is a danger that full time representatives,
especially if they are paid by the trust, may unwittingly begin to take a management
viewpoint above that of their members, so that members may not feel that their
concerns are being met. The ex-NALGO steward did not feel that the move to trust
status had enhanced UNISON's role:
"Now that hospitals are trusts, the situation for unions will get worse, because the
management is squeezing everything and everyone, trying to save money from the
bottom rather than the top. They'll try and push everyone into individual contracts.
Management are trying to make workers do more and more work in the same working
time and for the same wages. The younger workers are more prepared to sign individual
contracts and accept more work because they know no different and have many
responsibilities such as mortgages and children, they are just grateful to have a job.
Older workers know better. The trusts are trying to squeeze unions out altogether.
However, they will squeeze so much that eventually everything will come to a head and
the union will rebel like they did in 1978179."
39 Though the steward at that workplace was also at fault, because if she/he had communicated with
the members and had the right style of working, the members would not have had to rely on outside
sources.
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This was the opinion of a member on the shopfloor. She was presuming that the
situation would get worse for unions. Her main concern was the way that financial
considerations were managed, which as already argued UNISON did appear to have
less influence over, but this situation could change if the trust's policy is followed.
However, the assertion that management were trying to push everybody into
individual contracts may have had a grain of truth in it. At hospital 3, during the 1995
pay negotiations, some members of management had been talking to individual
workers about accepting the pay deal that they were offering, contrary to UNISON's
ongoing negotiations. A steward had intervened and letters informing all workers
about the negotiations were included in their next pay packets (itself an indication that
management did work with the union). Nevertheless, the steward did say that if she
had not intervened many members would have accepted what management were
offering them. In one respect this could be taken to indicate that those members were
satisfied with management's proposals, in which case the union could not have
communicated its message and intentions to its members or was not listening to what
the members were prepared to accept.sv
It could be argued that an increase in workplace bargaining would benefit members of
individual workplaces more than their reliance on "external" representatives. In
addition workplace bargaining might have a positive effect on shopfloor union
organisations; negotiations at workplace level may encourage lay representatives to
become more involved in those issues that affect them and their members. As Nichols
and Armstrong (1976) contended, because management and unions at a level outside
the workplace make the agreements, employees lacked an effective power base of their
own. If the stewards begin to solve problems to the satisfaction of their members and
management there is no reason why those stewards should not be able to build up an
effective shopfloor organisation independent of external sources. As workplace
bargaining appears to benefit members of the AEEU, at least in workplaces where the
workplace organisation could work independently of its FTOs, there should be no
reason why it should not work in the public sector. National, and even local,
agreements may be forced upon a workforce whereas domestic agreements are made
with their consent.
Local pay bargaining within individual trusts, rather than national pay deals, might
also be beneficial to union members. The national union may reject local pay
bargaining particularly because it might mean that workers doing the same jobs but in
different trusts may get different rates of pay and conditions attached to their
employment. However, workers are usually interested in what they can get at their
40 It could be argued that both these suggestions may be true. As not all stewards attended the
branch regularly they may not have received tbe relevant information to pass on to their members,
though tbose members who bad no contact with their steward may not have received the information
even if tbe steward was aware of it. As the local branch had boon accused of not listening to members'
opinions, and observations tended to confirm this, members DUly have been prepared to accept
management's proposals, but the local union was following the directions of the national
organisation.
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place of work rather than what workers get at other workplaces. Indeed, it could be
argued that the level of pay of similar workers elsewhere might be used as a
benchmark for negotiations. As Fatchett (1989) argued, workplace bargaining might
benefit many employees in the health sectors; the competitive nature of workplace
bargaining could force a hospital trust to pay above the current national rate for
particular skilled jobs forcing similar establishments to match those rates of pay so as
to retain their own staff. The fact that some union members were prepared to accept
management's proposals at hospital 3 may also indicate that members there would
have bargained differently had the local union not followed what UNISON's national
leaders were recommending.
It could be argued that if workplace bargaining became a norm in the public sector,
UNISON as a national and even a local organisation would lose a lot of its influence
over national and maybe even local issues. Even if pay is not negotiated within
individual workplaces there are many issues which can be bargained about, for
example, working conditions. While pay is a big concern for workers it is not the
issue which dominates their everyday working environment. Evidence suggests that
if a steward can maintain an independent workplace organisation, the members and
management of that workplace tend to benefit much more than if the local union is
brought in. Therefore, if workplace bargaining within the NHS was to become
widely accepted, provided lay representatives with the right style of working can be
recruited, it will be to the advantage of both management and members; if bargaining
remains within the confines of the workplace an amicable (and usually quicker)
agreement is more likely to be made between the parties concerned than when outside
sources not directly involved are brought in.
Brown (1986) contended that the structure of trade unionism was increasingly being
shaped to the needs of employers. However, it could be argued that locally UNISON
had not changed to meet the needs of its members' employers as the local trust
management were using UNISON to help in the efficient running of the trust. Bryson
et al (1995) found that trusts either believed that unions were a threat to their human
resource strategies or they worked very closely with them to win staff commitment
towards trust objectives. Kavanagh (1990) argued that the balance of power had
changed since 1979 from union leaders to employers and managers. Within the local
NHS trust it would appear that the management preferred to work with the unions
involved on equal terms. It is perhaps significant that the major priority for most
UNISON members was also that of the trust as a whole, patient care. Members'
concerns about trust spending was aimed at efficient patient care. AEEU members in
the private sector were less interested in what managers did with the financial side of
the company as long as they felt that they received sufficient remuneration for their
work.s t Generally, employees in both the public and the private sectors possessed
41 Generally managerial spending in the engineering industry was used to increase and upgrade
production so as to secure further contracts and ensure the survival of the company. Where an
effective workplace organisation existed, the workers benefited as much as management from increased
production, for example, through increased bonuses.
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no desire to take over their workplaces, they only wanted to have a say in the events
that directly affected them (for example, Marchington 1980, Beynon 1973, Batstone et
al 1977, MacInnes 1990). However, it could be argued that UNISON members were
also concerned with events that affected the nature of their work, patient care, rather
than just themselves. The AEEU in the private sector worked with management to
ensure the survival oftheir workplaces. UNISON members were not only concerned
about the survival of their workplaces but also about the level of care that they were
able to provide. It appears to be the case, as Elgar and Simpson (l994b) rightly
pointed out, that trust managers believed that as they shared the same concerns as
their staff a cooperative approach with the unions on site would be the most productive
in terms of the efficient running of the trust.
Union organisations do work to assist rather than frustrate managerial intentions
(Terry 1986). In fact, independent workplace organisations do this just as much as
UNISON as a whole; at hospital 2 the steward helped management to run the
workplace much more efficiently than they would have done otherwise (or than they
would have done if the convenor had intervened). Therefore, it is essential that lay
representatives with the right style of working are available in the workplace to ensure
that their members do not feel let down by their union. Indeed, workplace
organisation in the new union was to be based on an extensive shop steward system,
with stewards who would represent their members' interests both to managers in their
immediate workplace and to the wider union at "major employer level" (Terry 1996).
So it could be argued that UNISON did recognise that workplace representatives are
the main building block for union organisation within the workplace, the challenge for
the union must be to ensure that stewards who are able to develop an independent
organisation are sought out and recruited.
The economic and employment climate do not appear to have altered the union's role in
any way, especially where an independent workplace organisation exists. However,
the economic and employment climate may have altered the opinions of union
members regarding their union's priorities. Like the AEEU members, UNISON
members felt that "to safeguard my job" was an important reason for membership,
which may have reflected the employment climate at the time of the study, particularly
as contracting out within the NHS had become a feature of some UNISON members'
employment. However, where membership of the AEEU may have given workers an
increased sense of job security, it does not appear that UNISON membership did the
same, particularly among the nursing profession (UNISON/Gallup 1995).
Nevertheless, the attitudes of trade union members appear to be dependent upon their
representative: those members who had a workplace representative who was seen to
be effective in the workplace may have had a greater feeling of job security than those
who did not. For example, the steward at hospital 2 had, through her own
intervention, kept open the job of a porter and created two part time posts for porters.
She had also successfully defended a number of her members against dismissal during
her time as a steward.
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The legislation does not appear to have reduced UNISON's potential to achieve
effects, at least locally. In fact, it may have brought trust managers and full time union
representatives closer together as they had attended joint workshops designed to
introduce them to aspects of the legislation and negotiations within the trust. While
not forcing its employees to become members of a union the trust did "encourage its
employees to belong to an appropriate UPA recognised by the trust" and provided
"facilities for UPA subscriptions to be collected at source."42 Therefore, despite the
legislation the trust was in favour of 100% employee membership of its reeognised
unions-a and did favour helping the unions by operating the cheek-off system. The
legislation had not had any effect on how the steward worked at hospital 2 and her
style of working did appear to achieve her members their goals. Indeed, the threat at
hospital 2 that the night staff would refuse to work was not backed by a ballot of those
employees and this was not challenged by management. However, like firm A's
managers, hospital 2's managers preferred to keep their problems within their own
workplace and a resort to the law may appear like an admittance of not being able to
manage their workplace correctly.
The legislation certainly does not seem to have affected negotiations between UNISON
representatives and managers. However, as no major dispute involving the entire
health section of UNISON had occurred in the local region during the past five years it
is hard to say whether the legislation would have played a greater role. Nevertheless,
if Elgar and Simpson (l994b) were correct that managers in the NHS were reluctant to
legally challenge their workforces coupled with the relationship that the trust appeared
to want to maintain with its employees, it seems highly unlikely that the legislation
would play a great role in any dispute. Yet, the fact that hospital managers had taken
an opportunity to talk to individual employees about their pay offer while UNISON
was still negotiating nationally indicates that suggestions that the balloting procedures
may provide employers with time to "buy off" members (for example, Brown and
Wadhwani 1990) could be very realistic.
It could be argued that concerns that union members in the public sector may have
been coerced into action that they did not wish to take may have contained a grain of
truth; that is, members may want to fight for better payor working conditions but
many of them feel an obligation to their work, patient care. As hospital 2's steward
said "they have us over a barrel." However, claims that the legislation has made
national unions more representative of their members' views may not necessarily
apply to UNISON; many members in Xtown felt that their national and local
organisations ignored their views. The concerns voiced in the union magazine (see
above p326) indicate that, while other local organisations may not be as supportive of
their national body as the one studied, members nationally did not feel that their
national leaders were representative of their opinions. If the union does ignore the
42 "Agreement for Consultation and Negotiation in the Community Health Care service Trust"
Community Health Care Service (North Derbyshire) NHS Trust. 1994.
43 It also reserved the right to recognise other UPAs who may in the future have members employed
by the trust. Ibid.
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views of the majority of its members it cannot claim to be democratic and it could be
argued that the laws designed to make unions more representative of their members
have failed UNISON members.
In the local area UNISON was losing many members; however, this decline in
membership cannot be attributed to the legislation with its distinct promotion of
individualism. The decline in membership was due to a change in employee attitudes
towards UNISON. Indeed, one of the aims of the legislation was that members
should not necessarily give up their membership, but rather that they should challenge
the decisions of their union from within. However, workers who had resigned their
membership had not done so because their union was more militant than they were or
because they disagreed with the collective aspect of unionism (a principal aim of the
legislation), they had done so for quite the opposite reasons. For those members who
did not have an adequate lay representative within the workplace, individualism may
have prevailed over their reasons for continued membership; however, this was not
due to its constant promotion throughout the legislation; individualism appears to be a
predominant disposition among union members (for example, Goldthorpe et al 1968,
Rentoul 1989). Indeed, some of the workgroups at hospital 1 realised their goals
within the workplace collectively; therefore, it cannot be argued that individualism had
outweighed collectivism. However, they did not associate this action with unionism.
The lack of a lay representative at their workplace who had a style of working that
encouraged members to see themselves as "the union" prevented them from
associating their actions with unionism. To them unionism did not help them with
their workplace problems, it just provided compensation if they should need it.
Therefore, suggestions that the decollectivisation of workers' opinions had led to the
decline in union membership (for example, Metcalf 1993a) can be refuted, at least in
the case of UNISON locally.
Despite their lack of knowledge and interest in the law relating to trade unions, those
UNISON members who had an opinion felt that the legislation had had a negative
effect on trade unions and that they had lost their power. However, like the AEEU
members, this appears to be attributed more to the media coverage of well documented
disputes than to personal experience. However, the change of steward at hospital I
could well have induced members there to feel that trade unions are not as powerful as
they were; they may compare how "the union" was over four years ago with the
representation that they had received since.
It is hard to decipher whether members were critical of UNISON because of the union
itself or because of their lay representative, though both appear to contribute towards
members' attitudes. Many former active unionists had become very bitter about
UNISON since its creation suggesting that the union itself may be at fault. The nurses
who had resigned their membership after their regrading appeals had done so because
of the way that they felt their union had treated them. However, if particular shop
stewards are able to maintain their members' interest in their union, or their workplace
union at least, it indicates that the steward is the key to successful unionism within the
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workplace. If members are encouraged to see themselves as "the union", their
solidarity is given more meaning and they appear to remain interested in unionism for
reasons other than just benefits. Some lay representatives were also critical of their
national organisation; however, these were the ones who were able to sustain an
independent shopfloor organisation. It appears that unless UNISON can recruit more
lay representatives with the right styles of working it may be in danger of losing more
members and as members are the crucial components ensuring the existence of a trade
union and, indeed, its capacity to achieve effects this would be disastrous for the
union as a whole.
11: 13 Conclusions
It can be concluded that within UNISON there are three strands of unionism. To those
members who had contact with their lay representative, the shopfloor was the most
important one; however, those who had no contact with their steward tended to view
the full time convenor as their main representative and saw her as "the union". The
evidence suggests that how well that representative performed influenced members'
perceptions of their union. Where the full time convenor was brought in to solve
problems, the members studied rarely felt satisfied and did not feel a sense of
belonging to a union. "The union" was seen as something external to the workplace
and was not considered to be an essential part of the working environment.
If power is defined as the capacity or ability to produce effects, then, UNISON could
be defined as powerful in many ways. Nationally UNISON has achieved results in
court cases which represent an improvement not just for its own members but also for
similar workers all over Britain. Compensation, such as for accidents at work, are
also provided by the national organisation and can be seen as an exercise of power;
the union is achieving a desired goal for its members, something that they may find
hard to do alone. Locally, UNISON could be described as powerful. The local
organisation had achieved members' aims over many issues, especially those
involving involving health and safety and working conditions. It is significant that
within the local trust UNISON and management appeared to work together to ensure
its efficient operation and even though the union appeared to be less effective over
financial issues it had the potential power to be able to influence future decisions.
Bryson et al (1995) concluded that UNISON was "well placed to have a powerful
influence on industrial relations in trusts" (p13l) and that certainly was the case
locally. Nevertheless, the crux of union power, as far as members were concerned,
was on the shopfloor. Where a steward with the right style of working was available
in the workplace the shopfloor organisation could be described as powerful;
members' problems were solved within the workplace and it could be argued that,
while members do not necessarily associate the workplace organisation's ability to
achieve their goals with trade union power, this is the service that members actually
require and it maintains their interest in unionism. When a lay representative is not
available to members their opinions of their union tend to be negative.
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It can be concluded that if an effective steward is not available in the workplace
members begin to view UNISON as little more than an insurance agency. UNISON
may play a vital role campaigning about issues that affect whole communities for
example, but this aspect of unionism means very little to rank and file members; they
are more interested in the everyday realities that they encounter. Members wanted to
be informed about and involved in those issues that mattered to them; that is, those
that concerned themselves and their workplace. But at workplaces, such as hospital I,
where many members had no contact with their steward they were left in the dark
about all issues involving the union. Communication between the union and its
members was non-existent. It is perhaps no coincidence that most members at
hospital 1 had no conception of themselves as "the union". Members must be
encouraged to see themselves as "the union" if a shopfloor organisation is to develop.
The shopfloor organisations (or lack of them) to a large extent reflect the personalities
of those involved, in particular that of the steward. The evidence does indicate that the
shopfloor leader's style is essential in determining membership participation and
interest in workplace unionism and, therefore, the level of success that the shopfloor
unit has when dealing with management. It can be concluded that the personality and
style of working of the lay representative are essential ingredients for successful
unionism within the workplace. Therefore, it is essential that stewards within the
NHS become more involved as leaders of their workgroups and develop a style of
working that encourages the participation of members and diminishes their dependence
on the "external" union.
Effective shop stewards communicate with their members and involve them in the
problem solving process, thereby determining membership participation in the affairs
that involve them and promoting a sense of unionism that includes the members.
These stewards are able to negotiate much better than local officials on behalf of their
members, therefore, so that members receive the best possible service, independent
workplace organisations should be encouraged to develop. Indeed, this was the
intention of UNISON when it was created (Terry 1996); therefore, it could be argued
that the local organisation, in particular the branch committee, was at fault. As it
largely ignored members' concerns and did not advise stewards on how to deal with
problems, but either passed them off or the convenor would say "leave it with me",
stewards were not urged to even try and solve the problem themselves. As
Fairbrother (1990) argued, the forms of workplace organisation that the health care
sector of UNISON appeared to sponsor bore "the stamp of leadership manipulation
and control" and the establishment of stewards who acted within a very narrow remit,
dependent upon branch leadership (p 172). Indeed, the attitude of the branch may have
been a factor preventing members becoming stewards; if they perceived the full time
representatives as the main negotiators (who largely ignored members' concerns) they
may have felt that there was little that they could do to alter the situation. If the
stewards who relied upon the full time representatives to solve their problems were
encouraged to negotiate with managers themselves they may become more involved in
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those issues that directly affect them and their members and the capacity for an
independent shoptloor organisation to develop would be created. It can be concluded
that efficient workplace bargaining maintains internal solidarity much more effectively
than when outside sources become involved. Evidence indicates that if a steward can
maintain an independent workplace organisation the members and management of that
workplace benefit much more than if the local union is brought in.
Local evidence appears to refute the statement by UNISON that it provides a powerful
voice campaigning strongly on the issues that matter to women. All the UNISON
members studied were women andjudging from their opinions their national union did
not take their views into account and most held negative views of UNISON as a
whole. Colling (1995) had found that women were much more likely than men to
suggest that unions were powerless to protect their interests and to admit to having
considered cancelling their membership. However, it cannot be suggested that it is the
gender of a worker which determines how they are likely to perceive their union
because at hospital 2 female members viewed unionism in a much different light to
those at hospital 1. The steward was the key to determining members' perceptions of
unionism. If unions consider that some workers are not "ready for autonomous
forms of union organisation, either because of their class or gender position or the
specific circumstances of their employment as public service workers" (Fairbrother
1990, p172-3), stewards may not have been encouraged to develop a style of working
that enabled them to work independently of the branch leadership because of their
gender and their employment as public service workers. However, the lack of
encouragement of independent workplace organisations was more likely because the
local organisation wanted to remain in control of the workplaces under its jurisdiction.
It did not like opinions contrary to its own and if more workplaces were to become
less dependent upon the "external" union, then it may be in danger of losing its
influence in the local region.
The economic and employment climate has not changed the role of UNISON;
protection of its members' interests is still its main priority. However, the move to
trust status of local hospitals has enhanced UNISON's role within those workplaces;
the trust in Xtown recognised the need for employees to be represented by unions and
the fact that they had a vital role to play in the efficient running of the trust. Though
the local organisation of UNISON played a large part carrying out this role, where
independent shopfloor organisations existed they appeared to be more efficient at
ensuring their members' interests were protected and advanced. As union members
and managers were largely working towards the same goal, patient care, the union
organisations did work with managers to ensure that the most efficient service was
carried out. Nevertheless, managers and members may have had differing opinions
over how money allocated for patient care should be spent. The employment climate
during the 1990s may have given workers' an increased sense of job insecurity (see
also Hedges 1994). However, whereas membership of the AEEU may have given
members a sense of job security, this was not necessarily so among UNISON
members and appeared to be dependent on how effective the lay representative was in
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the workplace.
The legislation had not had any effect upon UNISON locally, with perhaps the
exception that it may have brought the union negotiators and management closer
together. Nevertheless, despite the lack of knowledge of the law relating to trade
unions, members' opinions about trade union power had been influenced by the fact
that they knew that legislation existed that intended to reduce that power (or perceived
power). Individualism may have prevailed among many of the union members
studied but this was not a result of the legislation: it was due to the lack of a
conception of unionism that encompassed collective action.
The key to successful unionism is the lay representative in the workplace. How she/he
works influences members' perceptions of their union and unionism in general.
UNISON must realise its original intentions and encourage active and independent
workplace organisations to develop. The scope of authority and expertise must be
transferred from the local organisation to the workplace if the union is to remain
viable, at least in the eyes of its members in Xtown.
The following chapter analyses the evidence presented in part 2 of the thesis and
relates the findings to the conclusions and hypotheses that were discussed in chapter
5. The conclusions from the research findings are set out and the implications that
they may have about trade union power in general are discussed.
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Chapter 12 TRADE UNION POWER IN THE 1990s
12:1 Introduction
When the research findings are compared with those of previous studies, especially
studies conducted before 1979, it appears that nothing much has changed, at least on
the shopfloor; even before 1979 some union organisations were found to be much
more successful at getting their own way than others. The paradox concerning trade
union power can be solved by suggesting that those authors who argued that union
power had been severely curtailed were referring to trade unions as national
organisations rather than delving deeper and looking at union organisation at
shopfloor level. Of course other studies may reveal that shopfloor unionism has also
been weakened over the last fifteen years, but the evidence presented in this work
indicates that the key to successful unionism at workplace level actually depends to a
large extent upon the workplace lay representatives and how they conduct themselves
in relation to their members and management; where trade union power appears to
have changed within a particular workplace, a change of leadership has usually taken
place.
It should be stressed that the bulk of the evidence presented was largely based on the
perceptions of those who took part in the study; therefore, the reliability of the
evidence could be questioned, especially as it has been suggested that members'
feelings towards their union constantly change depending on the circumstances at any
particular moment in time (for example, Fosh 1993, Batstone et al 1977). However,
as the aim of the study was to ascertain what members thought of their unions, it was
inevitable that many of the findings would be based upon individual perceptions.
Nevertheless, as similar perceptions were obtained from UNISON and AEEU
members who worked in different situations, it could be argued that some conclusions
can be made with confidence. In addition, the observational work and documentary
analysis confirmed many of the conclusions reached using individuals' perceptions. It
is also recognised that the results may only be relevant to those workplaces studied so
that generalisations about unions in general should be made with caution. However,
because of the nature of some of the conclusions an overall picture of why unions may
be successful at some workplaces but not at others can be built up and is worthy of
further study.
At first sight the findings presented in the last five chapters appear to indicate that there
were vast differences between UNISON and the AEEU. As far as the research was
able to study UNISON, it seems that since its creation many members were not
satisfied with the union and some were showing their discontent by resigning their
membership. Within the AEEU, at least in Xtown, members may be dissatisfied with
certain elements of their union, but overall the majority were happy to retain their
membership. Whereas UNISON appeared to be losing members the AEEU appeared
to be gaining them. This phenomenon leads to the question why have two very
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different pictures emerged of two trade unions operating within the same area?
However, a comparison of the findings from the two case studies reveals that there are
similarities between the two unions and their members and that the lay representative is
the key to successful workplace unionism in both unions.
12:2 National or shopfloor union?
It certainly appears that the debate about trade union power centres on what the term
"trade union" is taken to mean; that is, is it referring to the national union as a whole
or to a separate shopfloor organisation? Research points to the fact that there is a big
difference between these two entities and that the shopfloor unit is actually "the union"
as far as most members are concerned. Evidence from this study is no exception;
members were concerned with shopfloor issues, those that affected them personally,
rather than with the activities of their national union. In fact, the majority of members
did not even attend branch meetings or vote in their national union elections and those
that did tended to agree with their lay representatives that their governing bodies were
out of touch with the realities of the shopfloor. This was true of members and
stewards from both UNISON and the ABEU.
The two national organisations appear very much the same as one another. They both
campaign nationally on behalf of all workers and, indeed, all members of society, for
example on issues such as health and safety and better training and educational
facilities. They both inform members through union journals and leaflets about things
concerning their rights, health and safety and anything that might affect them at work
or even generally, such as the proposed European Single Currency. Through the use
of their solicitors both unions have gained some of their members large compensation
awards for things such as unfair dismissal and work related injuries. For example, a
nurse was awarded £80,000 damages for post traumatic stress disorder after an appeal
handled by UNISON's solicitors and a union member received £90,000 after the
ABEU proved that he had developed cancer after working with mineral oils. Initially
these awards benefit the particular individual member; however, some of these cases
may set a precedent and, therefore, will benefit many other workers in the long term.
In this respect the national organisations of both the ABEU and UNISON could be
described as powerful because they do have the capacity to produce effects and achieve
desired goals.
Both unions were beginning to resemble insurance agencies; they both provided a
range of financial and legal services for various things unconnected to work. The
unions appear to be taking the advice of reports such as "The Future Of Trade Unions"
(1994) which recommended that in order to attract more members unions would have
to provide more attractive measures than it was presumed they already did. National
union organisations are beginning to reassess what they think their members want; on
the basis of Basset and Cave's (1993) research the ABEU felt that its members wanted
packages aimed at them as individuals. However, the provision of individual services
may be seen as an important reason for membership, but on its own it may not be
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enough to satisfy members. The provision of the free wills service by both unions had
been widely taken advantage of, but UNISON members were still resigning their
membership which suggests that members want more from their union than individual
services. When firm A's ABEU members' opinions are taken into account, between
80% and 100% of members felt that "to show solidarity with those I work", "to use as
a workers' voice against management", "to safeguard my job", "to protect me if
problems come up in the future" and "to get higher pay and better working conditions"
were all important reasons for membership. All these reasons can be connected to the
workplace, and when members' grievances are taken into account the vast majority
were connected directly to their employment, for example, rates of pay, working
conditions and working practices. Indeed, the UNISON convenor said that "alteration
to contracts and working conditions" were the problems that came to her attention the
most. Therefore, it could be argued that members' main concerns lie
with issues related to their employment and if they feel that their
interests are not being met individual benefits, such as the wills
service, are not enough to encourage them to retain their membersbip.
This suggests that it is actually the union organisation within the
workplace rather than the national organisation that actually keeps
members interested in unionism and how successful the union is within
the workplace will influence members' opinions of their union.
The national organisations of the ABEU and UNISON were considered to be out of
touch with the realities of the workplace and what their members wanted. However,
where a lay representative was able to cope effectively on hislher own without
assistance from outside the workplace, members seemed to have less of an opinion
about their national body than those who relied on help from outside the workplace to
solve their problems. This suggests that outside involvement may be less effective
than when problems are solved by lay representatives. Even with work connected
benefits, such as for workplace accidents or industrial deafness, which are provided
by the national unions, members still tend to see their workplace representative as "the
union"; he'she is the person who gives them advice and as a rule helps them to make
their claim and deals with any problems relating to it. However, this may depend
upon the lay representative. According to the ABEU many members were failing to
take advantage of the services that are on offer, even those services which are directly
connected to work such as legal representation for an accident claim.'
Activists from both unions did not think very highly of their governing bodies. They
argued that their "leaders" were more interested in themselves and the financial aspects
of the union rather than their members' wishes. If the turnout for elections is taken
into account, the majority of members did not even bother to vote; only 28% and 31%
of the electoral roll voted respectively for the ABEU's president and general secretary
and only 36% of those UNISON members eligible to vote did so when balloted on a
deal to end the 1995 pay dispute. The turnout for the ABEU elections suggests that the
1 Union Review, May 1994 & Union Review, August 1994, union solicitor, Xtown's district
shop stewards' meeting.
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majority of members are not particularly interested in who their national leaders are.
The poor turnout for the UNISON ballot may have been created by the voting methods
chosen by local branches; by a show of hands in Xtown, which could mean that
members not on duty when the vote was taken were not included in the ballot.
However, as branch secretaries from other areas had voiced their opinions that their
members' wishes were being ignored and many, therefore, abstained from the vote
altogether,2 it could be argued that UNISON members around the country felt that
their national organisation was not complying with their wishes and that it was
pointless to vote because if the vote went against the recommendations of the
Executive Council another was authorised until it got its own way. Indeed, activists of
both unions complained that when a vote is held by their Executive Councils, the
union recommends its members to vote in favour rather than letting them make their
own minds up. In the case of the ABEU's ballot on the proposals for the new rule
book, local activists were dismayed because the Executive Committee were not even
recommending that members voted yes, they were telling members to vote yes!
The claims by both UNISON and the AEEU that they are "member led"
unions appears to be a sham when the opinions of members and
activists are taken into account. Members very often feel let down by decisions
made on their behalf by their local or national officials, which may lead to a feeling of
despondency. However, it is clear that where a lay representative exists who is seen
to be effective and, perhaps more importantly, interested in the fates of hislher
members, levels of morale tend to be higher among union members. It could be
argued that unless effective lay representatives maintain union organisation within their
workplaces new members may become a thing of the past.
The evidence indicates that the national organisations of both unions were very similar
in their outlook and in their dealings with their members; therefore, the different
picture which the evidence appears to portray of the two unions in Xtown did not lie
with the unions at nationalleve1. A major difference between the two unions was the
different strands of unionism that could be identified within them. Within the ABEU
there appeared to be two major strands to unionism, the shopfloor unit and the national
organisation (loosely taken to include all officials who are paid a wage by the union
itself). Within UNISON another strand could be identified, the local unit, which
played a large role within all the workplaces under its jurisdiction. The local unit of
the ABEU was an important source of information for the main workplace
representatives; however, where the workplace organisations of the ABEU were well
organised the local unit only acted as a go between for the shopfloor units and the
national organisation, which is why the local unit was disregarded as a significant
strand of unionism within the ABEU. It is also significant that whereas the local unit
of the ABEU was largely opposed to its national body's policies the local unit of
UNISON supported its national leaders. This most likely reflected the fact that
UNISON's local organisation was led by full time representatives of the union. The
local unit of the ABED was managed by lay representatives, though the district
2 UNISON Focus DO. 20, October 1995.
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secretary was part of the organisation. This would explain why the local unit of the
AEEU supported its members rather than its national leaders; it had more contact with
its members and, therefore, could relate more to their opinions than the UNISON full
time representatives, who spent more time with managers than their members.
The workplace is the location where problems occur and where the union organisation
is capable of working independently from its FfOS3 it is usually the place where those
problems are solved without any reference to the outside organisation. Nothing much
has changed in the nature of workplace unionism; even before the acclaimed
watershed year of 1979, some workplaces had strong organisations and others had
weaker ones. The gap between the workplace organisation and the national
organisation is not a new phenomenon (for example, Boraston et alI975). However,
Mcilroy (1988) argued that by basing conclusions of a minimal loss of union power
on the workplace alone it was redefining what unionism has meant in the past. As
argued in chapter 3, it is hard to agree with this statement. To the average worker and
trade union member unionism means the same now as it always has, the protection of
their interests at work. Of course there are the added advantages of services and
benefits, but in terms of reasons for membership these take second place to the
protection of members' interests, especially those that are work related, and on their
own they do not appear to be sufficient to retain members' interest in unionism. The
workplace is for most members, in the private sector at least, "the union" and even in
the public sector, where there may be a greater reliance on the local organisation, the
working environment was generally the main focus of union activity, at least where an
effective lay representative was present.
There have been immense changes in society since trade unions were first organised,
especially in the improvement of the working class. Trade unionism as a whole may
have been seen in the past as a movement which campaigned for all workers on
separate industrial and political dimensions. However, it is the case now, and has
certainly been the case for at least the last thirty years (perhaps from the start of the
union movement) that individual members are more concerned with issues that affect
them personally than remote issues that are affecting someone else. Most union
members are rarely interested in the campaigning aspect of unionism. There is a
distinct lack of membership interest: when it comes down to branch meetings; this
indicates that members see their union as being on the shopfloor or as associated with
their personal problems (for example where a shopfloor organisation is non-existent)
rather than as an organisation which embraces all workers. Perhaps this has always
been the case. Allen (1954) also noted low branch attendance. He argued that this may
indicate nothing more than the fad that subscriptions are collected "on the job" (I" that
an effective shop steward system is in operation. Local observations support this
view; the shopfloor is considered to be "the backbone of the union" and "head office"
3 UNISON's full time convenor was Dot an official of the union and was paid by the health authority
rather than the union. However, she was not part of anyone workplace organisation and for the
purposes of the study was considered as an "outside source". She belonged to UNISON's local
organisation rather than a particular workplace organisation.
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was described as "not having a clue about the grass roots of the union".
The impression given is that for most members they are not part of a wider union
movement; union members see their representative as "the union n taking all their
problems to himlher rather than using the proper channels, for example, branch
meetings. (See also, Marchington, 1980, Goldthorpe et aI, 1968, Goodman and
Whittingham 1969.) In those workplaces where an effective steward exists the
shopfloor is seen as "the union"; members develop a sense of the union that
encompasses themselves. Even in those workplaces where members felt that "the
union does nothing for me", they still blamed their union representative, suggesting
that whether the representative is viewed as effective or not he/she is still seen as "the
union" and blamed for the union's shortcomings. In terms of Flanders' two different
aspects of unionism, members tend to look upon their union as a "wielder of economic
muscle" in the workplace largely ignoring the "sword of justice" aspect. Many
members do not even support their national union's political outlook.
Rather than developing a "consciousness" that includes workers from outside their
individual workplaces, the majority of workers develop a "workplace consciousness",
that is, a sense that they are all in it together within the workplace. Where an effective
union representative is present that consciousness becomes associated with "the
union"; when a union representative can get members to unite, especially over issues
that may initially affect only one person, it instils a sense of togetherness and even an
"us and them" attitude. The ideology of the workforce is influenced and reinforced by
the way that the union organisation operates in their workplace. As Batstone et al
(1977) argued, the ideology of the domestic organisation fosters particular views of
the workplace and particular patterns of behaviour, partly reflecting the past actions of
the members. It could be suggested that a change of workplace leadership might
change the workers' ideological position. However, in the foundry at firm A and at
hospital 1, where a change of leadership had taken place, union members did not
appear to have lost their "workplace consciousness"; where there had been a history
of working collectively to achieve their aims, this was still done despite the lack of
leadership guidance from their union representatives. Nevertheless, at hospital 1, the
lack of an effective steward meant that the workers no longer associated their oollective
or "workplace consciousness" with unionism. It can be concluded that workers who,
as a group, had developed a "workplace consciousness" do not lose that sense of
solidarity; however, whether it was associated with unionism or not was dependent
upon the union organisation within their workplace+ For the majority of union
members that oonsciousness did not extend beyond the workplace; therefore, authors
who argue that workers' "factory consciousness" should be broadened into a wider
workers' movement may be disappointed. As Brown (1986) contended workforces
are interested in the fates of their own firms rather than the struggles of their fellow
workers elsewhere.
4 Workers who had never developed a sense of unity among themselves did Dot possess a "workplace
consciousness", for them individualism prevailed rather than a collective outlook.
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For the members there is definitely more to unionism than the provision
of services. Whether they experience it though depends upon the
workplace and the union organisation within it, in particular on the
personality and style of working of the main lay representative. It can
be concluded that as far as most members are concerned the shopfloor
unit is "the union", which confirms hypothesis number 1.5 The
national union has little significance except for the services side, and
even then, members tend to use their steward rather than contact the
union directly. Members' concerns are with the politics of the
workplace. However, the key to successful unionism in the workplace
is the lay representative, yet even when members have little conception
of workplace unionism, they still view their representative as "the
union" and direct their opinions about their union at him/her. Martin
(1992) was probably correct when he described the role of the national
union as more like that of the employers' association: a source of
expert advice, information and a provider of services.
12:3 The nature of the employment situation
The major workplaces covered by the two unions can be described as different.
Generally, employees within health care organisations tend to constitute a more
scattered workforce than those working within a factory. In a factory workshop most
employees usually work together as a "team", especially when cell working is
introduced, such as at firm A. Team or cell workers tend to work the same shift
patterns and work under the same supervisor and shop manager as each other and all
employees within the factory work for the same managing directors whose offices are
usually on site. Those working within the care industry, whether they are nurses,
ancillary workers or care assistants, do largely work as a team within their own
boundaries, that is, a care home or a particular hospital ward or department.
However, many of these employees tend to work alternative shift patterns on a daily
basis, rather than a weekly or continental basis like factory workers, and some, such
as domestic workers or porters may have different supervisors and managers from
other workers, such as nurses. Therefore, health care workers cannot be
homogenised. While each worker is essential to the efficient running of a hospital
ward, for example, they also belong to other groups of workers who do not
necessarily work together. For example, porters and domestic assistants are essential
components of hospital work; without them the infrastructure would not be able to
operate efficiently; however, though each porter and domestic assistant is part of a
team within their own work unit, that is, the ward or department that they work on,
they are also members of their own workgroup of porters or domestic assistants, and
each has to answer to their own supervisor and manager who may have different
priorities from those of the nursing manager, for example, who is responsible for the
nurses within the hospital. In other words, some UNISON members may have to
work in an environment where they find that they have two competing sets of
5 The hypotheses are set out in chapter 5. pages 122-123.
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priorities; those of their immediate working environment and those of their separate
workgroups. AEEU members, at least within the private sector, largely find that these
priorities are actually one and the same, though different workgroups may experience
similar problems at different times. It is easier to maintain unity when all the affected
workers have the same priorities.
It could be argued that the nature of the workplace and the workforce itself can either
aid or hinder the development of union organisation within that workplace. Low
levels of participative democracy among hospital workers have been noted before (for
example, Posh and Cohen 1990). Within a factory where the employees regularly
work together and are answerable to the same management union organisation will be
much easier to develop and maintain. All workers within a particular workshop are
liable to be affected by the same kind of problems, whereas within a hospital those
working on a particular ward or department may not all be directly affected by the
same issues. Therefore, imposing sanctions in a particular factory workshop, such as
an overtime ban, will be easier than imposing sanctions on a hospital ward,
particularly when some workers work under different conditions of service.
A major difference, then, bet:ween the workplace organisations of the ABEU and
UNISON hinges on the types of members that they recruit. The AEEU largely recruit
similar types of workers who work in similar types of jobs and unity is easier to
maintain. UNISON recruits many different types of workers all working within the
same workplaces. This may make the maintenance of unity within the workplace
harder but not impossible. As Posh (1993) argued, a lay representative who has the
right style of working should be able to write the different groups of workers within
that workplace regardless of their different employment situations. The steward at
hospital 2 had managed to do this; therefore, there should be no reason why it cannot
be achieved at other hospitals. Those groups of workers, such as porters and
domestic assistants, who have separate work groups and yet: work individually as part
of a team on their separate wards and departments, could be persuaded that as a group
they might not only benefit themselves but those working alongside them if their
unanimous support was to be forthcoming. Indeed, the evidence indicates that some
of these workgroups did act collectively to achieve their own goals; however, they did
not see this as being connected to unionism; they no longer had a steward who
encouraged them to see their actions as relating to anything other than their
employment situation.
Connected to the nature of the workplace is the nature of the employment itself. The
ABEU members covered by the study were employed to produce some item that
eventually constituted a finished product, whereas the majority of UNISON members
within the health sector do not actually produce a finished product as such. While this
should not affect union organisation within the workplace, it could have a great effect
upon the amount of "power" that the workgroup is perceived as possessing. Many
employees in the care industries feel a moral obligation towards their work, that is,
patient care. If industrial action is taken at a hospital, for example, employees, despite
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their ambition to achieve a desired goal, feel that the care of their patients might suffer,
whereas factory workers may feel no moral obligation towards their production as
their finished products do not "suffer" while they are not working. Past studies have
highlighted how factory workers may even resort to individual forms of "sabotage"
such as pulling "the safety wire" and stopping the line as a movement towards some
form of job control (Beynon 1973). At firm A the convenor was astonished to find
that in one workshop a particular "cell" was turning out "shoddy work" and the
inspector was passing it! These examples indicate that many factory workers have no
moral obligation towards their finished product. When employees feel a moral
obligation towards their work they are unlikely to refuse to work until a grievance has
been rectified and their chances of bringing about a desired effect solely by a threat of
action will be severely weakened, especially if their employer is aware of that
obligation.
If official strike action takes place within the public health domain workplaces are
staffed to provide the minimum care needed for any patients/clients. This may take the
onus off those who feel morally obliged towards their work; however, while
disruptions may be caused to non-essential services, and working conditions may not
be totally satisfactory for those working, it may undermine any action taken because
services are still being carried out, and in some ways managers looking for a way of
cutting their budgets even more may think that work can be done efficiently with fewer
staff.6 In the private sector factories covered by the ABEU, industrial action may take
several forms and, at least at firm A, threats to stop work and even short immediate
stoppages of work were not uncommon. Due to the nature of the production this
action usually secured the workers their goals, particularly if management had a
production deadline to meet. It is also significant that the workers studied at hospital I
looked upon their supervisors as their problem solvers, possibly because they had little
or no contact with their union representative. However,in this way the supervisors
ensured that work continued if there was a problem rather than it being disrupted,
though when particular workgroups felt strongly about an issue they did sometimes
take matters into their own hands and collectively solved their dilemma by refusing to
work as directed.
Clerical workers within hospitals are a totally different group of UNISON members
from those working directly or indirectly with issues of patient care. There is a great
potential for unity among this group of workers; they all tend to work the same hours
per day and work in a similar environment to each other. However, the nature of their
employment appears to make them work in competition rather than in harmony with
each other. The clerical workers were described as very competitive and alleviated
their problems individually by going straight to their manager rather than viewing
problems as collective ones. Maybe this is a result of the different work situations;
those workers who work more or less as "a team" work collectively and therefore
6 Indeed, at firm A it was found that employees were producing as mucb when they were on a four day
week as when they worked full time, whicb was a cause for concern for "the union" at the time as they
were hying to negotiate a return to their normal bours. (Convenor's notebooks.)
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think collectively, workers who work individually think as individuals. Evidence
from firm C showed how workers had become afraid to speak to each other about their
weekly wages because each person was getting a different rate of pay negotiated
individually. The AEEU convenor was astonished at just how low these rates were,
and was convinced that if those workers would join the union and work together he
would have been able to get them a much better pay deal covering everyone concerned
preventing animosity between the workers,
Even though the nature of the employment situations of UNISON and
AEEU members may be different, the fact that at hospital 2 an effective
union organisation operated indicates that this can be overcome. Also,
as junior members of management and clerical workers from the "staff
side" had joined the AEEU at firm A, it suggests that workers who are
not necessarily part of a team can be persuaded that collectivism is a
good thing. UNISON members need to be persuaded that by working
together they could be effective and might gain far more than by
working in competition with each other. A steward with the right style
of working should be able to do this. However, many UNISON
stewards remain dependent on the full time convenor to solve their
problems; they are not encouraged to develop a style of working that
would enable them to become independent of the local organisation.
12:4 The importance of UNISON's local unit
The fad: that the local organisation of UNISON played a larger role than that of the
AEEU to a large extent reflected the bargaining arrangements of the workplaces
covered by the two unions. The private sector fums covered by the ABEU had their
own bargaining arrangements, many, such as firm A, were governed by the national
agreement between the EEF and the CSEU, but they bargained about pay and working
conditions (and most other things that may affect their workers) within the firm itself.
Some workplaces were more reliant on their FrO than others, but generally these were
those with only a few members or where the shop stewards were less organised.
Within the public health sector covered by UNISON pay and general working
conditions were bargained for nationally and locally by the local officials, rather than
individual workplaces negotiating their own terms and conditions. Therefore the local
organisation of UNISON was much more prominent within those workplaces than the
ABEU in the private sector. However, this type of bargaining still leaves room for
workplace bargaining on other issues which may affect members; many grievances
can occur during the working day which a steward could negotiate with management
about, especially those which need immediate attention.
Another major difference between the ABEU and UNISON in Xtown was the fact that
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a full time UNISON convenor? represented members for all the local district. The
issue of full time stewards may be a contentious one. For example, the ex-NALGO
steward felt that a full time steward would be more appropriate for the type of
members that she had represented, that is, members who largely worked as
individuals. She felt that a full time steward would "bring an element of impartiality"
to the shopfloor and prevent any "backbiting" against the lay representative who has to
work alongside hislher members. In contrast the convenor from firm A, where no full
time stewards were employed, felt that full time stewards were not "as in touch with
the shopfloor" as lay representatives who work alongside their fellow members. This,
he explained, was for two reasons: full time stewards tend to be seen as part of
management, especially because any problem in the plant affecting the workers also
affects lay stewards; therefore, their involvement in the decision making process is
crucial because that decision also affects them, a full time steward would not be
affected personally by any decisions made. He also argued that full time stewards
were more attached to the national union than lay representatives, especially if they
were paid their wages by the national union.
As far as can be ascertained the evidence gathered indicates that the ABEU convenor
was correct, at least in the case of the UNISON full time convenor for health. She
appeared to be more affiliated to the local UNISON organisation and to be more in
touch with the managing side of the hospital trust than with her members. This may
have been purely unintentional on her part: her comments suggest that she did see her
members as "the union", but evidence from members implied that she did not
satisfactorily represent their interests. The fact that she was responsible for members
in such a wide area may have contributed to the appearance of seeing things from a
management point of view; her workplace visits tended to be to see the managers
responsible for whatever problem she was trying to sort out; therefore, her contact
was with managers rather than members. The AEEU stewards from firm A had also
been accused by some of their members of being "too friendly" with management;
however, as this accusation was made by a very small minority of members coupled
with the fact that the stewards at firm A were in regular contact with their members, the
situation at firm A was slightly different Still, it indicates that some members may not
understand the often delicate relationship that has to be built up between a steward and
management in order to be successful within the workplace. The fact that the
UNISON convenor was paid by the trust rather than the union may have made her
more amenable to see management's point of view. Nevertheless, minutes from the
trust's staff council meetings indicate that she did get on well with most of the
managers concerned and also that she did voice her members' concerns. However,
members and stewards regarded her in a negative way and most associated her with
the national side of UNISON rather than working for them in the workplace.
Darlington (1994) also concluded that once a steward became full time he/she became
7 The UNISON health service group conference 1995 actually agreed that the union should boycott
paid trade union liaison jobs, though a spokesperson for the executive said that "[t]his is not an attack
on lay officials who've negotiated full-time release and facilities. This is to prevent trusts appointing
p1acemen and women who cannot be democratically elected or removed." ("UNISON at work" No.4
November 1995.)
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distant from the shopfloor. This, it appears, at least for the majority of his members,
could not be said of firm A's convenor.
In many respects UNISON's convenor resembled the ABEU's district secretary. He
was also responsible for many workplaces within a wide area and evidence indicated
that in workplaces with a well established union organisation he was considered less
effective than the senior lay representatives. However, the main difference between
the two appears to be the fact that the AEEU district secretary's job was helped
enormously by AEEU workplace representatives, the majority of whom were able to
deal with most workplace problems without direct intervention from him.
Another difference between UNISON and ABEU workplace union organisations was
the number of stewards that each had Even within the ABEU some workplaces had
fewer stewards than they would have ideally liked, but most of the existing stewards
appeared to be reducing the workload of the district secretary. Within most
workplaces covered by the ABEU at least one senior steward was elected and he/she
took on the responsibilities for hislher firm that the full time convenor for UNISON
did for all the workplaces under her jurisdiction. UNISON's steward organisation in
Xtown must be built up so that stewards might begin to take on at least some of the
responsibilities of their convenor, for example issues that are exclusive to their
workplace or members; this would decrease her workload and perhaps enable her to
concentrate more fully on what her members do want in those issues that concern all
workplaces. The steward at hospital 2 was able to deal with issues in her workplace
quite adequately, in fact, solving problems much more effectively than the convenor.
The difference between UNISON and ABEU workplace organisations may not only lie
with the lack of stewards but also with the fact that many UNISON stewards were
dependent on their local organisation, or full time convenor, to a much greater extent
than the ABEU stewards. That is, they appeared less able to cope with everyday
workplace problems and relied on the local organisation to solve them. In many ways
this weakens the workplace organisation, particularly because members appeared not
to be involved in the problem solving process. If Posh (1993) was correct, that by
involving members in all stages of the problem solving process they develop a deeper
commitment to their union, then, this is being missed within many UNISON
workplace organisations.
The local UNISON organisation may actually have kept its stewards more dependent
on it. As bargaining on important issues such as pay and general working conditions
was taken out of the hands of the lay representatives they may have felt inadequate to
bargain themselves. At their branch meetings, UNISON stewards were not given any
substantial advice on how to deal with their particular workplace problems; the full
time representatives appeared to think that problems were best left with them, which
did not encourage stewards to work problems out for themselves. In contrast, at
ABEU stewards' meetings, stewards from different workplaces very often gave each
other advice on how to deal with problems that they had had the experience of dealing
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with themselves. The AEEU district secretary appeared to be quite happy with this
and only intervened if he felt it was necessary for him to do so. Therefore, AEED
stewards were allowed to develop their independence and learnt from each others'
experiences, whereas the UNISON stewards were encouraged to remain dependent on
their local organisation; issues of concern to ABEU members were addressed at
stewards' meetings rather than being ignored which regularly happened at UNISON
branch meetings. Fairbrother (1990) may have been right when he argued that public
sector workplace organisations "bear the stamp of leadership manipulation and
control" (pI72).
The fact that in the public services there is a greater reliance upon the outside union by
workplace organisations is not a new phenomenon (see for example, Brown et al
1978). It has been argued that the existence of a well developed shop steward
organisation is associated with a reduced wish to see more of the FrO (Brown et al
1978). Even without a well developed shop stewards' organisation, if the lay
representative feels that he/she can cope adequately on herlhis own the desire to contact
the full time representative appears to be less; the steward from hospital 2 found that
she coped more efficiently without the assistance of the convenor, who was very often
against the actions that the steward proposed to take, (perhaps because of her
relationship with management). In this situation the local organisation of UNISON
actually functioned similarly to that of the AEEU, as a go-between for the workplace
organisation and the national union.
The evidence does indicate that where stewards can work independently of the outside
union they are able to negotiate better deals for their members than their FrO would
have been prepared to negotiate for; the pay negotiations at firm A and the
employment of porters at hospital 2 are just two examples. It follows that where a lay
representative is capable of acting independently of hislher "parent" body, the union in
the workplace actually becomes more effective or "powerful" than the more dependent
workplace organisations. This suggests that it is the lay representative
within the workplace who is the essential ingredient for successful
unionism within that workplace.
Due to difficulties contacting members in larger hospitals, it could be argued that more
stewards are needed so that a steward network, of the type found within engineering
firms, can be built up, with each steward ideally representing similar groups of
workers. Stewards could then learn from each other's experiences and if a problem
should occur each steward would have less difficulty contacting his/her members, and
their opinions could be discussed by a stewards' committee within the workplace to
decide on the best course of action. This might help build a sense of solidarity
between all the UNISON members within one workplace, rather than members
viewing "the union" as some remote organisation away from the workplace (usually in
the form of the full time convenor) that did nothing for them. Terry (1982) suggested
that although the dominance of the major steward in local government derived from the
wide dispersal of the workforce, more effective organisation of the workers could
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reduce the freedom and dominance of the "key" steward, who dealt predominantly
with individual problems on a one to one basis rather than on a collective one. He also
argued that the need for a key steward may disappear as steward organisation at lower
levels became more developed and coordinated. This suggests that if workgroup
leaders were to emerge, with the right qualities, and most importantly a commitment to
collectivism, workgroups could organise themselves effectively and the work of the
full time convenor would be reduced. If successful workplace unionism is dependent
upon the shop steward, there is no reason why public sector workgroups cannot
develop effective organisations comparable to those in the private sector. Fosh' s
(1993) concluding remark is apt here, "a careful choice of local leadership style can
yield results even when members' experiences and situations are not the most
favourable for the development of unionism." (P589).
Members must be made aware of the fact that they JIB the "union" and
that any potential power to change things lies with them and not with
their union officials. This task tends to lie with the stewards. The
evidence does suggest that while the nature of the workplace can hinder
the development of a successful union organisation, it is actually the
lay representative him/herself who encourages union participation and a
sense of belonging to "the union". The steward must have the right
personality and style of working to convince his/her members that
participation in the affairs that involve them, directly or indirectly, will
benefit them much more than expecting things to be done for them
without their involvement. The nature of the local organisation of
UNISON may be discouraging stewards from developing the style of
working necessary to do this.
12:5 UNISON and the AEEU - are they different?
The two case studies reveal that while the national organisations of the AEEU and
UNISON appear very similar there are differences in how the two unions operate at a
local level, with UNISON's full time representatives taking more of a leading role than
the ABEU's. However, despite the differences highlighted above between UNISON
and the AEEU in Xtown, similarities do exist between some of the workplaces
covered by the two unions. While direct comparisons of members' opinions cannot be
made because of the lack of information from members at hospital 2, the evidence
gathered does show that the steward from hospital 2 was able to act independently
from the local UNISON organisation and that she did maintain a degree of unity
among her members. Despite the fact that a well established union and shop
stewards' organisation existed at firm A comparisons can still be made with hospital2
where there was only one UNISON steward. Even though the stewards at firm A
were responsible for their own workshops, it could be argued that it was actually the
convenor, the main lay representative, who negotiated with management over anything
that he felt was in his members' interests to do so, and as a rule "the union" secured its
goals. At hospital 2 the steward took on responsibility for all UNISON members, no
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matter what job they were doing, and like firm A's convenor was not afraid to
confront management over any issue that she felt needed attention.
The evidence also reveals that there are differences in the amount of bargaining power
that stewards possess between different workplace organisations of the AEEU, and
even within the same workplace two separate AEEU organisations can be perceived as
totally different by their members and by management. Even though the local
organisation of UNISON played a larger role within the workplaces under its
jurisdiction than the local unit of the AEEU, the fact that differences existed between
shopfloor organisations of the ABEU, where the work situation was largely the same,
and the fact that the union at hospital 2 was able to maintain itself independently of the
local organisation suggests that something more than the nature of the workplace and
the employment situation must be responsible for any differences between workplace
union organisations. The common factor which can be identified in each workplace
that was able to maintain its own union organisation and act independently of outside
sources appeared to be the main lay representative of that workplace.
Even though at first sight the findings may appear to indicate that there
are vast differences between UNISON and the AEEU, closer
examination suggests that, regardless of the differences in bargaining
arrangements and the nature of the employment situation, union
organisation at workplace level need not be ditTerent for the two
unions. Both the AEEU and UNISON have workplace organisations
which have differing degrees of success in achieving members' aims
and the key to that success appears to lie with the lay representatives.
12:6 Successful workplace unionism depends on the lay representatiye
The evidence reveals that there are differences in the success rates of different
workplace union organisations (UNISON and AEEU). Numerous studies have
stressed the importance of particular factors which may shed light on why the amount
of bargaining "power" that stewards appear to possess varies between and within
workplaces and at various points in time. (See chapter 3.)
It was generally thought that a relatively tight labour market contributed to the growth
in shop steward influence and that this could easily be weakened in adverse
circumstances. However, it has also been argued that unemployment and
redundancies did not represent any change in the workplace power of unions,
(Macinnes 1990, Martin 1992). If anything, the downturn In the fortunes of
rum A appeared to have strengthened the union organisation there; the
senior stewards found that they had many more problems to confront which made
them more determined to protect their members' interests. Moreover, even in times of
high employment there were still differences between workplaces in the levels of
influence of different shopfloor organisations. In addition many of the newer
employees at firm A had actually been working in a similar industry prior to their
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engagement; very few workers were recruited from the unemployed. Therefore,
MacInnes' suggestion that "the option of replacing existing workers with recruits
from the dole is not something that employers in the real economic world contemplate"
(1990, p225) appears to be corroborated, at least where skilled labour is required.
There were differences between the employment situations of the UNISON and AEEU
workers studied. However, while this may go some way towards explaining the
difference between different types of workers, for example, clerical workers who may
work on an individual basis and factory workers who work together as a team, it does
not explain the variations of steward "power" between similar groups of workers,
such as those at hospital I and those at hospital 2. The size of the workplace may
influence the nature of its shop steward organisation (for example, Brown et al 1978).
Large firms may give their shop stewards an advantage over those in smaller firms;
there are more members (and potential members and where there are more members
there is an opportunity to incorporate more stewards who can build on each others'
experiences). Size would not account for differences between workplaces of the same
size, differences within workplaces or even the fact that small workplaces may have a
strong union organisation. It appears that in the larger hospitals stewards may have
more difficulty contacting their members; however, as already suggested if more
stewards could be incorporated this problem could be reduced. As one steward
appears to have been effective in a smaller hospital, albeit she was still responsible for
many more members than the average AEEU steward, it could be argued that the size
of the workplace does not satisfactorily tell us why differences between stewards
exist.
Batstone et al (1977) found a considerable difference between the clerical "staff" union
organisation and the "shopfloor" organisation within the same firm. They found that
the shopfloor stewards tended to place greater emphasis on the need to adopt a
leadership role in relation to their members. They argued that differences in the
definition of the shop steward's role are related to the degree of involvement in the
steward network - those most involved experience a continual reaffirmation of the
norms of steward leadership, those less involved are subject to less general pressure to
espouse a leadership role; this tended to be the case for the staff stewards. As no
shop stewards' organisation appeared to exist as such within UNISON, at least not
one that was comparable to those of the AEEU, the local UNISON stewards were
isolated from each other, especially due to the nature of their work; therefore,
individual stewards received little enoouragement to adopt a leadership role. Contact
with other stewards reinforces the conception of the steward role. Even at their branch
meetings UNISON stewards were not encouraged to act as leaders but were
encouraged to leave their problems with the convenor; therefore, no conception of a
leadership role was given.
Institutional factors, such as the degree of centralisation in a workplace, the form of its
collective agreements and the nature of its wage structure, may influence steward
behaviour. It has been suggested that if a national union organises a workplace it
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hinders the development of member-steward communication; with national
agreements the employees' working lives are structured by externally given facts and
nationally agreed rules and procedures, so that the workers lack an effective power
base of their own (Nichols and Armstrong 1976). Boraston et al (1975) also
concluded that the outside union could encourage their workplace organisations to
become independent, especially by the availability of the FrO; lack of an FrO may
push a workplace organisation towards independence whereas the ready availability of
the FrO may hold it back. This would explain any differences between UNISON and
AEEU organisations overall. Some UNISON stewards were subordinate to their
Fl'Os; the availability of the full time convenor, no matter how useless she may been
described as being, prevented some stewards from becoming independent. It could
be argued that those Fl'Os preferred to keep the situation as it was so that they retained
control of the local organisation.
UNISON, at least in Xtown, appeared to actively inhibit its stewards from acting
independently. Stewards were not encouraged to solve problems themselves or even
to accompany the convenor when she was negotiating on their behalf; problems were
left with the convenor who solved them in her own way without consulting the
steward or the affected members. However, once a workforce has become self reliant
there is little the national organisation can do but accept it (Boraston et al 1975).
Hospital 2 and firm A were two examples where this had happened (though the local
AEEU FrO would have preferred all the workplace organisations under his
jurisdiction to have been as independent as the one at firm A). As bargaining by
workplace representatives appears to be more beneftcial to members and management
than when outside representatives are brought in, UNISON ought to encourage its
stewards to begin bargaining themselves rather than leaving this to their local
representatives. The authority and expertise should be transferred from the local unit
to the shopfloor units.
It would appear that the key to successful unionism actually lies within the workplace
itself with the main lay representative. It has been suggested that management and
their style of working may determine how successful a shopfloor union becomes in the
workplace (for example, Boraston et al 1975). This may have more than a grain of
truth in it, Edwards and Heery (1989a) described how the management at Freightliner
had become more assertive and more prepared to insist that the unions accepted their
proposals for turning the company around. However, they found that the workforce,
who were dissatisfied with the outcome, tended to blame the national union, looking
upon their leaders as ineffective, remote and too close to management. This implies
that if the workplace organisation had been more independent of the national union
they might have been able to achieve gains in their favour, albeit not necessarily to the
detriment of the company. Other evidence does seem to indicate that the success of the
workplace organisation has more to do with the lay representatives themselves.
Beynon (1973) described how a new convenor had managed to pull the plant together
after its "disintegration" under the old convenor. He argued that the shopfloor had
lacked confidence in their previous leader, the new one must have had a certain
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personality and style of working that regained members' confidence and therefore,
union influence. The fact that at firm A two different workplace organisations of the
ABEU had contrasting relationships with the same management suggests that this may
well be the case; the union's relationship with management in the foundry changed
after a new convenor was installed.
Despite the fact that the managementlunion relationship was very different at firm A
and hospital 2, at one management were prepared to work with the union and at the
other management preferred not to involve the union in their affairs, both
representatives appeared to satisfy most of their members' concerns and looked after
their interests. This would suggest that even with different management techniques,
successful unionism is possible in the workplace providing that the lay representative
has the right style of working and dedication to be able to protect his/her members'
interests. The main representatives from firm A and hospital 2 could be described as
similar in their outlooks and their approaches towards unionism, their steward role and
towards management. They were both dedicated to their job and their main priorities
were their members; both would fight for their members if they thought they had been
wronged in some way, no matter how difficult the situation might appear to an
observer. Rather than taking any credit for themselves both representatives spoke of
their work in terms of "us" and "we" rather than "I", suggesting that they carried out
their role seeing themselves as part of the collective rather than as an individual. They
both tried to involve their members in the decision making process and both gained
membership support when it was necessary. Their apparent success within their
respective workplaces supports Fosh's (1993) contention that a lay representative with
a commitment to collectivism who tries to involve all his/her members in the problem
solving process will become a more successful leader and gain more concessions than
a representative who treated problems solely as individual ones.
Some studies when taken at face value portray management as having the upper hand
when it comes down to the fmal decision making (for example, Boraston et al 1975,
Marchington 1980, Wilson et al 1982); however, management may claim to have
made the fmal decision when in reality the union may have shaped and altered the
original issue in such a way that it could claim to have substantially influenced it. This
appears to have happened frequently at hospital 2. The steward (or "the union")
helped to solve many problems; however, she took no credit for this and allowed
management to believe that they were in sole charge of the efficient running of the
hospital. To a large extent shop stewards must work on management's terms and if
they are to survive they need to learn how far they can take an issue with their
employers. Shop stewards, or at least the senior stewards, are in a position where they
can see the situation from management's point of view as well as the workers, This
does not mean that they abandon their loyalty to their members but that they try and
persuade them that certain courses of action may not gain them what they want because
management will not concede their demands as they would damage the future
prospects of the company. In this sort of situation the steward must be well
established and respected by his/her members, the steward must be seen as a leader
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rather than someone who just follows members' wishes. Edwards and Heery (1989b)
suggested that the NUM leadership who adopted a leadership role rather than a
representative role realised that on occasion members had to be persuaded to accept
unpopular management decisions for the good of the workplace as a whole.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that if the workplace organisation is seen to be strong
by its members and the steward's style induces participation and a sense of
"togetherness", the workgroup may be prepared to accept defeat, or at least a partial
climb down on their original claims, more gracefully than a group with a less respected
leader. The main representatives from firm A and hospital 2 appeared to have
understood their managers and their motives even though they did not always agree
with them. They had both developed styles of approaching their managers that they
knew would have an effect on them without necessarily damaging their relationship.
Both representatives preferred to take an amicable approach rather than a conflictual
one and in both workplaces they gained their own way in most cases, even if the
hospital managers preferred not to acknowledge that the union had shaped their
decisions. Mutual respect between union representative(s) and managers
appears to be the key to a successful management/union relationship,
both sides respecting the individual(s) they are dealing with. Evidence from firm A
particularly highlighted the fact that management, especially higher management,
respected the person that they were negotiating with rather than that person's position,
though it was recognised that the representatives were on the workers' side. (See
also, Marsh and Coker 1963, Goodman and Whittingham 1969.) Indeed, Edwards
and Heery (1989b) found that where NUM representatives had developed a degree of
trust with management they tended to be more powerful and the ability to deal with
higher management, rather than the subordinate levels "was a determinant of their
power, and no doubt also a reflection of it" (P180). This was very much the case with
firm A's convenor and in Edwards and Heel)" s terms would be an indication of his
"power" even though he did not view himself as powerful.
Research during the 1980s pointed out that, because of increased international
competitiveness in the private sector and a financial crisis in the public sector, trade
unions were involved in labour management in more compliant ways (Brown 1986)
and that it "is plausible to suggest that workers and management share a common
interest in the immediate survival of the firm" (Terry 1986, pI77). It could be argued
that when a shop steward does his/her job properly everyone gains; the shopfloor is
kept happy and productivity will continue benefiting managemeet.s However, this is
not necessarily a product of the 1980s. In 1969 Goodman and Whittingham
concluded that "[t]he response does not, then, support a stereotyped image of the
steward and his manager forever at loggerheads as the former aggressively defends his
position or attacks the manager's." (p98). This could also be said of some of the
S It has been argued that stewards' relationships can be described as "dualities" - their relationship to
management is characterised by a tension between resistance and accommodation, their relationship
with their members by a tension between democracy and bureaucracy, and with FTOs by a tension
between independence and dependence. See for a fuller explanation Darlington, 19948, pp 138-9.
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stewards at firm A. However, because their objectives did not always coincide their
relationship may occasionally have become a conflictual one, but this does not mean
that their relationship will be undermined. In 1968, MtGuthy and Parker concluded
that alongside the conflict situations managers and shop stewards appeared to have
reached a level of mutual tolerance and acceptance and that this appeared to be the
norm. The same could still be said now.
Nevertheless, some stewards may become management oriented, and therefore,
loyalty to their members may be lost.9 It has been suggested that once a shop steward
becomes "closer" to management, he/she has become "bureaucratised", and tends to
work solely on management and national union terms rather than for the workers;
he/she becomes divorced from hislher members and becomes part of an elite within the
workplace (see for example, Hyman 1979). It could be argued that UNISON's full
time convenor may have unwittingly taken this path; participation in training courses,
on negotiating techniques for example, designed by management would probably give
a management rather than a workers' viewpoint. As she dealt more with managers
than members she may have unintentionally become detached from them. However,
this could not be said to apply to the main workplace representatives from firm A and
hospital 2. Even though they may have had amicable relationships with their managers
they had certainly not become divorced from their members. In fact, their dealings
with management confirmed their loyalty to their members; neither was prepared to
accept management's viewpoint at face value or accept any proposals that would be
detrimental to their members' interests.
It could be argued that this all depends upon the steward him/herself. If he/she has the
right style and is able to see the current situation from both a management and a
workers' perspective, he/she (with membership support) should be able to reach a
compromise acceptable to all concerned when negotiating. Batstone et al (1977)
argued that the ideology of the domestic organisation can be an important base of
power, because it fosters particular views of the workplace and particular patterns of
behaviour, in part reflecting the past actions of the members; these, they argued can be
changed by present endeavours. It could be argued that this was true at firm A.
Management believed that the MS convenor had the backing of his members, probably
because of their past actions. This can be crucial for the workplace organisation and
could be described as a catch 22 situation; in order to be perceived by management as
having bargaining power, the shopfloor representative must have the full backing of
hislher members, yet at the same time it appears that members will only give their
support to leaders who they perceive as having bargaining power already. Therefore,
it is crucial that the steward has the right working style necessary to determine
9 Many studies claim that some stewards would like to gain promotion within the firm. In fact,
Goodman and Whittingham (1969) found that many managers regarded their stewards as potential
supervisory material. The stewards in Nichols and Armstrong's (1976) study were actually trained by
the foremen; they were taught how to handle the workforce but not how to represent them. At firm
A the convenor had commented that some stewards were only after a supervisor's job, which might
suggest that these stewards were working for themselves rather than their members. In some respects
this may be reflected in the adverse comments made by AEEU members about their particular steward.
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membership participation and, most of all, confidence in him/herself as the leader of
the workgroup. The convenor from firm A and the steward from hospital 2 both
appeared to fit this bill. Yet after a change of leadership at hospital 1 the attitudes of
members and, therefore, their opinions of their union had also changed, reflecting
upon the different approach taken by their new representative.
The members playa crucial role in their steward's "effectiveness"; without members'
support a steward loses any influence or "power" that he/she may have had
Nevertheless, it can be argued that it is the steward him/herself who determines
members' reactions to unionism. Batstone et al (1977) argued that there was less of a
commitment to trade unionism on the staff side and that management played a key role
influencing those workers' attitudes, fostering individualistic perspectives and courses
of action. This resembled the clerical workers at hospital 1. The fact that the domestic
supervisors at hospital 1 took on the role of "leaders" of their workgroups, also
influenced some of their employees attitudes. If employees have little conception of
working collectively they may consider the short term advantages for themselves rather
than any long term implications of their actions. As Nichols and Armstrong (1976)
found, the workers appeared to be all for themselves; if they saw a short term
advantage "they were willing to forget the consequences for their workmates" (p124).
If the union representatives had adopted a style which developed a sense of unity
among these workers, allowing them to see that they all share the same basic problems
and that they can be dealt with effectively collectively, the situation may have been
different. Batstone et al (1977) argued that the institutional centrality of the union in
work experience fosters commitment to the union. At hospital 1 the workers had lost
any conception of the union being connected to the workplace let alone their work
experience. An active shop steward with a commitment to collectivism may have
altered this situation.
To members the shopfloor is "the union" and it appears that how well their lay
representative performs actually influences their perceptions of their union and the way
that they react to different situations. This relates to hypothesis number 3: however,
whereas the representative's performance appears to influence members' perceptions
of their union, it does not appear to influence their perceptions of the "power" of their
union. Nevertheless, hypothesis number 5 appears to be substantiated: it could be
argued that the personality and style of working of the lay
representative are essential ingredients for successful unionism in the
workplace. This would go a long way to explain the differences between and within
workplaces as to the perceived power of the union organisation. Members are a
crucial factor determining the success of a workplace union organisation, without their
support it has little chance of achieving their aims. Where stewards are able to
determine membership interest and participation in workplace unionism, the level of
success that "the union" has when dealing with management is greatly enhanced.
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12:7 The steward's personality and style 0/ workings»
Research over the years tends to confirm that the personalities and working techniques
of individual stewards are important factors contributing towards the success of the
union within the workplace (for example, Goodman and Whittingham 1969, Edwards
1978, Fosh and Cohen 1990). "Of course, different local leaders have dissimilar
material with which to work: members have different initial commitments to
unionism, experiences of union membership and work and community backgrounds;
further, relations between management and unions in a workplace can differ sharply.
Some local leaders will have an easier job encouraging members to take part in
workplace activities and to become more solidaristic in their approach to the union.
However, .... a careful choice of local leadership style can yield results even when
members' experiences and situations are not the most favourable for the development
of unionism." (posh 1993, p589).
The style of working of the shop steward is essential to successful unionism in the
workplace. This must also be connected to the individual's personality and hislher
experience of the role. It has also been suggested that in addition to the steward's
personality and individuality the social framework of hislher life and hislher outside
contacts should be considered (Beynon 1973). This is a point worth remembering.
Contacts can be essential when needing advice and support, but it could be argued that
a person's life and the contacts that he/she has built up are also a product of that
person's personality. The convenor from firm A found that by keeping in contact with
his retired predecessor, who was also a friend, he was able to uphold some of the
traditions that had already been built up. Experience may be important to a steward;
for example, a steward may be trusted and respected because of hislher past
achievements but these may also be oonnected to hislher style of working and
personality. Batstone et al (1977) argued that patterns of power and influence were
actually created and new shop stewards might find that they inherited these from their
predecessor. However this may vary, for long standing stewards may derive a good
deal of their influence from sources not immediately available to newoomers, for
example, a network of social relationships with their members which facilitates their
leadership roles. This appeared to be the case for the convenor at firm A and the
steward at hospital 2; both had built up a network of relationships with their members,
which no doubt had a significant effect when they required membership support. In
the case of firm A's convenor this also had a profound effect on management, who
took his word at face value when he threatened that "the lads will be out"; without his
relationship with his members, management may have been prepared to take the risk
that he might have been bluffing, However, it could also be argued that if a new shop
steward has the right approach to the role and, therefore, can rely on membership
support, he/she should be able to build up hislher own sources of influence (if he/she
has not already done so prior to election). In fact, Batstone et al (1977) did suggest
that the personalities of the stewards are one reason why they build up different
10 This is relevant to hypotheses numbers 3, 4 and 5.
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networks of relations.
To be effective the shop steward must be seen as a workgroup leader as well as a
union representative and "[a] commitment to collectivism intrinsically embodies the
concept of leadership" (posh and Cohen 1990). McCarthy and Parker (1968)
recognised that some stewards had more influence than others and suggested that this
could be to do with the differences in leadership style and therefore effectiveness; they
distinguished between the charismatic leader who gained a wide degree of discretion
and influence and those who chose not to lead at all and were little more than a channel
for the objectives and strategies of others (see also Batstone et al 1977 who
distinguished between populist and leader stewards). Fosh (1993) was probably
correct when she argued that a workplace leader who has a collectivist outlook, that is
one who sees all issues as relating to the shared employment situation rather than as
individual grievances, will encourage members to view the union as something which
encompasses group action rather than as an individual grievance agency alone.
Stewards must lead their members rather than just follow up their individual problems.
This would explain the differences within and between workplaces as to the way
members use their union and gain results.
In fact, many studies have shown that some shop stewards may not even be regarded
as a work group representative, let alone a leader, by their members, but as individual
problem solvers (Goodman and Whittingham 1969, Batstone et al 1977, Schuller and
Robertson 1983, Terry 1982). If these stewards had changed their style and tried to
involve the whole work group in the problem solving situation, thereby turning
individual problems into group ones, they may have been regarded differently by their
members. Schuller and Robertson (1983) found that shop stewards spent more time
talking to each other than to their members, contact with members tended to involve
individual problems only; the stewards held the view that their members were only
self interested. This is still true today; however, where a shop steward can turn a
member's "self interested problem" into a group problemu they may be able to evoke
a response to workplace unionism, which they could then use and build on; this
depends upon the style and personality of the representative. Indeed, Schuller and
Robertson argued that if oontact with members was oonfined to individual grievance
processing it would reinforce the tendency of members to ignore the role of the union
as a collective organisation. Terry (1982) argued that "an emphasis on individual
grievances places less strain on fragmented local organisation than might collective
issues, since there is no strong pressure to develop collective policies oovering the
entire workforce." (P16). This may be so, but then members do not develop a
oonception of unionism that encompasses themselves; they view unionism as
unconnected to the workplace and as a personal problem solving agency. Members at
hospital 1 were a good example.
Both the convenor from firm A and the steward from hospital 2 appeared to have the
11An important point here is that, as a rule, all members have the same self interests; therefore, the
task of turning an individual problem into a group problem should not be so bard.
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right style of working; they were both able to "lead" their members when necessary
and were able to confront management and in most cases appear to have satisfied both
sides. Their styles of working must be related to their personalities and beliefs, which
suggests that their success may be related to particular aspects of themselves. A
commitment to collectivism, but not necessarily a commitment to the national
organisation appears the most essential part of a steward's make up. Both main lay
representatives were committed to their members and their interests first and foremost,
even above their own personal priorities; for example, both would give up their
leisure time in pursuit of "justice" for their members, or even just one member. An
essential part of an effective steward's personality must be a selfless attitude, whereby
he/she is prepared to put others before him/herself, even though in many cases it might
be a "thankless task" (or as Beynon, 1973, put it, to be prepared for "graft without
glory"), Therefore, it could be argued that the right style of working partly comes
naturally and partly evolves; that is, with certain personalities taking on the role of
"leader" may come naturally and that person's style of working develops over time
with experience and practice, for example, of dealing with management and members.
Both stewards were confident, and neither was afraid to confront management at any
time, they were stubborn and strong willed ("you've got to be prepared to stand your
ground"), but perhaps most importantly they were both seen as honest and fair, which
especially from a management viewpoint, is very important. However, despite this
they were both solidly on their members' side, even though they could accept
management's viewpoint they both tried to work out a solution to any problem that
would be fair to both sides; management at firm A recognised this, seeing the
convenor in some respects as a member of management even though they knew he
was on the workers' side. So, even though an effective steward's major priority is
his/her members he/she may give an appearance of working on management's terms
when he/she is actually shaping management's terms to suit hislher members. An
essential component of the stewards personality, then, must be communication skills:
he/she must be able to communicate with management and members (and this includes
being prepared to listen, especially to all sides of an argument). Confidence is the key:
a successful steward must have confidence in himlherself and also be able to portray
this to hislher members and especially to management.
It can be very important that the steward is seen as "one of the lads"; if he/she is
viewed as being outside the group the likelihood is that he/she will not be thought of as
a leader let alone a representative. This may be one of the reasons that UNISON's
convenor was not thought of very highly by her members; she was not seen as "one
of us"; she did not work alongside hee members and was associated with the union
organisation outside the workplace, but more importantly she did not instil in her
members a feeling of togetherness. The shop steward's relationship with hislher
members is the most crucial aspect of his/her job and the key to his/her success. A
point worth noting is that while most shop stewards are subject to re-election at regular
intervals, in practice opposition is limited and many retain the office as long as they
wish. However, this does not imply a lack of resistance to their leadership; informal
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leaders very often emerge in opposition to the steward, who may either put pressure
upon the steward to act as they wish (with membership backing) or will bypass
himlher altogether and go straight to a senior steward or convenor or in rare cases even
management (Goodman and Whittingham 1969, Batstone et al 1977). It appears that
this sometimes happened at firm A, indicating that the members involved did not think
that their own steward was able to solve the problem.
Nevertheless, informal leaders tend to be unwilling to stand for election; perhaps they
do not wish to take on the extra responsibility that is attached to the post; they are only
prepared to "lead" when the situation suits them! For example, at hospital 1, unofftcial
leaders of some workgroups emerged when problems had arisen and the collective
action of the workers secured them their goals. Yet these workers did not associate
their actions with unionism and the unofficial leader may not have been a union
member. If these workers were encouraged to see their actions as associated with
unionism, the unofficial leader might be persuaded to become a steward, but because
no conception of unionism as a collective organisation existed at that workplace the
workers were happy to continue as they were. Nevertheless, some unofficial leaders
may not appreciate the dilemmas that stewards often face; a particular member at firm
A had continually disrupted a workplace meeting designed to put certain proposals to
the membership during a period when the workforce were on a three day week. The
member had accused the stewards of "being in management's pocket" and refused to
listen to their proposals; however, after becoming a steward himself, according to the
convenor, the member had begun to change his opinion after realising that everything
is not always as it may seem. This confirms Fiorito et al's (1988) contention that the
more a worker participates in union business the more he/she begins to appreciate the
constraints on union influence.12
Consideration should also be given to the fact that shop stewards are also employees
and individuals in their own right and, therefore, like rank and file members they have
priorities of their own, such as mortgages and children, which may affect the way that
they carry out their role. There is always the possibility that those individuals who
have been coerced into taking on the position may not be as dedicated as those who
readily volunteer and as members appear loathe to become stewards (Millward et al
1992) this probability may apply to a number of stewards. The shop steward's role
extends further than the workplace; therefore, if stewards, like most employees,
prefer to forget about work when they finish for the day, they may not be considered
as effective as those who respond to their members and their problems in their own
time. Women may be affected more by this than men; after a working day women
still tend to be the ones responsible for child care and other household chores;
therefore, some women may find that they are not always able to extend their
steward's role further than the workplace. However, evidence from the study indicates
that this is not always the case and that women can be as effective as men if they have
12 All the stewards at firm A were over 30 years old and had been union members for over ten years.
This suggests that the process of becoming a steward may be a gradual one; helshe gains an insight
into the union organisation within the workplace first.
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the right style of working.
Goodman and Whittingham (1969) suggested that the growth of AEU
membership during the war was a result of the work perfonned by the
shop stewards, who devoted their spare time to improving the working
conditions of their workmates. This is still the case today. The two
main lay representatives considered their steward's role as a full time
one and not one that rmished at the work gates, and at both their
workplaces union membership remained solid. The evidence does
show that where shop stewards are seen to be effective union
membership tends to be constantly upheld, whether the union on site is
the AEEU or UNISON. Other studies have also concluded that strong
local unions actually gain members (for example, Hancke 1993). The
personality and style of working of the steward are essential
ingredients for successful unionism in the workplace.
12:8 Industrial action
There are a wide range of sanctions which workers have at their disposal to help them
get their problems solved. The overtime ban appeared to be the most commonly used
by AEEU members in Xtown, officially and unofficially. The UNISON members
studied did not appear to resort to action in the same way as the factory workers,
probably because of the nature of their employment, though the refusal of some
workgroups to do extra work had achieved them their aims (but not necessarily in the
name of the union). Within the health care industry, where an independent workplace
union organisation existed it appears that workplace problems were solved so that
members had no need to put pressure on the workplace manager. However, in those
workplaces where the UNISON representative was not looked upon as effective,
rather than trying to solve their grievances by means of collective action, it appears that
some UNISON members were resigning their membership instead.
The sanction most commonly thought of, perhaps because it is the one which is most
likely to reach the public gaze, is the withdrawal of labour or the strike. The vast
majority may only last a matter of hours13 as a protest, for example, against unsafe
working conditions or to call for the reinstatement of a workmate, usually against one
employer and by one group of workers; the problem is usually rectified quickly. This
type of action appears to have taken place at firm A occasionally; however, the
workers there did not appear to associate it with industrial action; to them it was a
normal working practice that secured what they saw as a "legitimate grievance".
Of greater significance to the shopfloor organisation is the threat of a withdrawal of
labour, which may happen more often than those involved care to admit. In this
situation it is essential that the shopfloor leader has the support of his members and
13 Very often in these situations the workers do not even leave the workplace. but sit around until the
problem is solved.
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that management also believe this. Some negotiations may involve an element of
"bluff" and therefore more emphasis is given to any kind of a threat (involving any
sort of sanction) if full membership support is forthcoming. Even though it was
suggested earlier that threats made by workers' with a moral obligation towards their
work may be less effective than those made by other workers, the example from
hospital 2, where the nurses had said that they would refuse to work at night with no
porters on the site, achieved their goal, even though the steward admitted that the
nurses probably would not have taken strike action because of their feelings towards
their work (though it could be argued that the steward solved the problem so that
action was not necessary).
The "workplace consciousness" of union members is an essential element when threats
are made to management and their past actions will give more substance to the threat.
As long as management perceive that workers will support their leaders, those leaders
can have a great deal of influence over management even when the affected members
do not know that a threat has been made on their behalf. This appears to have
happened regularly at firm A; the convenor knew that if "the union" had a valid case a
threat to management that "the lads will be out" was taken seriously even if "the lads"
did not know that a threat had been made. Threats are probably more significant in
workplace industrial relations than actions, because the party on the receiving end must
weigh up the significance of the threat before making any decisions. Very often action
does not need to be taken because the threat is taken seriously and a solution is
forthcoming. However, it must be remembered that where major issues are involved,
for example, pay, the economic climate and the market situation may influence any
outcome and not always in the workers' favour. In addition managers can also use
threats: employers may not use legal sanctions very often against their workforce, but
they may threaten to do so, and where the workplace organisation is not perceived as
effective, these threats appear to work. Firm B was an example.
Industrial action of one kind or another had been taken at firm A since 1987 and as no
ballots had been organised by the national organisation of the ABEU, the law on
industrial action balloting appears to have had little effect on the union or management
at that particular firm. (See also Elgar and Simpson 1993b, who also found that most
industrial action in the engineering industry was unballoted.) Union members, at least
in the private sector, do appear to be prepared to take immediate action if they feel
strongly about an issue, and immediate action usually means refusing to work.
However, members do not seem to define this sanction as industrial action. It can be
concluded that, at least where an effective union organisation is seen to operate, the
majority of union members still take the same types of action against their employers
that they took before 1979; that is, action that is confined within the workplace and
usually, because of its effectiveness, shortlived. This type of action also adds weight
to any future threats against management that employees will stop working.
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12:9 The impact of the legislation
The fact that the majority of employers prefer where possible to settle disagreements
with their own workers' representatives (for example, Elgar and Simpson 1992)
suggests that the legislation has had little effect upon the majority of workplace
relations. This study indicates that where the workplace organisation is capable of
acting independently of its national union this is indeed the case. At hospital 2 and
firm A threats that members would stop work rectified problems without recourse to
any action, let alone a properly conducted ballot. It also appears that the legislation
had had no impact upon the local organisation of UNISON in Xtown, with the
exception that it may have brought the union negotiators and management closer
together through the joint training courses. However, at those private sector
workplaces where the union organisation was dependent upon its FrO to help solve
problems, such as firm B, management did threaten their workforce with ..the law"
and it appears that this did dampen the workers' complaints. Nevertheless, evidence
suggests that the main workplace representative might have been partly to blame for
this; after he was replaced by another steward management-union-member relations
became more productive and membership morale appeared to grow.
Awareness of the law is far from universal among union members, though the law
relating to industrial action appears to be the most well known, perhaps due to its
prominence in the media. Even the ABEU stewards were not fully aware of all the
legislation. The most common mistake appeared to be the belief that the criminal law
might be involved rather than the civil law. However, members and stewards alike
may not take an interest in those things that they feel do not affect them personally; the
legislation certainly does not appear to have had any effect upon the union organisation
at firm A; therefore, there is probably no reason why members should be aware of it.
Nevertheless, even those aspects of the law which related to members directly were
not known by all members; for example, the requirement that all check-off paying
union members must sign a written authorisation every three years before the money is
deducted from their wages; over half of those ABEU members who responded to the
questionnaire did not know this despite the fact that they had all done so in 1993.14
Perhaps more significant for union organisation is the fact that over half of the ABEU
members and half of the stewards believed that if a single union deal was made
between an employer and a particular union all union members should be members of
the union party to the deal. In fact, at firm C the AEEU did lose a few members
because they believed that they should join the printing union which had signed the
deal with their employer. This has implications for members as well as a loss of
membership for the unions involved; members may find that they lose out depending
on the union that they have joined. Non-recognised union representatives may in
some instances still represent their members within a firm (see also WIRS3); at firm C
the ABEU representative tended to negotiate a better deal for the small minority of
members that he had in one workshop which was dominated by the GMB. Even
14 Even more significant is the fact that many other members did not know that their method of
payment was called "check-off'.
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though he was not party to any negotiating rights he had established himself with the
managers, who respected him and his opinions, even if it was unofficially, and in the
long run this benefited his members. Those employers in Xtown whose employees
were represented by more than one union have shown that Simpson's (1993a)
reservations that the right to belong to the union of one's choice might dissuade
employers from entering into single union deals were unfounded.
It does appear that the legislation has affected the national organisations much more
than workplace organisations. The national union of the ABEU, for example, was
constantly reminding its representatives of the need to observe "the law" and updated
its requirements for industrial action ballots each time a court case appeared to signal a
new limitation. Despite this, at workplace level, if a strong workplace union
organisation was present, balloting on industrial action was largely ignored, usually
because the time taken to conduct a proper postal ballot was considered unnecessary (if
it was considered at all at the time) by those involved. Though at firm A workplace
secret:ballots were conducted. Other research highlights the fact that ballots may have
strengthened a union's hand when bargaining. Evidence (for example, TUC I995a,
AEEU Executive reports in the union journals) also suggests that one aim of the
legislation has failed, that is, that members would restrain their union from using its
"power" excessively; the fact that strike ballots are very often instigated at the request
of members lather than their national leaders, at least in the private sector, indicates
that it is actually members who want to take action lather than their national leaders
coercing them into it. However, within the public sector, members' reactions to the
proposals of their local union organisation might indicate that in the past, and indeed
even now, some members were coerced into action that they would lather not have
taken. For example, during the 1995 pay negotiations, it appears that some UNISON
members would have been prepared to accept management's proposals, but because
their local unit was determined to follow national guidelines and wait until a vote had
been taken nationally, members had to wait until the local unit was satisfied with what
was offered. Indeed, it was also the case that many UNISON members in Xtown did
not know precisely what had been offered by management; therefore, UNISON's local
representatives could not be considered accountable to or representative of all their
members; if members had not had the chance to consider the options open to them the
local representatives could not have been acting on the opinions of all their members.
It has been argued that ballots for union elections have shown that members do
support their leaders and their policies. Yet postal balloting for union elections and
other important decisions which affect union members does not appear to have led to
an increase in membership participation. The low turnout for union elections also
suggests that members are not particularly interested in who their national leaders are.
Members from the ABEU and UNISON in Xtown were very critical of their national
leaders, but the fact remains that someone must have voted them in. It may be claimed
that the balloting procedures have made trade unions more accountable to and
representative of their members; however, it appears that both UNISON and the
AEEU try to "guide" their members on how to vote and members in Xtown (and
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elsewhere in UNISON's case) felt that they were often "misled" into voting for
something which may not be in their best interests. UNISON locally also conducted a
vote on the 1995 pay proposals by a show of hands ignoring members' doubts about
whether that was democratic. Therefore, it could be argued that at national (and in
UNISON's case in Xtown at local) level unions are not truly accountable to their
members.
Evidence from the ABEU case study also suggests that the idea that postal ballots
would lead to members voting as individuals in their own interests rather than in the
interests of the collective has not necessarily borne fruit. Members appear to take their
voting forms to work (or to their branch if they have no representative at work) to ask
the advice of their representatives on who or what they should vote for. Therefore,
members either do not know much about the issues that they are being asked to vote
on or they prefer to vote along with the rest of their group, which undermines the basic
principle behind the introduction of postal ballots.
Despite the demise in law of the closed shop, employers in both the public and private
sectors in Xtown saw advantages in having a predominately unionised workforce.
While not enforcing membership on their employees they were actively encouraged to
become a member. Employers may not insist that employees become members but, at
least in the private sector, fellow workers may make non-union members' working
lives miserable if they do not. Xtown' s NHS trust and firm A's managers recognised
that having their workers represented by a union was essential to the efficient running
of their workplaces. At firm A the union was seen as a stabilising influence on the
workforce; "the union" was able to exercise a degree of control over its members that
managers would have found harder to do. As Edwards and Heery (1989b) also found
that most colliery managers viewed union representatives as a useful tool to be used to
control the workforce, this may be more widespread than commonly thought. This is
contrary to the contention that during the 1980s managers were exercising a deliberate
choice to develop relationships with individual employees rather than groups
(Brewster 1989).
The demise of the closed shop has not necessarily reduced the "power" of workplace
unions; the findings indicate that if the workplace organisation is perceived as
successful union membership is upheld and new employees join the union. Hospital 2
and firm A were good examples. In close knit workplaces, such as firm A, members
may feel strongly about their membership and even refuse to work with non-union
employees, which in most cases has resulted in that employee joining the union. Yet
at workplaces such as hospital I, where UNISON was rapidly losing members, even
if a closed shop had been in operation, the union organisation there would probably
not have been perceived as "powerful" anyway. Therefore, the demise of the closed
shop may have resulted in a decline in union membership but not necessarily in union
power, though it must be noted that the workers at hospital! who had resigned their
membership had not done so because of the legislation; they had done so because they
had become disillusioned with their union.
369
Declining membership is liable to have a greater effect upon national organisations than
independent workplace organisations, especially in terms of fmance; fewer members
means less SUbscription money. Fewer workplaces in the traditional strongholds of
union recruitment will decrease the number of members overall, but in those
workplaces where a union presence exists nothing much has changed on the
shopfloor. Where the workplace union is seen to be effective membership tends to be
constantly upheld (see also Hancke 1993). At firm A even junior members of
management had joined the AEEU rather than the MSF, which suggests that those
workers perceived the workplace organisation of the AEEU to be more effective than
the workplace organisation of the MSF. It also indicates that to the workers protection
against their employer is the important reason for membership. In those workplaces
with a weaker union organisation workers may not see their work related interests as
being protected and they, therefore, see no reason for union membership. To combat
this fall in membership, the national organisations ought to concentrate on ensuring
that effective stewards are available in all their workplaces rather than introducing
services aimed at members as individuals. Unions should also exploit the sectors of
employment which they have not traditionally entered into, such as the service
industries, where employees may welcome an organisation that would look after their
interests.
Despite the gloomy forecast by Waddington (1993) the check-off legislation appears to
have been advantageous to unions. Many have actually gained members; the exercise
of having to get every member's signature on the authorisation forms actually
uncovered workers who had never been asked to join a union. Providing that
employers are prepared to continue with their existing practices (and the local NHS
trust and finn A's managers were happy to do this), this piece of legislation has
created no hardship for trade unions; however, the prospect of having to get members
to re-sign the authorisation forms every three years may become a burden. The onus
appears to be falling on the national unions rather than the employers to ensure that this
is done, at least within the AEEU. At firm A management and stewards found the
exercise a nuisance taking up their valuable time; management wished to keep the
existing arrangements but allowed the union to carry out the task. Firm A's
management did not appear to be worried by the legislation and they had not informed
union members that there had been an increase in deductions from their wages for their
union subscriptions. In this sense the legislation had not a great effect upon the
management of firm A. It could also be argued that those union members there who
knew their rights were not interested in challenging the increased deduction without
fustbeingnotifted
It can be argued that at national level trade unions have been affected much more by the
legislation than those workplace organisations that can work independently of outside
sources. Nevertheless, the national organisations have weathered the legislative attack
well and perhaps the only disadvantage is the added financial burden; for example,
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even though fines and damages awarded against trade unions were rare15, legal action
may have cost them over £1 million in just one year (TUC 1995a). National unions
are very careful that they act within the legislative boundaries when a confrontational
situation with an employer is imminent; they realise the problems they might face if
they do not. A frequent comment from local shop stewards was that the national
organisation was scared of sequestration, which could be seen as an indication that
"head office" is looking after its own interests rather than the immediate ones of its
members.
Balloting may have strengthened a union's hand when bargaining; yet it could be
argued that in cases such as at firm B, where a ballot was carried out by the national
organisation but nothing was gained from it through lack of membership support,
money was spent gaining nothing. If national unions put more of their resources into
concentrating on building up their workplace organisations and encouraging and
training stewards to act independently, unions might be able to save themselves further
expense, for example, on wasted ballots; an independent workplace union, such as at
firm A, appears to be able to settle its own problems and even incorporate its own
"unofficial" overtime bans if necessary, saving the national union money at the same
time. Only if the employer should decide to resort to the law (and in many cases, at
least in Xtown, the employer wants production to return to normal as soon as
possible), would the national union become involved, by either repudiating the
unofficial action or facing the consequences in court.
At shopfloor level union members may find the need to take instant action in support
of a grievance which needs immediate attention; this type of action is probably taken
without any thought about the likely consequences. In this kind of situation the two
different strands of unionism can be clearly seen, one restrained by the legislation the
other acting on impulse. However, on the shopfloor members will act in the name of
their union whether they have the support of "head office" or not. The majority of
threats of some form of action against an employer are most likely to come from the
shopfloor rather than the national union and very often the grievance will not even be
brought to the attention of the national organisation.
Whether workers are prepared to take immediate action or at least give a threat of it
appears to depend upon the personalities at the workplace. Welch (1993) argued that
his findings indicated that trade unionists were more likely to favour compliance with
the law. Yet at the same time he contended that many lay union representatives
generally favoured what they considered to be the relevant action, irrespective of
whether they thought it was contrary to the law. Firm A's and hospital 2's stewards
appeared to fit into this category. However, their members were also prepared to back
them; therefore, the shop stewards must have stimulated an interest in membership
15 A disgruntled AEU member lost his claim in the High Court that the Executive Council had acted
contrary to the rules, in bad faith and in breach of the rules of natural justice after they had amended
the rules to remove the requirements for divisional organisers, which he was a potential candidate for.
(Union Review. May 1994, p2). This shows that some members will challenge their unions and also
that the challenge failed.
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participation. Nonetheless, if members are not aware of the law they would not know
if they were complying with it or not.
Welch (1993) argued that his findings suggested that legal controls were working to
restrain the forms of industrial action that trade unionists take, and other studies have
looked at the way the legal reforms have restrained industrial action and in particular
strike action. However, it appears that the majority of grievances (possibly excluding
pay claims) are resolved amicably without any action being taken, at least in Xtown.
The grievance may be of such a nature that management will also benefit from its
resolution, such as a health and safety issue. But Welch seems to imply that legal
restrictions have actually restrained any action that workers may take, and therefore
that they have lost any leverage that they may have had in the workplace. Strike action
could be looked upon as a sign of weakness rather than strength in the workplace, and
therefore a lack of strike action could be taken to indicate the strength of workplace
unionism. Certainly, at firm A, the law did not appear to have had an inhibiting impact
upon the forms of action that members took; they were still prepared to act the same as
they always had and would stop work immediately if they felt strongly about an issue.
This indicates that forms of industrial action do take place regardless of legal controls.
However, the evidence from firm A revealed that some union members may not
associate their actions as industrial action; in particular refusing to work until a
grievance had been solved did not appear to be defined as strike action. Therefore, it
could be argued that members did not realise that their actions could be considered
contrary to the law.
However, differences, and in some cases very large differences, existed between
shopfloor units. It is possible that how the legislation has affected shopfloor units
may be a result of the degree of dependence that the shopfloor organisation has on its
national union; that is, those shopfloor units which are more reliant on their FrO may
have an increased awareness of the necessity to abide by "the law".
National unions may conduct their daily business with more procedural
caution than previously, but the legislation cannot be said to have
altered trade unions in any adverse ways. Indeed, as far as local AEEU
and UNISONmembers were concerned, their national leaders were not
even accountable or representative of their interests. Even the local
organisation of UNISON within Xtown could not be considered
representative of all its members if they were not consulted on deals
and proposals that affected them.
In many ways where a workplace trade union organisation is seen as
"powerful", the legislation has had no effect upon it at all; this also
appears to apply to the local organisation of UNISON. The law has had
little direct relevance to those studied in their industrial relations
activities. As other authors have concluded (for example, Dunn and
Metcalf 1994), the law appears to play only a peripheral role in the
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industrial relationships between most employers and their workforces.
However, despite the lack of knowledge of, and even interest in, the
law relating to trade unions, members' opinions about trade union
power had been influenced by the fact that they knew that legislation
had been passed which intended to reduce that power. Therefore,
hypothesis number 7 was unfounded.
12: 10 Individualism versus collectivism
Members' attitudes have not changed a great deal over the years; they have an
overriding self interest in union membership. At a national level unions may be taking
on board the notion that individualism outweighs oollectivism in what their members
want and providing individual incentives to entice workers to join. However, on their
own packages aimed at members as individuals do not appear to be effective at
enoouraging members to remain with a union. The evidence suggests that members
want much more from their union. Their main concerns lie with their immediate
working environment. At least where effective union organisations are operating,
such as at firm A and hospital 2, collectivism tends to be the means that workers use to
satisfy their self interests.
Whether members associate their oollective action with unionism or not is dependent
upon their union representative. Where an effective lay representative is present in a
workplace, members tend to associate their actions with "the union"; that is, the
representative has enoouraged membership participation in unionism, so that they see
themselves as "the union". As they all have the same self interests in relation to their
employment those self interests beoome the collective interests of the group. But
where members have no conception of unionism in the workplace, they tend to view
unionism as an individual insurance agency and use the union only for personal
reasons, such as for accident claims. The union is not used for workplace related
problems. However, while a few of these members may act as individuals, many of
them (and even non-members) do act collectively to solve their problems.
Nevertheless, these workers appear to have developed a sense of workgroup
solidarity, or "workplace consciousness", before the departure of their previous
steward. Therefore, it could be argued that even though their oonception of unionism
had altered they still retained their "workgroup oonsciousness" but it was no longer
associated with "the union"; "the union" had become an insurance agency for personal
problems and was no longer connected with the workplace.
Individualism and collectivism work together to achieve the same aims. Evidence
from the case studies indicates that collectivism is not yet a thing of the past.
Individualism may prevail among union members but where a sense of solidarity
exists members (and non-members) agree that collective action is more effective than a
solitary voice. The individualist nature of trade unionists cannot be attributed to the
legislation since these attitudes have existed since the formation of trade unions
(Marquand 1988, Kingdom 1992) and since support for trade unions and their
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collectivist principles appears to be continuing, at least where an effective
representative is available in the workplace, it could be argued that the aim of
promoting individualism at the expense of collectivism has failed. Even where
collective action is not associated with unionism it is still used as the most effective
means of achieving workers' self interests, or at least those interests that are associated
with their employment.
Unionism and its collectivist pursuit of goals does not impede individualism: it
enhances it. Where national union organisations are concerned the promotion of
individualism may have had some effect, but at least where effective workplace
organisations exist it appears that collectivism still plays a large part in the strategies of
"the union" to achieve its aims. Therefore, it can be concluded that individualism has
not yet undermined the collective principles of unionism. Nevertheless, this may
depend upon one crucial factor, the lay representative, or at least the main lay
representative, within a workplace. Differences between (and within) workplaces
seem to relate to the particular styIe of working of the shopfloor leader. Arguments
that industrial relations problems had been caused by too little collectivism rather than
too much (MacInnes 1987, Marquand 1988) seem to be oorrect; where collective
attitudes are almost non-existent individual self interests lead to a competitive and
hostile working environment, which cannot be in the best interests of the employees or
management.
12: 11 The economic and employment climate
The economic and employment climate of the 19808 and 1990s has not altered the role
of trade unions; they still protect and advance their members' interests. It could be
argued that unions may be more willing to work with managers and accept changes
than they did previously. However, as research conducted before 1979 also reached
similar conclusions this is not necessarily characteristic of the 1990s. Even if unions
are willing to work with managers, it does not necessarily mean a diminishing of trade
union power; an effective union organisation appears to be able to shape
management's decisions so that management and members both get what they want.
Managers within the private sector appeared to be following the trend identified by the
Labour Research Department survey and were introducing changes in the way that
their employees worked.16 Human resource management (HRM) and profit related
pay (PRP) were the two most common changes made within Xtown. However, in
those workplaces where an independent workplace union was present their members
had not been adversely affected by any changes. Rather than allowing management a
free rein to introduce change as they wish, unions have not lost the will to fight and
ensure that changes are implemented to the advantage of their members. Nonetheless,
the personalities and styles of working of those involved appear to be significant
factors contributing to the union's success.
16 Bargaining Report no. 147. February 1995. pp 7-13.
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If the union is perceived as powerful in the workplace it does not necessarily mean that
management "do not manage"; a powerful organisation does not work against
management in an arbitrary way. Indeed, an effective workplace leader may work to
management's advantage; satisfied workers tend to work better and produce more,
whereas an ineffective leader and a weak workplace organisation may lead to low
morale among workers and a low productivity rate to management's disadvantage (see
also, Edwards and Heery 1989b). This would confirm those arguments that collective
organisation is the best way to secure increased production (for example, Brown
1994). The move to trust status of local hospitals had actually enhanced UNISON's
role within those workplaces; the trust recognised the need for employees to be
represented by unions and the fact that they had a vital role to play in the efficient
running of the trust. The fact that union cooperation with management makes the
running of a business much easier (Edwards and Heery 1989b, Brown 1994) appears
to be recognised by many employers in Xtown. Particularly in the private sector with
the competitive nature of its product markets, unionism can be as beneficial to
employers as it is to employees. This is particularly so, if unionised workplaces are
more likely to introduce advanced technology (Daniel 1987), which would assist those
workforces to produce more than non-unionised ones (see for example, Metcalf
1993a).
It can be concluded that workplace relations have not changed a great deal. It could be
argued that a trade union's role is still primarily negative and defensive, especially in
relation to protecting its members' interests; "the union" reacts to situations that appear
to disadvantage its members in some way. However, it appears that the workplace
organisation at firm A and the local organisation of UNISON within the local NHS
trust were also used by management to help ensure the efficient running of those
workplaces. Therefore, the role of these union organisations was much more than
reacting to decisions that might affect their members; they also played a part in the
management of the workplace. Union "power" is not only used to defend (and
advance) its members' interests but also to assist management in the efficient operation
of the workplace.t? This is contrary to Brewster's (1989) contention that managers
were working carefully to reduce the importance of the trade union relationship. Even
when a union works to management's advantage as well as its members' , it cannot be
argued that the role of the union has altered. Even before 1979 most established
workplace organisations were acknowledged by managers as helping to run their
companies more efficiently than they might otherwise have done (for example, A.I.
Marsh 1963, M<£arthy 1966, Goodman and Whittingham 1968, Batstone et aI1977).
Claims that managers had rediscovered the right to manage (for example, Purcell
1991) may be unfounded; that right appears to be shaped and influenced substantially
by the union organisation within a workplace (with management's blessing) so that, in
effect, unions actually structure management's right to manage.
17 This aspect of unionism in Britain astounded a group of French managers who were visiting firm
A. They were astonished that union representatives actually spoke to members of management other
than when negotiating, let alone that they could play a role helping the firm run more efficiently than
it might otherwise do. Apparently in France union representatives do not talk to managers unless
they are bargaining.
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The economic and employment climate may not have altered the role of trade unions
but members' attitudes about what unions' priorities should be appear to have
changed. Workers are more aware of the need to safeguard their employment,
especially as many employees have mortgages and other debts, incurred through the
increasing use of credit to purchase household and luxury items. Where an effective
workplace organisation exists union membership appears to give members an
increased sense of job security; where employees jobs have been saved, such as at
firm A and hospital 2, workers appear to voluntarily join the union. Job protection
now appears to be one of the major benefits of unionism; workers who once may not
have considered joining a union appear to be willing to do so if they feel that the union
is effective at protecting their employment. Also, members who attend a tribunal for
unfair dismissal tend to get a better settlement when backed by their union (TUC
1995a); therefore, it is essential for those workers in the industries which tend to be
over represented at tribunals, for example, hotels and catering, that trade unions begin
to organise themselves and give the workers the representation that they are lacking.
This may also cut the numbers of applicants to industrial tribunals for unfair dismissal;
under a third of unfair dismissal cases made between Aprill990 and March 1991 were
made by union members. Where a strong workplace organisation exists, such as at
firm A, dismissed members may not need to attend a tribunal as the workplace union
tends to negotiate for their return.
Workplace union organisations may be working with employers to ensure the survival
of their companies and, therefore, the jobs of their members. However, where the
union appears to be effective members attitudes towards management do not seem to
have altered much; they still presume that their employers should give them more than
they are offering. Members' expectations can become out of touch with reality to the
disadvantage of themselves and management. Therefore, the ability of the steward to
"lead" his/her members is of the utmost importance; he/she must have the confidence
and respect of members and management so that he/she can act as a mediator between
them. Nevertheless, some ABEU members in Xtown had not had a regular wage rise
over the last five years; they had worked with their employers to ensure the survival
of their workplace and therefore, their employment. However, workers' attitudes
towards issues at work, such as accepting a lower pay rise than anticipated rather than
fight the cause and risk losing everything, including their job, are not new; studies in
the 1970s highlighted how members might be prepared to "give in" to management
because of their responsibilities (see for example, Beynon 1973). As Batstone (1984)
argued, it is likely "that stewards and workers will seek to make the minimum
concessions to ensure plant survival" (P235). The economic climate of the 1980s and
1990s may actually have affected those in employment much less than commonly
thought, or at least those trade union members in employment.
Members still appear to view the workplace as they did two decades ago
and unionism means the same to them now as it always has. The key to
whether they view it as a collective organisation or as an individual
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problem solving agency lies with their lay representatives, but this has
always been so. The one important change is that job protection has
become an important part of membership, perhaps reflecting the
employment climate. It can be concluded that the economic and
employment climate has not changed the role trade unions: they still
protect their members' interests.
12: 12 Trade union power - implications for the future
For the purposes of this study power is defined as a union's capacity or ability to
produce effects; that is, the ability to bring about or accomplish something. Trade
union power is the union's capacity or ability to achieve desired goals.
As the basic purpose of a trade union is to look after its members'
interests, a trade union's power is its capacity or ability to defend and
advance its members' interests. Using this definition of power the AEEU and
UNISON can both be described as powerful. The national organisations produce
effects for their members in the form of compensation for things such as workplace
accidents and industrial illness and where independent shopfloor organisations operate
within workplaces, at least in Xtown, they could be described as powerful; for
example, they ensured that changes made in their workplaces were to the advantage of
their members. The union organisations at firm A and hospital 2 were effective at
achieving members' goals and therefore could be described as powerful. It can be
concluded that despite the determination of the previous government to reduce trade
union power, that power, at least at workplace level, remains the same as it always
has.
However, the legislation, despite not being fully understood, does appear to have
influenced members' perceptions about the power of trade unions, at least when they
are asked directly about trade union power. The knowledge that legislation had been
passed which intended to reduce that power appears to have influenced members'
opinions about trade union power. If the AEEU members' perceptions of union
power, at their workplace and in the country as a whole, were taken at face value
without reference to any of the other information presented in part 2 of the thesis, it
might be suggested that union power had indeed been curbed during the 1990s, at least
from a members' point of view; many more respondents from this study thought that
unions had "too little power", than those who responded to the seventh BSAS
(Millward 1990) and Stevens et al's (1989) survey.
The essential thing when talking about "power" is how each individual interprets the
concept. It appears that the notion of "power" means more to individual members than
the ability to achieve effects; success at achieving their aims in the workplace does not
appear to be equated with the power of their workplace union. For example, the
majority of respondents from firm A thought that their workplace union did not have
enough power, yet the evidence portrays a powerful union organisation. Members
may take the role of "the union" for granted and because they have become accustomed
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to the fact that it usually solves their problems satisfactorily, they expect that it should
do much more. Alternatively members may only think of trade union power as
something that unions at national level possess; for example, media focus on trade
union power tended to make it out to be a force that encompasses society rather than
something that enables employees in individual workplaces to achieve their aims. It
was certainly the case that those members who viewed the union as a national concern
accepted that union power had been reduced. For many the 198415 miners' strike
signalled the downfall of trade unions in general. They accepted that Mrs Thatcher's
government had beaten the miners and if the NUM had lost its power, then there was
no hope for other unions. This indicates that the media and Conservative propaganda
had had an effect; studies such as Edwards and Reery's (l989b) suggest that the
NUM is still a force to be reckoned with, only in individual pits rather than on a
national scale. Even though the shopfloor is "the union" as far as most members are
concerned, some of them only associate "power" with unions at a national level and
they see that power as severely diminished.
The role of the national union may have changed, particularly from an adversarial to a
service role (Millward et al 1992), but where independent workplace organisations
exist nothing much appears to have altered. The ABEU and UNISON still represent
members in all the workplaces in Xtown that they had in the 1970s and, at least where
stewards worked independently of outside sources, they were still defending and
advancing their members' interests quite adequately. Workplaceorganisatioos vary as
to the level of success that they have when dealing with management but this appears
to have always been the case (for example, Brown et al 1978, Edwards 1978,
Edwards and Reery 1989b). Members may also get a better deal through their
workplace union than when the "external" organisation becomes involved: the national
union is restricted by the law, whereas on the shopfloor outside influence is limited so
that some members may receive support from their workplace which the outside union
would not condone, for example in the case of a person rightfully dismissed.
Evidence locally in both the public and the private sectors indicates that lay
representatives actually negotiate better deals than the FrO. This raises the question of
how far national union leaders actually represent the interests of their members.
Agreements which are acceptable to management and union officials may not be to the
shopfloor, which may result in lower worker morale. When workers have been
involved in the negotiating process, via their steward, they at least have had a say in
the outcome and may be more liable to accept a slight alteration to their demands than
when they have been left largely on the sidelines while an "outsider" decides their
future. A.I. Marsh (1973) termed this the "cult of privacy" - that is, workplace
organisations prefer to work without outside interference; private settlements resolve
immediate problems without any fuss and create no precedents for other workplaces
and perhaps more importantly, both parties have to live with the consequences of their
settlements whereas outsiders might create difficulties for which they accept no
responsibility. It also appears to be the case that where an effective union
organisation exists it actually "runs" the workplace as much as management do,
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though management may be loathe to admit this, as at hospital 2.
Trade union power, or at least potential trade union power, still belongs to the
workplace where it has always been; union power works upwards from the members
on the shopfloor, "the backbone of the union", and the ability of the lay representative
to instil membership interest and participation in workplace unionism is extremely
important. The origin of a union' s power is the collective strength of its members. It
can be concluded that the main lay representative within a workplace is the key to
successful unionism within that workplace. However, where more than one steward
is present in a workplace members' opinions about their workplace union seem to be
influenced by their own representative and the way that he/she performs, rather than
the level of success that the union has in the workplace as a whole. The workplace
leader's style of working is essential in determining membership participation and
interest in unionism, and therefore, the level of success that they have when dealing
with management.
However, the members themselves can determine how much "power" the union
displays by the level of support that they are prepared to give to their representative. A
steward can only be as powerful as his/her members allow himlher to be; that is if
he/she does not have the support of hislher members any potential capacity to achieve a
desired outcome could be lost. It is clear that some members appear to think that their
representative should be powerful without their support; these members do not have a
conception of "the union" that encompasses themselves. Members must be made
aware of the fact that they are "the union" and that any potential power to change
things lies with them. Following Fosh (1993), if a steward whose members are not
prepared to support him/her altered hislher style of working he/she may be able to
determine greater membership participation and, therefore, enhance the success of the
union within the workplace.
It is on the shopfloor that any bargaining power against the employer is exerted and
this is the service that members appear to want from their unions. Effective workplace
organisations appear to gain members. Members view protection as an important
reason for union membership and for the majority of members that protection is largely
connected to their employment; they expect their interests in the workplace to be
protected. Job protection is the highest priority given to union membership and where
the union is perceived as effective union membership may give employees' a sense of
job security. Independent workplace organisations appear to be able to protect their
members' interests much more effectively than those that are reliant upon the outside
union to help them solve any problems.
This has important implications for the future of trade unionism. WIRS3 found that
those workplaces without lay representatives were more likely to be represented by
paid union officials than in the past. The evidence presented in this work suggests that
representatives from outside the workplace are not as effective as lay representatives
when negotiating with management. Having a PTO (or in UNISON's case a full time
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convenor) to represent the shopfloor is better than no representation at all. In some
circumstances the shopfloor may regard the FrO as doing a better job than their
steward; if the steward is viewed as ineffective it may make the FrO appear to be
effective. However, as the majority of members believe that their national leaders, and
in UNISON's case their local leaders, do not represent their true interests, it is
essential that more stewards with the styles of working appropriate to the role are
incorporated into workplaces.18 The fact that full time stewards and officers become
differentiated from their members has been well documented (for example, Beynon
1973, Lane 1974, Darlington 1994). However, FfOs have a very large workload
covering many workplaces; therefore, it might be understandable that they become
divorced from their members' workplace grievances. This strongly indicates the need
for more effective stewards, particularly within UNISON; the stewards would be
more knowledgeable about the kinds of workplace problems that affect their members
and the workload of the FfOs might then be reduced.
The future of unionism is in the workplace (and it could be argued that its past was
also firmly embedded there). It is evident that independent workplace organisations
are more beneficial to members than when union representatives from outside the
workplace are brought in. For example, if bargaining with management is conducted
by lay representatives, members' interests are represented by those who know exactly
what those interests are. Shopfloor representatives know the intricacies of their own
workplaces and how far they can take an issue with management and also how far they
can rely on their members to support them (which may reflect upon the steward
him/herselt). All this may be unfamiliar to representatives from outside the workplace.
As WIRS3 concluded lay representatives are the most basic building blocks of trade
union organisation; without effective stewards unionism has little meaning to many
members.
Unions at national level, and in Xtown UNISON at local level, must realise that if they
wish to retain their members' faith in unionism as more than just an insurance agency,
they must put more of their resources into steward training. However, as stewards
appear reluctant to attend training courses some other way of ensuring that stewards
develop the right style of working for the role must be devised. Learning from each
other and practical experience appeared to be the major ways that the AEEU stewards
developed their styles of working. At firm A, where the union organisation was well
established and a number of stewards were present, the stewards learnt from each
other, in particular, individuals new to the role learnt from the past experiences of the
18 A letter from a GMB shop steward to the GMB 's joumal sums up the difference between what the
national leaders want and what shop stewards feel that they should be doing: ..... The hierarchy of our
union wants shop stewards who can recruit, anything else does not matter. Myself being one of those
lowly shop stewards believes that the role is to recruit of course, but also to retain, represent, protect,
and be the voice of the member (the latter being the criteria most likely to make those in the
hierarchy cringe). The constant tirade of 'recruitmentitis' is, to be frank. pathetic because it comes
from those senior national officials who wouldn't know one end of a membership form from the
other. I recruit every minute of my working life because I believe it is important to this union, but it
is not important enough that everything else has to suffer ..." ("Direct" NovlDec 1996. Issue 29.)
The AEEU stewards who saw this letter agreed with it 100%.
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more established stewards; by maintaining contact with each other the steward role
was continually confirmed.
The AEEU shop stewards' meetings enabled stewards from different workplaces to
share their experiences and they learnt from each other the best ways of how to
approach particular problems. If stewards are reluctant to attend training courses,
especially if they feel that they have little relevance to their workplace situations,
something along the lines of the ABEU' s district shop stewards' meetings might be a
valuable tool whereby stewards can learn from each other's experiences, especially
about the particular problems that they might be encountering at that moment in time.
Stewards may be more willing to attend meetings of this kind if they address the
specific problems that they encounter. Rather than being a training course with a
special instructor the stewards themselves would largely conduct the meetings.
Aspects of steward training could be incorporated into the meetings, though sharing
information on how to approach situations at work appears to more relevant to
stewards. The ABEU stewards were better equipped than UNISON's stewards to
bargain with management themselves and through experience and practice developed
their individual styles of working.
The local organisation of UNISON appeared to keep some stewards dependent upon it
by not encouraging them to attempt to solve their own problems within their
workplaces. Stewards must be encouraged at branch meetings to discuss problems
between themselves and the branch committee should give them advice so that the
knowledge of the full time representatives is passed down to the stewards. Even
accompanying the convenor when she is dealing with their individual workplace
problems would enable stewards to experience bargaining with their own managers
and their confidence in themselves as workplace leaders might be built up, so that they
develop a style of working that determines membership participation in unionism. The
steward at hospital 2 was able to this more effectively than the convenor, therefore, if
stewards would begin to be in charge of their own workplace union organisations their
members might receive a better service. Also, the local organisation of UNISON
might lose some of its importance if stewards began to take responsibility for their
own work units.
The personalities of those involved cannot be altered by any kind of steward training
and it may be that different personalities approach the role in different ways.
However, a commitment to collectivism and a selfless attitude appear to be necessary
if the steward is to carry out the role effectively; however, confidence and
communication skills can be built up so that stewards learn how to accommodate both
their members and management.
In the light of the above, the termination of the ABEU's district shop stewards'
meetings could signal an end to local ABEU stewards supporting each other. At the
time of writing the structure of the ABEU branches had not been altered, but if
stewards are to continue helping each other the sooner the changes are implemented the
381
better; as the ABEU branches are to be amalgamated to create one large branch for
Xtown, it is probable that they will resemble the structure of UNISON's branch. If
shop stewards are encouraged to attend it could become like a monthly shop stewards'
meeting and in this way it would be more beneficial to stewards; knowledge of local
issues could still be shared between workplaces and they could still help each other to
overcome their problems but on a more regular basis than previously. However, this
would depend on the attendance of stewards, who do not at present attend the branch
regularly, though it could be argued that the present structure of branches are not like a
formal stewards' meeting perhaps discouraging attendance. Indeed, if the AEEU
branch did resemble UNISON's, all the paper work that was dealt with by the branch
officials, such as claims forms, would be dealt with by members or stewards sending
them direct to the relevant parties; therefore, the belief by ABEU branch officials that
these ought to be dealt with in the workplace might actually happen. Nevertheless, the
intentions of the national union may affect how the branch is operated; if it wanted to
dispose of local ABEU organisations because of their opposition to national policies
and the way that they could influence local opinions, it may want the new branches to
be run like UNISON's, so that stewards are not encouraged to become independent.
However, the strength of feeling among local ABEU stewards was such that it could
be argued that it would be hard to change the situation within the foreseeable future,
but this would depend upon whether the local stewards are able to continually reaffirm
their role with each other.
It could be suggested that some of the differences between UNISON and ABEU
workplace organisations may be related to the fact that, at least among those studied,
males tended to dominate the ABEU and women UNISON. Colling (1995) found
differences between groups of women and groups of men workers, in particular
women were much more likely than men to suggest that unions had been powerless to
protect their interests, However, the men and women studied in Xtown tended to hold
similar views about unionism and what its priorities should be. The major difference
between the workplace organisations of the two unions was that many more UNISON
stewards were dependent on the help of their full time representative than the ABEU
stewards. While it could be argued that women may not have as much time to devote
to the union outside the workplace, the steward at hospital 2 was able to act
independently and effectively and so was the steward from the community health team,
who also had a young family to look after; therefore, this argument does not apply to
all women. In addition some ABEU male stewards were considered to be ineffective
by their members. Fewer UNISON members (and it could be argued stewards) were
encouraged to participate in the affairs that involved them within their workplaces and
as participation enhances success and therefore satisfaction with the union (for
example, Fiorito et al 1988) this would appear to account for the differences between
the workplace organisations of the two unions. If Fairbrother (1990) was correct that
some stewards were kept dependent upon branch leadership because of their class or
gender position or the specific circumstances of their employment as public service
workers, many UNISON members are being disadvantaged by the organisations that
are supposed to protect their interests. Indeed, a move towards workplace based
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bargaining in the NHS could have a positive effect for workplace trade unionism.
Those stewards who presently rely on their convenor to negotiate for them might be
encouraged to begin bargaining with management themselves, which would give them
more experience and might lead to them developing a style of working that is beneficial
to themselves and their members, which in turn might develop a greater sense of
solidarity among their members which would enhance the bargaining power of the
steward.
Bryson et al (1995) argued that "the strong membership base and powerful resources
of UNISON have established it as a very major player in the future of NHS industrial
relations" (P132). This does appear to be the case, but, at least in Xtown, if more
effective lay representatives are not forthcoming UNISON's membership base may
collapse altogether in some local hospitals. Bryson and his colleagues (1995)
concluded that:
"Union policies need to be seen to be effective in an environment where industrial action
is not always even a last resort (although if forms of action excluding strike action are
successful, this may lead to change in policy by some organisations). The key to
effective policies is to develop their own wider agenda rather than just respond to
management initiatives." (p132.)
Certainly, union policies need to be seen to be effective, by members as well as
management; however, rather than developing their wider agenda it could be
suggested that unions, especially UNISON, should be developing their shop
stewards' organisations. As Colling (1995) suggested in relation to competitive
tendering in the public services: "The crucial test for trade unions will be their ability
to reconfigure the current distribution of authority, skills and resources within their
organisations and to actively build and invest in workplace organisation in particular."
(pI42.)
Union amalgamations may be designed to combat the fall in membership, but they
appear to isolate members even further from their national leaders, Indeed, the
creation of the AEEU and UNISON does not appear to have benefited their members
in any substantial way; in fact local opinion appears to be that the amalgamations have
altered the unions for the worse rather than the better. It may well be the case that
trade unions as a whole are now too big. In terms of membership service on the
shopfloor the national organisations appear to becoming more and more out of touch
with their members and their interests. It must be recognised that it is an advantage for
workers to be represented by effective independent shopfloor organisations when
dealing with an employer.
The shopfloor is where unionism begins and for the vast majority of members that is
where union activity takes place and their interests are protected. If the shopfloor
organisation is seen to be effective and achieves results then, it will gain members.
Martin (1992) concluded:
"Bargaining power at company and plant level remained 'robust', dependent on the same
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environmental, organisational and individual features as in the 1960's and 1970's. The
major decline was in the power at the centre of the trade union movement." (pI78).
This conclusion is supported by this study.
12:13 Conclusions
The Conservatives wanted to reduce trade union power and introduced legislation
designed to do just that. However, trade union power is still a reality in the 199Os.
Nevertheless, that power may be looked upon differently depending on whether the
focus is on trade unions at a national level or within the workplace. National
organisations can be looked upon as powerful in the sense that they achieve effects for
their members in the form of compensation against employers. But the "power" of a
trade union to defend and advance its members' immediate interests lies on the
shopfloor. Those authors who argued that trade union power had been curtailed were
referring to trade unions at a national level and members appear to agree with them.
Even though members may not view their union organisations within the workplace as
powerful, it is there where the capacity to produce effects lies; the essential ingredient
for trade union power is the solidarity of the workers and the key to membership
involvement in unionism is their representative.
National unions may have changed but within the workplace much appears to remain
the same as it always has. Some workplace organisations, even of the same union, are
effective and others do not appear to be as successful at achieving their aims, but this
has always been the case. The key to successful unionism within the workplace
appears to be the main lay representative within that workplace; the personality and
style of working of the representative are essential ingredients for successful
unionism. The leader's style of working is essential in determining membership
participation and interest in workplace unionism and therefore the level of success that
the shopfloor unit has when dealing with management. Hypotheses numbers 4 and 5
were substantieted.ts
The shopfloor organisation is the most important as far as rank and file members are
concerned National organisations, and in Xtown UNISON's local organisation, are
looked upon as being out of touch with members' priorities: those that relate to the
everyday realities that they encounter in the workplace. The workplace representative
is looked upon as "the union"; he/she is the person who deals with their problems,
even those that the national union eventually resolve, such as workplace accidents.
Where an effective union organisation exists at a workplace the shopfloor is "the
union" as far as the majority of members are concerned (hypothesis number I); they
have a conception of themselves as the union. Even where a workplace organisation is
non-existent as such the representative is still seen as "the union". How well the
representative performs influences members' perceptions of their union.
19 The hypotheses are set out in chapter 5, pages 122-123.
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As the amount of power possessed by unions varies from workplace to workplace it is
difficult to generalise about the extent of trade union power let alone any decline in that
power. Nevertheless, members appear to think that trade union power has been
curtailed; they do not appear to associate the concept "power" with achieving effects in
their individual workplaces. Therefore, even though the lay representative's
performance in the workplace influences members' perceptions of their union it does
not influence their perceptions of the "power" of their union. Members do not
measure the extent of their union's power on the level of success that they have in the
workplace in achieving their aims. Therefore, hypotheses numbers 2 and 3 were
unfounded.
However, contrary to hypothesis 7, the legislation appears to have had a great
influence on members' opinions about the power of their trade union and unions in
general. Despite their lack of knowledge of the law relating to trade unions, their
opinions appear to have been influenced by the fact that they knew that legislation had
been passed which intended to reduce trade union power. Well documented disputes
where employers had made use of the law, such as in the printing industry and the
defeat of the NUM in 1985, appear to have made an impact upon members so that they
believed that trade union power had been reduced despite the fact that the union at their
own workplace might have been successful at achieving most of their aims. Claims
that the legislation had reduced trade union power appear to have been taken at face
value.
At a national level unions may conduct their business with more procedural caution,
but if Xtown' s members' opinions are taken into account national leaders are no more
representative of their members than they were in the 1970s. Independent workplace
organisations do not appear to have been affected by the legislation at all; they still
carry on their daily business in much the same ways as they did before 1979. It
appears that the Conservatives misinterpreted the main source of union power; the
legislation was largely aimed at national unions and their leaders; however, even if
members do not interpret: it as such, the main source of union power lies with them in
the workplace.
Overall it can be concluded that the legislation has failed in its main aims; the majority
of employers, at least in Xtown, have not: been encouraged to assert themselves
against unions, mainly because they see advantages with a unionised workforce. The
encouragement of individualistic attitudes among trade union members has also failed.
Individualism may be a predominant disposition among trade union members, but the
pursuance of self interests, at least in relation to employment problems, appears to be
done more effectively collectively than alone. However, this may depend upon one
crucial factor - the lay representative and whether he/she encourages members to view
their self interests as collective or individual problems. Where workers have a history
of working collectively to achieve their aims they still appear to do this. The idea that
by encouraging individual members to make decisions in their own interests, rather
than the interests of the group, trade union power would be reduced was based on a
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flawed interpretation of individualism (hypothesis number 6). Individualism is not
necessarily the opposite to collectivism: the two appear to work together to achieve the
same aims; that is, because most union members have the same self interests, they
become collective interests. The majority of union members realise that the most
effective way of achieving their self interests, albeit collective self interests, is by
acting together. Where individualism is the predominant trait within a workplace the
atmosphere can become competitive and hostile, which is not advantageous to the
workers or management.
In relation to hypothesis 8, the change in the economic and employment climate over
the last fifteen years has not altered the role of trade unions; in fact it may have
strengthened the determination of workplace organisations to protect and advance their
members' interests. Trade union organisations may be working with managers to
ensure the survival of their workplaces but this does not appear to be contrary to the
1960s and '70s. In fact the change in the economic climate may have made managers
more aware that it is advantageous for them to have an effective union on site. The
change to trust status of hospitals in and around Xtown appears to have enhanced
UNISON's role within those workplaces. However, this, at least for the members,
appears to be dependent upon whether their lay representative can work independently
of the local UNISON organisation. The impact that UNISON has within hospital
trusts is worthy of further study, particularly as at the time of this study UNISON had
not really settled after its creation.
The role of trade unions may remain the same, the protection and advancement of their
members' interests, but a major change in the attitudes of trade union members appears
to be that they now see job protection as a major priority for unions to work towards.
This is most likely a product of the employment environment over the last twenty
years. The fear of unemployment may have made it easier for unions to recruitment
members, especially if the union in the workplace is perceived as effective and offers a
degree of job security. Nevertheless, it appears that, at least where an effective union
organisation is present in a workplace, members' attitudes towards their employment
situation have not altered a great deal and they are still prepared to make demands of
their employers.
Unionism still means the same to members today as it always has; the protection of
their interests at work. On their own services provided by the national organisations
do not appear to be enough to satisfy some members. Members want service in the
workplace. Unionism as a national movement has lost its impetus; it is perhaps
significant that many union members are not familiar with trade union terms such as
"check-off" and the traditional address of fellow members as "brother" appears to be
used much less than it was, indicating that members are not interested in unionism
except as a means of protecting their self interests in the workplace.
In the light of these conclusions it can be suggested that no matter what legislation
might be passed, either for or against trade unions, it will not make a big difference to
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trade unionists in the workplace. Even if the national union leaders gain favour with
the Labour government, it may affect members' opinions about the power of their
national organisation but it will make no difference to the power of workplace
organisations to help their members. The success of workplace trade unionism is
dependent upon the personalities and styles of working of the lay representatives. As
long as effective lay representatives are forthcoming there is no reason why trade
unions at workplace level should not continue protecting their members' interests well
into the 21st century, though some form of steward training appears to be essential if
more workers are to gain the benefits of effective unionism. This must be identified as
an area for future research.
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Awendix I
This appendix is an addendum to chapter 4. It outlines some of the law in relation to
trade unions that was not detailed in chapter 4.
lA. Balloting
All the law relevant to trade unions and their balloting procedures was consolidated by
the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A),
although this Act has been amended by the Trade Union Reform and Employment
Rights Act 1993, (TURERA).
All important decisions made by trade unions must now be conducted by a postal
ballot of members. Voting must be made by the marking of a ballot paper and every
person voting must be allowed to do so without any interference imposed by anyone
else and without incurring any direct cost. An independent sautineer(s) must
supervise the production and distribution of the voting papers and make a detailed
report on the conduct of the election. The scrutineer is required to retain custody of
the returned voting papers for at least a year after the announcement of the result. The
name of the scrutineer must be communicated to all the union's members and must
also appear on the voting paper itself. The scrutineer is required to inspect the register
of members' names and addresses, particularly if requested to do so by a member or
candidate who suspects that it is not accurate or up to date.! A copy of the register
must also be kept in the same way as the retained voting papers. Within three months
of receiving the scrutineer's report the trade union must notify all members of its
contents.
Any member may apply to the High Court or to the Certification Officer for a
declaration that their trade union has failed to comply with the law relating to secret
ballots. The Court may make an order specifying the action that the trade union must
then take, the Certification Officer has no such powers but may specify the actions to
be taken by the trade union to remedy the declared failure. The application must be
made within one year from the last day on which votes were cast in the ballot.
Executive committee. Every member of the executive committee of a trade union
must be elected at least every five years.2 Every member of the union is entitled to
vote, except: i) those who as a class are excluded by the rules from doing so; ii)
unemployed members; iii) members in arrears; iv) members who are students,
trainees, apprentices or new members. (TULR(C)A section 46.)
Voting papers must be sent to the voters by post accompanied by a list of all the
candidates. No member should be unreasonably prevented from standing as a
1 The identity of any person making a complaint to the scrutineer must be protected.
2 If the election is uncontested no ballot need be held.
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candidate for election to the principal committee and each candidate must be allowed to
prepare an election address to be sent out with the voting papers at no expense to the
candidate.
Political funds. A ballot must be held at least every ten years to determine whether
a political fund should be continued/created.
Merger ballots. Trade unions must send members a written notice, at least seven
days before the ballot, informing them of the full details of the proposed amalgamation
allowing them to form a reasonable judgment of its effects. No statements making a
recommendation or expressing an opinion must accompany the notice. A simple
majority of recorded votes is sufficient to pass the resolution unless the union rules
state otherwise.
Secret ballots before industrial action. To retain immunity from actions
against them in tort in respect of acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute trade unions must:
I) have the support of a ballot;
2) have notified the employer at least seven days before the opening of the ballot
a) that the union intend to hold a ballot;
b) the opening day of the ballot;
c) the description of the employees who will be entitled to vote in the ballot3; 3)
have sent a sample of the voting paper to the employer who must have received it at
least three days before the ballot opens.
The legislation sets out how the voting papers must be worded and specifies other
details which they must contain. For example, if the trade union wishes to ascertain its
members' views on whether they would be willing to take part in a strike or other
industrial action, these must be two separate questions and the required majority must
be obtained in favour of the course of action adopted. The voting paper must specify
the person who is authorised to call the action and must contain the following
statement without it being commented upon - "If you take part in a strike or other
industrial action, you may be in breach of your contract of employment".
The union must ensure that every voting member and every relevant employer has
been informed of the number of votes cast, the number of "yes" votes, the number of
"no" votes and the number of spoiled papers. However, the union only has to provide
3 A trade union may have to name individual members who would be entitled to vote and/or are likely
to be called upon to take part in the action. Only if the employer is aware that all of his/her
employees (or all in a particular grade or area) are union members will the union be able to rely on a
notice which describes members solely by reference to a broad category or label: Blackpool & The
Fylde College v NATFHE [1994] ICR 227. However, a union is not required to restrict its call for
industrial action to members who were members at the date of the ballot. Industrial action does not
lose its statutory immunity because new members (those who joined between the date on which an
employer is given notice of a ballot and the taking of action) are called on to take action: London
Underground Ltd. v National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 29.9.95 Court of
Appeal.
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a copy of the scrutineer's report on request within six months of the date of the ballot.
The employer or an individual member can apply to the courts for an order restraining
industrial action if a trade union has failed to comply with the ballot rules. In addition,
TURERA allows a "citizen's right" to challenge unlawful industrial action if an
individual member of the public is, or might be, adversely affected by the action.s
Public funds and use of employer's premises. The Secretary of State was
empowered to set up a scheme whereby trade unions could claim back the costs of
certain ballots held by them (section 115 TULR(C)A). However, this section was
repealed by section 7(1) ofTURERA and the scheme was phased out, ceasing to have
effect from April 1996.
Employers were required, under certain circumstances, to allow recognised trade
unions to use their premises for balloting purposes; this right was also repealed from
April 1996. This may seem to reflect the fact that those balloting procedures regulated
by statute are generally required to be postal ballots, but other ballots not regulated by
statute could be affected. However, the legislation does not prevent an employer to
allow hislher premises to be used for these purposes, though it could be assumed that
the intention of the repeal was to encourage postal ballots for all issues.
lB. Individual members rights vis-a-vis a trade union
The statutory rights of an individual in respect of his/her trade union membership or
non-membership are contained in TULR(C)A (1992) amended by TURERA (1993).
The right not to be excluded or expelled from any trade union : An
individual may not be excluded or expelled from any trade union unless: he/she does
not satisfy an enforceable membership requirement contained in the union rules, for
example, employment in a specified trade, industry, profession or a particular part of
Britain; the exclusion or expulsion was entirely attributable to the individual's
conduct. "Conduct" cannot: include being or ceasing to be: a member of another trade
union; employed by a particular employer or at a particular place; or a member of a
political party. Nor can it include any conduct which would constitute unjustified
discipline (see below). (Section 14 TURERA).
A union may still specify who is entitled to join within the limits set out, but if a
person needs a union card because an employer operates a closed shop he cannot
otherwise be excluded from membership. However, in this situation the aggrieved
individual would have a right against the employer under the unfair recruitment
provisions. If a person's application for membership is neither granted nor rejected
within a reasonable period he/she shall be treated as having been excluded from the
4 The Commissioner for Protection Against Unlawful Industrial Action provides assistance to
members of the public who are contemplating or taking proceedings in order to restrain the unlawful
organisation of industrial action.
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union
Anyone who claims to have been wrongly excluded or expelled from a trade union can
complain to an industrial tribunal. There is a six month time limit for such complaints,
except where the tribunal finds that it was not reasonably practicable to do so, in which
case the tribunal may extend the limit as it considers reasonable. If the complaint is
upheld the tribunal will make a deelaration to that effect. If the applicant is admitted or
re-admitted to membership, a further application can be made for compensation to be
assessed by the tribunal. The amount awarded shall be what the tribunal considers to
be "just and equitable" in all the circumstances, and may be reduced if the individual
caused or contributed towards the exclusion or expulsion.s If the applicant has not
been admitted or re-admitted to the union, an application may be made to the
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), within the same time limits, and the EAT will
make an award on the same principles.
The right not to be unjustifiably disciplined : A member has the right not to
be unjustifiably disciplined by hislher trade union. A member is unjustifiably
disciplined if the reason for the disciplinary action was for conduct which consisted of:
a failure to support or participate in a strike or other industrial action or an indication of
his/her opposition to the action; something required of himJher by virtue of an
obligation imposed by hislher contract of employment or another agreement with
hislher employer; the making of an assertion that the union or one of its
representatives or trustees has contravened or is proposing to contravene a requirement
of the union rules or a legal provision or attempts to vindicate such an assertion; the
encouragement of any person to perform an obligation imposed by virtue of a contract
of employment or any other agreement; failing to agree to or withdrawing from a
cheek-off agreement; resigning from a union, becoming a member of another union or
refusing to join any other union; working with individuals who are not union
members; working for an employer who employs individuals who are not union
members; requiring the union to do something which the union is required to do under
TULR(C)A; an approach to the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union
Members or to the Certification Officer for advice or assistance on any matter
whatsoever; a proposal to engage in conduct or preparatory conduct as outlined
above.
"Discipline", for the purpose of the legislation, is a determination made under the
union's rules that a member should: be expelled from the union; pay any sum to the
union or to any other person; be deprived of or refused access to any benefits,
services or facilities which would otherwise be available to himJher as a member of the
union. Suspending a member involves depriving himJher of these benefits; be
excluded from another branch or trade union; or be subject to any other detriment.
However, a member will not be unjustifiably disciplined if the reason for the
disciplinary action was that he/she had made a false allegation that the union, an
official, a representative or a trustee had contravened the union's rules, an agreement
S Saunders v Bakers, Food and Allied Workl!rs Union [1986] IeR 28, [1986] IRLR 16.
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or a rule of law and the member knew that it was false or otherwise acted in bad faith.
Any member who believes he/she has been unjustifiably disciplined may take hislher
complaint to an industrial tribunal within three months of the alleged infringement,
unless the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to do so and that
any delay was wholly or partially due to any reasonable attempt to appeal against the
decision. If the tribunal upholds the complaint, the applicant's remedies depend on
what the trade union does about the situation. If after four weeks and within six
months from the date of the declaration the situation has not been put right an
application must be made to the EAT, but if the necessary steps have been taken to
reverse anything done the application should be made to the industrial tribunal. The
EAT or tribunal may then make an award of compensation and may also order the
union to repay any sum paid to the union or another person by way of a fine or
donation. The amount of compensation will be such as is considered "just and
equitable" in all the circumstances, bearing in mind the duty of the applicant to mitigate
his loss, and a reduction may be made on the ground of contributory conduct.
The right to a ballot be/ore industrial action : If a trade union calls on
members to take part in any industrial action without the affirmative support of a ballot
conducted in accordance with the legislative requirements (see appendix lA), any
member can apply to the court for an order seeking to have the authorisation or
endorsement of the action withdrawn by the union. If the court fmds that the union
has not complied with the statutory provisions it will make an order requiring the
union to take steps for ensuring that no member engages in action and that there is no
further inducement to take part in the action. A court may grant interlocutory or
interim relief by ordering that the authorisation or endorsement of the action is
withdrawn, but it cannot order the union to hold a ballot.
In addition, a member may obtain an order compelling a trade union to hold a ballot
even if action has not:yet taken place; the member only has to show that it is "likely"
that he/she will be induced to take part in that action.
The right to inspect union accounts : A trade union must keep its accounting
records available for six years from the 1st January following the period to which
those accounts relate. These records must be available for inspection by any member.
Access to the accounts must be permitted within 28 days of the request to inspect
them. The member is entitled to take an accountant with him/her, and to take, or be
supplied with, such copies or extracts from those records that he/she may require.
(The trade union may make a charge in respect of reasonable administrative expenses.)
If the trade union fails to comply with the member's request, the member may apply to
the court, which may make such order as it deems necessary for ensuring that that
person is granted his/her rights.
Unions must also appoint auditors to audit their accounts and must submit an annual
return to the Certification Officer. the contents of which are specified in detail by the
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statute. Unions who refuse or "wilfully neglect" to perform any of these statutory
duties may be found guilty of a criminal offence.
Trade unions must take all reasonable steps to provide each member with an annual
statement within eight weeks of sending the annual return to the Certification Officer.
Exactly what should be included in the statement is set out in TURERA and it may also
contain "any other matter which the union considers may give a member significant
assistance in making an informed judgment about the financial activities of the union in
the period to which the return relates." (Sections 8 and 9). The statement must also
include a declaration as set out in the Act, informing members what steps they can take
if they are concerned about any irregularities in the conduct of the union's financial
affairs. The statement may be sent to members individually or it may be provided by
other means in line with the union's normal practice for disseminating information. If
a member requests a copy of the statement within two years a copy must be provided.
A copy of the statement sent to members must also be sent to the Certification Officer.
Other individual rights : A member has the right to apply to the courts if the
union has failed to comply with the statutory requirements relating to union elections
(see above) and he/she also has a right to inspect the register of members, which the
union must keep up to date.
A member has the right to restrain the union from indemnifying unlawful conduct.
Any member who considers that the trustees of the union's property are allowing an
unlawful application of that property or are complying with an unlawful direction
given to them under the union's rules may apply to the court for an order, which may
include the appointment of a receiver of the union's property, the removal of any of the
trustees or the requirement that the trustees take all such steps to protect and recover
the union's property,e
A member seeking determination or conciliation of a dispute under the union rules
should first pursue the case through the union's internal disputes procedure. But
members also have an indefeasible right to apply to the courts any time after six
months from when the union first receives the application to have the matter looked
into. This right is in addition to a member's right to apply to the court at any time
when, for example, the action complained about is contrary to the law.
The Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members : The post of
Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members was established under section
19 of the Employment Act 1988 and is now contained in section 266 TULR(C)A. The
6 For example, it is unlawful for a trade union to use any of its property towards the payment for any
individual or towards the provision of anything for indemnifying an individual in respect of any
penalty imposed on himlher for a relevant offence or for contempt of court. If property bas been
applied in this way, the equal amount of any payment is recoverable from the individual coreerned by
the trade union. If the trade union unreasonably fails to make a claim against the individual any
member may apply to the court for authorisation to bring or continue proceedings on the union's
behalf and at the union's expense.
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post was established to help protect certain statutory rights of union members but the
role was extended to cover the protection of contractual rights. The Commissioner
may provide fmancial assistance to a member who is taking or contemplating taking
action against his/her union, an official of the union or a union trustee in a complaint
that the union has breached certain statutory duties or in the enforcement of their
common law contractual rights.
Assistance may only be granted where the Commissioner believes that the breach in
question is likely to affect members of the union other than the applicant or that similar
breaches have been or may be committed in relation to other members of the union. In
addition assistance is only available to those who are able to bring proceedings to court
in their own right. At the member's discretion the Commissioner can appear alongside
the assisted person in the title of the proceedings although the Commissioner is not a
party to those proceedings.
The assistance which the Commissioner may provide includes: paying for any legal
advice and representation; making arrangements for legal advice or representation; or
a combination of both. In determining whether to grant the application for assistance
the Commissioner may have regard to: whether the case raises a question of principle;
whether it is unreasonable, having regard to the complexity of the case, to expect the
applicant to deal with it unaided; and whether the case involves a matter of substantial
public interest. The recovery of any expenses incurred by the Commissioner shall be a
first charge on any award payable to the applicant.
The Commissioner is not empowered to provide assistance in the making of an
application to the Certification Officer, nor can he/she give assistance in industria]
tribunals or before the EAT.
1C Industrial action
Trade union immunities : Since 1980 the statutory immunities enjoyed by trade
unions have been steadily restricted, although they have always only provided
protection for unions when legitimate objectives were being pursued; that is, acts done
in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. The 1982 Employment Act
restricted the definition of a "trade dispute"; a trade dispute must relate "wholly or
mainly" to a specified list of employment issues, rather than just being connected to
them as before. In order to qualify for immunity a trade dispute must be between
workers and their employer, a strike called for political reasons is not a trade dispute.
(Now contained in TULR(C)A section 244.)
TIJLR(C)A section 219 gives immunity against legal action to anyone who calls a
strike or other industrial action and thus induces a breach of contract by other workers.
It also provides immunity where a threat of industrial action is made. However, the
immunity provided by section 219 will be lost in certain circumstances. All legal
immunity for official disputes is conditional upon a majority vote in a secret ballot in
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favour of strike action by all those involved (see appendix lA) and an act will not be
protected if its intention is to impose union recognition upon an employer. If a ballot
is to be called at different workplaces, unless all members entitled to vote have a
common factor relating to their terms and conditions of employment. separate ballots
for each workplace must be conducted. A ballot ceases to be effective after four
weeks; therefore, if action has not been called within that time a new ballot must be
held before lawful action can take place. If, during the four week period, industrial
action is prohibited by a court order which is subsequently discharged the union may
request that the period during which the prohibition took place should not count
towards the four week period, but no application can be made after eight weeks from
the date of the ballot.
Trade unions are now vicariously liable for all their officials and representatives
(including shop stewards) if they authorised or endorsed any act done by them. Trade
unions are now legally liable for all unofficial action unless they repudiate it; a written
notice must then be given to every member believed to be taking part in the action 7
and to the employers telling them of this. If the union wishes to endorse the action, to
preserve its immunity it would have to suspend any action until a properly oonducted
ballot had been carried out.
Secondary action : Secondary action loses a trade union its immunity as all trade
disputes must be confmed to the employees' place of work. Even if a trade dispute
was legitimate there would be no immunity if unlawful secondary action was taking
place. The only type of secondary action which remains lawful is peaceful picketinge
at or near the picket's own place of work. 9 A Code of Practice on picketing
emphasises: that only peaceful picketing is lawful; that only primary picketing is
lawful; and that the number of pickets at any workplace entrance should not exceed
six,lO The final section of the code advises pickets to ensure that the movement of
goods and supplies and the provision of services essential to the life of the community
are not impeded or prevented. However, it is left up to those affected by the action to
use the law and seek an injunction to prevent the action going ahead and/or to claim
damages for any loss incurred as a result of the unlawful action.
Industrial action affecting an individual : Any individual may make an
7 The notice must be in a particular form telling members that the union will give them no support
and that if they are dismissed while taking action they will have no right to complain of unfair
dismissal.
8 This must only be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information or
peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working.
9 A person who bas lost bis/ber job because of a trade dispute is allowed to picket at bis/ber former
place of work.
10 This limitation was thought necessary because it was argued that excessive numbers on a picket
line was the main cause of violence and disorder. The mass picketing and use of flying pickets during
the 1984/5 miners' strike was seen by the Conservative government as a threat to public order. In one
of the civil actions brought by working miners, mass picketing was identified as a tort of
unreasonable harassment and effectively gave the limitation of the number of pickets a legal status
(Davis and Freedland 1993).
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application to the High Court or Court of Session if the effect of industrial action,
which is actionable in tort or has not been supported by a properly conducted ballot, is
to prevent or delay the supply of goods or services or reduce their quality. If the Court
is satisfied that the claim is well founded it may make an order that requires the union
to take steps to ensure that no further action is taken. If unlawful industrial action is
not challenged by the employer (or union members) any individual, whether affected
by the action or not, can apply to the court to seek an appropriate order. Assistance
can be sought from the Commissioner for Protection Against Unlawful Industrial
Action.
The Public Order Act 1986 made certain offences connected with picketing
arrestable without a warrant and section 14 treats mass picketing the same as other
disorderly gatherings. Therefore, if the legislation relating to picketing becomes
ineffective, that is, workers ignore it, the police have wide discretionary powers to
control picketing. Though most disputes do not involve the police; the vast majority
of picket lines are often small, peaceful and uneventful and the incidence of picketing
of any sort is low (Auerbach 1990).
Emergency powers: The Emergency Powers Act 1920 enabled governments to
declare a state of emergency and to take over essential services if the community was
deprived of the "essentials of life" and the Emergency Powers Act 1964 allowed
temporary use of services personnel on "urgent (civilian) work of national
importance". Between 1945 and 1979 troops were used in twenty three industrial
disputes. The implementation of emergency powers, according to every government
since the war, does not constitute "strike breaking": it is seen as a moral imperative.
Though, what the "essentials of life" and work of "national importance" actually
constitute is arguably debatable, as Jeffrey and Hennessey (1983) argued, the
distinction between 'maintaining essential services' and 'strike breaking' become
blurred.
1D The right not to belong to a union
Mandatory compensation is available for dismissals violating the right not to belong to
a trade union and a dismissed claimant is allowed to bring a claim against the trade
union which brought about the dismissal by threatening industrial action because of
his/her non-membership. The 1982 Employment Act also prohibited union labour
only and union recognition clauses in oonnection with contracts for the supply of
goods and services.
396
Ap_pendix2 The questionnaire completed by trade union members.
A covering letter accompanied the questionnaire, which informed respondents of who I
was and what Iwas doing. It also assured the respondents that they would remain
anonymous and that all the information provided would remain confidential. The letter
also contained my telephone number so that respondents could contact me if they had
any queries regarding the research. They were also informed that a summary of results
would be available at the end of the research.
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1. Below is a list of possible reasons for belonging to a trade union. For each one please put a tick
in the appropriate box to indicate how important it is to you personally.
YW)l faiJ:bl not vary not at all dQn1
important important important important JillQ_w
To get higher pay and D D D D D
better working conditions
To protect me if problems D D D D D
come up in the future
To get members' benefits, D D D D D
such as financial or health
schemes
To help safeguard my job D D D D D
To use as a workers' D D D D D
voice against
management
I believe in them In D D D D D
pnnclple
To campaign against D D D D D
Inequality and injustice
To show solidarity with D D D D D
those I work with
Most of my workmates D D D D D
are members
It's a family tradition D D D D D
If there are any other reasons that you regard as Important please state .
...................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
2. Which single reason for belonging to a trade union is the most important to you?
...................................................................................................................................
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3. In general how would you describe relations between management and your union
at your workplace?
Very good D
quite good D
not very gxx:1 D
not at aI gxx:1 D
oon'tknow D
4. If you have a work related problem of any kind who are you IWlIllikely to go to?
Tick one box only.
Supervisor/Foreman D
McntgerTl8I1t D
Convenor D
SOOp steward D
Workmate D
Noooe D
Other D
Ooo'tknow D
5. Do you think your union / shop steward does a good Job when negotiating with management
over wage related issues at your workplace?
Yes 0
No D
Sometimes D
OOO'tknow D
6. a) Does your shop steward/convenor ever negotiate with management about work related
problems?
No
D
D
D
Yes
Don't know
b) If you answered yes, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way work related problems
are dealt with at your workplace?
Satisfied D
D
D
D
satisfied in some ways but not in others
Don't know
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7. Which of the following describes your workplace union representatives?
TIck aU which apply.
Your shop steward Your convenor
(If you have one)
Easy to approach 0 0
Readily available 0 0
WiNing to help 0 0
Knowledgeable 0 0
DedCated 0 0
An individual problem solver 0 0
Gives advice and sorts out problems 0 0
urvelated to WOI1<
A leader of a OOIlec11veawroach 10 pOOIems 0 0
Any other Comments you may wish to make:
.........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
8. Are you satisfied with the union representation at your workplace?
Yes
Not sure
o
oo
o
9. What kind of Issues are raised by members with the shop stewardslconvenor at your
workplace? These may include workplace p-oblems or personal grievances .
............................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................ , .
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
1o. Does your union representative generally decide hlmlherself what action should be taken
over any complaint, grievance or problem or Is this decided by the majority of merrbers?
Union representative decides
Majority of members decide
Depends on the problem
Don'tkoow
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o
o
o
o
11. Do you feel that oyerall your union Is effective at your workplace?
Yes D
D
Notsure D
12.
No
Do you think of your workplace union as different from the national union?
Yes D
NoD
Don't know D
13. a) Have you ever been represented by a union representative?
Yes D
NoD
AtYtOk D
A 1Jt>LrlaI D
b) If yes, where did this take place?
DPlease specify:
...................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
c) Were you satisfied with that representation?
Yes D
NoD
NotS1..1'9 D
d) Approxlmatety, how long ago was this?
....................................................... ~ .
..................................................................................................................................
14. a) Have you ever received AD.V. form of union benefit, such as legal representation or compensation
for an accident at work or for a work related Hlness (eg. deafness) etc.?
Yes
No
My claim Is being processed
D
D
D
b) If yes or you have a claim being processed, what kind of benefit wa.cwisIt?
Please tick the appropriate boxes:
Legal representation
Accident at work
Other ax:kBlt
Work Related Illness
D
D
D
D
Other D please specify
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..................................................................................................................................
15. Do you think that being in a union makes a difference in the case of the following?
Higher wages: Yes Cl
No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Being unfairly dismissed: Yes Cl
No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Being accused of something by Yes Cl
your employer: No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Having your conditions of work Yes Cl
changed: No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Efficient health and safety: Yes Cl
No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Having an accident at work: Yes Cl
No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Preventing harassment and Yes Cl
discrimination: No Cl
Don't Know Cl
Job Protection: Yes Cl
No Cl
Oon'tKnow Cl
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16. Trade unions have been described as a cheap form of insurance, do you agree or
disagree with this description?
Agee
Disagree
Don't know
D
D
D
17. It is often said that workers need trade unions to protect their interests, particularly at work,
do you agree or disagree with this?
Agee
Disagree
Don't know
D
D
D
18. For you personally, where would you say most union activity takes place?
Theworkpace
ll1ebcntl
At nati>nallevel
Don't know
0Iher
D
D
D
D
D Please specify.
..................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................
19. Do you see the union as being an essential part of your working life?
Yes
Not sure
20. a) Do you have union meetings at your workplace?
Regularly
Only when there is an Issue 10discuss
Never
Don't know
No
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
b) If you have meetings at your workplace how often do you attend?
Whenever possible D
NaverD
Sometimes
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D Please state when that is:
21 . How often do you attend a union branch meeting?
Whenever possible o
o
Sometimes 0 please state when that is:
22. Do you think that workers achieve their goals, for example better pay and worldng conditions,
by working hard on their own or by sticking together?
Oon'tknow
ooo
By working hard on their own
By sticking together
During the last fifteen years there have been changes In the way that tTtlde
unions must conduct their business If they wIsh to remain within the law,
particularly In relation to Industrial action. The tNtlloting procedures are
one example.
23. Do you feel that the recent changes In the law have had any affect on the way that negotiations
are conducted between your workplace union and management?
Yes 0NoD
oDon't know
24. What forms of pressure, if any, have been used in disputes with management at your pI~e
of work, since you have been working there?
Threats to stop work 0
Overtime bans 0
Working to Rule 0
Go-sbNs 0
StrI<eAction 0
Nooe 0
Other o Please specify
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
25. Do you feel that the recent changes in the law have had any effect upon any form of
industrial action (over time bans, work to rule, walk outs etc.) at your place of work?
Yes 0NoD
Don'tknow 0
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26. If any serious problem should occur In the near future would you be prepared to take:
Industrial action short of a strike? Strike cdIon?
Yes D Yes D
No D No D
Don't know D Don't Know D
27. Would you be prepared to take Immediate action without a ballot under any of the following
circumstances? TICk all which apply.
A health and safety problem
The dismissal of a workmate
A~dispute
Changed working conditions
To ensure that aM workers doing the same job
get equal treatment etc.
Ca'l't reaJy sat
D
D
D
D
D
D
If there are any other situations that you consider Important enough to warrant immediate action
please specify:
28. If a vote Is taken at your worl<plcr;e, how Is that vote ysyally carried out?
A show of hands D
A workplace secret ballot D
AJDlaltdX D
Other D
Don't Know D
29. Do you believe a trade union should comply with a court order to call off a strike?
Yes
No
NotSU'8
D
D
D
30. Would you be prepared to ~ against a majority vote in a ballot?
Yes
No
Not sure
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D
D
D
31 . At your place of work would you say that a threat to walk off the shopfloor is usyally
sufficient to make management concede to your demands?
Yes
Don't know
No
D
D
D
32. a) Do you feel that the changes in the law relating to trade unions have had any affect upon
trade unions in general?
Yes
Don't know
No
D
D
D
b) If you answered yes to the last question do you think the legislation has had a negative or a
positive effect?
Positive
Negative
Don't know
D
D
D
33. Do you think your union at your workplace has too much or too little power?
Far 100mt.d1 power D
Too much power D
About the r1ghtamount D
Too little power D
Far 100littlepower D
Not sure D
34. Do you think that in the country as a whole, trade unions have too much or too little power?
Far 100nu::h power
Too much power
About the rigrt amount of power
Too little J:X>wer
Farec little power
Don't know
406
D
D
D
D
D
D
35. Below is a list of statements, please indicate in the appropriate boxes whether you think
each one is true or false.
It is a criminal offence for Industrial action to be
organised without first holding a secret ballot.
Postal ballots protect strikers from dismissal.
The organisation of a postal ballot protects the
national union from legal liability if a strike Is
called in support of a pay claim.
The employer has no right to dismiss employees
for taking industrial action based on ·working to
contract", such as an overtime ban.
Even with a majority vote in favour, striking in support of
workers at another workplace is unlawful.
Organising industrial action short of a strike without a
postal ballot could involve your national union incurring
legal liability .
A trade union member can obtain a court order to
stop a union from taking industrial action without a
properly conducted ballot.
It is only lawful for a person to peacefully picket at
or near hislher own place of work.
Each member of a trade union's executive committee
can retain the post as long as they wish.
An employer must get an employee's written
permission every three years before deducting
union subscriptions from hlslher wages.
A person can be rightfully dismissed because of
his/her union membership.
When an employer makes a single union deal with
a particular union, all union members in that workplace
must be members of that union.
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True False Don't Know
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
36. How many hours a week do you nonnally work?
less than 10 hours D
10 - 15 hours D
16 - 23 hours D
24 - 30 hours D
Over 30 hours D
37. How do you pay your union subscriptions?
Checkoff D
At local branch meetings D
Collected by a union representative D
Standing OrderlDlrect debit D
0Iher DPlease specify:
38. Are you male or female? Male D
FEIIlBe D
16-20 D
21-30 D
31-40 D
41-50 D
CNf!l5O D
39. Please indicate you' age~.
40. Approximately how long have you been a union member?
If you would like to comment on any of your answers above. or if you have any other
comments you would like to make regarding your trade union or trade unions In general
please feel free to do so In the space below and on the reverse of this paper. Thank you
for your co-operation.
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Appendix 3 The questionnaire completed by shop stewards.
1. Below is a list of possible reasons for belonging to a trade union. For each one please put a tick
in the appropriate box to indicate how important It is to you personally.
Y.e.Ol ~ not very not at all dQn.l
important important important important JillQyI
To get higher pay and 0 0 0 0 0
better working conditions
To protect me if problems 0 0 0 0 0
come up in the future
To get members' benefits, 0 0 0 0 0
such as financial or health
schemes
To help safeguard my job 0 0 0 0 0
To use as a workers' 0 0 0 0 0
voice against
management
I believe In them in 0 0 0 0 0
principle
To campaign against 0 0 0 0 0
inequality and Injustice
To show solidarity with 0 0 0 0 0
those I work with
Most of my workmates 0 0 0 0 0
aremembers
It's a famHy tradition 0 0 0 0 0
If there are any other reasons that you regard as Important please state.
2. Which alogia reason for beIon!jng to a trade union is the most important to you?
...................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
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3. a) Do you have senior stewards at your workplace?
Yes
b) Are you a senior steward?
Yes
4. Why did you decide 10 stand as a shop steward?
5. a)
No
D
D
D
DNo
Have you taken part in any kind of training or instruction for your role as a shop steward?
Yes D
DNo
If yes what kind of courses have you attended? (for example, health and safety courses,
courses for union representatives etc.)
b) Has it helped you In your role as a shop steward?
Abt
A 1liiie
N<Xatai
D
D
D
6. In general how would you describe relations between management and your union at
your workplace?
Very~ D
qulte~ D
notvery~ D
notatall~ D
don't know D
7. a) Do you ever discuss and settle problems with management yourself?
Yes
Sometimes
Convenor deals with management
Full time officer deals with management
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No
D
D
D
D
D
b) If yes, are you generally satisfied with the outcome of these discussions?
Yes
No
Sometimes
oo
o
8. Does your management ever place restrictions in your way which hamper you in
carrying out your duties as a shop steward?
Yes
No
If yes, what kind of restrictions do you come up against?
oo
9. What kind of issues do members bring to you?
These may include workplace problems or personal grievances.
10. Are your members' demands reasonable ones that you can do something about?
AN/ajS 0
U;ua~ 0
About 112 of them 0
Other oPlease specify:
............................................................................................................................................
11 . Do you feel that you can get members to see things your way when a particular dispute
arises, and get them to do what you believe is right?
No I everyone has their own opinion
Yes
Sometimes
Other
oo
o
o
12. As a shop steward what kind of issues are YOU most concerned with?
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13. Do you think members view you as an Individual problem solver or as a leader of a collective
approach to problem solving?
Individual problem solver
A leader of a collective appro~h to problem solving
BoIh
Don't Know
oo
o
o
14. Howdo you think your work as a steward is regarded by your members?
Most appreciate what Ido for them 0
Most take It t>r gcrrted 0
Some appreciate it and some take It for granted 0oPlease specify:
15. Are you satisfied with the opportunities to contact members at your workplace?
Very satisfied 0
Fai1y saIisfted 0
Dissatlsfled 0
Other o Please specify:
16. When an Issue that affects your merreers Is being negotiated at your workplace, are all your
members Involved In the decision making process, that is are they consulted on any proposals
or deals offered by management etc.?
Yes
Depends on the issue
No
oo
o
17. Do you feel that overall your union is effective at your wOrkplace?
Yes 0
NoO
Notsure 0
18. Do you think of your workplace union as different from the national union?
Yes
Don't know
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No
oo
o
19. Trade unions have been described as a cheap form of insurance. do you agree or
disagree with this description?
Agee
Disagree
Don't know
D
D
D
20. Do you have meetings of union members at your workplace?
Regularly D
Only when there is an issue 10discuss D
NeverD
Don'tknow D
21 . How often do you attend a union branch meeting?
Whenever possible D
D
Sometimes D plea-;e state when that Is:
22. How often do you meet a full time officer on union business?
WefJIJy D
Monthly D
Once every 3 months D
Once every 6 months D
NeverD
D Please specify:
...................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
23. Do you feel it necessary to meet a full time officer often?
D
D
D
Yes
Not sure
No
24. Would you say that your full time offtcer plays an Important part In local negotiations at
your workplace?
Yes
Not sure
413
No
D
D
D
25. Do you think that being in a union makes a difference in the case of the following?
Higher wages: Yes 0
No 0
Don't Know 0
Being unfair1y dismissed: Yes 0
No 0
Don't Know 0
Being accused of something by Yes 0
your employer: No 0
Don't Know 0
Having your conditions of work Yes 0
changed: No 0
Don't Know 0
Efficient health and safety: Yes 0
No 0
Don't Know 0
Having an accident at work: Yes 0
No 0
Don't Know 0
Preventing harassment and Yes 0
discrimination: No 0
Don't Know 0
Job Protection: Yes 0
No 0
Don't Know 0
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26. Do you think that workers achieve their goals, for example better pay and working conditions,
by working hard on their own or by sticking together?
By stCking together
Don't know
D
D
D
By working hard on their own
During the last fifteen years there have been changes In the way that trade unions
must conduct their business if they wish to remain within the law, particularly In
relation to Industrial action. The balloting procedures are one example.
27. Do you feel that the recent changes in the law have had any affect on the way that negotiations
are conducted between your workplace union and management?
Yes DNoD
DDon't know
28. What forms of pressure, If any, have been used In disputes with management at your place of work
since you have been working there?
Threats to stop work D
Overtime bans D
Working to Rule D
Go-sbNs D
Sbi<e Action D
I'ble D
0Iher D Please specify
........................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
29. Do you feel that the recent changes In the law have had any effect upon any form of Industrial actio
(over time bans, work to rule, walk 0U1s e1l::.)at your place of work?
Yes DNoD
Don't know D
30. If any serious problem should occur in the near Mure do you think your members would be
prepared to take:
No
Sbike ldion?
D
D
D
Industrial action short of a strike?
Yes DNoD
D
Yes
Don't know
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Don't Know
31 . Do you think your members would be prepared to take immediate action without a ballot
under any of the following circumstances? Tick all which apply.
A health and safety problem
The dismissal of a workmate
A pay disp.Jte
Changed working conditions
To ensure that aD workers doing the same job
get equal treatment etc.
cart really 8aI
oo
o
o
o
o
If there are any other situations that you consider important enough to warrant Immediate action
please specify:
32. If a vote Is taken at your workplace, how is that vote usually carried out?
A show of hands 0
A work~ace secret ballot 0
AJXSlalbab 0
Other 0
Don't Know 0
33. Do you believe a trade union should comply with a court order to call off a strike?
Yes
Not sure
No
o
oo
34. Would you be prepared to go against a majority vote in a ballot?
Yes
Not sure
No
ooo
35. At your place of work would you say that a threat to walk off the shopfloor is ysually sufficient
to make management concede to your demands?
Yes
Don't know
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No
oo
o
36. Below is a list of statements, please indicate in the appropriate boxes whether you think
each one is true or false.
It is a criminal offence for industrial action to be
organised without first holding a secret ballot.
Postal ballots protect strikers from dismissal.
The organisation of a postal ballot protects the
national union from legal liability if a strike is
called in support of a pay claim.
The employer has no right to dismiss employees
for taking industrial action based on "working to
contract", such as an overtime ban.
Even with a majority vote in favour, striking in support of
workers at another workplace Is unlawful.
Organising industrial action short of a strike without a
postal ballot could involve your national union incurring
legal liability.
A trade union member can obtain a court order to
stop a union from taking industrial action without a
properly conducted ballot.
It is only lawful for a person to peacefully picket at
or near hlslher own place of work.
Each member of a trade union's executive committee
can retain the post as long as they wish.
An employer must get an employee's written
permission every three years before deducting
union subscriptions from hlslher wages.
A person can be rightfully dismissed because of
his/her union membership.
When an employer makes a single union deal with
a particular union, all union members in that workplace
must be members of that union.
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True False Don't Know
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
37. a) Do you feel that the changes in the law relating to trade unions have had any affect upon
trade unions in general?
No
D
D
D
Yes
Don't know
b) If you answered yes to the last question do you think the legislation has had a negative or a
positive effect?
Positive D
D
D
Negative
Don't know
38. Do you think your union at your workplace has too much or too little power?
FarmmLdl (X}Wer D
Too much power D
About the right amount D
Too little power D
Far too little JX)Wer D
NotSll9 D
39. Do you think that in the country as a whole, trade unions have too much or too little power?
Fa-mmuch JX)Wer D
Too much power D
About the r1g1t 81TlOlJ1t of power D
Too little JX)Wer D
Fa-m IItIIe power D
Don't know D
40. How many hours a week do you nonnally work?
less than 10 hours D
10 - 15 hours D
16 - 23 hours D
24 - 30 hours D
Over 30 hours D
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41 . How do you pay your union subscriptions?
Check off
At local branch meetings
Collected by a union representative
Standing OrderlDirect debit
D
D
D
D
Other D Please specify:
..........................................................................................................................................
42. Are you male or female? Male D
Femia D
16- 20 D
21-30 D
31-40 D
41-50 D
over SO D
43. Please indicate yotJ" age~.
44. Approximately how long have you been a union member?
..........................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
45. Approximately how long have you been a shop steward?
If you would like to comment on any of your answers above. or If you have any other
comments you would like to make regarding your trade union or trade unions In general
please feel free to do so In the space below and on the reverse of this paper. Thank you
for your co-operation.
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Appendix4 The questionnaire completed by UNISON's convenor.
What is your title?
How long have you been a union representative? .
Which areas are you responsible for? .
Does this cover only hospitals or are you responsible for other workplaces such as schools
etc.?
How many UNISON branches are there in Xtown? .
How often do they meet? .
How often do shop stewards from different workplaces meet together? .
Do your think your members are generally interested In trade unlonlsm? .
........................................................................................................................................
Do you deal directly with members or is your contact mainly with your shop stewards?
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
Do you have much contact with your shop stewards? .
........................................................................................................................................
What kinds of issues do members use their shop stewards for? .
........................................................................................................................................
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What kind of grievances come to your attention the most? .
Do you feel that you can get members and shop stewards to see things your way when a
particular dispute arises, and get them to do what you believe is right? .
Can you usually deal with problems yourself or do you have to take them higher up the union
hierarchy? .
Do you have much contact with the workplaces under your jurisdiction? .
........................................................................................................................................
Is this on a regular basis or just when a problem occurs? .
........................................................................................................................................
Do you have access to all levels of management? .
Do you ever encounter difficulties approaching the level of management that you feel you
should be talking to? .
What is the general attitude of the employers/managers that you deal with towards UNISON?
Is the work by UNISON shop stewards generally accepted by management? .
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
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Are shop stewards able to deal with management themselves? .
Do managers provide all the Information you ask for? .
Do any managers ever come to you for oovlce or to discuss some change etc. that they may
want to make? .
How much influence do you feel you usually have on what actually happens within
workplaces?
Are members consulted on deals and proposals mede by management before they are
accepted/rejected? .
Would you say that you are helping managers to run their workplaces more efficiently?
Do you think that your shop stewards are effective and Influential?
Do you/your shop stewards treat problems as Individual ones only or do you/they try and
Involve the whole workforce in solving a problem collectlvely? .
Do you think your shop stewards are too ready or too slow to contact you? .
.......................................................................................................................................
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Are enough people willing to become shop stewards? .
What do you see as the main benefits of union membership? .
As a union representative what kind of issues are the most important to you? .
Do you feel that overall UNISON is effectlve? .
At [a local] hospltal? .
Are local or workplcr;e UNISON organisations In Xtown able to cope on their own without
national assistance? .
Do you feel that the recent changes In the law relating to trate unions have had any affect
upon UNISON? .
Do you think the legislation has had any effect on the way that negotiations are conducted
between UNISON and managements?
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
423
Do you regard your union as powerful? .
Do you take an interest in UNISON's national policies etc. or are you concerned more with
local issues?
Has the move 10 trust status of local hospitals made a difference to the work and status of
UNISON in those workplaces? .
Please feel free to CKid any other comments that you may wish to make. Thank You.
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Awendix5
Representation by a union representative (Firm A members).
63 (53%) of respondents had been represented by a union representative. The
answers to question 13 are set out below in table form.
Satisfaction with union rc:a>resentation-
Yes 41
No 13
Not sure 8
No response 1
63
Where the representation number of
tlokpa:e respondents Satisfied
At work 58 37
At a tribunal 2 2
At work & a tribunal 1 1
Other 1 1
No response 1
How long ago the representation Number of
took place respondents SatIsfted Not sure No
Under 1 year ago 8 6 0 2
1-2 years ago 15 11 0 4
over 2 years & under 5 4 3 1 0
years ago
5 ·9 years ago 16 11 3 2
10-15 years ago 9 4 1 4
On a regular ~Is 1 0 1 0
No response 10 6 2 1
41 8 13
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Appendix6
Receipt of any form of union benefit. (Firm A members)
50 (42%) respondents had received some form of union benefit and 4 were having
their claim processed at the time of the study. The type of benefit received is shown in
the table below.
The type of benefit received Number of
/ being processed respondents
legal representation 6
accident at work 12
work related illness 28
legal representation & 4
accident at work
work related Illness & 2
accident at work
legal representation & work 1
related Illness
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